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CHINA

A NATION IN EVOLUTION

PAUL MONROE

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

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

CHINA: A NATION IN EVOLUTION

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THE GREAT WALL THROUGH ONE OF ITS OPEN DOORS

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CHINA:

A Nation in Evolution

By

PAUL MONROE

Director of the International Institute and Barnard Professor of Education, Teachers' College, Columbia University

THE CHAUTAUQUA PRESS

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1927

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CONTENTS

PAGE

Foreword. By Dr. Alfred Sze ix

Introduction xiii

CHAPTER

I. THE PROBLEM OF CHINA 1

Intellectual transition—Religious readjustment—Political revolution—Economic changes—Problem of alien cultures—Contacts with the West.

II. THE PEOPLE AND THE PHYSICAL BACKGROUND . 21

The natural wealth of China—Agriculture and the land—Economic conditions: standards of living—Famine—Transportation.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND . 41

Government: nation, province, district, town, and village—The family—The handicraft system—Modern industry in China—Child labor—Commerce: business procedure—The traditional educational system.

IV. THE PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIONS OF CHINA . . 77

Yin and Yang—Heaven—Human nature and evil—The fundamental virtue: the path of duty—Orthodoxy and heresy—Ancestor worship—Confucianism—Taoism—Buddhism—Mohammedanism.

V. CONTACTS WITH THE WEST 113

The period of the adventurous traveler—The period of the trader—The period of political contacts—The period in which attitudes of mind are the controlling factors.

VI. THE REPUBLIC 151

Character of government under the Empire—The efforts of the Manchu's to save themselves—The North and the South—The Republic: 1911-1913—

330857

CHAPTER PAGE

Yuan Shih Kai and the revolution—Yuan Shih Kai and the presidency—The militarists: 1916-1927—The cost of militarism—Neither empire nor republic.

VII. Sun Yat Sen, the People's Nationalist Party, and the Nationalist Movement 181

Life of Sun Yat Sen—The "Three Peoples' Principles"—Dr. Sun's writings—The Nationalist's demands.

VIII. Russia and China 209

Russia's historic relations with China—Russian territorial expansion and the Chinese Republic—Russian Communist influence and the National Movement.

IX. American Policy with Reference to China 235

During the pre-treaty days—Early treaties and formulations of the American policy—China becomes a part of the Pacific problem—Relations with China become an American domestic problem—The "Open Door" policy revived.

X. Modern Education and the Student Movement 271

Origin of the modern system—Reorganization with the founding of the Republic—The present organization—The present school situation—The renaissance, or the "New Tide"—The Popular Educational Movement—The Student Movement.

XI. Christianity and Mission Work 299

What mission work has contributed to China—Reasons for the present opposition to missionaries—Government demands on mission schools—The outcome.

XII. A Model Province and a Benevolent Despot 333

XIII. The Chinese Puzzle—from Inside Looking Out 357

Extraterritoriality—Tariff autonomy—The concessions and settlements—The leased territories—Spheres of

CHAPTER PAGE

influence and spheres of interest—The unequal, or "unilateral" treaties—Imperialism—Treaty revision.

XIV. The Chinese Puzzle—from Outside Looking In 393

The point of view of the disillusioned—The point of view of the foreign business population—The economic point of view—The problem as viewed by the student of government—From the British point of view—The Japanese view of the problem—The Russian point of view—America views the political problem.

Bibliography 434

Index 441

FOREWORD

THIS volume, as Dr. Monroe states in his preface, is "for the average American, puzzled by the complexity of the problem, by the strangeness of the names of places and of people; confused by the contradictory character of the news; yet earnestly desirous of understanding."

There is indeed a great demand for correct and accurate information about recent events in China, for the public cannot safely rely for this information upon telegraphic reports. This fact has been officially recognized by two of the foreign powers which have been greatly interested in those events. Early in the present year the British and French Foreign Offices felt themselves justified in warning the public that the news cabled out of Shanghai should be received with caution; and later events have shown, in a considerable number of instances, that messages, purporting to report events that had happened, had been little more than the unsupported creations of fertile brains, and that forecasts of events to come were not realized.

At best, the explanation to the people of one country of the aspirations and acts of the people of another country is a difficult matter; and this difficulty is greatly increased when the task is the interpretation of conditions in a country whose civilization, institutions, modes of thought, and national ideals are somewhat different from those of the country to whose people the interpretation is given. It is necessary, therefore, that one attempting such an interpretation should have not only a first-hand personal knowledge of the country and people he seeks to describe and explain, but also a truly sympathetic insight into their needs and aspirations. These qualifications Dr. Monroe possesses, and though it is not to be expected that any one will wholly agree with every interpretation which he has made of events in China or with every one of his evaluations of the motives and forces which have lain back of them, it yet remains

true that Dr. Monroe, in this kindly and yet objective and clear-sighted volume has placed under great obligation those who have desired a better understanding of present conditions in China. He has thus, in general, if not in all details, successfully carried out his declared intention to "state present problems in terms of their origin and environment, and thus, minimizing the personal equation, to arrive at a more adequate appraisal of those essential elements which will prove not only influential in the present but of definitive value in the future."

Dr. Monroe knows China and the Chinese people well. Since his first trip in 1913, made at the invitation of the educational authorities—when he visited places in the interior which had seldom if ever been visited by Westerners since the time of Marco Polo—he has been making frequent visits to the country. His educational influence in China is shown by the fact that of the Chinese educators who have attended college or university in the United States, the large majority have attended his classes at Teachers College, Columbia University, in New York. It is certain that his influence in and contribution toward the development of modern education in China will, when it is summed up, be found to be immense, and that it will bear witness to the extent to which it is possible for one man, by sound advice and disinterested service, to exert a beneficial influence upon the progress of an entire and alien people.

SAO-KE ALFRED SZE
Minister of China to the United States

Washington, D. C
October 10, 1927

Nature changes, and so the seasons fulfill their time.
Fang and Wu were those upon whom came the change in the Great Plan.
The Change came in full accord with the will of God.
And in complete response to the need of man.
How great is the time of Change!

On all sides, inscriptions, good and bad:
All of them the work of fools.
I, too, a fool, scribble my scrawl; for
I, too, am clay of the same lump.
—*Ancient scrawl on a temple wall*

INTRODUCTION

So NUMEROUS are the books on China that with difficulty can another be justified. This volume is not for the specialist, or for those familiar with China; but for the average American, puzzled by the complexity of the problem, by the strangeness of the names of places and of people; confused by the contradictory character of the news; yet earnestly desirous of understanding.

In the belief that the Chinese problem is one not quickly to be solved, but long to remain with us; that beneath the political revolutions and conflicts, economic, industrial, and cultural changes far more significant are going on; that to effect these changes will take time measured in decades and generations; that the foreign powers will be compelled, through their own sense of international justice and welfare, to grant the Chinese demands for international parity; that beneath these demands of China for political independence there are political evils, as those of militarism, administrative inefficiency and corruption, which she herself must settle before political stability can be obtained; that even this political revolution in China, with its elimination of militarism and its attendant evils, may take time, the extent of which no one is in a position to estimate; that the Soviet influence has been both for good and evil; that Russian objectives, in their nationalistic aspect, do not greatly differ from those of other foreign powers; that the Nationalist cause in China is just and deserves to win; that it will be greatly to the real interest of foreign powers and of friendly international relations when it does so; that the American people are friendly to China and desirous of knowing how best that friendship may be expressed; in the belief: that the Chinese problem is extremely complicated and needs to be set forth in its simplest outlines.

so that those unfamiliar with it by study or personal contact may get a reasonably clear sketch of it in its entirety—the present volume is offered as a contribution to this end.

The only qualifications of the author for writing such a book are a slight knowledge of the Chinese people, some travel in their country, a personal acquaintance with many Chinese students and scholars—above all, a sympathetic attitude toward the aspirations and claims of the Chinese and an admiration for their achievements and their sterling qualities.

An authoritative work on the religions of China has now reached six large volumes, is still only in its beginning, and relates but to one restricted area. The Legge edition of the classical texts is in 28 volumes. The 1889 edition of the T'u Shu Encyclopedia is in 1628 volumes. The Yung Lo Encyclopedia is in 22,877 volumes, sixty of which are index. The complexity and variety of Chinese life are so great, the extent and antiquity of the country are so vast, that superficial acquaintance only becomes one of the necessary qualifications for writing a brief volume. By contrast with works more adequate to the subject, the chief justification of this modest attempt is such complete recognition of its limitations as should disarm most criticism.

Every traveler in China has had the experience—when in a village inn or home, with its windows, doors, and even walls made of paper—of discovering numerous transparent spots appearing on the secluding walls. At first he may think these are drops of rain; later he discovers that they are made by the moistened finger-tips of curious visitors. The experience is sometimes irritating, sometimes peculiarly demoralizing; until the traveler realizes that this is exactly what he is doing in his visit of curiosity—attempting a friendly insight into the intimate life of his hosts.

The author can do little more than ask his readers to peer through such finger-tip translucencies in the opaque walls

which intervene between two great peoples who deserve to and should better understand one another.

Should any further apology be needed for a book for laymen by a layman, may it be found in the Chinese proverb:

> He who would understand both the past and the present must read five cartloads of books.

To understand life in China take a pinch of the struggle of the Early Church; throw in a little of the European Renaissance; add some of the wild thinking and bloody events of the French Revolution; pour in a good quantity of the Spirit of 1776; add a little Bolshevik red pepper; then mix well and cook until half baked.

CHINA: A NATION IN EVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF CHINA

APPROACHING Shanghai, or any port in China, the traveler on the Pacific steamer is greatly impressed by the change in the color of the ocean. Long before land is sighted, the water turns from blue to green, from green to gray, from gray to yellow. Some hours after this change is first noticed, the low coast line comes into view; some hours still later, houses, villages, cities appear. Thus does the soil of the remotest mountains of China—thousands of miles inland—color the surrounding ocean. Thus do the myriads of particles from all over this vast land intermingle to proclaim its unity and its pervasive power. The mightiest of nature's forces acknowledges the dominating influence of this mysterious land.

As in the physical world, so in the human. From the remotest ages, descend customs, religious beliefs, philosophical thought, all of which influence and determine the turbulent social forces of to-day. The magic square which forms the shuffle boards on the decks of the Pacific liners was the magic five combination that marked the nine plates on the back of the sacred tortoise that crawled on the banks of a remote river in Szechuwan 2000 years before the birth of Christ. Thus also every individual of this largest aggregation of peoples, amorphous and lacking unity, is given a common character by these pervasive influences which seem as uncontrollable as the untamed forces of Nature. Thus do the countless numbers of ignorant though intelligent people, remote from the confines of civilization, make their influence felt throughout the world; and have made it thus felt—in their own areas at least—through successive eras of history.

Little wonder is it that yellow was the Imperial color. The yellow dust of the Gobi desert fills the air of all North China. Through its persistent effort the yellow soil has been built up. In turn the yellow soil colors all the waters that run to the Yellow Sea and to the yellowed ocean. That the Yellow Way (ecliptic) makes a path for the sun, has passed into a proverb. The flowers are yellow; the fruits are yellow; the sun and moon through the dusty air are yellow; the people are yellow. *Hwang* or *Whang* or *Wang* or *Wong* is the transliteration of the Chinese character for yellow. A modest exaggeration would permit one to say that half of the 400,000,000 Chinese bear some form of this word as a surname. All the Messrs. White and Black, Brown and Gray, Blue and Green—who in the Anglo-Saxon world bear colorful surnames—among the Chinese become some shade of Mr. Yellow. Even in our offensive corruption—John Chinaman—John is said by some to be a corruption of *Wang*. And when that inevitable day comes "when the Yellow Dragon calls," he who has been an honorable and faithful Chinese, may expect to be carried to dwell in endless peace on the shores of "the Yellow Springs." Is it any wonder that the Yellow Throne imagined the influence of Cathay to be supreme?

In yet one other way the intermingling of land and sea is impressive. No other operation of Nature is more sublimely inflexible than that by which the barren mountains of China, through the countless particles of erosion, build up the habitable and fertile lands, and—more successful than King Canute—push back the ocean continuously. Thus "the valleys are exalted and the mountains are laid low" by forces as primeval and inexorable as those invoked by the Psalmist. Occasionally this process assumes titanic proportions in the great floods which at times seem to break up the land and to reconstruct the ocean shores. Recently in one twenty-four hours, twelve feet of silt were deposited on a bar in the Peiho. Engineers estimate that the silt carried each year by the Yangtze River is sufficient to

completely cover an area of forty square miles, to a depth of ten feet.

So it has been and is now with the human China. By tradition the land of the pacifist and the people of unchanging habits, unaccustomed either to changing fashion or to aggression, it has yet experienced outbursts of violence which have occasioned reorganization of customs, institutions, classes, and even dynasties, cataclysms as revolutionary as the shifting of the course of a river or the re-formation of coast lines.

Such a readjustment is now taking place in China. The human revolution affects all the attitudes toward the past of a people devoted to ancestor worship, and the attitude toward their neighbor of a people who have been taught from time immemorial that all within the four seas are brothers.

Another thought is suggested by this conception of China as a power as pervasive and as incontestable as the forces of Nature. Such forces present a continuity. Human history is here made possible because the generations are continuous, not successive. But China presents the continuity of generations in a manner transcending the visions of the patriarchs, the predications of the scientists, or the possible attainments of any other people. If the people of China were to file by, one by one, the procession would never end; for before the last man of this generation could pass, another generation would have come upon the scene. For ever and ever the procession goes on and on, and has gone on and on from time immemorial. The Chinese are the only people that lived under organized institutions with an established culture when Homer sang and when Moses wrote the laws on Sinai—and they are still living under substantially that same culture. This consciousness of belonging to a mighty group with an unending history produces an imperturbability and often a self-satisfactory attitude that in times past has been extremely disconcerting to foreigners, and even to-day is often irritating. Recently I asked a Chinese scholar if he did not fear the disruptive power of Communism.

His reply was: "China has tried it three times; once before the time of Confucius; once, some centuries after; and again, some five centuries ago. It has never worked; it is contrary to the genius of the Chinese people; it will not work now. Why should we fear it?"

Comparing the transition from ancient forms to modern organization now going on in China with similar situations in the history of Western peoples, one may say that there is taking place before us the formation of a modern nation, comparable to the process through which all Western peoples have gone during that period of history which is called "modern." However, there are several differences between the historic processes which have taken place in the West and those now going on in China.

First of these is the difference in the time element. Most European nations covered some centuries in the course of their development into modern nations. Great revolutionary forces and changes followed one after another: the Renaissance of the fifteenth century brought about a revolution in methods of thought and in the intellectual life; the Reformation of the sixteenth century, a revolution in the religious life and organization; the overthrow of Feudalism, a revolution in social structure; and these were succeeded, in turn, by the political revolution of the eighteenth century and the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century.

In China these changes are being compressed into the lifetime of one generation. And while they may at present affect intimately only a limited class, yet they are determining the lines of social reorganization, and some of them already permeate the lives of the masses. Consequently, a huge body of people, many times as large as that of all Europe at the period when similar changes there took place, is now being electrified—literally—by modern methods of communication. Due to the resulting high pressure, the phenomena of mob psychology frequently follow. Reports of such superficial

excesses fill our newspaper columns to the exclusion of far more significant events.

While the transition processes above indicated are to be dealt with in greater detail in subsequent chapters, a brief statement of each is here desirable in order that we may have before us the quantities involved in formulating the equations of our problem.

INTELLECTUAL TRANSITION

By contacts with richer and more vitally alive cultures, Greece was stimulated to her Periclean age, Rome to her Augustan age, and Western Europe to its Renaissance in the thirteenth and also in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. With the contact of its students with the educational activities of the Western world, and later with Japan, China entered into a similar period about a generation ago. The Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 were the inciting causes. Inquiry always provokes comparisons; comparisons, criticism; and criticism, in turn, develops skepticism. In the present case this skeptical attitude relates not only to things Chinese, but to things Western as well. The same skepticism of a considerable part of the intellectual class that rejects the forms of Confucianism and the traditional philosophical theories, lead to a criticism of Christianity and of the essential features of Western civilization. This attitude finds expression in magazines and books of a distinctly modern flavor, and dominates some of the university groups.

As is apparent with similar European movements, a reform of the language and a simplification of literary usages are among the current changes. Also similar to the European experience, these fundamental readjustments produce an attempt to transfer learning and literary creation to the language of the people. The modernity of this whole movement, which is one of the most profoundly significant aspects of all

these changes, is indicated by the fact that its outstanding leader is not yet forty years of age. A vast number of publications, chiefly in the form of vernacular newspapers and pamphlets, is the result. Attempts to reduce the language to a phonetic basis are being made. Widespread endeavors to promote adult education are meeting with striking results. An entire nation is receiving an intellectual shock which is galvanizing it into a new life.

For centuries Chinese intellectual life had been restricted in very narrow channels by an examination system which stifled all originality. In 1905 this system was abolished and for the first time free intellectual contact with the West and unrestricted speculative inquiry were possible. That the resulting activities should contain not only normal and constructive intellectual endeavors but every type, including the wildest vagaries, would be a foregone conclusion with any people. Such indeed has been the case in the cultural renaissance in China.

RELIGIOUS READJUSTMENT

The casual visitor to the temples of Oriental countries is strikingly impressed with the fact that, compared with the Indians or even the Japanese, the Chinese are not a religious people. Their temples are not frequented as are those of other Oriental countries; nor are religious ceremonial processions and festivals as frequent or as obtrusive. Further inquiry reveals that practically every Chinese is trained in the Confucian code of conduct and accepts its standards and teaching; and that at the same time, he may be a Buddhist, a Taoist or a Mohammedan. If accepting the teachings of Buddha and occasionally calling upon the Buddhist priests for service, or, on rare occasions, worshiping in the temple, he may also call in the services of a Taoist priest in an emergency of perplexity, of misfortune, of important decisions, or of social rites. He might, indeed, accept all these teachings, and at the same time object to being classified as a Buddhist, or as a Taoist, or even

as a Confucianist. He would recognize the Buddhist priest as a Buddhist; and the Taoist priest as a Taoist; and acknowledge that Chinese social custom and order and ethical standards are all based on the teachings of Confucius. But he would rightly object to being classified as a sectarian in any of these groups.

If he philosophized about his attitude, he would probably say that all religions contain some elements of truth; that all possess some elements of error; that in all, the fundamental truths are greatly beclouded by human interpretations and embellishments; and that the wisest attitude is to accept the important truths of each on the basis of one's own personal experience, or the ministration of each as occasion might require. In recent years such an attitude of personal aloofness has been strengthened by the intellectual renaissance.

One result of this conception of religion has had a deep historical and social significance. Not being attached exclusively to any one religion, the resulting attitude of eclecticism has not been favorable to the development of either orthodoxy or heresy. Consequently, religious prejudices have not played so large a part in the life of the Chinese as with other people. Their history does not reveal them as the peaceful people they are often popularly supposed to be; on the contrary they have been given continuously to warfare, as other civilized peoples. Yet they have been spared one type of internal conflicts disastrous to group solidarity and social development; namely, religious warfare. The local wars in which they have so frequently indulged have been chiefly dynastic or feudal; only on a very minor scale have they been sectarian. Similarly, unless connected with foreign or racial or feudal prejudices, religious persecution has played a minor part.

Another aspect of this movement is the growth of a distinctly skeptical attitude that has been consciously fostered and has fitted in with ancient philosophical teachings. Including the teachings of Confucius, these were all of a more or less

agnostic character. They revealed a willingness to encourage inquiry, but little inclination to gratify the craving for dogmatic belief in the realm of theology. In the realm of conduct the dogmatic teaching of the sages was keenly felt; in that of religion, except in the primitive demonology of the Taoists, it was scarcely stimulating. Skepticism, agnosticism, pragmatism, are all combating religious belief among the intellectual Chinese of to-day. This also means that China is challenging a more positive religious force than that embodied in the traditional faiths.

The development of the influence of Christianity in China will be traced later. Suffice to state here that during the last half century it has become a real interest to the Chinese. The open hostility on the part of many at the present time is an evidence of this, and such a result is but a natural and perhaps from every point of view a desirable outcome. This situation also demonstrates that the Christian mission forces during the past century have not been mistaken in their view that China furnishes the great opportunity and the great challenge to Christianity.

Whether the Chinese are to become Christian, or should become Christian, is a question which can be answered only by themselves. If affirmatively, it must be a form of Christianity suited to their genius, adapted to their institutions and manner of life, and interpreted in terms of their own intellectuality rather than in those of the West. It is devoutly to be hoped that Western representatives of Christianity whose mission it may be to give the Chinese the opportunity to answer the major question may be wise enough to grant these corollaries.

That the emphasis on individualism which is a fundamental tenet and influence of the Western forms of Christianity has also influenced the political development of democracy in China, is hardly to be doubted. That the educational missions have trained more youth in modern political attitudes than

in religious belief; that they have greatly stimulated government and private endeavor in these lines; and that they have presented the challenge of Christianity to the thinking Chinese, cannot be denied. Through the daily press we are informed of the attitude of the uneducated masses toward these questions; and the situation has its counterpart—though not so well advertised—in the attitude of the intellectual classes. There is a religious reformation going on in China; but as yet it is not clear what the outcome will be. The real question is not whether the Chinese shall become Christian, but shall Christianity become Chinese? The former question cannot be wholly answered for some generations—and then, as already suggested, only by the Chinese. On the latter question it may be as difficult to convert many advocates of Western Christianity as it is to convert the intellectual Chinese to the religion of the Occident.

POLITICAL REVOLUTION

The political transition is more obvious and external than the intellectual and the religious. China declared herself in 1911 to be a Republic. The Ch'ing dynasty of three centuries of Manchu rulers came to an end. The Empire had existed from time immemorial. There was little bloodshed in this revolution; but there have been turmoil and revolution or rebellion ever since. Notwithstanding this constant disturbance, there has been until the last few months little bloodshed and, save in the spots where armies contended or foraged for existence, surprisingly little interruption of the ordinary activities of life. China adopted the outer forms of a republican constitutional government in 1911; but not so easily are the habits of centuries thrown off. For centuries China has not had a strong central government. The central Imperial government ruled lightly through the provincial governors and its local mandarins, content with enough tribute, mainly in grain, to support a more or less extravagant court in its isolated

oriental life. Lack of communication, lack of foreign contact, lack of modern forms of wealth or of modern opportunities for extravagance on a big business scale, circumscribed its powers either for good or for evil. Central government was weak and merely the application of tradition; intermediate provincial government was by delegation and of greater or less indifference; local government was by traditional forms, democratic in a pragmatic sort of way. Through these generations of the past, as through recent decades of inefficiency or disturbance, China functioned as a nation because of the inherently democratic common-sense ways of the family, of the village community and of the guild, or of the local group such as the merchants or the residents of a given street or area. Theoretically the government was an Imperial despotism; in practice, an operating local democracy tempered by tribute and occasional arbitrary oppression; tempered, at times even more frequently, by local rebellion and mob protest. The unwritten constitution assigned by tradition all rights to the local communities which were not assigned by tradition and use to the distant central power.

Such a government might function well in the isolation and stagnation of an oriental culture and tradition. But, as with all other groups of people, China has come within the influence of those forces which for want of a better name we call "modern." Their disruptive influence on old political and social forms is irresistible. New ideals and ideas, through renaissance, reformation, and economic revolution, have rendered old political forms inoperative; it is no more possible to put the traditional squab back into the shell than modern China into the old political forms.

And yet the fact that for nearly four hundred years any display of interest in political affairs outside of his village or *hsien* (county) by any leader, except through the established way of the scholarly examinations, was but an invitation to disaster or to death, has formed a habit of indifference to gov-

ernment or to general political welfare that cannot be thrown off in a few years' time.

While the revolution has been comparatively bloodless, it was nevertheless cataclysmic. Forms of government are merely forms of habits of living together in groups. These cannot be created out of hand. They must be grown into. The process is a slow one. Among Western nations it has taken generations; in China, also, it will take time for an efficient modern form of government on a democratic basis to be worked out. The most encouraging phase of the outlook is that the most competent and constructive democratic force in Chinese life, the government of the village elders, has not yet brought its influence to bear on the present situation.

One other striking difference between China and the West should be noted. All European and American government grew out of a society founded on a feudal system. The feudal system constituted a centralized unifying power, a classification of population into social strata, gave women a secure and even an exalted place, and supported a military class whose obligation was the protection of the political structure. Japan and at least Mogul India have a somewhat similar line of development. China is perhaps the only large national group that has not the discipline and the centralizing influence of a feudal period. In some respects it is passing through such a stage with its militarists now. But evidently China must work out its unified government through some other combination of influences and experiences. This process is now going on before the whole world, with modern electric communication to make all the world attentive daily observers—and critics. The religion which the West preaches is Christianity; the religion which it practices is nationalism and commercialism. We have carried both our preaching and our practice to the Orient, and now are greatly astonished and quite embarrassed to discover that China has accepted the religion which we practice and questions the religion which we preach.

ECONOMIC CHANGES

No less important than the political is the economic revolution. Here, even more than with the political problem, size is determinative. While China is the largest unified aggregate of people, yet for the last half century, according to the estimates of experts, its population has been nearly stationary. Fully eighty per cent—perhaps eighty-five per cent—of the population are engaged in producing a food supply, whereas in some Western countries not more than thirty-five per cent, or even less, are similarly occupied. Even with that, and a considerable importation of food stuffs, the standard of living in China is almost inconceivably low, and millions are annually at the starvation margin. The Malthusian saturation point of population has been reached.

The most obvious readjustment and the one now rapidly going on is being brought about through the introduction of modern industrial methods. Through such methods the surplus population and inadequately occupied rural population may be more efficiently employed. Through industrial production the national annual wealth may be increased, and China may draw more generously on the world's food supply. And through a steady continuance of these activities the general standard of living may be raised. These processes of development, however, demand capital, which China does not possess, but which foreigners may supply—for a consideration. To the Chinese this intake of foreign capital for the purpose of developing modern industries is liable to be viewed as a dangerous aggression of imperialism, as the capitalists' exploitation of China's helpless people. To the foreign business man it may appear merely as a chance for the investment of funds, promising rich rewards if political and social conditions are stable, but with a large element of risk with things as they are. To the general observer the industrial revolution in China may be but a natural social transition; inevitable, once the preceding

changes which put China into the current of modern life have taken place. Whether viewed as desirable or as dangerous, these economic changes seem to possess that same irresistible nature that characterizes all the forces emanating from or operating upon this great nation. While political, religious, and intellectual problems may soon be solved or cared for by the Chinese people themselves, the industrialization of China bids fair to remain for some generations an outstanding problem, not only for the Chinese but for the Western world as well.

PROBLEM OF ALIEN CULTURES

Still another contrast may assist in clarifying the situation in China for the American. We are perfectly familiar with the situation in which one people receives a vast number of immigrants from other and mostly alien cultures. Since these numbers from alien cultures, with their descendants, are almost as numerous as the traditional stock with their descendants, the result is practically a new culture. The problem which the Chinese are facing is that of an immigrant civilization tending either to replace or to fuse with the old; and since, in this case, the alien culture is perhaps the more powerful in its economic force, its political ideals and forms, and its intellectual processes (including modern science), the new fusion is bound to include large elements of the foreign. We, in America, are very conscious of the difficulties which arise in the incorporation of many individuals among the alien group, but the fusion of culture nevertheless goes on without attracting special attention. Consequently, it is not easy to visualize the difficulties attending the fusion of two cultures more or less antagonistic, or at least antipathetic, when there are few human carriers as visual instruments. With the Chinese, attention is focused on the alien civilization. When elements of that culture are quite foreign, the antagonism is intense. Hence the prominence given to anti-imperialism, to the anti-Christian movement, and

to similar hostile expressions. This contrast with the American experience also indicates an explanation of the place of the student in the Chinese situation, for the student is the carrier of the immigrant culture. He becomes not only influential, but super-sensitive to all that these changes involve.

CONTACTS WITH THE WEST

These brief references to the intellectual revolution, the religious reformation, the political revolution, and the economic changes do not present all the factors necessary for the statement of our problem. There is yet another of determining importance to be considered, that of the contacts of Western powers with China. These contacts have passed through certain distinct stages, to be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, but here to have merely passing notice. The failure on the part of the West to recognize that these relationships have evolved to a stage different from that of the past century, or even the past decade, is one of the chief causes for misunderstanding between China and the Western powers, and one of the chief reasons why individuals seeking to understand what is going on in China are so often mystified or even antagonized.

During the earliest of these stages the contacts of China with the West were of the rarest, or are lost in oblivion. The occasional traveler, or the trader who was more often adventurer than merchant, made these contacts, lured by vague rumors of the country's wealth; rumors which have continued to draw as a lodestone through all the modern centuries. Some of the ancients were drawn also, either by the attraction of luxury or of wealth or of mystery. The outstanding representative of the march to China was Marco Polo, during the thirteenth century, long classed—even to our own day—with Mandeville or Munchausen, only recently recognized as fact. During all this period China was looked upon as the land of marvel, with a civilization superior in arts and refinement.

So, also, was it for the most part during the period following, which may be classified as that of the trader. Led on from India, the Portuguese and the English and the French, and from the East Indies the Dutch traders, made China and Japan the frontiers of their ventures during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. So uncivilly, not to say savagely, did these European traders use their privileges that finally they were excluded from both countries, with the exception of one trading post in each. This was the period in which maritime warfare among the European nations was but legalized piracy, and piracy itself all but a legitimate business. With no government to restrain them, these hardy representatives of the West did their utmost to justify the epithet "foreign devil," commonly bestowed upon them by the Chinese.

With the dawn of the nineteenth century, however, better methods came to prevail; but not with the entire elimination of hardships and offenses. Various causes, to be more fully stated in a future chapter, led to the war between England and China in the fourth decade of that century—the so-called Opium War. Then followed a succession of troubles, aggressions, and misunderstandings on either side. From that time to the end of the World War—a period of nearly a century—may be called the political era, during which the contacts between China and the West were of a political character. Major misunderstandings were settled by force; the victor, of course, always being the West. When misunderstandings and exasperation on the part of the Chinese reached a point of retaliation, the only recourse was retaliation in turn. There is no opportunity here —or, in fact, any need—to apportion responsibility. Both sides erred. These were the limitations of the times. The Western powers used the methods they were accustomed to use among themselves. The Chinese, on occasion, used the methods they were accustomed to apply to their own people and problems. On both sides these methods were inadequate and inapplicable, at least to the other side; while judged by present-day standards,

they were both reprehensible and barbarous. Each side misunderstood the other; each retaliated on the other. But the West, being the stronger, has applied its will by force. Though the resulting treaties may have been in a sense voluntary, subsequent realization of their significance in the light of the conduct of Western nations in China has led to their characterization as "the unequal treaties." The universal use of this term among the Chinese and the universal demand among the Chinese for their cancellation are evidences that the major factor in the situation now is not political but psychological. Attitudes are now more important than facts. Or, rather, attitudes have now become the most important of the facts which the Western powers have to face in China. This is but one indication that the relationships have passed from the political to the psychological stage. The failure to recognize this aspect of the situation is chiefly responsible for the unfortunate predicament in which the Western powers find themselves *vis-à-vis* China. To emphasize the significance of this change and the absolute necessity on the part of the people of the West—at least, of the people of the United States—to change their point of view, is the chief occasion for the writing of this book.

When the Western trader has gone to China to endeavor to create new desires in the mind of the Chinese; when the Western diplomat has gone with the endeavor to change the attitude of the Chinese on any matter of controversy or of negotiation with reference to his own country; when the missionary has gone with the idea of persuading the Chinese to change his mind with reference to the most intimate of views, religious beliefs; it is astonishing that trader, diplomat, or missionary should have paid so little attention to what the Chinese actually thought or to their ways of thinking. Conscious of our own rectitude of purpose, or of the excellence of our goods, we have been quite indifferent to what the Chinese thought.

This indifference towards and ignorance of the Chinese mind has been the chief limitation to the efforts of the past; is the chief cause of the misunderstanding in the present; and, unless obviated, will produce a hostility which again, for a period, will eliminate the Westerner from China. For another corollary of the psychological period is that no longer can difficulty be settled by force. To physical force will be opposed psychological force—passive resistance. The two are not interchangeable, and brain is mightier than brawn. The Chinese are past masters of the art of passive resistance. One of their customs still in vogue is that of "talking up the street," by which any woman can obtain redress from the aggressions of her superior—man. The woman has now become all China, and the street, the world. The Chinese have recently shown in the Hong Kong strike how very expensive such resistance can become to the Westerner and how helpless he may be in combating it. The Westerner has long marveled at the Chinese custom of "saving face." But if for a few days he could ignore the similar convention of "national prestige," treat the Chinese as equal, ignore the bargains or treaties of the past, which now the Chinese regard as one-sided—and which the Westerner acknowledges as such or he would willingly re-negotiate—the outstanding misunderstandings would be cleared up in a brief time.

Any satisfactory solution of the present difficulties must, therefore, be based on the recognition that psychological factors are now more important than political. In business, in diplomacy, in religious or educational endeavor, in friendly approach, the Westerner must change his attitude if he expects the Chinese to change his acts.

Whether the treaties are unilateral is not quite the major consideration; the fact that all Chinese believe them to be, is. Whether modern business is imperialistic is not quite so important as whether we shall do any business at all, since the Chinese think that the present forms of business are based on

treaties and customs which are both unfair and humiliating to them. That we believe Western education to be essential to the development of any efficient nationalism, and that missionary education—especially American missionary education—constitutes one of the chief influences in the development of the present nationalistic movement, is not so important as that for the present the Chinese quite generally believe the contrary to be true.

In every point of contact with the Chinese at the present time, what the Westerner does is a less important consideration than what the Chinese thinks. The first consideration, then, in dealing with the Chinese on any question, is to seek to understand their point of view, and to give as great weight to their views as to the acts of irresponsible individuals. Imperialistic pretense and ambition are more significant than concessions; the attitude of Anglo-Saxon or European superiority and indifference has undermined all the special privileges of extraterritoriality. The privileges once existing, which protected the superiority of the foreigner to national laws, are now gone because the foreigner himself has destroyed them by his arrogance and superciliousness. Simply raise the question with any old-time resident, and one gets a complete justification of this statement as a reply.

This, then, is our problem: On one side there is the largest single racial aggregate that exists or ever has existed, possessing the oldest and most stable culture. Within the lifetime of one generation it is now passing through revolutionary changes in intellectual attitudes, in religious beliefs, in economic and industrial processes, and in political forms. On the other side is the Western world, desirous of selling its products, of advancing its views, of sharing its knowledge, of assisting in these momentous changes; above all, of increasing or at least maintaining its prestige and advantages both as a Western

unity *vis-à-vis* the Oriental and—more important still—as a unit within this Western world against all the other units. Is it possible for us to understand these unknown quantities, as the one side of the equation, so as to determine our conduct, which represents the other side?

Have you eaten rice?

—*Chinese Salutation*

There was a famine in the land.

—*Ancient Records*

The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirit of the land and grain are next; the sovereign is the least in importance.

—*Mencius*

CHAPTER II

THE PEOPLE AND THE PHYSICAL BACKGROUND

THE FIRST and most lasting impression one gets of China is of people—multitudes of people. On arrival at any of the smaller seaports, or at any of the river ports, long before the steamer has come to anchor, swarms of people have clambered aboard in search of the few pennies to be earned as porters, hucksters, peddlers, sampan men, hotel runners, or what not. Using a long bamboo pole, to one end of which is attached a hook, this half-clad, shouting, squirming mob clambers up the sides of a ship much as did the pirates of old. In fact, witnessing the impossibility of controlling such a mob, one realizes how readily a needy maritime population can slip into piracy. Yet this invasion is all carried on peacefully and in the course of ordinary business.

On land the impression of multitudes is borne out. The narrow streets; the economical use of house space, which puts the population on the streets or on the narrow merchants' benches and counters facing the streets; the use of the streets for foot passengers only or chiefly; the use of human beings for all needs of transportation; all add to the impression of crowds. In large cities, where some streets are wide, and where there may be vehicular traffic, most of the city traffic in merchandise and in transportation of buyers is by man power. The crowds are only increased by these various forms of transportation. Unlike most Orientals, these people are constantly on the move; so that the term "crowds" does not convey the impression one receives. Significantly, the conventional descriptive term has come to be "swarms"—and, truly enough, the bee or the ant is involuntarily suggested by the streets full of these busy people.

Not only are the city streets, lanes, shops, and houses

crowded, but the water around the cities is covered with a floating population, crowded into small boats by the use of which they make their living. The permanent river population in and around Canton is estimated at two hundred thousand. Though nowhere else is this water-borne population so large, yet every city or river or canal presents a similar spectacle. Around Canton may also be observed the curious phenomenon, a would-be amphibious population. In huts built on stilts with communication with the shore, these people—made aggressive by the pressure of the river population—seek to secure a permanent residence ashore, but are warded off by the jealous possessors of the precious plots of land. Caught between this pressure fore and aft, the hut dwellers gradually regain their foothold on the land, by fair means or foul.

Travel in the country, or on any of the great rivers, gives the same impression of dense overcrowding. Even the long railway journeys do not take one away from the throngs until one has passed beyond the Great Wall into Manchuria. The vast coastal plains, which make up the most of China, carry an enormous number of human beings.

In no other countries do the burial customs so create the illusion that the generations of the dead are to be counted along with the living. Whether arising from the worship of the dead, or from their belief that ancestral spirits haunt the environment of the living, or from the fact that the ancestral grave or even the ancestral coffin is an intimate presence, may be a matter of interesting speculation. The custom of delaying burial until the propitious moment, or until the corpse can be conveyed to the home of its ancestors, causes multitudes of bodies to be kept above ground, all too obvious to the passer-by. Ancestor worship demands that the graves of the dead be jealously guarded, and that they be honored by ceremonial observances at certain seasons. Consequently, graves are everywhere evident. Conspicuous monuments indicate the worthiness of the dead. Nearness to home, that their presence may be felt or

their ghostly needs satisfied, causes them to dot every field and cover every barren hillside. Around Canton, until recent reforms appropriated those choice spots for suburban residences, the visible ancestral population was estimated at five times greater than the living.

Notwithstanding this impression of crowds, which one gets from traveling through the more accessible China, there are vast territories that are sparsely inhabited. Approaching Peking via the railway of Manchuria, one is impressed by vast fertile plains, resembling those west of the Mississippi that have but a scattered population. That two hundred thousand farm laborers migrate each year from the crowded regions of Shantung, to return each winter, indicates that there are forces other than that of food supply to be reckoned with in explaining the pressure of population. Even before railways were built, this annual migration—demanding months of hardships of travel—took place. Despite the inducements of fertile and cheap agricultural lands, and all that governments and railways can offer, ancestral ties hold these peoples to the region of their birth.

Whether the three semi-independent territories of Tibet, Mongolia, and Turkestan shall be considered as parts of China is a question open to debate. All are represented on the Chinese flag and are nominally parts of China. All are quite remote, with slight and infrequent communication and with indefinite political connection. Mongolia and Turkestan are largely under Russian influence, with Russian control over Outer Mongolia now unchallenged. In fact, Outer Mongolia has declared its independence and maintains a Soviet government; more accurate to say, perhaps, that a Soviet government controls Outer Mongolia. Whatever the political allegiance may be, these territories consist of vast areas of semi-arid land, with a sparse population living in a pastoral and mostly a nomadic stage. While their economic significance is now slight, they offer the possibility of support for extensive agricultural

settlements, if Western or especially American methods of cultivation could be introduced.

There exist also, within the eighteen provinces, vast areas of untilled land which, with other methods of agriculture, might be made available. The extensive mountain regions of China are almost without cultivation, and almost uninhabitated. Vast reaches despoiled by the flooding of the Yellow River have never been reclaimed. Immense plains, sandy or semi-arid, are to be found within the limits of the eighteen provinces. All told, the population problem of China is one of distribution rather than of over-peopling; a distribution which might be obtained by modern agricultural methods, modern transportation, application of modern science, and good government.

Estimating the population of China has assumed the importance of an indoor sport, unencumbered by any definitely established rules. The situation offers such alluring attractions to the amateur in statistics that few have been able to resist. From an early period, before the Christian era, estimates of inhabitants are available. These are largely similar to those found in the Old Testament—of a very general character. The greater part of both the earlier and later estimates were prepared for the purpose of taxation. The modern value of the totals thus depends upon the determination and age limit of the people included for taxation purposes, and of the multiple taken to ascertain the total. Manifestly, if the taxation census is of families it is quite as important to know whether three or five or seven is the size of the average family as it is to know the original number. There is no means of making an actual determination of this multiple. The variations in present-day estimates are due largely to similar variables in the calculations. A detailed discussion of these estimates through the centuries is given by S. Wells Williams in his *Middle Kingdom.* Compared with other regions, the evidence reveals a very large population throughout the centuries.

Results rather than methods are of interest in this brief

PEOPLE

THE RIVER POPULATION AND THE BUND CITY AT CANTON

Reproduced from W. H. Mallory: China: Land of Famine, American Geographical Society's Special Publication No. 6, New York.

GRAVES ON TILLABLE LAND

Methodist Prints

GRAVES ON HILLSIDE—EACH SMALL MOUND A GRAVE

survey. The Post Office estimate, which is the source of the most accurate figures of an official character, gives the numbers of Chinese, including those of Manchuria, as 427,679,214. To this would be added 11,000,000 for Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan, making about 438,000,000 in all. Some foreign estimates are as low as 350,000,000; most of them are around 400,000,000 to 425,000,000. Native popular estimates of quantities are generally vague, and in estimating the population I am likely to remember my experience in trying to get from the loafers at the railway station—always amused at the question—some idea of the size of the adjacent city. Almost invariably the answers are descriptive rather than quantitative, the most frequent being, "very many," "enough," "too many." So, indeed, may the entire population problem be stated.

That the population is at the Malthusian saturation point is the essential fact to be noted; it is now as large as the available food supply will support. Estimates of the population for nearly a century past do not vary greatly from the present figure. The Tai-ping Rebellion, near the middle of the nineteenth century, is supposed to have destroyed thirty to forty million—some say even one hundred million—lives. The famine of 1874-75, following, also took a huge toll. But the balance was soon restored. The extent to which this huge mass of humanity presses upon the food supply will be seen in the subsequent discussion of agricultural and rural life. The fact itself constitutes one of the most important considerations in an understanding of the problems of China.

THE NATURAL WEALTH OF CHINA

While the Far East has ever been the land of mystery and illusion, perhaps the greatest illusion of all is that of the great material wealth of the Orient. That the East was the source of silks, tapestries, and gorgeous embroideries, of spices and aromatic gums, of the ruby and the pearl, gave it, in the eyes of the West, an economic value far beyond its real merits.

China's contributions in arts and inventions are of far more value than all the material wealth she has contributed to trade. But the gold of Ophir was ever an allurement, as it remains to-day. In natural resources which count in the modern industrial world, the Orient—and particularly China—is singularly lacking. All told, the Far East now furnishes but five per cent of the world's copper, one per cent of the iron, five per cent of the coal, and three per cent of its oil. Contrasted with this, the North Atlantic area—the industrial section of the West—furnishes ninety per cent of the world's coal, ninety-eight per cent of its iron, sixty-five per cent of its copper, and ninety per cent of the oil. Of the meager contributions of the Orient, China furnishes but a fraction, that in coal and iron.

Even more important than this is the fact that, as far as modern exploration has gone, this situation is due not to lack of development but to permanent handicap. Perhaps the fact that China has neither oil nor extensive mineral resources is a political protection; but it is also an industrial and economic handicap which the country cannot overcome.

While modern industry, particularly modern machine production, no doubt will develop—in fact, must develop—if China is not to be swamped by machine-made goods from the West, yet, so far as can now be seen, China can never become a great industrial nation in the Western sense, or as Japan may become.

China's mineral resources consist chiefly in coal and iron, the essentials of the modern industrial world; but even in these she is not particularly rich. These two complementary products are not well placed with reference to each other; neither are they of especially good quality. Belgium or Pittsburgh or the Ruhr can compete with the Han Yang works—the one great steel plant in China—even in its own home. While the iron ore reserves are estimated at about fifteen per cent of those of the world, they are of very low grade, at present not commercially of great value, or even sufficient to develop a great modern steel plant. Of the high-grade mineral ore, the reserves

are such as would supply the present American demands about two years. China now produces about seventy-five per cent of the world's supply of antimony, and fifty per cent of the tungsten, two minerals used largely in the production of certain alloys. Of peculiar significance during the World War, they were then extensively exploited; but they are of value only in a highly developed industrial civilization.

Of the precious metals, gold and silver, China has disclosed very little. While it has been popularly supposed that belief in *Fung-Shui* and superstitious terror at disturbing the earth's surface has protected whatever mineral resources may exist, yet in a country so long inhabited and as crowded as China, where the arts were so thoroughly developed centuries ago as to give metals great value, it can hardly be supposed that the precious metals would exist in any quantity without being discovered. With all their superstition, the Chinese are a very practical people and, like other peoples, find a way to circumvent the limitations of religion when economic advantage is concerned. Deposits of any significance in other countries industrially as backward, or as isolated from Western inquisitiveness and acquisitiveness, would usually have long been known. Furthermore, most of China's mineral deposits, now known though not extensively used, have long been known to the native. Search for raw materials by Western industrialism has left little unexplored ground anywhere. From either point of examination, it seems extremely improbable that China will in the near future reveal mineral resources of sufficient scope and importance to assist her in her economic struggle or to enable her to enter largely into modern industrial development. Instead of living in a Golconda, it seems that China and the Far East in general are in quite the contrary situation; and that, in this respect, they may continue to be dependent upon Western industrial countries, relieved somewhat by Japan, and perhaps India. In this event, China's dependence will continue to be on agriculture and on those industries whose essential

elements are human and agricultural material in the raw. The "white man's burden" may not after all be a fictitious assumption, but one imposed by Nature herself.

The fact that the country possesses no great mineral resources save coal and iron does not prohibit industrial development of certain types. Though scattered, large pockets of coal and iron do exist; sufficient, at least, to give China a start until modern science may find substitutes. The availability of cheap labor—industrious and potentially skillful—the over-crowded conditions of agriculture and the wide diversification of handicraft industry, seem to invite such development. Already there has been a beginning. The urge of expansion which Japan reveals is due partly to the demand by an expanding industrial society for new materials which it does not possess. China does not seem to offer the possibility of such a challenge; at least, this is true if her growing needs are met by other means.

AGRICULTURE AND THE LAND

The first condition concerning Chinese agriculture which impresses even the casual observer is the very small unit of the holdings. The average size of the farm in North China, where the crops are wheat, millet, corn, or *kaoliang,* is about four acres; in the South, where the principal crop is rice, or mulberry leaves for silk, it is about one and a half acres; for all China, less than three acres. The Chinese Bureau of Economic Information estimates that for the wheat area of the North it would take the crop of 4.7 acres of wheat to support a family of five at subsistence point; that thirty-three per cent of the farms are less than one acre in extent; that fifty-five per cent are one and one-half acres or less; and that the large holdings are very few.

In Central and South China the staple food crop is rice. The rice lands are far more productive than the wheat lands and require far more intensive cultivation. Here the necessary support of a family of five would require but 1.7 acres. But

the government figures given above show that fifty-five per cent of families own one and one-half acres or less. Even in the rich rice regions, the majority of farm lands fail to make a living for the cultivators.

Statistics of imports of food products seem to bear out this conclusion. For the past three years the excess of imports over exports has averaged 2,260,000,000 pounds, or, translated into terms of population, the food of over one million families.

One curious thing about all Chinese statistics concerning population, food supply, agriculture, and industry, is that most of them prove that there cannot be any Chinese people long, for they inevitably will all starve—in fact, should have all starved to death long ago. Several explanatory facts may be found to mitigate this dire conclusion. One is that on much of the land more than one crop is raised—on much the same principle that the Negro in the Southern States of America gets his corn crop without any labor, by planting it between the rows of cotton. Another is that on most of the rice land a secondary food crop is raised. So far as excess of imports over exports is concerned, it may be said of foreign trade statistics in general that there has been continuously, over a considerable period of years, an adverse balance of trade. Though enormous remittances from Chinese working abroad have constituted one large factor, just how this adverse balance is righted no satisfactory explanation is given.

Our major problem is to understand conditions in China and the present problem of unrest. In this consideration, the fact of fundamental importance is that, even with eighty or eighty-five per cent of the population engaged in food-raising occupations, there is not sufficient food to supply the actual life needs of the people. This statement seems a paradox. What is the answer? The facts that large numbers of the people continuously go hungry; that other large numbers are habitually undernourished; that the span of life is short; that the mortality and morbidity rates are inconceivably high; that

large quantities of material that is unnutritive or deleterious are eaten as food; these furnish partial answers.

Agriculture is one phase of Chinese life that the Westener has been taught to regard as greatly superior to anything that is to be found in the West. In one fundamental respect this is so; in others not. In the preservation of the fertility of the soil, which has been maintained for three or four thousand years, the Chinese farmer has no rival. The methods of this preservation, involving an amount of labor that the cultivator of the soil in the West is quite unaccustomed to undergo, have been followed from earliest antiquity. Early religious writings, nearly four thousand years old, give these methods the significance of a religious rite, which the farmer must scrupulously follow. All physiological waste of both human beings and animals, all residue of vegetable decay, all ashes from fire, are worked into the soil which supports the growing plant. Much of this is done by mixing all refuse with a small amount of soil, then allowing time for decay, then thoroughly mixing it with the soil of the field. It has been calculated that the entire tillable surface of China and Japan, to the depth of twelve or sixteen inches, is actually lifted by hand from two to five times a year. Two or three crops will be grown at once on a given piece of land; and there is constant cultivation of the soil even if it is under water, as with the growing rice; so there is a complete assimilation of the elements essential to fertility. All residue of weed, straw, grass, or any vegetable growth is either worked into the soil or, if needed for consumption as fuel, later worked in as ashes. To this is added the sediment of rivers and canals. Only for the silk crops or in well-to-do regions are commercial fertilizers used.

The intensiveness of cultivation can hardly be imagined. The rice is grown in seed beds so that a seed plot will, when transplanted, furnish a sufficient amount for twelve or fifteen times the area. This transplanting of each separate stalk is all done by hand, but it gives the use of nine tenths of the land

for a growing crop for an additional five or six weeks. Except in the wheat, corn, and millet areas of the dry north, where animals may be used, most of the cultivation is by hand. So also are all the processes of harvesting the crops.

While the Chinese farmer excels all others in the preservation of the fertility of the soil and in intensive cultivation, he is woefully deficient in other essential rural arts. He practices little or nothing of seed selection and has only limited empirical knowledge of control of pests, fertilization and grafting, composition of soils, deep cultivation or use of mechanical means of cultivation, and rotation of crops. While in all these respects there is some knowledge and a surprising insight of an empirical character, all is deficient because of lack of that scientific investigation which has so improved the agriculture of the West. The modern trained agriculturist and a number of agricultural schools are making a beginning in the new knowledge, but as yet little of it has got over to the farmer.

One chief agricultural crop is silk—or the leaves for the consumption of the silk worms. Yet, although silk manufacture is one of the oldest known arts in China, and long a monopoly, China silks have lost their former hold on the market because the raw silk is of an inferior quality, due to the prevalence of diseased eggs. In the cultivation of cotton, China now ranks third in the world, but the product is of so poor a quality as to be of little value for export. Rice is grown in great quantities, yet there is not sufficient yield to supply the home demand.

The needs of Chinese agriculture are great, but the possibilities of improvement are just as great, once scientific knowledge of agriculture is brought to the farmer. The world tea market has been lost to India and Ceylon, the silk market to Japan, the vegetable oil market is now going to the tropics; but all these could with effort be regained, and the cotton market taken from America and India.

Notwithstanding the intensive cultivation and the ingenu-

ity of the farmer, it is estimated that no more than fifteen per cent of the surface of China is under cultivation. But to increase this percentage, new methods of cultivation must be employed, modern farm implements and machinery must be obtained, forestation and irrigation must be developed, transportation must be provided, and the population itself must be more evenly distributed. None of these essentials of prosperity is within reach of the Chinese farmer as he is now situated. He must be provided with some scientific knowledge, and the government must furnish capital, transportation, irrigation, and forestation. Whether this can be done is one of the questions which constitutes the problem of the future of China.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS: STANDARDS OF LIVING

The extent to which the impoverishment of the people has increased, the meager and wholly inadequate standard of living, and the methods by which an accurate knowledge of conditions is obtained may be illustrated by the results of one investigation. In 1922 the International Famine Relief Commission was sponsor for an investigation made under the direction of members of its own staff, supplemented by trained investigators from the staffs of the leading educational establishments. The men who did the actual field work were chiefly students from Tsing Hua College, the institution which trains the students sent to American colleges on the remitted indemnities. The investigation covered numerous and typical *hsien,* or counties, of the rural regions of four provinces. In these four provinces the percentages of the families investigated in which the family income was $150 a year or less were 64.3; 52.4; 52.1; 82.5. A specialist in dietetics of the Peking Union Medical College has estimated the minimum subsistence ration of a family of five to consist as follows: Of grains—*kaoliang* (a rough corn), 48 oz.; millet, 24 oz.; wheat, 32 oz. Of vegetables—turnips, 8 oz.; soy beans, 7 oz. Of fruits and green vegetables (cabbage), 16 oz.; sesame oil, 8 oz.; *chiangyn* and tea, 2 oz. The estimated

PRIMITIVE CULTIVATION

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TRANSPLANTING RICE



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A FAMINE CROWD WAITING FOR FAMINE RELIEF

Reproduced from W. H. Mallory: China: Land of Famine, American Geographical Society's Special Publication No. 6, New York.

FAMINE SUFFERERS AT WORK ON A RIVER EMBANKMENT

cost of this diet for the family of five is from $150 to $160 per year. The reader will have noted that it includes no meats, fish, or eggs; and, in this cow-less land, no milk or milk products. To this the estimate adds $20 a year for clothing; that is, $4 a year (or in American money, $2 a year) per person for clothing—surely a modest allowance, though the adjective may not be quite appropriate. Other additions to the estimates were $5 for housing, $5 for light, $7 for all other expenses, including social, medical, educational, recreational. This makes a total of from $187 to $197 a year per family, of which eighty per cent is for food. American readers should divide these figures in half, as the sums are in Chinese silver dollars, worth at the present time not quite two for one. Even on this incredibly low standard, only from thirty-five to fifteen per cent of the families in the rural regions could qualify. To some extent a mitigation of these extreme conditions is to be found in the fact that at the time these inquiries were being made, some of the regions under investigation were recovering from the famine of the preceding years and were yet in abnormally poor condition; and for a similar reason the families involved were perhaps inclined to minimize such resources as they had in anticipation of prospective relief. This tendency was guarded against by those making the investigation, since they had worked in these same regions in famine times. It was noted, however, that many of the families were gathering the supplementary famine rations of elm bark and willow leaves, in anticipation of the winter drawing near.

One other consideration should be mentioned, since it throws light on the situation in two directions. Even the casual visitor must have noted the lethargic condition of the village population in winter in these regions, when agricultural activities are impossible. Work is then at a minimum, time is spent in the sunshine, the food requirements are probably much less than when active labor is going on. As nearly as it is possible for human beings to do so, these people hibernate. The idle-

ness everywhere evident is not so much from choice as from pressure of necessity and of subsistence.

The contrast between these rural conditions and those which the casual visitor may see in the cities shows how contrary to fact is that ancient conception of China as a land of gorgeous luxuries; it is similar to the contrast between the opulence of the fabled Golconda and its active natural resources. While writing these pages, I was priviliged to visit some of the five thousand curio shops of Peking, in the company of a connoisseur in Chinese art, financially able to gratify his taste. Here, in shops of sordid exterior, were revealed, time and again, objects of rarest beauty; porcelains displaying the wonderful greens of the Kang Hsi period, the pinks of the Yung Cheng reign, and the blues of the Ch-ien Lung period; vases in pairs, valued in thousands of dollars; tapestries, even to the ten-thousand-dollar value; paintings, ivory carvings, pictures in cut silk, priestly robes, carvings in jade and stone and wood; the best, in all cases, made in the Imperial factories or by Imperial craftsmen, now being slowly disgorged by the nobles or the families of the old Manchu régime as a means of prolonging their existence.

One experience was typical. The shop itself was incredibly squalid, in a squalid section of the city; the unsorted masses of objects, covered with dust and dirt—often half an inch thick—gave an impression of a veritable junk shop of the meanest kind; the dealer was not to be distinguished from the poorest coolie of the street, except that he spoke excellent French. But as we penetrated remote rooms of the home behind the shop, objects of great beauty and value were brought to light. At a glance this "coolie" could tell, by the fine shadings of color and the delicacy of design, the various dynastic periods of the porcelains; and he was also an expert collector of antique gold timepieces of European make—made so by dealing with the released wealth of these old families of the Imperial *entourage*. From some secure hiding place were brought forth

vases of two and three thousand dollars' value; and the expert paid twenty or thirty dollars for small saucers of the Ch'ien Lung period, or one hundred dollars for a teapot that would hold one ordinary cup of tea. These, he said, were the most reasonable prices to be found in Peking.

Such are the contrasts between the luxury and refinement of the ruling class and the sordid condition of the masses, though the evidences now found are largely survivals of the past which are being rapidly obliterated by the revolutionary social changes going on. What we are now witnessing is the destruction of the remnant of this favored class of the past; shall we see the corresponding improvement in the lot of the masses? Perhaps the fact that the masses are now enjoying the privilege of daily visitation of the parks of the old Forbidden City, and are sipping their tea where of old only the Imperially favored might do so, is an earnest of what may eventually happen on a much wider scale. But time, in China, is measured in generations.

FAMINE

The real economic condition of China is indicated by the frequency of famine. Two independent investigations made recently of historical records disclosed the average of about one famine a year during the Christian era; to be exact, 1,828 famines between 108 B.C. and 1911 A.D. While most of these were local, affecting but one province, all were of sufficient extremity to require government action for their relief. A famine is usually recorded as a drought sufficient to cause failure of crops; and since there is little accumulated surplus, with no adequate transportation facilities, starvation in the affected areas is inevitable. In the Imperial days, each province or district or city had its own storage warehouse for rice or wheat, in which the tributes or taxes for the Imperial Government were kept. These served as granaries from which a starving population could be fed. Since the Revolution these ware-

houses have all been destroyed, so that famine conditions, unless checked by advantages of modern transportation, develop much more quickly now than in the past. Some of these famines, even within comparatively recent times, have been of enormous proportions. One lasting from 1876 to 1879 caused the death of thirteen million people. Even with all the facilities of modern transportation, in the recent famine of 1920, five hundred thousand perished. The incredible amount of human suffering and misery caused by these recurrent famines is indicated historically by the frequent records of resort to cannibalism, and in the present day by the harvesting of elm bark, willow leaves, and various roots by the farmers in these regions, as a precaution against insufficient food supply.

The causes of famine are various—economic, natural, political, and social. In his recent authoritative work on this subject,[1] Mr. W. H. Mallory enumerates these as follows. Among the economic causes are an actual lack of food supply, short crops, surplus of labor, lack of credit, exactions of the money lender, antiquated agricultural methods, depletion of forests, poor transportation facilities. Among the natural causes are deforestation, droughts, floods, earthquakes, typhoons, and the locust pest. Among the political causes are militarism, banditry, heavy taxation by corrupt officials, the opium traffic. Among the social causes are ancestor worship, the high birth-rate, early marriage, social waste due to feasts and public ceremonies, burial customs (especially use of tillable lands for graves), waste of time, foot binding, and the conservatism of the people. In general, there stand out as the major factors: over-population caused by religious and social ideals connected with ancestor worship, and economic backwardness, which does not provide against flood, drought, and poor transportation.

[1] *China, Land of Famine.*

TRANSPORTATION

An essential feature in China's backwardness, and an essential element in any great economic improvement, is to be found in the methods of transportation. The problem of food, the problem of government, the problem of the militarists, the problem of banditry, the problems of famine, of flood, of unified and strong central government, of modern industry, and of general intelligence, are all bound up with the problem of transportation. Taking account of area and population, probably no country is so backward in its method of transportation as China. The railroads are few and very infrequent —about 7000 miles when in operation; and in many portions of the country—especially in the densely populated areas where rice is cultivated—there are no roads and few beasts of burden. While wheelbarrow transportation is extensively developed in some regions, and donkey or camel transportation in others, the transportation of goods is yet chiefly accomplished by human labor. The one respect in which China excels in transportation is in the canals. Though built for both irrigation and drainage, they serve for transportation more extensively than in any other country.

The excessive burden which this lack of transportation facilities places on China cannot be estimated. It costs more to bring a bushel of wheat to the industrial center of Hankow from the river basin in Shensi—three hundred miles—than it does to bring it from Seattle. So the Shensi farmer gets only one third the market value of his crop while the remainder goes for cost of transportation. Good anthracite coal is mined in Shansi for a few cents a ton, but even with the railroad (foreign owned), it costs about twenty dollars a ton to get it to Hankow.

The limit which primitive transportation methods put on famine relief throws an interesting sidelight on the whole transportation question and demonstrates the intolerable burden

placed on China's economic condition by the lack of modern facilities. A strong man can carry about one hundred catties (113 pounds) about fifty li—twenty-six kilometers or about eighteen miles—per day. The average distance of a carry is about ten or eleven miles per day. But he will consume two catties of food per day and his family of five will need five and one half catties more. At seven and one half catties a day, the load will support carrier and family thirteen days, or a distance of six and one half days at eighteen kilometers per day. In other words, the absolute physical limit of extending food relief on a large scale in a famine area is about seventy-five miles.

The burden imposed on the whole country by such methods is obvious. The average day's work for one man is one ton per one kilometer (.6 per mile). At this rate it would take nearly two billion men working 365 days a year to carry the railway freight tonnage of the United States. Though the wage of carriers is about twelve cents (gold) a day, the average cost of freight transportation away from railways and water ways is ten times that of the United States.

Within the last few years experts have come to realize that the problem of famine and of food relief is as much a matter of transportation as it is of crops. Consequently, all recent famine relief measures have concentrated on road building and water conservancy. Funds used for relief require labor on roads or dikes. Permanent funds are being loaned for preventive measures against floods; responsible officials and people are being interested in the problem of transportation. With internal peace, China would witness a great activity in road building. As it is now, China has about one thousand miles of dirt country road, and surfaced roads only within a few city limits; while the United States, with one fourth of the population has 2,500,000 miles of rural roads and 300,000 miles of surfaced roads, and these are being rapidly increased. This contrast in roads gives perhaps the best index of China's

TRAVEL BY CHAIR AT THE MING TOMBS

F. J. Muller

PRIMITIVE AND MODERN TRANSPORTATION

Richard Wood Randolph

JUNKS ON UPPER YANGTSE

Lewis R. Freeman

RAILWAY BUILT BY CHINESE

economic backwardness; it also indicates one of the first steps toward the way out. In all Oriental countries where there has been a marked improvement of rural conditions in recent years, there has also been a marked development of road building. This is one service that "imperialism" has brought to other countries of the Orient that China only can bring to herself. The daily labor of a Chinese coolie will purchase a coolie transportation of one ton per mile; while the common laborer's wage in America will purchase from two to four hundred kilometer-tons of railway transportation. This is a measure of what transportation will accomplish in the improvement of general standards of living.

Thus we see the first set of factors in our problem: a vast population whose numbers can only be estimated; a country which has revealed but little mineral wealth, and promises none sufficient to support a modern industrial country; a land which yields its agricultural wealth to hard labor and infinite pains in conserving its fertility and where eighty-five per cent of the population must be devoted to food-producing activities. From these there has resulted an economic standard of living lower than that in any other civilized country or in any other large aggregate of human beings, and a frequency of famine that has proved to be the chief check on population. To these limitations of nature, a further hindrance of human origin has made this oppressive control of natural environment complete: lack of any efficient methods of transportation. Probably the pressure of population on food supply, preventing any intensive development of animal transportation, has been partly responsible. Dependence on a large population needing some form of employment, ease of water transportation, religious or animistic beliefs prejudicial to any disturbance of the land surface, have contributed with other forces in preventing the development of man's initial control over the physical environment.

What heaven has decreed, man cannot disobey.

When the fire is lighted, the whole family should be kept warm.

The loftiest towers rise from the ground.

—*Chinese proverbs*

The Scholar is the highest of the four classes of people.

—*Confucian Analects*

To the really educated man, there is no caste or class distinction.

—*Confucius*

CHAPTER III

INSTITUTIONS AND THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND

TRIUMPH over the limitations of natural environment, solution of the problems of the pressure of population, the continuous existence of a people through the centuries, has been made possible through the character of its fundamental social institutions. One feature of this social organization, guaranteeing survival, is its unity. Government, family, industry, business organization, religion, all have grown up from the same sources and under the same influences and hence possess a homogeneity, a mutual adaptability, and a durability not often found in other societies.

GOVERNMENT: NATION, PROVINCE, DISTRICT, TOWN, AND VILLAGE

That a country which seems quite unable to arrive at any settled political condition or to establish a stable government in our own generation should yet possess some kind of government that has outlasted all others is one of the intriguing aspects of the Chinese problem. Even though the description be but a cursory one, no adequate grasp of the present situation, either in its hopeful or its discouraging aspect, can be gained without some consideration of the government in the past and of the background of that on the surface at present. For, back of the turmoil which is presented as a moving picture in the daily press, there must be something far more stable and far more significant than the meaningless struggle of the militarists or the ineffective motions of a ghostlike government. That something is the survival of the ancient system, through which the masses of the people continue to govern themselves as of old, indifferent to politics if left alone by the militarists.

Under the old régime, the emperor—representing the will

of Heaven, though guided by counselors—ruled by edicts and the appointment of viceroys or governors; but for the most part he left the people alone. From each province, except in time of crop failure, famine, or disaster, he received a generous though not burdensome tribute, proportioned in amount to its wealth. When disaster overtook a region, tribute was remitted and relief given. Each large province, or group of smaller provinces, was ruled by a viceroy appointed by the emperor. Under the viceroy, or sometimes in independent control of a province, was a governor. The viceroys, with their power of recruiting and maintaining an army, of coining money or borrowing it, were practically independent. The chief function of the viceroys and governors, aided by a few provincial officers—chief among whom was the treasurer and collector of taxes—was to oversee the minor officials. While law, in the sense of legislative enactment, scarcely existed, custom, Confucian rules of conduct, edicts, and the rule of equity prevailed and were declared by a provincial judge. Every province was divided into prefectures, each under a prefect possessing a number of general functions. But the three legs upon which Chinese government really rests are three officers yet lower in order: the magistrates of the district counties, or *hsien,* the elders of the village, and the heads of the family groups.

Presiding over the *hsien,* representing to the great masses of the Chinese people the embodiment of government, and exercising a great variety of powers and duties, is the district magistrate. In this most complex of societies, organized on a patriarchal system, the magistrate represents the patriarchal government. Selected originally because of scholarly ability and familiarity with custom, tradition, and the Confucian texts as shown by competitive examination, he is the judge of first instance in all matters of controversy. In accordance with the popular term applied to him, "father and mother official," his function is, rather, that of guardian and protector—really the educator—of his people.

Manifold are the duties of a magistrate. If a murder, theft, or other crime is committed, he must investigate. Should a dead body be found, he becomes the coroner. If the land tax is burdensome or a crop fails, he mitigates the severity of the government obligations. Are soldiers to be raised, he superintends the levy; if a census is to be made, as a basis of taxation or conscription, his is the responsibility. Land registries are in his charge, as are also important business contracts. Responsibility for school funds or lands, the support of education, the supervision of the written examinations, are all his. He must relieve famine, guard against floods, succor those who suffer from either. As high priest of his people he conducts the annual worship or special intercession at lack of rainfall, at the sowing or the harvest, at special occasions, as the New Year. For the literati he conducts the reverence to Confucius twice a year. He rewards or calls attention to notable cases of filial piety or of the faithful widow. Until recent years the magistrate must not be a native of the district over which he was appointed, lest he be tempted to partiality; but as a reward for meritorious service, unless called higher, he might remain in the district indefinitely. But with the disappearance of the Empire and the old examination system by which the magistrates were selected, though they still continue to function, the prohibition against serving in the native district no longer holds. Foreigners having official contacts with the Chinese prefer to deal with these men. The famine relief commission and conservancy boards find them the most dependable of officials. Held to their obligation by local responsibility, they remain in office long enough to carry out a responsible policy. Contracts with them over a period of years, unless catastrophe intervenes, are faithfully carried out.

The magistrate dwells in the one large city or walled town of the *hsien* and rules the city population directly. In this he is assisted by various county officials, but, until the present century, most of all by the "headman of the hundreds," the

pochia or *tafao.* Every ten families must select a headman; and every ten of these (a *chia*) must select a *pochia.* The latter must keep accurate lists of families, of their membership, must note the advent of strangers or visitors, and report at stated times to the magistrate. Even yet the organization of cities by streets, blocks, or local units is a survival of the old *pochia* system. By these groups or streets, police and local municipal affairs are kept up; and the old order is only now being gradually replaced by the modern system of police and municipal government. The development of modern methods of transportation, of industry, of factory control, of militarism, has contributed largely to the undermining of the former system; but its remnants yet function as a mode of self-government, supplementing the ineffective modern forms imposed upon it. In its partially broken-down condition it is assisted by the guilds, chambers of commerce, and kindred organizations. The *Ch'ing ui Tien* or the Constitutional Code of the Manchus stated:

> Ten households make a *pai* (tithing); each *pai* shall have a headman. Ten *pai* make a *chia;* each *chia* shall have a chief. Ten *chia* make a *pao;* each *pao* shall have a director. These heads of the *pai, chia,* and *pao* shall each be elected by the ten heads of the groups which he represents.

This system in principle long antedates the Manchus. Thus the family units were brought into a village or local unity, neighbor was brought to govern neighbor, and a system of practical working democracy made possible the long continuance of a formal Oriental despotism that touched but lightly or occasionally the life of the common man; it made possible also a practical working local government which has survived the vicissitudes of militancy, frequent civil war, corrupt or inefficient general government, and constitutes the hope of the future.

The guilds are similar to the old medieval guilds of

Europe; but, notwithstanding the fact that in them we have a present-day working survival of an obsolete European institution that has attracted much historical research, scarcely any study has been given to these existing forms. We know in general of these several types. The immigrants from a given province or city organize into a social or co-provincial guild. Thus the Ningpo guilds practically control Shanghai. While the functions of these are chiefly social, providing for the less fortunate of their own compatriots, other social guilds—for worship, pleasure, insurance, especially burial insurance—form a network in every locality. Of such are the *tongs* in American communities; chiefly fraternal in character, their particular object is that of insuring that the body of a deceased member shall be returned to his ancestral home. The tong warfare which occasionally furnishes the spirit of mystery for our newspaper write-ups usually springs from the violation of rules by some official of these guilds, especially as to overlapping membership. Merchants, bankers, professional men—all have their guilds. Each trade is organized into a guild, with its masters, journeymen, craftsmen. Where the handicraft system yet prevails, this system is an essential part of it. Also, when markets are local and when articles are made to order in the shop where the raw material only is purchased, control of prices, of quality of goods, of contracts, and of the entire business procedure is by rule of the guild. For this reason the elaborate amount of legal and governmental machinery, made necessary by our complicated industrial and commercial system in the West, finds little place in China. For this reason, too, any development of legal procedure, as in the West, has been slow, and when forced upon the Chinese by Western demands, does not work well. Such organization is, for them, wholly artificial, and without meaning. Wherefore, the insistence of the West that the Chinese develop a modern—that is, Western, even Anglo-Saxon—system of laws, courts, and legal procedure to care for business, is rather aside from the point, and cannot

function well, even if developed. Many Western firms prefer to deal with these guilds in settlement of accounts rather than to depend upon consular courts.

But, as often remarked in all accounts of China, the vast bulk of the Chinese live in villages—there being little population scattered over the land—where contact even with the county magistrate is an unusual occasion. Here guilds are developed only in rudiment, if at all, and the *pochia* is reduced to the rudimentary form, that of the village elder. The rule of the village elder remains the most significant and important part in Chinese government; it has been less modified than any other feature of the ancient structure of society; and it is a form of pure and primitive democracy. Through its influence Chinese life and society goes on, indifferent to the present military chaos, and by many observers it is considered to be the chief political hope of the future.

THE FAMILY

The center of this village system and of the entire social system is the family. Unlike the family in the West, the Chinese family may consist of four or five generations and four or five collateral branches; that is, twelve or fifteen groups all told, all living in one household. To say that these groups all live under one roof is not literally correct; for the Chinese house, with its four pavilions or rooms surrounding a court, with the addition of supplementary courts as they are demanded, renders privacy of the individual family groups possible. So different is the Western family with its individualism and its limited group of one couple and their dependent children, that quite unfortunately the one word entirely fails to convey the two ideas. Nor does the word clan, the next larger unit in China, convey the family idea. For a village of from two hundred to five hundred distinct families may all belong to one clan; or the village may represent many clans, and several families of each clan. This com-

posite family is under the dominance of the patriarchal head, really under that of family law and tradition. Education consists in informing the younger generation in the traditional customs, while each group may have in addition its own "family laws." Worship of ancestors holds the family together and necessitates its perpetuity by adoption of sons, or by concubinage if necessary. The earnings of the family constitute a common fund, nominally under the control of the father, really largely controlled by the mother. Women in this system are not repressed, as is sometimes inferred. The mother has always a place on the ancestral tablets with the father; her spirit is revered with that of the father; her place in the management of the household and in the training of the young is secure and important. The loss or gain of any individual member is the loss or gain of all. A scholar or student member is supported by the group. The group is responsible for a crime, a misdemeanor, or a debt of any member. In other words, the group bears a responsibility for all its members; and political and social responsibility is thus an affair of the group or family, not of the individual. Herein is found one of the chief explanations of the fact that Chinese society goes on irrespective of wars or bad government. Herein, also, is an explanation of the reputed honesty of the Chinese in any business dealing; for all agreements, when definitely made as such, become a group responsibility—oftentimes met at great sacrifice and, from the Western point of view, with no individual obligation. Here, again, Western industrialism assumes a great responsibility if it deliberately breaks down this system of economic responsibility in favor of its own individualism, and should not recriminate unduly if it suffers somewhat in the process.

Filial piety, the first duty of the Chinese, holds the family together. The youth is married, through arrangement of the parent, usually long before he has reached the age of self-support; the wife cancels all connections with her own family

and becomes a member of her husband's family, worshiping their ancestors. A saying of Confucius, "Children should not wander far while their parents are alive," is yet commonly observed and holds the family as a bond. In a similar way, loyalty to brothers, sisters, and kinsmen is taught. Violation of these rules may be brought before the family tribunal. The family, then, not the individual, constitutes the real unit in Chinese society, and thus influences greatly—and in ways difficult to understand in the West—industry, business, government, and social relations in general. This fundamental difference causes much of the misunderstanding between the East and the West. Western Christianity, for example, is wholly individualistic, and has made little or no attempt to adjust itself to the Chinese conception of the moral unity of the family.

The family, or a group of related families forming the clan, is further cemented together by the worship in the ancestral hall. This memorial temple contains the small wooden tablets upon which are written the names of the ancestors of the family, as previously stated, the husband and wife together. Such ancestral temples may hold the common worship of several hundred Chinese families, several thousand families in the Western sense. Especially in the South, where social disruption by famine, flood, and civil war has not been so serious as in the north, many of the villages consist of but one clan. Consequently, the ancestral temples here may be very pretentious affairs, and, in fact, often are very beautiful buildings. I have visited some that have been turned into industrial schools, girls' schools, or ordinary schools. As these temples very often own common land or property, they may have considerable wealth. Occasionally this wealth may be devoted by the philanthropic head of a clan to some such school or enterprise as just indicated. Oftener it is used as a common source of income, to meet emergencies, relieve distress of a poor member of the clan, educate a scholar, or—most frequently—

for a general distribution on the occasion of the semi-annual worship of ancestors. The ancestral hall is, especially in the South, the home of the school, which is usually a clan school. Or it may form a threshing floor, and may store the farming implements owned in common by the clan. Here, except when guarded by the head of the clan, is kept the family genealogy, the book of record of family history and family rules, which the elders of the family must enforce.

Subordinate to this main ancestral hall of the clan may be many smaller ancestral halls of the families; or, conversely, the family unit may have a room set aside in the home. In very poor families this may be reduced to a shrine with tablets of paper only. In recent times the modern photographic portrait tends to supplement or take the place of the ancestral tablet and forms one of the most interesting illustrations of the influence of modern science on ancient custom.

However much the clan and family organization may assume of the burden of political government, local or village government centers rather in the village temple and the system of elders. This temple is the center of the social life of the village, as the ancestral temple is the center of the economic and cultural and religious life of the clan or family. In each village there is by common consent a group of elders composed of the best educated, the wisest and the most influential of the heads of families. Constituting a more or less permanent group, it is this body that conducts negotiations with the higher governmental officials and with neighboring villages, settles the more important village quarrels, punishes the more serious crimes, receives the visitors, and in general sees that the traditions and conventions of Chinese social and group organizations are carried out. It is this group which the official or casual visitor meets, and which gives one such confidence in the honesty, stability, and efficiency of Chinese society.

The internal affairs of the village are looked after by a series of offices which are passed around among the families

in succession. Each village or town is divided into sections, either by streets, areas, or groups of families. The offices are distributed among these families, each family designating the member entitled to hold office—either the head of the family or some efficient head of one of the unitary families in the group. The incumbents of such offices usually serve without compensation, rendering services which oftentimes are so onerous as to be escaped rather than sought. The village temple is the official home of these groups. Frequently, also, the court or yard of the temple is the village market, the village threshing floor, or it may contain the village school. There is seldom any priesthood in any of these temples; consequently, while idols may be found therein, usually of some deified hero, worship is an individual act only. The temples themselves perform rather a social, economic, and political function, with religious services only on rare or special occasions. The village temple may also own and rent land, rent out the market, or receive gifts from the superstitious worshipers. In such ways it may be a source of income for the village to support a school, relieve distress, keep up the roads, pay a levy, maintain lights, landing places, canals, etc., or contribute in any way to the common welfare. Thus, in these temples, through either the elders or the board of administrative officers, all the functions of government are carried on.

If unmolested by marauding bandits or looting militarists, about eighty or ninety per cent of the Chinese population are thus capable of complete and adequate self-government, and have very little contact with the higher units of government. In fact, the district magistrate forms about their only contact with the outside world and the general government. Aside from the annual land tax, this is about all the contact that is essential in normal times. An understanding of this system will indicate how it is that China goes on in a normal way, indifferent to the disturbance of the wars of the militarists if those wars are not in their immediate region. Unfortunately,

there has recently entered in a wholly novel disruptive force, whose influence no one can measure or foretell—that of Communistic propaganda. If it is constructive, as in certain of the political and even economic influences in the city, the influence may be helpful; if it is merely destructive, as in so many of its manifestations, the effect on this mainstay of Chinese social stability cannot be other than disastrous.

THE HANDICRAFT SYSTEM

Earlier than any other people, the Chinese developed a minute division of labor in industrial pursuits. Due chiefly to the pressure of population but partly to the early development of the arts, partly to the absence of machinery, partly to isolation, the minute division of labor continues and results in the continuance of the handicraft system. Only to a slight extent does it exist in the country villages, for here, to a remarkable degree, the farmer cares for all the needs of his simple life. Such division of labor as exists occurs chiefly in the family. The few mechanical needs are mostly met at home. Clothing and shoes are home-made in many regions, even cloth may be woven at home. Farm implements are at a minimum; the plow, if one is used, is home-made; but most cultivation is by hand, with a few primitive tools.

In the larger village, town, and city one sees the handicraft system, like that of medieval Europe, flourishing in all its details. A shop or store is not only a place where articles are sold, but where, uninfluenced by the importation of foreign-made machine goods, articles are made. Seldom can one buy outright an article which one wants, it must be ordered made from model or description. The cleverness of the Chinese workman in imitating any article left to be copied is proverbial among the foreigners who live in China. In the larger cities shops may carry a limited number of staple articles, but frequently one cannot find ready-made any needed article.

Streets or sections of streets are given over to certain handi-

crafts. There are embroidery streets, brass streets, silver streets, lantern streets, silk streets, chair or furniture streets, coffin streets, curio streets, bird streets; regions for fish, grain, rice, rugs, old clothes, second-hand articles; "thieves' markets"; groups of shops for almost every conceivable kind of article may be found, the number and extent depending upon the size of the town or city. Scattered among the shops are restaurants innumerable; and enough money changers, barber shops, and personal service stands of various kinds to make the composite necessary for an urban population.

The organization of this system is simple, and has been handed down through the ages. The master workman owns the shop, takes the orders, fills contracts, oversees and is responsible for his journeymen and apprentices. The journeymen may be one or many, each living on a modest wage; perhaps as a member of the household, perhaps with a simple home of his own. The apprentices, serving without wages for years, live on the most meager of fare and with the simplest of necessities. The bench or the counter with a mat or thin cotton pad, will make a bed; a block of wood or porcelain, a pillow. Late into the night one may see or hear the seemingly unending toil of these laborers. Certainly, no factory system will add to the hours of labor of the workingman! As the Chinese shop, directly facing the street—which usually is the only "sidewalk" also—is opened for business by taking down the front shutters and exposing the entire interior, anyone curious about the way other people live and work finds these streets most fascinating. It is as though it were a toy city—with the entire fronts taken from all the houses, with every form of handicraft man ever invented, and with every curious and delicate and ingenious article man ever fabricated. As with no other, one can observe the details of the industrial life of these people. And yet scarcely anything has been written in English on this phase of their life, and perhaps but one scientific study has been made of it.

The significance of the guilds in the past may be judged by this mention made by Marco Polo: "There were in this city (Hangchow) twelve guilds of the different crafts and each guild had twelve thousand houses in the occupation of its workmen." [1]

A third phase of this industrial system is to be found in the homes where agricultural or other forms of work are supplemented by spinning, weaving, embroidery, and lace work. In many regions, where a loom is to be found in nearly every home, this system is very extensive. Practically all the silk used in China is so fabricated. So is much of the cotton cloth, of which these people use an enormous amount. Certain regions, such as Nanking, still make the exquisite brocades which bring joy to every lover of the beautiful. Since the great variety of the Chinese silks made for their own markets do not have the dimensions, the colors, or the quality demanded for the Western markets, few of these products find their way to the West.

A final phase of the handicraft system is reached when it is adapted to produce for the quantity market of the West. Thus the manufacture of rugs, still under the handicraft system, has been developed to extensive proportions around Tientsin and Peking. The introduction of knitting machines into the family on a rental system is now producing a large quantity of silk and cotton socks, stockings, under and outer garments, etc., both for the local and the foreign trade. The making of straw braid, out of which women's hats are fashioned, has become an extensive industry around Chefoo. The hair-net industry, once the economic salvation of the poverty-oppressed regions of Shantung, has now been almost destroyed by the Western change in styles of wearing the hair. In some of these industries—as, for instance, rug-weaving and the knitting industry—the necessary materials and tools are furnished to the workmen, who then make the articles in their own homes;

[1] *The Book of Marco Polo.*

in others, they are being brought together in small shops, thus paralleling the stages through which the factory system developed in the West.

The impact of Western industrialism on this system, through the importation of goods made by machines, with the aid of which one workman produces as much as a score or a hundred of handicraft workmen, is the influence which is producing the great economic disturbance in China and which underlies the political disturbance. Herein, also, lies the great importance of tariff autonomy to the Chinese. That the Western business man, with this situation before him, should hold that the Chinese have no right to protect themselves against such a revolutionary upheaval—should demand that the Western governments use all their military power to force unending quantities of machine-made goods of the West upon an economic and industrial system which, in its dissolution, threatens to carry with it a social and political system of a quarter of the population of the globe—is, to say the least, almost unbelievable shortsightedness.

MODERN INDUSTRY IN CHINA

In one important respect the entire problem of China may be stated in terms of modern industry: the actual economic support of China's millions demands that modern industry—machinery and organization—must supplement the limited production of food. But the introduction of modern industry means also modern individualism, which undermines China's traditional moral and social control as found in the family or clan system of social organization; which, again, actually supplies the economic support, the moral, religious, and, as it were, political control. This constitutes an important phase of China's present problem. Modern industry is coming in; individualism is replacing the old family socialism; no moral or religious or social control adequate to the transition has been developed. Lack of these controls imposes upon the govern-

OLD ROAD—SHANSI

MODERN ROAD—SHANSI

Richard Wood Randolph

"TWO WOMEN SHALL BE GRINDING AT A MILL."

THE HANYANG STEEL WORKS

ment a task for which it is not prepared, and individualism fails to furnish it with the necessary support.

However, our chief concern is with the facts. Modern industrialism has three factors: transportation, or railways; raw material, or mines and agriculture; factories, or gross production. The first two factors we have previously considered. In one sense the factory is not altogether new. Under the old system mass production of certain articles was so concentrated that such production has long been carried on in what amounts to factories. This was particularly true of porcelain, one of the chief manufactures of China. In a less degree it was true of lacquer ware, cloisonné, fans, matting—the wares which we are accustomed to consider typically Chinese. But for the most part these are luxuries. The real problem is the production of essentials on a large scale, through the development of the complicated modern system of production, which will not only permit but actually force a higher standard of living.

The iron, steel, and textile industries furnish the basis, and here some progress has been made. The chief untoward factor in the situation is that the iron industry, with its subsidiaries—including ship-building—is chiefly owned and controlled by the Japanese. Of the 118 modern cotton mills now operating in China, 48 are owned by foreigners, chiefly Japanese. Flour mills, match factories, silk filatures, and food-stuff manufactories have now become very numerous, while many distilleries, breweries, cigarette factories, printing and publishing houses, leather works, and sugar refineries indicate the rapid development of modern wants, met by large-scale production. Among those employing the largest capital, aside from the iron and steel industries, are the chemical and cement works. The *China Year Book* devotes many pages to the enumeration of individual manufacturing firms, in fifty-eight different lines. There can be no doubt in the mind of any thoughtful observer that peace and stable government would bring a very rapid and extensive development of the modern industrial system.

The extent—even the rapid growth—of the modern industrial system is not, however, so important as other features of the situation, such as the rate of wage, productivity and organization of labor, child labor, and the effect of the change on the traditional social organization.

The first feature that strikes an observer is the appallingly low wage. Of one of the larger cotton mills, employing 2,500 laborers and running on a twelve-hour shift, the daily wage scale was as follows:

	MINIMUM *Mex. cents*	MAXIMUM *Mex. cents*
SKILLED LABOR (Foremen)		
Men	35	60
Women	30	50
ORDINARY LABOR		
Men	30	50
Women	20	30
Boys (15)	20	30
Girls (15)	10	20
Small boys (10)	10	20
Small girls (10)	7	10

To compute this in Western rates, divide by half; that is, in this factory, which paid one hundred per cent dividends for several years, the highest daily wage was thirty cents (gold) and the lowest three and one half cents. These figures are now four or five years old, and the situation has somewhat changed. At the same time, wages in the largest coal mine in China were from twenty to twenty-eight cents (or half that in our money); out of which the laborer must pay three or four percentages to labor contractors, mine bosses, etc. These figures are typical; and they indicate that, with the low standard of living throughout the village and rural regions, there is an inexhaustible supply of low-wage labor. They also indicate the very wide latitude for improvement in rate of wage and in living conditions. That improvement must begin with the factory laborers; for here there is the possibility of increase,

due to the very large profits and to the fact that prices are fixed, to some extent, with reference to a world market. The low wage and the unlimited supply of labor mean that less care may be taken of labor conditions here than elsewhere. Though it must be said that, to a casual observer, the conditions under which labor is performed in factories, regarding light, ventilation, cleanliness, crowding, etc., seem to be far better than average conditions under the prevailing handicraft and apprentice system. This is also true concerning the conditions under which the laborer lives in the regions where factory employers attempt to provide living quarters for the employees. Unsupervised conditions, no doubt, are appallingly bad—as are the hygienic conditions under which most of the city population lives.

With reference to the productivity of labor, several conditions must be borne in mind. Where the population is so large, where living is so near the subsistence border for all, where all activities are on a traditional basis, where individualism is replaced by a group unity, the object in most industrial activity is not to produce as much as possible but to have such activity support as many laborers as possible. Division of labor is carried further in China than in any other society, not so much to increase efficiency as to increase jobs. While this situation is partially counteracted by the piece or contract system—as in the coal mines—or by the synchronizing of labor and machinery, yet this general tendency is one of the difficulties which modern industry meets. While industry in the West is confronted at times by the same false economic theory, conditions in China are much worse, for the belief is universal and forms a part of the people's attitude toward industrial and social organization in general. Nor can the situation be met so long as capital takes such profits as it does in some cases, or labor receives so low a return. The general economic theory is reinforced by the dominance of the family system. The ethics of the family organization compel anyone in a position of

authority in business, industry, or office to support as many of his family or relatives as is possible for the enterprise to carry; so the unproductivity of labor is fostered by this social tradition. Furthermore, as the earnings of the individual belong to the family group, the incentive of individual gain above mere subsistence is largely lost. These, together with many other aspects of Chinese life, such as the numerous holidays, unfamiliarity with machinery, unwillingness to respond to any external urging that seems to imply force, all result in a relative inefficiency. American manufacturers who have established textile factories in China, drawn by the lure of extremely low wages, state that in the long run the cost of production is about the same in China as in America, the very low wage being offset by inefficiency. When one views the problem of the industrialization of China as a means of increasing the productivity of its people, and hence of raising the standard of living, it presents great complexity and little immediate promise.

The most effective means for changing the "rate of wage" situation that is now operating is the organization of labor. This movement began in Canton some years ago, and has been greatly stimulated by the Russian Communist influence. However, this latter has been so disruptive, and so closely connected with political and general social propaganda, that the constructive influence of organized labor on the industrial situation has been lost; the effect of the Communistic views having been to paralyze industry entirely. What adjustment will eventually be made, to secure the continuance of the modern industrial activities essential to the improvement of China, remains to be seen.

The Chinese are past masters of the strike; by means of passive resistance they have been able to control almost any social crisis. But to passive resistance the Communists have added a use of force which has proved as paralyzing to progress as it is foreign to Chinese tradition. Some of the demands of

labor—that of a threefold increase of wage, that of payment of the arrears on such an increase for one-, two-, or three-year periods—constitute the favorite method of operation. Of course, no industry or enterprise can shoulder such a burden, for which no previous provision has been made. When Communized labor has taken all property out of the hands of the property-owning class, as has happened in some centers, the situation assumes an aspect quite other than the problem of modern industrial development. Under normal conditions it would seem that organization of labor, if restricted to normal channels, might hold great possibilities for the improvement of economic conditions of the masses in China, both because of the common use of passive resistance and because of the similarity to the old guild system.

As explained elsewhere, handicraft labor—as formerly in Europe—is thoroughly organized with guilds. Price and quality of commodity, rate of wage, conditions of labor, relation of workman to master, and relationships of masters among themselves, are all controlled by guild custom or regulation. The apprentice is protected, supported, and controlled by the master; the journeymen and masters are united in the guild. Without these institutions, the old industrial system could not carry on. Workmen and employers, then, are equally familiar with this form of union. But although the modern form of labor union places the laborer in opposition to the employer, while the old guilds united them, modern social as well as individual organization seems to permit no other form. At least for the immediate future, this new form is certain to exercise a larger influence than the old in the development of modern industry.

This is another phase of the matter that is of profound importance. Modern industry, as already intimated, is proving one of the great disintegrating forces in Chinese society, especially in its impact on the family solidarity. To understand the significance of this impact, one must recall that all moral

and social standards furnished in the West by religion, by government, by business, by community life, by the press, and by education, is furnished in China by the family. Morality, patriotism, honesty, industry, helpfulness, coöperation, and neighborliness are all replaced by the family virtues; and the modern state, industry, church, school, or individual family unit of man, wife, and children, has evolved no hold upon the individual Chinese—with a few exceptions—to replace these old controls, which were effective, comprehensive, and absolute. Consequently, the break-up of the old family system is having appalling results among the uneducated as the effectiveness of the Communist propaganda is proving.

The operation of the modern industrial organization on the family unity is to be seen in several respects. The individual worker is taken from his village home and remains away more or less permanently; he associates with others who in a similar way are dislocated from a normal social environment; he needs all his funds for support, so he neither contributes to nor receives help from the family group. When he marries, it is later in life than was formerly the custom, and likely to be on his own choice rather than on that of the family. He then sets up a small individualistic family of his own, which has none of the moral qualities of the old clan family, wherein all group virtues were developed through community life and possessions. Marriage customs, which require that each youth shall marry out of his clan name, bound the old communities together. For each village seldom had more than two or three or four clan families represented. These were welded together by the compulsory intermarriage, as were also villages of a given vicinity. In the modern industrial community innumerable families are represented. There is no difficulty in finding a wife of a different clan name, in fact, these are so numerous that in the larger communities marriage ceases to be a unifying force in the community. To this dissociation

from the family must also be added dissociation from the land—and the two strongest bonds which hold the ignorant Chinese peasantry to any moral or social standards are gone.

What, then, is to regulate them? Industrialization seems necessary to avoid starvation; an intense class struggle together with the disintegration of all traditional social standards, as well as of the foundation institutions, seems inevitable. Contemplating this prospect, Sun Yat Sen advocated a State socialism: foreign capital to furnish the funds; Chinese labor, the docile and productive industry; Chinese government, the organization; the Chinese people as a whole, rather than individual capitalists, to reap the profit. Present conditions do not look hopeful for such a solution with respect to any of the three essential factors.

When visualizing various aspects of the social and economic transitions now going on, one realizes that the problem of China is no simple one; certainly not one to be solved in a few months, or even in a few years.

CHILD LABOR

One feature of the industrial system, common to both the traditional handicraft system and the modern factory system, deserves special attention—that of child labor. Visitors to the rug factories of Peking or Tientsin must have been impressed by the large number of children engaged in the making of rugs. In fact, most of the knot-tying—which is by far the greater part of the labor in the making of a rug—is done by children, four to eight to a rug, under the supervision of perhaps one journeyman worker. Many of these children are only six or seven years of age; practically all are under fourteen or fifteen—for by that age they become sufficiently skilled and sufficiently valuable to receive a wage; for the truth is that the greater part of the labor on these rugs that adorn so many American homes is done by children who receive no wage except their

food and a sleeping place—perhaps, too, the scant clothing which they wear. At least, such was the condition in many of the factories, as shown by personal investigation, a few years ago. Even the journeymen workers received but a few cents a day. And one often wondered whence these workers were recruited; and what became of the numerous children who served their five or seven years of apprenticeship for their "board and keep"—an expression literally true here, for the floor, the frame of the loom, or a hard board was the only bed, and they were kept in the inclosure practically as prisoners. The greater number of these children—mostly boys—were brought from the country villages, where their families would doubtless be glad to be relieved of a mouth to feed, and would consider assured labor with the necessary living for a period of years as a great favor indeed. It should be added that the increased prices which American customers may have had to pay for their rugs recently do not represent any increase to these tiny laborers, but only an increased contribution to the militarists.

In the silk filatures of the South—a form of factory belonging as a supplement to the old handicraft system—child labor is also found in abundance. Here, however, it is in a different and perhaps less reprehensible form. Children are seldom employed except in the family group. The child nearly always accompanies the mother worker. In fact, the factory may be quite "cluttered up" with babies, left around by their mothers. But children of all ages accompany their parents; and much of the unwinding of cocoons and the spinning of silk is done by family groups. The cocoons are steeped in very hot water, and unwound from these kettles onto the spindle. One woman, with child assistants, may tend many spindles. The offensive features here, as far as child labor is concerned, are the steaming atmosphere and the very long hours.

In the cotton factories of modern industrialism children are employed directly in tending machines. The wage is a

mere pittance, the hours of labor usually twelve, with perhaps no intermission for eating and no free day in the seven.

However, every observer of the old handicraft system, and even of agriculture, has noticed the extensive participation of children in all forms of occupation, seemingly at any hour of the day or night. Evidently the opportunity for work is considered the highly essential thing in this land of starvation wages; not the age of the worker, the condition of labor, or even the rate of wage. The Tujun in command of Shanghai at the time of a recent campaign against child labor in that city expressed the opinion that the foreigners were "crazy" in attempting to close any opportunity for labor. As a matter of fact, the chief opposition to any restriction in child labor comes from the parents of the children, the older laborers, themselves. To them such restriction but represents a curtailment of the family income where the standard is so near the margin of subsistence, and is resented most bitterly.

The campaign just referred to was one arranged by the Y. W. C. A. in the effort to prohibit labor—among the two thousand children employed in factories in the foreign settlement of Shanghai—of children under ten, and, after four years, of those under twelve. While cotton mill employers, those chiefly affected, were not generally opposed, the reform would have required the approval of a quorum of the foreign-rate payees—about nine hundred out of twenty-seven hundred, —which it was not possible to obtain. While conditions in the modern factories are bad in this respect, unbelievably so if measured by Western standards, they are no better in the handicrafts and in the home. This constitutes simply one more feature of that most difficult and complicated economic problem—the problem of living in China. Reasoning from the Western industrial systems seems to be quite aside from the point, possessing little validity. Yet here is one place where the foreigner certainly might set a standard and an example, if he would.

COMMERCE: BUSINESS PROCEDURE

In the early days of commerce between China and the West trade was restricted to Canton, to a certain trading season in the year, and to passage through the hands of a small group of merchants selected by the Chinese Imperial authorities. These were finally limited to thirteen—the *hong* merchants of Canton. The foreign traders were confined to one place of residence, the *co hong*. They could not bring their families; they could not leave the precincts of the co hong or of the factories, as the warehouses and shops were termed. All trade must be consummated through one of the hong merchants, at prices which he might fix, or might agree upon with the foreign merchant. There was no competition; and a variety of charges or commissions—on ship, on cargo, on sale of goods, on every privilege and essential relation of trade—might be made by the hong merchant. As a result of the early wars with Great Britain, a definite scheme of custom duties, limited to five per cent on the value of the goods, replaced the old scheme of indefinite charges; additional trading ports were opened; plots of ground, sometimes very extensive, were granted, in which the foreigners might build their homes and shops, might reside and bring their families; each foreigner's own government, through its consular agents, was given the privilege of hearing and investigating all charges of misconduct and all disputes concerning trade. These privileges were all forced from the Chinese by the victorious armies and were sealed in the resulting treaties. Under the new conditions, the system of doing business through the hong merchant, or through middlemen representing the merchants who bought the goods, was continued; only by the force of these new treaty privileges, the middlemen became the agents of the foreign merchants rather than of the Chinese government.

Moreover, the middleman became the foreign merchant in China, protected by these governmental privileges, replacing

the old hong merchants with their special privileges protected by the Chinese Government. To do business with the Chinese, they must have interpreters and go-betweens, who understand local conditions, so a Chinese middleman was added. Borrowing the term from the Portuguese, who had first worked out the system, as they had the first concession, the word "compradore" was used. That it is still a common term, covering a custom always present in foreign business in China, is sufficient evidence of the antiquated character of the existing business system. There are now two middlemen for every transaction.

Fostered by artificial privileges and protected by abnormal political guarantees, this system of business has been continued to the present day. With the growth of trade and the natural development of competitive interests, now on the side of the foreign merchants, business interests and methods were insulated, as it were, by this artificial protection, so that the normal effects of competition either did not work or worked but slowly. The position of the Chinese middleman was so strengthened that he might readily profit at the expense of either employer or customer. The institution of "squeeze," or commission, became the established one, sanctioned and practiced by the foreigner as well as by the Chinese. To conduct such a system, profits must be large, and indeed the whole business structure is built upon the principle of large profits and small turnover, rather than the reverse, which prevails in the Western world. The entire system is archaic and would neither work nor be tolerated in the West.

The middleman, with the assistance of the compradore, performs one real service essential in the past, that of furnishing a stable currency and of interpreting the various and clumsy Chinese systems into a Western monetary system—though the Chinese believe that the chief service that he here performs is one saddled upon them by the unfair privileges accorded these middlemen. In becoming middleman, the foreigner developed a

new type of business, serviceable to both the foreign selling merchant and the Chinese purchaser; namely, that of making the exchange in money, as the compradore does in language. In course of time this financial middleman came to issue a currency which would take the place of the old Chinese bullion *taels,* and in so doing facilitated trade and again assisted the merchants on both sides. As this benefit developed, so did the corresponding banking service—that of furnishing the immediate capital to finance the transactions. Thus it happens that not only much of the banking—practically all of it engaged in foreign trade—but much of the currency issued in China is by foreign controlled banks. This again is a trespass upon sovereignty; one necessary at the time the custom was instituted, and then helpful to all parties; but now, despite the fact that the issues of foreign banks are far more stable than those of Chinese banks, it is, in the present situation, a limitation on the Chinese Government and on Chinese business. The Chinese claim that the influence of these foreign banks has constituted one chief obstacle to the development of a uniform government currency, and maintain that the custom these banks have of discounting their own notes from city to city is a heavy tax on trade, differing little from the old custom of piling up charges before the days of the treaties.

In general, but typical of many things Chinese, the position of the foreigner and of the Chinese is now reversed from what it was a century ago. The foreigner makes and applies the restrictions, controls the monopoly, and treats the Chinese as an outcast; consequently, the Chinese are now calling for the abolition of these conditions, as did the foreigner of yore, and —also as did the foreigner—are appealing to arms to secure the cancellation of the unfavorable conditions. In one respect the Chinese yet hold the whip hand, in that the foreign merchant is restricted to the treaty ports, both in his trade and residence. The condition on which this restriction may be cancelled is the abrogation of the extraterritorial rights.

Seemingly, the privilege of unrestricted trade and residence throughout the Republic would be far more to the business advantage of the foreign merchant than the present arrangement; but as he is wedded to his system of middlemen and compradors and special privileges, as well as to the large profits and small volume of trade practically guaranteed by his Government, he is either unable or unwilling to grasp the potentialities of the situation. Certain influences, not altogether political, are, however, forcing the issue to the front and to a solution. In the West, and particularly in the United States, business has developed within recent years into an entirely different system, wherein are involved the principles of small profits and large sales, speedy turnover, high wages of producer as well as high profits, direct contact between producer and consumer—or as direct as means of information and transportation permit. Some of these new business methods, especially in American merchandise, have made moderate headway in China; but they cannot go far under present restrictions. To a large degree, then, the protection which the foreign merchant in China is endeavoring to perpetuate in the old system of special favors, is not only against the Chinese Government but against up-to-date business methods of the West.

The change which has occurred in the Chinese position, corresponding to the desire of the West for wider trade privileges, or for direct contact with the Chinese consumer, is the desire of the Chinese to modernize their government and their culture, and to enter into the family of nations on a basis of equality. Such a transition takes time, and the foreign business interests cannot see far enough ahead to visualize the advantage; or else they lack faith in the ability of the Chinese to bring about their part of the necessary transition. Undoubtedly both phases of the transition must go on. The Chinese is most conscious of the foreigner's failure to bring about the changes in business relations and methods which are within his power; the foreigner is most conscious of the failure of

the Chinese to accomplish the transition necessary to make Chinese conditions, commercial and governmental, comparable to those in Western countries, as, for instance, the Japanese have done. This is, in fact, a fair statement of the problem as it stands now.

THE TRADITIONAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

No one phase of the traditional institutional organization of Chinese society had more permeating influence on all other institutions—governmental, religious, social—than the educational system, and none has so completely disappeared from the modern life.

When an educated Chinese is asked to indicate in what respect the civilization of China is superior to that of the West, he will invariably state that its chief merit lies in the esteem which is shown in his country for learning and in the position of influence and power which scholars and educated leaders possess. In these days of militarists, of confused social, political, and military movements, when most of the educational institutions in China are closed, or are used by the students as means of political agitation and propaganda, such a statement may impress the Westerner as much overdrawn. Nevertheless, this very situation, in which the immature and inexperienced dominate not only the educational institutions but much of the political tendencies is but a vindication of the claim, but now under wholly new and abnormal conditions. In fact, the claim gives the clue to understanding the present situation.

A reflective Chinese observer, familiar with conditions abroad, when asked for an analysis of the difference between China and the West, stated that the West was superior in the comforts of life, in the mechanical mastery of the physical environment through science, and in the position of woman; while China was superior in its food and cooking, in its reflective and rational attitude toward life, and in the respect paid to learning. Considering the devotion which the West

pays to the externals of education, this contrast may seem as odd as the previous one and as odd as the traditional claim of the culture of the East to superiority over that of the West. However, the belief must have some basis which is worthy of attention. An understanding of the claim and of the basis on which it rests will throw much light on the puzzling situation that challenges the West at the present moment.

In the West education is now considered chiefly as the means of affecting the future, of determining progress. In China the old education was organized wholly as a means of preserving the past. In this it succeeded beyond any other historical example. This was accomplished by making the Confucian ethical writings, moral precepts, and habits of conduct, the substance of education, and by means of an examination system which chose those most perfected in this learning as the rulers of society.

The fundamental relation of education to the entire scheme of life of the Chinese is revealed in the initial sentence of one of the Confucian texts: "What Heaven has conferred is called nature; an accordance with nature is called the path of duty; the regulation of this path is called instruction." The purpose of education was to train each individual in this path of duty, wherein was most minutely prescribed every detail of life's occupations and relationships. These had not varied for centuries. In reality, Heaven had "conferred" merely that which existed—that which was established, or rather, elaborated, explained, certified to, and made authoritative because it had the sanction of the ancestral approval of many generations. The natural state—that authoritatively approved by religion, morality, and the government—was the existing state of relationships. The "path of duty" was the maintenance of that which exists, without change or modification.

No age or place, either in the past or present, had seen a people that was so thoroughly controlled by the minutiæ of custom, that regarded so sacredly its most punctilious observ-

ance, or that had persisted so long in this subserviency to the past. Thoroughly interwoven as they were with every aspect of their life, the educational ideals and practices of this people explained the long continuance of their unchanging social structure, their conservative character, their chief moral traits, their strength and weakness, either as individuals or as a nation.

With no other people that developed a formal culture did this literary education possess such direct relationship to the details of life and thus possess such distinctly moral character. While the education of the schools was distinctly literary and was often cited as an example of a wholly formal and unpractical education, yet the content of this instruction and this literature related entirely to conduct, and so gave to the individual thus trained both an ability to shape his own conduct aright, and a knowledge that would enable him to direct the conduct of others. Rewarded as were the learned men or the educated class of no other country, the successful student of this literature became the political official, with complete control of the organization and direction of social life. Such government as they had consisted in applying these ancient rules of conduct to present-day life; their governing class was wholly composed of "scholars in politics"; their aristocracy was truly an aristocracy of learning. The aim of the Chinese system of government was to prevent change, and because of this they were often represented as having no government. In a remarkable way that was not true of any Western people, the education, the government, the ethical beliefs and practices of the Chinese, were all based upon and all found an expression in a religious or a formal ethical system—that of Confucianism. Confucianism was embodied in the sacred texts, *The Four Books* and *The Five Classics*. These are in part the work of Confucius (551-478 B.C.), in part that of his great disciples. However, Confucius in his time assigned the authority of more than twenty centuries to the teachings that have subsequently borne his name. In a remarkable manner Confucianism united

political or social ethics with private morality. All ethical teachings and all social obligations were summed up in those of the "five relationships" that were taught to every child in ten syllables, as an A B C of conduct. These are the relation of sovereign and subject, parent and child, husband and wife, brother and sister, friend and friend.

Strikingly parallel to the teaching of the Greek philosophers that virtue consisted in moderation, in the medium between excess and complete denial, in the mean between two vices, was this teaching of Confucius, recognized as his chief principle: perfect equilibrium of emotions and passions resulted in virtue, was "the doctrine of the mean." Also strikingly similar to Greek ideas was Mencius' teaching that man is by nature good, not evil, and that ethics and education are to preserve nature and direct him in its way.

The following brief passage from the *Li-Ki,* or *Book of Rites,* one of the *Five Classics,* will better illustrate the content and spirit of these sacred books, as it will illustrate at the same time the aim and content of their education. This passage includes the opening paragraphs of the chapter on "The Pattern of the Family," where one would expect to find the virtues of this people set forth; and is typical of the material that is studied in the school, under the old régime.

> The sovereign and king orders the chief minister to send down his [lessons of] virtue to the millions of the people.
>
> Sons, in serving their parents, on the first crowing of the cock should all wash their hands, and rinse their mouths, comb their hair, draw over it the covering of silk, fix this with the hairpin, bind the hair at the roots with the fillet, brush the dust from that which is left free, and then put on their caps, leaving the ends of the strings hanging down. They should then put on their squarely made black jackets, knee covers, and girdles, fixing in the last their tablets. From the left and right of the girdle they should hang their articles for use: on the left side, the duster and handkerchief, the knife and whetstone, the small spike and the metal speculum for getting fire from the sun; on the right, the archer's thimble for the thumb, and the armlet, the

tube for writing instruments, the knife case, the larger spike, and the borer for getting fire from wood. They should put on their leggins and adjust their shoestrings.

This continues for many paragraphs, devoted to the conduct of the younger son, younger daughter, daughter-in-law, etc., and for many chapters upon every possible activity and relationship of individuals in the family. The virtues of family life are those of filial duty, fraternal love, friendship, and the like; the concrete embodiment of these and other virtues can be judged in the light of the passage quoted.

These texts contain no portrayal of immorality of the gods as in the Greek religious literature, or of men as in the Hebrew, or the extravagances of the mythologies of most peoples; on the other hand, they inculcate the solid virtues of an unchangeable and unprogressive system of society, and of a people destined to a materialistic and, of necessity, prosaic view of life.

Educational administration of a public character and educational institutions have a recorded history dating from 2300 B.C., antedating those of any other people except the Egyptians. But for the Chinese this educational history has been continuous, and is still a living influence. The period when Greek and Roman culture originated in the West was a flourishing period in the East. An elaborate educational system existed in China from the twelfth to the sixth century B.C. During the sixth and the following centuries Confucius and his disciples, chiefly Mencius, systematized the ancient learning and moral teachings into the classical writings, which soon became the basis of the culture and of the social order of the Chinese. This classical literature furnished the substance of their formal education for many centuries. During this time, also, the examination system, which originated in the earlier period, was improved, and it was perfected in subsequent Confucian revivals.

As this examination system was the heart of the old educa-

THE OLD EXAMINATION HALLS AT NANKING

VILLAGE SCHOOL IN AN ANCESTRAL TEMPLE AT SAM WA LIM, NEAR CANTON. NOTE THE TREADMILL IRRIGATION PUMP AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS AT THE REAR IN THE RIGHT-HAND PAVILION. THE PAVED COURTYARD IS USED AS A VILLAGE THRESHING FLOOR. AT THE REAR OF THE MAIN PAVILION, ALMOST INVISIBLE, ARE THE ANCESTRAL TABLETS.



AN OLD TIME SCHOOL—BOY BACKING HIS BOOK

DEGREE POLES BEFORE AN ANCESTRAL TEMPLE

tional system, and its abolition has had most important consequences in the present situation, a brief description, though it is of the past, is of importance. In the old system schools were almost altogether of a private character. Of the elementary schools, the family or clan often maintained one for its own members. Higher studies might be guided by a master, but usually in an informal or tutorial manner. The public feature of the system was examination.

Ordinarily the first examinations were held once in three years in each district city by the literary chancellor having jurisdiction over an entire province. The first day's examination consisted of three essays, two on themes taken from the *Four Books* and one of a poetical type taken from the *Book of Odes.* These examinations, held in the examination halls or cells such as constitute the "universities" of this country, continuing from eighteen to twenty-four hours, were of most exhausting mental labor. As out of the six or seven hundred candidates, or even, in some districts, two thousand candidates, only a limited number, usually about one in twenty, were allowed to receive the degree, this test often had to be repeated four or five times, until the requisite number were secured by elimination.

Some months later these successful candidates, now termed the "flower of talent," repaired to the provincial capital to be examined for the second degree, also held every three years. Contestants often numbered ten thousand, of whom only about one in every hundred could obtain the coveted honor. This test, correspondingly more severe, but of the same character, ordinarily occupied three days and had to be repeated three or four times. The examination compositions, in prose and verse, covered a wide scope and tested the extent of reading, the depth of scholarship, and the skill in composition of the candidates. Again, the rewards of the successful examinee, the "promoted scholar," were largely of an immaterial character. "He adorns his cap with a gilded button

of a higher grade, erects a pair of lofty flagstaves before the gate of his family residence, and places a tablet over his door to inform those who pass by that this is the abode of a literary prize man." But above all, he could then compete in the examination at the Imperial capital, or in a special examination held by the chancellor, the passing of which admitted him as an "entered scholar" into the ranks of the favored few from whom all higher officials were selected. The proportion passing this examination, thirteen days in length, was much greater than that in previous tests, and the successful candidate might soon hope to become a mandarin and live and travel at the expense of the state. There were no age limits set for these examinations at all; they were simply tests of knowledge possessed and of a certain imitative skill acquired. As persons often continued to try for these prizes throughout a lifetime, cases have been known of father, son, and grandson attempting the same examination. Even yet this wonderful system of the selection of the fittest by elimination through examination had not done its perfect work. There was a still higher examination, to which only the doctors or "entered scholars" were admitted to competition, and from which but a few, a score in all, were selected. Carrying with it no degree, but an office which ranks one above all governmental magistracies and practically constitutes one a member of an Imperial cabinet, this honor was the most highly prized of all. The persons selected by this examination constituted the *Han Lin Yuan,* the Forest of Pencils, or the Imperial Academy. As an educational institution this academy possessed only advisory and ceremonial functions, but its members were elsewhere given important governmental positions.

From the highest ranks of students the emperor on rare occasions might select one as the consummate flower of literary perfection out of four hundred millions of people, and confer upon him great ceremonial distinction. Formal education systematization could go no further.

The following summary of examination statistics for the year 1903 is given by Lewis. There were 1,705 matriculation centers where the preliminary tests were held; 252 centers for the examination for first degree; 18 for that of second degree, one, at least, containing 30,000 cells; and one for the third degree. But 28,923 bachelors' degrees could be given to the 760,000 competitors; for the somewhat rarer master's degree, or "promoted man" examination, but 1,586 competitors were selected out of a total of 190,300. Not to mention the million or more that were preparing for the preliminary examinations, in 1903 there were 960,000 men preparing for these examinations, of whom all but 1,839 were destined for failure. In 1905 this system was abolished.

Thus, in the institutional foundation of Chinese culture unity is preserved. The Confucian unity of the family works itself out in village government, local government, Imperial government; industrially it expressed itself in the handicraft system; and commercially in the guilds. The educational system tied all together through its inculcation of Confucian ethics and modes of conduct as the complete substance of formal education and through the selection of those most proficient in this learning as the controlling political officials.

It is difficult to decide what tense to use in this summary. The analysis made was true of the past. To a very considerable extent it is true of the present, especially as concerns the masses. But profound and rapid changes are going on in every respect as modern ideas affect the teachers through Western education and affect the masses through the modified guidance of the teachers and through the direct impingement of Western influence. In this situation, in fact, lies our story.

How this institutional background or foundation is unified and vivified by philosophical beliefs and religious practices constitutes the next stage of our analysis.

Do not disgrace your imperial ancestors and it will save your posterity. —*The Book of Odes*

Sincerity reached through intelligence is Religion.
—*Doctrine of the Mean*

The superior man moves so as to make his movements in all generations a universal path;
He behaves so as to make his conduct in all generations a universal law;
He speaks so as to make his words in all generations a universal norm.
—*Confucius: The Great Learning*

The Way that can be expressed is not the Eternal Way;
The Name that can be named is not the Eternal Name.

. . . . . .

The Way of God is to bless and not injure;
The Way of Holy Men is conduct, not controversy.
—*Lao Tze: opening and closing verses of "The Doctrine of the Way."*

The lotus flower, leaf and food all came from the same root:—the three religions were originally from the same home.
—*Chinese proverb*

No image maker worships the gods: he knows what they are made of.
—*Chinese proverb*

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIONS OF CHINA

> Men at their births are by nature radically good.
> Though all alike in this, in practice they widely diverge.

THIS opening sentence of the Tri-Metrical Classic, learned by every schoolboy under the old régime, expresses the distinctive feature of Chinese philosophy. This philosophic conception affects the religious beliefs and practices of the Chinese, their ethical system, their education, their political system, their general beliefs, and, in a peculiar manner, their social structure, habits, customs, and institutions. In fact, much of the difference between Confucian and Christian society may be traced back to the attitude expressed in this brief phrase.

A comparison may make this point clearer. Hindu philosophy considers human nature prone to sin, through human desire. Desire produces activity, and activity is apt to lead to sin. The human soul is a part of the World Soul and subject to the universal laws of nature, which are omnipresent. Sin brings punishment; evil brings retribution and suffering. This is an irrevocable law of nature from which there is no escape. So eternity is an endless round of lives, each expiating the sins of those preceding, since the soul in its transmigration may take any living form. Strife, endeavor, human effort, will not achieve the expiation; rather, will they lead to additional sins because of the very quality of human nature, of human desire. The only way of escape is by suppressing desire, by avoiding action, so that ultimately sin may be eliminated and the human soul, through attainment of perfection, may be merged with the All-Soul. So, then, the endlessly turning wheel is the

symbol of the countless generations of eternity through which man may gradually achieve salvation.

In Western philosophy the individual is surrounded by a hostile nature whose laws he must learn, and which he must control through his own intelligence. By constant striving he may bring this hostile nature under subjection to his will. Indeed, to accomplish this is his greatest obligation. On the spiritual side human nature is totally depraved and prone to sin; but the penalties of sin are avoidable, for there are repentance and forgiveness of sin. Strife, struggle, effort, continual endeavor, are the price to be paid by man for his own independence and control over the laws of nature and for avoidance of the operation of universal law in the world of spirit. The symbol of this system of thought is the cross, representing suffering, expiation, triumph over the natural law by the divine.

To the Chinese, human nature is good, but prone to deviate from its native goodness and must therefore be held to the original quality by human rather than by divine means, as in Western religions. The chief means for keeping man in the road of natural goodness are education, proper forms of conduct embodying great ethical system, and government. The endless round of meticulously observed rules of conduct that results in the formation of habits of conduct covering all situations tends to develop or preserve the good in human nature, creates a social structure which enables society to persist through the centuries, and makes political government of little necessity and significance. The symbol of this system of thought is the *Yin* and *Yang* device.[1]

YIN AND YANG

The *Book of Changes, Yi Ching,* to which Confucius directed so much study, the content of which dates from the mists of antiquity, sets forth this theory variously. This idea

[1] See medallion on cover of this volume.

of *Yi,* of primordial or creative force, is expressed in the idea of *change.* "In olden times, when the wise men made the *Yi,* they wanted it to be in accord with the nature and destiny of things, which is reason. Therefore, they established the Heavenly Way in *Yin* and *Yang;* they established the human way in humaneness and righteousness; they established the earthly way in tenderness (Summer) and rigidness (Winter). Thus each of the three powers of nature was made to be controlled by a set of two principles." These three powers of nature are the heavenly or spiritual, the natural or physical, and the human or psychological; while the two principles are the *Yin* and *Yang.* In modern scientific terms we would call them anabolic and catabolic, the two phases of metabolism or the *Yi.* The one is creative, active; the other, passive. They represent such combinations as heaven and earth, summer and winter, sun and moon, male and female, light and darkness. The two forces are equal and opposite, and by their interaction the universe, the world of phenomena, life, and the constant succession of generations have come into existence. To some of the philosophers this *Yi* was personified and made the God of creation. To most of the earthly theorists, out of Chaos these reciprocal principles of *Yin* and *Yang* produced the universe and still furnish the motive power. As expressed in the symbol, they produced both revolution and evolution.

Nature changes, and so the seasons fulfill their time.

The close association of ideas which are banal to the modern mind with those which are startlingly suggestive of modern phases of thought, is found in these teachings. While they originate in the writings of the Great Period, a millennium earlier, they are re-formulated in one of the immortal writings of Confucius—the *Book of Changes.* To quote this book:

In the physical world, the eight symbols interact. To stimulate, we have thunder and lightning; to moisten, we have rain and wind;

the sun and the moon revolve and travel, giving rise to cold and warmth. The strong principle makes the male, and the weak principle makes the female. By the strong, the great beginning is known; the weak brings beings into completion. The strong principle becomes intelligible through changes; the weak principle becomes efficient through selection. The changing is easy to understand; the selection is easy to follow. As it is easy to understand, there grows familiarity; as it is easy to follow, efficiency is gained. That which is familiar will last; that which is efficient will be great. Lasting is the virtue of the wise man; great is the accomplishment of the wise man. Through change and selection is obtained the reason of the universe. When the reason of the universe is obtained, the perfect abides in its midst.

Through the interaction of these two forces—*Yin* and *Yang*—in the physical world are produced the five physical elements: fire, water, earth, wood, and metal. By their interaction in the world of humanity, what we call the moral law is produced in the incarnation of the five moral virtues: justice between ruler and subject; affection between father and son; consideration (or prudence) between man and wife; respect between brothers; and sincerity between friends. "Heaven gives birth to the multitude of people, endowing each being with its corresponding principles. The people who are so endowed love these virtues." Confucianism is largely concerned with the analysis of these virtues and with the elaboration of a procedure or a set of rules which, when followed, will preserve and develop this original endowment of virtue. The Chinese, and especially Confucius, being more interested in human nature than in the physical world, developed their philosophy along the ethical rather than the metaphysical and physical lines followed by the Greeks. On the other hand, Lao Tze, the founder of Taoism, was interested in the more speculative metaphysical and physical lines; and because the physical world was the field of speculation also, Taoism thus includes both the highest reach of speculative thought and the grossest superstitions of the masses of the people.

While the *Yin* and *Yang* theory underlies both Confucian-

ism and Taoism, in both it is nascent rather than obvious and furnishes the background much as the primitive belief in many gods formed a background to the monotheism in the historic books of the Old Testament. *Yin* and *Yang* has been termed the primordial microbe; and, in fact, the resemblance in diagrammatic form to the biologic germ is most striking. Striking also is the fact that in the primitive philosophy of this most enduring and stable of all human societies—which is popularly supposed to be hostile to all change—rather than in the changing West, should be found this fundamental principle of constant change, or revolution, resulting in a creative evolution.

HEAVEN

The union of heaven and of earth produces the human soul—man. Heaven endows man with its own great qualities through the *Yin-Yang* force described above. These qualities become the five constant virtues: benevolence, justice, reverence, wisdom, and sincerity. To develop and conserve these is the aim of education; in turn, they become the basis of social and political organization.

One fundamental conception, both philosophical and religious, perhaps more used than any other in Chinese classical writings, is the term "Heaven." In the past the Chinese constantly used the term "Yamen" for its magistrate and "Throne" for the Emperor whose power it expressed. So the word "Heaven" was used to express the Chinese conception of deity. As Lao Tze says, "The Name that can be named is not the Eternal Name."

In Chinese literature Heaven is personal.

> He hears and sees; He enjoys offerings; He has a heart or mind; He is aided by man, and disputes His work especially to kings and their ministers; He can be honored and served; He is awe-inspiring, of dread majesty, and to be feared; He confers on men their moral sense and makes retention of His favor dependent on moral character; His will is glorious, may be known, and must be complied with; a

virtuous king is after His own heart, but He will have no regard to the evil-doer; with such a one He is angry; the virtuous king He will reward with peace and dignity; the appointment to kingly office is in His hands, such appointment is contingent, and favor may be lost; He protects, but may withdraw His protection; He warns, corrects, and punishes the evil king, even afflicts, ruins, and destroys him, and of this instances are clearly given.[1]

Heaven is also impersonal.

It gives birth to the people; It gives valor and wisdom to princes; It gives blessings to the good and woes to the evil; It ordains the social order, the religious and social ceremonies, and human virtue; It sends down rain; It is gracious to men and helps them; Its will is unerring; It does not shorten men's lives, they do that themselves; It is not bound to individuals by ties of biased human affection; It commands men to rectify their character; It gives man his nature, compassionates him, and grants his desires; It is only moved by virtue, but men may cry and weep and pray to It, for It will hear.[2]

Thus the various manifestations of Heaven or Deity, as expressed throughout the classical writings of the Chinese, are summarized by a Western student. Reversing the attitude of the West, as is usual, the masses of Chinese have looked upon Heaven in its impersonal manifestations, reserving to the reflective few the personal interpretation.

HUMAN NATURE AND EVIL

In this philosophy of human nature, far less stress is placed upon evil than in Western religious thought. The Chinese agree with Emerson: "It is not a good sign when a man thinks too much of his sins." Less concerned with the origin of evil and its eradication, they center their attention on the origin of good and its preservation. To be sure, evil exists. "Wise [or able] men cultivate the five virtues and secure blessings; while unwise [or weak] men violate them and bring on misfortune." Unless man coöperates with Heaven in bringing

[1] Soothill, W. E., *The Three Religions of China* (1923), p. 126.
[2] *Ibid.*

about good, his nature will degenerate and evil will result. Opposition to the will of Heaven is sin or evil. So the corruption in man's nature and the evil in society are brought about by man's unwillingness to coöperate with Heaven. The fault is man's, not Heaven's. Evil is due to man's own departure from the nature implanted in him. Good and the will of Heaven are to be preserved by following the path of duty—or "the Path." In so doing the individual may be assisted by education, and by the rites and ceremonies systematized by Confucius from the learning of the ancients.

THE FUNDAMENTAL VIRTUE: THE PATH OF DUTY

"An accordance with nature is the path of duty," wrote a follower of Confucius—his grandson—in a text memorized by every schoolboy in China. The idea of the path, or "the Way," is as old as the idea of virtue itself, and is found in most religions. In China it not only runs through all the religions, but is fundamental and antecedent to them all. By our very nature there is created in us a sense of duty, the Tao. In Taoism this principle becomes the fundamental truth of the religion, and is either set forth in the highest mysticism or elaborated in the crudest of superstitions—while it appears in every grade between. In Confucianism it becomes the fundamental bond of society. With the idea of "the way" is combined the innate recognition of the way or the inborn urge to follow the way.

This idea of the Path and the urge is somewhat like but not quite our conception of conscience; it is more of a dynamic force. It is a combination of sympathy, of loving-kindness, of friendliness, of a feeling of fellowship. Dr. Williams translates the term, "reciprocity," which lacks the personal and moral quality or emotional element. The idea is more clearly expressed in the creative ideal of a great American sociologist—"Consciousness of kind." This feeling, which is innate in every individual, is awakened by contact with any other fellow-being;

the realization of it becomes the foundation of society and of all human institutions. No moral being can exist without responding to this influence, without following this guide or path. It is this idea which is expressed in the Confucian Golden Rule and in various forms throughout Chinese literature. Says Confucius: "A man who has *jen* [feeling of fellowship], wishing to establish himself, will have others established; wishing himself to succeed, will have others succeed." This is the primary altruistic instinct in man, and is but the practical realization of the human nature which is at basis good. It is from this primary instinct, created by Heaven—or the *Yin* and *Yang* —that the moral qualities are created; it is not only the fundamental moral quality, it is the guide to our everyday life. One of the great interpreters in the revival in the Sung dynasty stated the social as well as the moral implication thus: "Fellow feeling is the norm of the universe. When the norm is lost there ensues lawlessness and discord."

In this doctrine the two great religions of China fuse. "Fellow feeling is to love others with gladness of heart, to rejoice when they are blissful, and to be grieved when they suffer misery. This is because the heart is unable to refrain from being so affected, and has nothing to do with a desire for compensation. Therefore," says Lao Tze, "superior fellow feeling works as if it were not working."

The ramifications of these doctrines are infinite, but it may be pertinent to call attention to one practical application to the present crisis. The sense of violation of this feeling of fellowship, of reciprocity, of these fundamental moral qualities, gives a significance to the condemnation of unequal or unilateral treaties that is not apparent to the Westerner. To the Chinese, such action becomes the unpardonable social sin.

ORTHODOXY AND HERESY

Out of these fundamental philosophical conceptions, which are more or less common to the various shades of Chinese

religious beliefs, develop certain qualities of religion in China that are not characteristic of religion in the West. There can hardly be said to exist either orthodoxy or heresy. The Chinese are not divided into three religious sects: the Confucianists, the Taoists, and the Buddhists. Only when a Chinese becomes a Christian or a Mohammedan does he cease to be a Buddhist and a Taoist. Even then, if he is an educated person he probably does not cease and cannot cease to be a Confucianist. These three religions of the Chinese do not exclude one another; they do not cover the same ground. So it is quite possible for an individual to be all three, and to express his personality or his experience at one time by one, at another time by the other. Each of these three expresses a mode of thought, a tendency, a phase of experience; hence, at times each may represent the expression of human need.

Consequently, there is no general mode of thought which represents the orthodox or the heretic. Religion, to the Chinese, is one way of interpreting life. There may be many ways, valuable as occasions differ. All religions may have some truth; all may have some error; all are most apt to be incomplete. Failure to recognize this situation by the Christian missionary intent upon urging his exclusive idea of religion, was one of the chief difficulties in the way of his understanding the Chinese situation and, concomitantly, one of the great difficulties in the way of an understanding, by the Chinese, of the Christian method of approach. This exclusiveness, and its desire to destroy indigenous Chinese modes of thought, tolerant in themselves, is one of the chief basis—perhaps the chief basis—of the attack on Christianity at the present time. By its exclusiveness and its insistences Christianity becomes "imperialistic"; whereas, to the Chinese there is nothing inconsistent between the fundamentals of Confucianism and of Christianity.

With all its troubles throughout history, China has been spared religious wars, and—with a few slight exceptions—religious persecutions. Where hostility, opposition, and per-

haps persecution do arise, is where a religious cult takes upon itself a political complexion and threatens to disturb the social equilibrium. Such, for example, might be an attack upon ancestor worship, which has no particular connection with any formal religion, but is a fundamental social process or function. Even the recent elimination of Confucianism from the schools by the Republican government produced very little opposition; especially as, in the usual spirit of toleration, the old schools of elementary type were allowed to continue.

That a social or political orthodoxy is now developing in place of a religious orthodoxy should appeal to the understanding of the American people. Unfortunately, however, there is also developing in China a spirit of intolerance in political and social beliefs. As this, in America, is the only heresy which really interests the people and produces marked controversy, we should be in a position to understand, and—if we believe in toleration—even to tolerate. The present unwillingness of the Nationalist Party to tolerate any minority shades of opinion is a new phenomenon in China, and one suggestive of trouble ahead.

ANCESTOR WORSHIP

The real religion of China, which permeates the life of all the people and determines the organization of society and the characteristics of social life, is not Confucianism, Buddhism, or Taoism, but ancestor worship. Confucianism may furnish the framework of society, Buddhism or Taoism may furnish the roof, but the cult of the dead is the foundation. We are familiar with the idea of the worship of the dead in ancient Egypt; the student, through De Coulanges, knows that in early Greece and Rome the city state—the very structure of governmental and of social institutions—was dependent upon the preservation of the family unity through the worship of departed ancestors. All ancient cultural societies, so far as we know, were based on this religion. When these ancient religions

decayed, the states upon which they were founded in time disintegrated. In China there is preserved until to-day, in extensive operation, this most ancient form of social organization and life. That China is existent to-day, and has outlived all other cultures, all other ancient civilizations, is, indeed, due to this very feature. That China is so disturbed to-day, that her social structure seems to be dissolving, is due to the fact that belief in and practice of this ancient cult are being undermined and are fading away. In truth, the ancient culture is disintegrating because of the decay of the ancient faith. The cult of the dead, with its attendant rights and its fundamental beliefs, cannot stand in the light of modern scientific knowledge and attitude of mind. Modern education, contact with modern society in other lands, inevitably conduces to its decay. The masses of the Chinese people are not mistaken in their irrational, formless fear of "foreignism"; for these influences from the outside, embodied in their own leaders, their own student class, are bringing about this inevitable result. As they vaguely feel this crumbling of social foundations, the break-up of the great deep of the Chinese past, they can but become terrified —and hostile to all manifestations of the forces bringing destruction.

In the West we are familiar with the idea of the continuity of social organization, upon which our institutional life is based, and with the idea of the continuity of individual life, upon which our religious beliefs are based. In China neither the individual nor society possesses this continuity, as such; or possesses it only as a corollary to that which is fundamental: namely, the continuity of the family. With the Chinese the family consists of all deceased members of the given unit, all the present members, all prospective members. The needs, happiness, and welfare of the departed members of the family depend upon their worship and care by the living. Hence the necessity of a continuous posterity—or else all preceding generations must be left to wander uncared for through an

eternity of suffering. Hence, too, the individual is of little value except as he assists in preserving this family unity; he is merely the connecting link between all the generations of the past and of the future. As such, his responsibility is tremendous; but as any male descendant may keep this continuity unbroken, his importance is merely that of a link in the chain. Individuality, as such, does not exist. And on the social side, society consists mostly of the vast agglomeration of these family units. If life is kept normal, there is little use for further social organization. As the welfare of the dead is preserved by the righteous conduct of the living, society becomes sufficiently controlled. We in the West depend much for social control, for moral life, upon the idea of spiritual retribution for evil conduct; but the penalizing effects are limited to the individual. To the Chinese, the punishment of evil conduct is the suffering of the entire family group. This dependence of the welfare of ancestors upon the moral conduct of the living is what has given such importance to the very minute regulation of conduct by means of meticulous rules. Even Confucius, who was little interested in speculation concerning the dead or the spirit world, yet could emphasize, as a fundamental principle, "Take no step, speak no word, contrary to the rites."

This ancestor worship, which made the welfare of departed generations depend upon the filial piety, the prudence, the upright conduct of the living, has done much to produce the thrift, the practical efficiency, the industry, the everyday virtue of the Chinese. There exists a constant check upon conduct, such as cannot exist when the penalties are purely personal.

The religious aspect of this system of belief is no less striking. Here is a religion without priesthood, without church or temples, without monks or monasteries, without processions, without a sacred book, with no Deity, without revelation, without any supernatural element save that of the immortality of the soul—and yet it penetrates into every daily act of life of practically every individual of the largest unified aggregation

of human beings living together in the most enduring of social structures. Whoever assays lightly to undermine this structure assumes a heavy responsibility.

Of all the curious reversals of attitude between China and the West, none are more striking than that by which the Western conception of future life becomes in China ancestor worship; and that by which essentially the same principle becomes in the Christian religion the keystone of orthodoxy and in the Chinese religion a superstition to be eradicated. True, there are many elements of belief connected with ancestor worship that are additions to that concept of immortality which has made of it a force to perpetuate society—and which have so loaded it down with superstitions that it has become non-progressive. Whether Chinese society can become re-invigorated, progressive, creative in the modern sense, depends upon whether it can throw off many of the corollaries or addenda to ancestor worship which now weigh it down and impede economic and intellectual development.

The same forces of Heaven which produced human nature produced the physical world; and the World Soul that was shared with the human soul was also shared in its own degree with the sub-human. The animism which has been eliminated from most Western societies still permeates everywhere the life and thought of the Chinese. Here, to a greater or less degree, all the material world—both animate and inanimate—is pervaded by the spirit world. The everyday life of the Chinese is guided by these "Nature Spirits."

Hindu thought, through Buddhism, has added the idea of transmigration of souls—which, with the Chinese concept of reverence for ancestors, creates a burden that to the uneducated is often quite paralyzing. For one common aspect in belief in immortality is that the spirits of ancestors not only survive, but that they may inhabit the air or the physical environment close to the scene of their earthly existence. Particularly, if the proper attention and observance of the neces-

sary forms of respect and of worship have been neglected, may the ancestral spirits suffer intolerable agony in the limitations of their spirit existence; or, in turn, heavy penalties for such neglect may be incurred by the careless relatives. At this point the two religions of China seize upon this primitive belief; and that which may be ennobled in Confucianism to the highest of ethical teachings, may in Taoism or Buddhism become the grossest of superstitions, the means of impoverishing the people and of maintaining a worthless and economically debilitating priesthood.

The belief that not only does the soul live after death, but that it is dependent upon the living for all its needs of food, clothing, shelter, social respect and prestige (face), honor, prosperity, and happiness, is—rather than the Hindu belief in transmigration of souls—the outstanding addition made by ancestor worship or spirit worship to the Western belief in immortality; and it is this addition which makes it a burden to Chinese society and an impediment to progress. True, these human needs can be transferred to the disembodied spirits by spiritual means; that is, usually, by burning paper imitations of the objects needed so that the economic burden may be small. But it is not always so; and ritualistic religions have added heavy burdens and, at times, penalties to these.

The neglected dead may wander as beggars in the spirit world, suffering both hardship and disease—but at times recompensing themselves by bringing similar evils upon the living. Either life or death under these conditions may bring but misery or torture, to be avoided only by the reverent spirit of the descendants. Thus filial piety becomes the sum and substance of all other virtues. To fulfill its obligations becomes the chief moral aim in life; to maintain a line of descendants, the chief material aim. Mencius mentions several stages of filial impiety, but the greatest is failure to leave a male descendant. While the patriarchal system gives to the living head of the family absolute power over the living descendants, their economic

productivity, and their social relationship, the need of ancestral worship often gives the elder son, from his childhood days, a psychical control which is not good for his moral development. With life as uncertain as it is in Chinese environment, such tends to become the importance of all sons that in some features ancestor worship is reversed. But it is the finer aspects of ancestor worship that need here the greater attention, as the less fine are the more conspicuous.

After the decease of the body, the soul has three aspects or embodiments. Or, crudely, it may be said that there are three souls: one is entombed with the body; one resides in the ancestral tablets; one resides in the empyrean or Heaven or in the atmosphere around. Wherever the spirit world may be, the welfare of this free spirit depends upon the care and worship given to the remaining two. In every household there is a shrine, a niche, a chapel or, with larger families, a temple, devoted to the worship of the ancestors. In the poorest families the two tablets representing the ancestors may be but the names written on slips of paper. But more often they are written or carved on small tablets of wood—at the present time they are frequently represented or reinforced by large family portraits of the enlarged photograph type. Each day, by every member of the family, the reverential bow before these tablets must be performed, accompanied by the simple prayer and the burning of incense. The similarity to the customs of ancient Greece and Rome is here most striking. By these means, the spirit of coöperation and unity in the large family groups are kept alive, while the friction of the large numbers in close daily association is somewhat reduced.

The second form of ancestor worship is at the ancestral graves. Here, at least twice a year, elaborate ceremonies must be conducted by the filial worshipers. Such services comprise the cleaning and caring for the graves, the offering of sacrifices, both in paper imitations and in material forms, and worship at the graves in person—which may take two or three

days and entail considerable expense and often laborious travel. As these are occasions of festival, of feasting, of family reunion, they partake somewhat of the nature of our Christmas or Thanksgiving holidays; only there is no one date upon which the services occur—simply a general season within which each family arranges its own celebration. The ceremonies proper consist in the burning of incense, paper money, paper houses, paper utensils, and paper reproductions of whatever the spirit may need; the pouring of wine on the graves; and performing the signs of reverence, bowing, prayers, etc. The materials of the sacrifice may furnish the family feast, or, by a curious metonomy, both material and spiritual, the head of a pig with its tail in its mouth may become an acceptable substitute for the whole animal. On its economic side the service may easily become a burden; which, multiplied for the whole society, becomes a staggering load where life is so near the margin. But, considered as a form of social control, who shall measure its worth, or replace its restraint by a multitude of laws?

The third of these services is that of the burial. Forming the most conspicuous feature of the countryside in any part of China are the graves of different types and models, indicative of the various regions; each containing, in the coffin, objects of art or utensils of use. While often—now, as in the past—representing great social extravagance, these funeral customs have brought down to us from vanished generations, their objects of art and a representation of their everyday life. The coffins—often left uninterred for months or even years, awaiting the propitious day for interment to be determined by priest or geomancer—are in evidence everywhere—in the field, or by the home, or even in the house. The loss of land for the use of graves is a very heavy one in the densely inhabited agricultural regions. In other localities the barren and unproductive hillsides are utilized for the purpose. Since the body must be preserved as long as possible, the coffins are made of massive slabs of wood, are heavily lacquered, and most expensive. Most

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THE BARD OR STORY-TELLER

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PAPER MONEY FOR THE SPIRITS

Henry S. Leiper

FOR A GHOSTLY JOY RIDE

of the timber consumed in this all but forestless land is used for coffins. The economic loss represented in this and in the land for burial purposes has often been estimated as colossal. But, again, who shall measure the value of these customs as great forces of social control in Western terms of laws and of government?

The adaptations of these ancient beliefs to modern conditions often occasion striking situations. In place of the paper or wooden horse, which, in later years, has replaced the living animal formerly sacrificed at the grave of a departed worthy, the modern funeral procession carries a paper facsimilie of an automobile. It may be that that great benefactor of the human race, Mr. Henry Ford, has jeopardized his prospects in the Jewish heaven, but he has a secure position in the Chinese one, for all the paper automobiles carried in the funeral processions of Peking are models of Ford sedans.

In addition to these three localized forms of worship there is a fourth, more general, but no less burdensome—the official mourning. The Confucian writings prescribe in greatest detail the regulation of mourning customs, and these are said to be restrictions on the extravagance of earlier ones. Mourning customs among the Chinese have a social significance far greater than the personal significance which they assume with us. Not merely are they an expression of personal grief; they indicate the loss of the social headship of the family, its support, its representative to the spirit world and the worshiper of its ancestors, as well as the complete deprivation of all which death brings. Not only is there change of clothing, involving the donning of plain, colorless garments—in China these are white—but the chief mourner leaves his bed, his table, perhaps his house; he may sleep in a mud hovel erected beside the home for three days—perhaps for a month—perhaps even for a year; he may crawl after the coffin, indicating deprivation of ordinary means of locomotion as well as his personal grief; he may, and usually does, incur expense far beyond his means.

The memorials of the ancestors are preserved as individuals through the ancestral tablets; but with generations these spirits may become more generally merged into a family ancestral spirit. To the unreflective masses these, no doubt, are clothed with the attributes of divinity and worshiped as such. In the primitive psychology yet held by the great masses of the Chinese, the spirit of Heaven is distinguished only by gradation from the lesser spirit of the air, the soul of the human being, and the shadow or shade of immaterial things. So this ancestral spirit worship elevates the belief in the everyday spirit and ghost world of oppressive superstition—no doubt much as the Psalmist's identification of Jehovah as "the shade ever at his right hand" elevated the demonology common to the Hebrews and to all primitive peoples.

With the Chinese, in the case of worthies or of very distinguished men, the circle of worship or of filial devotion may be enlarged. Thus the human may come to partake of the nature of the divine in its lower orders and, as in the case of the Emperors, or notably in the case of Confucius, may have a nation-wide circle of worship. In the first missionary kindergarten that I saw years ago, the children made their morning obeisance to an effeminate picture of Froëbel, which—to their elders, at least—must have appeared in form and content a very sickly imitation of the students' daily obeisance to Confucius, or as but another form of ancestor worship.

This ascending scale of worship of spirits finally reaches its highest and most impressive note in the adoration of Heaven on the two days of the year when in Imperial times the Emperor worshiped in the temple of Heaven the one God of his people for his whole people, in a ceremony as impressive as—and similar in kind to—the worship offered by the High Priest of the Jews in the Temple of Jehovah.

Even this very superficial sketch of the religion which controls the daily life of this huge mass of mankind cannot be closed without a brief mention of some of the more restrictive

influences. The most serious practical outcome is the unchecked increase of human beings, which keeps the population at the saturation point of existence. With the population effects of ancestor worship on the ancient Jews we are familiar. With the Chinese, this is on a larger scale, and the incentive is as active to-day as in the remote past. All other considerations fade before this necessity of keeping up the male line of descent, which puts a premium upon unlimited multiplication of the species. This phase of the subject is considered elsewhere, but here must be noted again the fact that many of the evils of Chinese civilization grow out of this situation. The high death-rate, the insensibility to human suffering which invariably follows, the small value placed upon human life, and, until recently, the infanticide or exposure of female children—which characterized Greek, Roman, and all earlier systems based upon the same fundamental principle—all are but inevitable corollaries of ancestor worship.

We have also seen elsewhere that the modern political problem is to build up a central government of modern form, based on the obligations of individual citizens, out of this huge mass of self-supporting and self-governing family units. The transition can hardly be made with sufficient rapidity to replace those old sanctions, which held the individual to a social course of action, with the modern political sanction of patriotism and civic duty. Similarly, the industrial transition meets many obstacles in this old genetic organization of society, and only succeeds in its most modern form by breaking up the old.

The abolition of the worship of Heaven together with the abandonment of the study of the Confucian texts in the schools, and the desertion of Confucianism as practically an established or at least recognized state religion—all on the occasion of the establishment of the Republic—constitute the outward symbol of the abandonment of ancestor worship. Economic and intellectual forces will work more quietly and more effectively than

political forces in bringing about this fundamental change. But just as new political and cultural ideas permeate slowly from above, so do these primitive ideas of ancestor worship fade slowly from the depths of the experience of the lowly.

CONFUCIANISM

If the term Confucianism is supposed to indicate a religion, it is because Confucius is not the founder but the organizer, systematizer, and interpreter of beliefs and practices that in his day possessed sanctity because of their antiquity. Confucius himself wrote little; and if religion is identified with the supernatural, he wrote practically nothing on religious topics. While he commended and formulated the worship of ancestors, yet his entire views are very well summed up in one of his most famous sayings. When asked about the status after death, he replied, "How can we know death, when we do not know life?"

Though prominent enough in other Chinese religions, there is no mystical or supernatural element in Confucius' teaching. Nor is there any worship in Confucianism. There is no personal God, as in the religions originating with the Semites; there are not deities, as with Buddhism. Once, when asked about the gods, Confucius replied that he did not understand much about them, but thought that the duty of man consisted in fulfilling his duty to his family and to society rather than in the worship of unknown spirits. He taught, "Man need not concern himself with what lies beyond him; he need not adore, he need not pray to a god." When one recalls the animistic beliefs, customs, and superstitions surrounding him and oppressing and terrifying the Chinese of his day, one can understand the basis of his teachings. In Confucianism there is no ritual, no service; and, aside from the occasional Confucian temples for the simple memorial services of scholars, aside from the support which Confucianism may give to ancestor worship through example and precept, there are no temples or shrines.

Again he sums up his teachings thus: "Lead a good life, and make no demands. To lead a good life is the prayer of the Sage. He who leads a good life need fear neither Heaven, nor men, nor his own conscience. Happiness or unhappiness follow good or evil actions." Slight wonder, then, that it is difficult to class Confucianism as a religion.

And yet, in a sense, all Chinese are Confucianists. Here is a religion without mysteries and without terrors. It has no hell. It makes no supernatural pledges; it promises neither punishment nor rewards. Auguste Comte and other philosophers have dreamed of a religion of humanity. Here is one that has functioned for centuries and has influenced countless millions. It is a religion which appeals solely to man's reason and to his social sense. If it could be disentangled from the complexities of the other religions which the Chinese have also accepted, and which are all the things that Confucianism is not, one could study or contemplate the effects of such a religion. The Chinese scholars of the older generation are the present embodiment of this religion. Like all other religions, it has degenerated; like all others, it has tended to become mechanical, and to survive as meaningless form.

While it is often doubted whether the teachings of Confucius permeated beyond the scholar class, yet Confucianism more profoundly affects Chinese thought, and more adequately represents the Chinese people, than does any other aspect of their religious life.

How, then, are the ideals set forth in Confucianism to be attained? These are set forth in the fundamental tenets of Chinese thought, which Confucius sought to reveal and to render workable through his teachings.

The heavenly or creative force—the *Yin* and *Yang*—which operates throughout nature, and in man impels him to the good, this is Confucian. The Path—the way of life—the *Tao* which this heavenly force reveals to man, this is Confucian. The universal feeling of fellowship, which binds men together

and makes possible the institution of human society, this is Confucian.

More specifically, the master taught that the Path may be found and trod, the feeling of kind may be discovered and developed, through reverence and self-inspection. Most of the Confucian writings are given to directions for the guidance of reverential deportment, by which the egoistic or selfish impulses are restrained and the altruistic ones are developed. "Sincerity is the heavenly way; and to strive after sincerity is the human way. Sincerity hits the mark without much ado; it prevails without premeditation, quietly and leisurely in the nature of things, as in the case of holy men; while to strive after sincerity means to adhere firmly to goodness when it is discovered and espoused." In the *Doctrine of the Mean* the principle of sincerity is set forth. The possession of sincerity is identical with the Way or the Path, or it is the intelligence which leads to the discovery and the cultivation of the moral impulses that control the followers of the Path. Sincerity is identical with virtue, and many definitions and expositions are given as people of varying experiences and abilities inquire its meaning. While in this sense virtue or sincerity is an individual attribute, yet it becomes universal. Note, for example, one of the quotations preceding this chapter, "The superior man behaves so as to make his conduct in all generations a universal law." This is a clear formulation of the Kantian imperative, the highest mark of speculative modern ethics, as the Confucian Golden Rule is the highest reach in spiritual or practical ethics.

Confucius, or Kung-tze (Kung, the philosopher), lived 552-478 B.C.—about the period of the early Greek philosophers, and also about the time of the writing of many of the books of the Old Testament. In fact, Confucius did for the ancient Chinese writings just what the school of writers of the corresponding period in Hebraic history did for their writings of the much earlier historic period—systematized and edited them into the modern canon. Confucius' lifetime was about the

middle of a long period of the Chou dynasty, the most flourishing period of early Chinese culture. While this was a period of great political disturbance and of social upheaval, it was also one of cultural productivity. Confucius was one of many philosophers, thinkers, writers, of whom we shall notice only two others—Lao Tze, the founder of Taoism, an older contemporary of Confucius, and Mencius, his most renowned disciple and exponent of some generations later. Confucius wrote little that was original with himself; his one original writing was a chronicle of some contemporary monarchs, about as inspiring as the genealogies of the Old Testament, and of as little significance. What he did do was to systematize and clarify by comment and interpretation the writings of the ancients. The real authority to whom many of the quotations attributed to Confucius—as those preceding the chapters of this book—may be ascribed, is impossible to discover. He gave them his stamp of approval. In comparison with our own religious writings, the usual Chinese reversal is apparent; for it is not the original composite authority, as with the earlier books of the Old Testament, who gets the credit; but it is Confucius, the later compiler, who becomes the authority with the Chinese.

Early in life Confucius became a minor official, and also gathered around him a group of youth in the study of the ancient wisdom. In these humble circles he remained until fifty years of age. Then for a few years he became a man of great influence in his native state—a man whose wisdom brought to his fellow citizens great prosperity; such prosperity and power, indeed, that the little state became an object of envy, and in a few short years "the philosopher who was King" became an exile and a wanderer. For ten years he traveled from state to state, always learning, always teaching, and often a refugee from persecution. The last years of his life he remained at home, surrounded by his faithful disciples. They have left us the conversations, dialogues, and daily habits of life of their master in *The Analects,* the chief source of our knowledge

of his teachings. To the work of those years of editing and classifying the writings of the ancients—which often bear the name of Confucius himself, for these are the Confucian texts—his countrymen owe the hold which Confucianism has upon them. But the validity and significance of the teachings depend but little upon the originality of Confucius; rather upon his clarifying approval of customs of ancestral significance.

Even in the days of Confucius it is doubtful whether his works would have survived had it not been for the works of his followers, especially of Mencius—or Mung-tze—Mung, the philosopher (372-289 B.C.). Mencius wrote far more systematically than did Confucius, and elaborated the doctrines of the master in relation to social institutions and processes, and to political life.

Chinese history had by this time degenerated into a period of feudal war, such as has frequently disturbed China. One philosopher, taking his interpretation from life around him, held—in contradistinction to Confucius and Mencius—that human nature was altogether evil, and only to be held in check by laws and government and penalties; while Mencius, starting with the same disturbed condition, found still the philosophical truth in the essential goodness of human nature, and, taking the side of the people against the lawless and corrupt rulers, elaborated the system of social ethics which carry out the general principles enumerated by Confucius.

Through its inculcation of reverence for authority and for government, Confucianism did much to build up the absolutism of the Imperial power; and at the same time, through the philosopher's insistence on the moral obligation of sovereign and ruler, supplied the regulation of that power. In fact, he even sanctions the right of revolution on the part of the people.

Succeeding the period of Confucius and Mencius came the Ch'in dynasty, which gave to China its name, and constituted a period of oppression that threatened to destroy all learning.



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A SPIRIT STAIRWAY

Methodist Prints

ANCESTRAL TABLETS

Courtesy Camera Crafts Company, Peking

SHRINE AT TOMB OF CONFUCIUS

Courtesy Camera Crafts Company, Peking

CANON OF CONFUCIAN SCRIPTURE

One Emperor decreed the destruction of all books, and came near to executing the barbarous edict. The Han dynasty following, about two centuries before and two after the Christian era, witnessed a revival of Confucian influence, and in turn the strengthening of the Empire through the religious sanction which Confucianism gave to political authority. Near the close of this period the Confucian texts were fixed by engraving them on huge tablets of stone. The elaboration of the early examination system during this and the later Sung dynasty, based now more directly on Confucian texts and serving as a test for official position, strengthened both these tendencies.

However, another seven hundred years of depression and of eclipse of the Confucian influence followed, to be revived again in the Sung dynasty (960-1279). The study, the enthusiasm, the revival of imperial power and of culture, made of this period a real renaissance; above all, a renaissance in Confucianism, which fixed its dominance over all the subsequent period in Chinese life. During this time the examination system for officials, based largely on the Confucian texts, was finally fixed. While in the long run this tended to formalize the teachings of the great ethical teacher into rules and rites, yet it provided a system by which those most perfect in Confucian learning and knowledge of social procedure should come to direct the lives of the masses. And thus has Confucianism come down to us in our day.

Of Confucius himself, the tribute of a great Frenchman may well express the judgment of the Western world: "There is something both of the Stoic and of the Epicurean in this refined and noble gentleman. He is an aristocrat in mind, and yet has found means of making men and virtue loved as he loved them himself. That a whole race, a fourth part of humanity, should have chosen him for a guide and for twenty-five centuries meekly followed in his steps is something almost miraculous."

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TAOISM

As Confucianism represents the practical, the ethical, the social, and the intellectual aspects of religion, Taoism represents the mysterious, the immaterial, the speculative, the miraculous element. Reaching on the one hand to the highest flights of the mystical and spiritual to be found in Chinese literature, on the other, it harbors the most superstitious of attitudes, the most degrading of practices. Accepting the doctrine of the Way determined by Heaven, set forth in the earliest of Chinese speculative writers, Lao Tze, the founder of Taoism, living and writing at about the time of Confucius, presents in this *Path of Virtue* the most elevating, spiritual, and mystical of Chinese religious teachings. Even if this work be erroneously attributed to Lao Tze, as some scholars hold, its doctrines are essentially the highest formulation of Taoism, whether from Lao Tze or from some of his followers.

On the mystical side, Taoism was greatly influenced by the speculative Hindu philosophy and has much in common with it, even to the doctrines of passivity and non-resistance, and of ultimate absorption into the World Soul as the one hope of salvation for man. While there are a few of the Taoist priests, even to the present day, who are worthy followers of these esoteric doctrines, the significance of Taoism is quite the reverse. Dealing with the mysterious in nature, Taoism in its popular form becomes merged with those primitive animistic beliefs which peopled the air, the earth, the water, with every variety of spirit form—demons, witches, spirits, goblins, fairies. In practice Taoism becomes the most elaborate and complicated system of magic, myths, spells, charms, incantations, demonology, and all similar forms of superstitious practice that any society has developed. The Greeks and Romans evolved their mythology; the Egyptians, the occult and the mysterious worship of the dead; the primitive societies, their magic, charms, spells, incantations, and *taboo;* Christianity has

developed its worship of the saints; most peoples have developed a folk lore of myths and some cult of superstitious practices; but Taoism is a jumble of all these.

In that it deals with the control of the world of spirits, Taoism is connected most closely with the worship of the dead. Perhaps it is this close contact between the reality and the immediacy of the spirit world, in the surrounding presence of ancestral spirits, that has made so vivid to the uneducated masses of the Chinese the omnipresence of the spirits of foreboding character in all their physical environment and in every act of their daily life. To rid the people of this intolerable burden of superstitious practices, the present-day leaders have countenanced the dissolution of ancestor worship, for it seems that education alone cannot bring about the critical attitude adequate to the destruction of these benumbing and impoverishing beliefs. So great is the contrast, indeed, between the ethical and speculative teachings of Lao Tze and the practices of Taoism that many students hold that there is no connection between them historically.

One illustration out of the innumerable mass must suffice to make concrete the influence of this slavery to ignorance. The whole environment of man is peopled with spirits, friendly or unfriendly; no act can be successfully undertaken until these spirits are properly placated. This can be done only by the proper incantations, spells, or rituals which only the priests or the geomancer can perform. The philosophical world connects with the most profound beliefs of the people. As we have noted earlier in this chapter, the five elements which compose all matter are water, fire, metal, wood, and earth. All things are merely various combinations of these, brought about through the activity of those invisible, intangible, creative forces, the *Yin* and *Yang*. Each of the five elements contains both these forces, so there is *Yang* water, *Yin* water, *Yang* fire, *Yin* fire, etc. Conceived of as forces rather than as mere lifeless elements, the very term element is made up, in the Chinese

character, of the outline of the right foot and the left foot—that is, walking, progress, force. Each element is, therefore, either constructive or destructive; water destroys fire, fire destroys metals, metals destroy or cut wood, wood destroys or consumes earth. Or, in the constructive powers, heat applied to metal produces a liquid; water nourishes wood, wood nourishes fire, fire produces ashes, or earth.

Now the work of the geomancer or priest is so to arrange the surroundings of a building, a grave, a field, so to provide for the initiation of a journey, so to direct the selection of a wife from the proper family and region, above all, so to select the place and time of burial, that the spirit world may be propitious. These are not secured merely by haphazard guess or incantation. Arrangement of the forces or elements of the natural environment so that the influences of the spirit world will be propitious becomes a most elaborate pseudo-science. This balancing of natural environment is termed *Fung-Shui* (wind water) and becomes the art of the geomancer or often of Taoist priest. Charts, diagrams, geomancer's compasses, most elaborate rites, ceremonies, casting of horoscopes, acts of divination, all enter in. The south represents fire, as being the warmer region; water therefore is north; the sun, bringing verdure and rising in the east, represents wood, as the opposite virtue is the west; earth is the center. Then there are the five minerals: gold, silver, copper, lead, and iron; the five grains: pulse, millet, hemp, corn, and rice; the five fruits: peach, plum, apricot, chestnut, and jujube; the five sacrificial animals: ox, goat, pig, dog, and fowl; the five lakes; the five guardian mountains; the five supernatural creatures; the five virtues, which we have discussed; the five blessings: longevity, riches, peacefulness, love of virtue, and a successful life; the five degrees of mourning; the five forms of punishment; and an almost endless succession of derivations from these, with their complicated adjustments and fantastic applications. There are five tastes, five colors, five shapes, five smells, by each of which the various

objects of the five forms of each of the five elements can be classified—for example, in the Chinese pharmacopœia—so that the Chinese druggist has a far more complicated task than his Western confrère at the soft-drink counter. Chinese medicine adds the complexity of the five organs, the five senses, the five pulses to the complexities of the pharmacopœia to compose the mysteries of his profession. To these the geomancer and astrologer adds the complexities of the five planets, the constellations, and the signs of the Zodiac.

As previously remarked, it is through the worship of the dead that these priestly directors or surveyors of *Fung-Shui* maintain their control over the living. The prosperity and welfare of the living, depending as it does on the peaceful abode of the spirit, connected as that is, in turn, with the proper burial of the body, necessitates the utmost care in such burial, so that the surrounding elements will nourish and not disturb the body of the dead. If this body suffers, so also must the living descendants suffer.

If the body suffers, woe be to the descendants. Their doom is sure. To avert such a calamity all the factors of Fung-Shui are employed to the utmost. The heavenly stems and earthly branches are brought in to determine the deceased's eight characters, and from this, his dominating element. Next the geomancer must scan the horizon and range the country far and wide (if sufficient funds are forthcoming) to ascertain by a study of the mountains and plains in the district just which of the nine stars and five planets control the various formations. This will give him the elements in control of different sections on the landscape. Should, for example, the dead man's predominating element be Earth, then the grave must not be near or face a spot where the Fire or Earth elements, as seen in a study of the mountains, predominate. These factors satisfactorily disposed of, it must be also arranged that the Green Dragon, always to his left, is higher than the White Tiger to his right, or the latter would work disaster. The Wind must also be watched, especially that from the north, which would give birth to white ants, destroy the coffin, and disturb the dead. Wind from a hollow near by will also enter the grave and cause consternation. To keep out these fatal winds, therefore, a mound is frequently erected

of a horseshoe shape surrounding the grave on all sides save a small opening at the foot or south. South winds bring prosperity, so are welcomed.[1]

The influences of *Fung-Shui* may be seen everywhere. As the spirits move only in straight lines, a screen is always erected in front of an open gate; streets are often made with jags in them to impede the progress of the unfriendly spirits (this is true even in Peking); roof lines are always curved, thus giving the characteristic feature to Chinese architecture; the roof ridges have protecting figures of lion or dog or dragon to guard against the evil spirits; Yamens and public buildings must always face south. Scarcely any feature of Chinese life, from the five colors of the national flag to the carelessly fluttering paper strip tied to a beggar's sleeve, but has a significance —lost to the uninitiated—in the doctrine of *Fung-Shui.*

One other concomitant of Taoism, with its occultism, should at least receive mention: that is, the secret societies—a most common feature of Chinese life. It can be readily seen how the superstitious rites and incantations of popular Taoism would lend themselves to the encouragement of all types of secret societies. From the Boxer Rebellion—with its promise of immunity against bullet wounds to the initiate—to the latest Tong war in New York, the evidences of these societies and of this cult are to be seen. Thus the support of religion, of ignorance, and of the most powerful of occult beliefs may be brought through boycotts to the assistance of very modern political programs.

While modern education and the weakening of ancestor worship are undermining the power of Taoist thermaturgy, yet for our generation this degenerate religion remains a real social force to be reckoned with.

[1] James Livingstone Stewart, *Chinese Culture and Christianity.*

BUDDHISM

Most in evidence of all religions in China, through its temples crowning the many hills, through its monks and monasteries, through its processions, festival days, and public ceremonies, Buddhism is, nevertheless, of foreign origin, hostile in its teachings to Confucianism, and seemingly hostile to the genius of the other institutions and characteristics of the Chinese people. Hostility to Confucianism is revealed above all in its commendation of monasticism—the obvious negation of ancestor worship; in its emphasis on the mysteries and supernatural in belief; in its elaborate systems of rewards and punishments after death; in its use of a foreign language in its ecclesiastical literature and liturgy. However, it answers to a need of the human soul which neither Confucianism, with its rationalistic ethical system, nor Taoism, with its supernaturalism, its occultism of the physical world, and its abstruse metaphysics, has furnished. What Buddhism furnishes is a religion of worship, of devotion; a religion that provides for those conscious of sin, for those desiring to forget this world, for those eager to serve others, and in this service to forget themselves; a religion of faith, of rewards and punishments, of Heaven and Hell. Confucianism offered none of these things, and Taoism only the latter, in indirect and corrupt forms. In these latter respects, Buddhism and Taoism coalesce, and in the ordinary life of the people—especially in the various manifestations of spirit worship and of *Fung-Shui*—can with difficulty be distinguished the one from the other.

Only a very much corrupted form of Buddhism, for the most part, finds place in China. For the most part, it is remarked advisedly; because there are many temples where a relatively pure form of worship is to be found; there are some monasteries that are the abode of devotion and of a seeking of a higher life; and there are many individual followers of these tenets.

When the early Jesuits came to China they were so impressed with the resemblance between Buddhism and their own form of worship that they looked upon the former as the work of the devil, to have so nearly approximated Christianity, mimicking in the outward form of heathenism every detail of Catholic worship and belief. The singing or intoning of a liturgical service, which the visitor may yet find rarely impressive; the invocation of saints; above all, the worship of a Mother and Child made most prominent and affecting; monasteries, nunneries, monks, nuns, ascetics; temples, images, saints, shrines and relics, beads and rosaries; tonsured heads; a celibate priesthood; the use of candles and incense; gorgeous priestly vestments; Heaven and Hell; rewards and punishment; pilgrimages and penances; prayer and fasting; doctrines of sin, of conversion, of forgiveness of sin, of renunciation of the world, of salvation of the soul. If one assayed to enumerate the outward characteristics of the Roman Catholic Church, would the results be other than the above? Yet this is a description of Chinese Buddhism. Unfortunately, the finer embodiment is found but rarely; only the more corrupted forms abound popularly. Hardly to be distinguished in its popular manifestations from Taoism, the two religions coalesce to preserve the more unintelligent and degraded survivals of the primitive animistic beliefs, such as are not to be found among any other civilized people, or perhaps in any form in the modern world. The break-up of these primitive forms is now threatened through the impact of modern thought, brought everywhere in contact with Chinese life. The alarmed devotees among the more superstitious groups rightly read their doom in any form of modernism, Westernism, or imperialism. The time will come, however, when the keen common sense of the practical common man, however uninformed and uneducated he may be, will enable him to distinguish between the false and the genuine.

Buddhism, like Taoism, has added much to Chinese life

in the past and has elements of value for the present. To the speculative and reflective few, Taoism yet offers a challenge; to the reverential, the worshipful, those oppressed with the world, Buddhism offers a temple, a monastic retreat, a religious consolation. Out of the masses, such form a comparative few. To the majority, both faiths offer a confirmation of their superstitious fears and a means of escape in magic rites and ceremonies and the expensive services of priests. Both confirm China's bondage to the past, not so much in conforming to ancestor worship—which both do—as in insisting upon obedience to meaningless forms inherited from antiquity and in opposing any change.

Both have given much to art in the past, and something to literature; though of recent times seemingly nothing to either of these. With their local cults, secret societies, regional worship, and absence of any general head or system, they add but another to the divisive social forces which prevent this great people from finding itself.

A most friendly appreciation is given by Clennell in his *Religions of China:*

> To the active and strong, Buddhism offered travel and a life of adventure as a missionary all over Asia. To the sinful it held out the prospects of buying pardon by works of piety; or threatened the penalties of a dread underworld of purgatory—the judgment seat of Yen-Wu, the hill of knives, the glowing column of fire, the Wheel of the Law, whose turning causes bad men to be reincarnated as beasts. To the multitude it presented the glamor of splendid services, images, and incense, or the excitement of popular pilgrimages to the hallowed miracle-working shrines, the amusement of accumulating merit by feeding, catching, and releasing again the immense black carp with black and golden scales, kept stocked for the purpose in the temple pond; to all, a communion of inward tranquillity, unshaken by the storms either of worldly greatness or worldly failure; peace to the weary; sainthood to the devout lovers of the gentle Buddha and his law.[1]

[1] Clennell: *Religions of China,* p. 26.

MOHAMMEDANISM

To the Mohammedans in China, variously estimated as from ten to thirty-five millions, but scant notice can be paid. Mohammedan customs and habits have been adapted to Chinese forms rather than the reverse, while ancestor worship, with its complex rites and ceremonies has not noticeably abated. While the cult of the prophet—introduced, very shortly after the founding of the new faith, by Arab sea-faring traders along the southern coast, or by Turkoman or Arab trade along the old trade routes of Central Asia—injected an element of much needed virility into the Chinese stock and social life, yet this virility has found its chief expression, from time to time, in revolts and rebellions which have meant slaughter and destruction instead of an impetus to progress. The proselyting force of Islam, evident in all other countries, though it has contributed a color to the Republican flag, wields but nominal influence.

Similarly, Lamaism, or the Mongolian form of Buddhism, though a powerful and dominating influence in Tibet and Mongolia, and once the inspiration to a great revival of Chinese national strength, has but slight influence upon Chinese life or character. Through a few isolated monasteries its peculiar features and its degrading influence are exemplified.

On the whole it will be seen that Chinese native religions are but the conservers of long established rites and customs. Far more concerned in the preservation of ancestor worship, the cult of the dead, the form and control of magic, the superstitious veneration of incantations and priestly ceremonies, and the economic exploitation of their dupes, than in the exemplification of the ennobling principles, the helpful spiritual exercises, and the glimpses of universal truths which they all contain, these religions offer little aid to China in her present situation. Fearful of change, since any change will shake their

power over the ignorant, and conscious of the inevitable changes which must come with new contacts and the corresponding enlightenment of the people, the priesthood seek to spread terror of and hostility to the changes now going on—a break-up of the foundations of society which produces such terror as when the earth quakes beneath their feet.

All within the four seas are brethren.

—*Confucius*

For the East is East and the West is West;
And never the twain shall meet.

—*Kipling*

Ceremonies are but the veneer of loyalty and good faith.

—*Lao Tze*

Heaven's views may be known from the people's views,
And Heaven's desires from the desires of the people.

—*Pre-Confucius*

Be kind to the stranger who comes from afar.

—*Tseng Tsu*

The good people are those who live in countries so near to each other that they can hear each other's cock crow and dog bark and yet never have had intercourse with each other during their lifetime.

—*Lao Tze*

CHAPTER V

CONTACTS WITH THE WEST

As WITH most Americans of the passing generation, my earliest contact with things Chinese was through the fire-cracker with which we celebrated our national holiday. When days of reflection came, wonder arose that fire-crackers should also be used to celebrate the birth of Christ. Some universal kinship was suggested when, long after, I discovered that the Chinese use the same fire-cracker on religious and solemn social occasions, at funeral ceremonies, as well as at occasions of rejoicing. The youthful thrill at finding a cracker clothed in magisterial green or yet more rare Imperial yellow stimulated visions of a culture where there were stages of grandeur beyond the gorgeous red. In more recent years no thrill of the Orient exceeds that of chance observation of a celebration in which ropes of fire-crackers, fully three stories long, hung from the curved eaves of tall theaters and restaurants, demonstrating that the dreams of youth may, though tardily, come true.

Later, the curiously shaped mountains, the fantastic trees, the pictures of houses and temples such as did not exist even in a child's imagination—all from the tea-caddy—joined the yellow dragon of the fire-crackers. Willow bridges, men in flowing garments, curious castles and pagodas on porcelain called Chinaware, brought more intimate realization of a civilization different in quality from our own. And in later life actual contact has confirmed the impression that there are qualities not to be found in our own customs and institutions which may have an independent worth of their own. In both experiences perhaps the most striking quality was the combination of the mysterious and the terrible with the most commonplace and useful: pagodas, piratical looking individuals carrying huge knives but clothed in flowing silk, dragons

and terrifying beasts in company with fire-crackers, tea, and dishes.

One will not go astray even in interpreting the news of the day if this contrast is ever borne in mind.

It is this paradox which strikes the traveller everywhere on Chinese ground. This perpetual mixture of the prosaic and the mysterious disconcerts one more than continual mystery. The refinements and scepticisms of an advanced civilization rub shoulders with Negro fetishism, the most sober good sense allies itself to amazing superstitions which penetrate and direct all the daily life of this nation of traders and canny peasants; one is in a world where nightmare and sorcery alternate abruptly with the most commonplace matter of fact, where atheism does not exclude the most gross and puerile of religious observances, where beings arrayed like butterflies or fairies flit like apparitions through the sordid crowds dressed in blue smocks, black alpaca, and work-a-day trousers; where every kind of magnificence, of coarseness, of dainty refinement, of fetid odour, and sweet perfume mingle.[1]

In addition to this combination of the mysterious and the commonplace there is another contrast which cannot escape any observer or any reader. Illustrations of this contrast conventionally find a place in every book on China. The Chinese are antipodal to the West not only geographically but in their manners and habits. In this queer Alice-Through-the-Looking-Glass world most things are done in a way contradictory to our way. The true significance of these contrasts dawns on one with contact. Most of their "curious" ways are just as rational as—often more rational than—our own ways of doing the same things. Our customs are founded on "custom," as are those of the Chinese.

In China the men wear long, flowing robes; the women, trousers and a long jacket. The formal meal begins with sweets and ends with soup. The clothing is buttoned on the side; the throat and chest, most sensitive to exposure, are always covered and a full collar worn. Formal clothing is worn suspended

[1] Hovelaque, *China Seen from Without*, p. 15.

UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET
Lake Baikal
Lake Balkash
Urga
OUTER MONGOLIA
Autonomy, 1912
Soviet Republic, 1921
Desert of Gobi
SINKIANG
INNER
Great Wall
CHINESE EMPIR
TIBET
Hwang
HIMALAYA MTS.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Delhi
Lassa
NEPAL
BHOTAN
Ganges
Brahmaputra
Chungking 1891
Ichang 1876
Han Kow
CHIN
Yangtze
BRITISH INDIA
Calcutta
UPPER BURMA
To Gt. Brit. 1886
BAY OF BENGAL
LOWER BURMA
TONKING
To France 1885
Gulf of Tonking
HAINAN
Mekong
SIAM
Bangkok
INDIAN
OCEAN
CAMBODIA
To France 1863
Gulf of Siam
To France, 1862
COCHIN CHINA
To France, 1867

CHINA
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300 400 500
Treaty ports of China, with dates of opening, are underlined
SEA OF OKHOTSK
PACIFIC OCEAN
JAPAN SEA
EAST CHINA SEA
KOREA (CHOSEN)
Seoul (Keijo)
To Japan, 1910
Tokyo
Port Arthur
Rus., 1898; Jap., 1905
To Japan, 1905
Weihaiwei
To Gt. Brit., 1898
Kiaochow
To Germany, 1898
To Japan, 1920
To China, 1923
Chinkiang
1860
Chefoo, 1898
Shanghai, 1842
Ningpo
1842
Wenchow
1876
Shashsien
1895
NANSEI IS. (LIUKIU)
To Japan, 1879
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
To Jap., 1895
To Russia, 1858
To Russia, 1860
MANCHURIA
MONGOLIA
SINKIANG
TIBET
Peking
CHINA
TROPIC OF CANCER
Longitude West from Greenwich For U.S.
Longitude East from Greenwich For China
110° 100° 90° 80° 70°
120° 130°
45° 30°
CHINA
With outline of United States on same scale
80° 90° 100° 110° 120° 130°

from the shoulders and is usually a flowing robe. A Chinese book ends where ours begins; the Chinese read from right to left on the page, and in perpendicular columns rather than horizontal lines. At their banquets the left is the seat of honor. Men keep their hats on in polite company and carry fine fans on all occasions; white is the color for mourning; the south is the standard point of the compass. The Chinese begin their buildings by first erecting the roof. While it is customary for law-abiding men to shave the head, criminals are not allowed to have the hair cut. The Chinese shakes his head when he means "yes" and nods when he means "no"; instead of shaking the hand of a friend in greeting, he shakes his own hand; he hisses for applause (in a most disconcerting way); and he reverses our motions for calling or dismissing a person. He strikes a match or uses a tool in the way opposite from that of the Westerner; he sets the saw blade at right angles to the handle; he gets under the board he is sawing; he draws the plane toward him. His instinctive movements and habits are, in fact, usually the reverse of ours. When such contrasts are pointed out, the Chinese are likely to reply by quoting one of their proverbs, "Alike in big things; different in little things."

But, after all, these contrasts are more significant than merely curious, in that they indicate a difference in origin, a difference in quality. The fact that such customs may have an antiquity and a changelessness far superior to those of our own culture should indicate that such differences may have elements of worth not to be fully measured by our own cultural yardstick. Furthermore, such contrasts are found in nature itself. A common grain, *kaoliang,* a species of corn or maize, bears the grain on the tassle. In the Western Hills near Peking the pine trees have gleaming white bark like the Western sycamore; oak trees bear acorns in burrs and the chestnut tree its fruit in cups.

Western cultures are all composed of a combination of different degrees of a native or racial element, with certain common basal cultural contributions. Among the latter are

the ethical and religious ideals of Judea, the art and philosophy of Greece, the political and social institutions of Rome. The early Mediterranean cultural elements have replaced practically all the early genetic constituents of the various European stocks. Even India is greatly influenced by the culture of the Iran and the Mediterranean. But China has none of these; and possesses about the only culture not influenced by them. As previously indicated, Japan had long experience with a feudal system so similar to that of Europe that its later political history has much in common with the West.

China stands alone and has been able to stand alone because of her isolation. Guarded on the west by a continent of deserts, inhospitable lands and people and impassable mountains, she has proved vulnerable from this direction only to the rare and lucky traveler, or to the trader native to the yet more isolated regions lying between China and the West; or from time to time in the remote past to those huge amorphous masses of migratory population that have been speedily absorbed into the native population. To the south, she was guarded against the early travelers or traders from India by impenetrable mountains and dangerous seas around the long extension of the Malay peninsula. To the east, two great oceans and an unknown continent separated her from Europe, and—until recently—an unsettled continent and a forbidding expanse of sea protected her from the venturesome Yankee trader. To the north, approach has been guarded by the frozen steppes and barren deserts, and from the semi-barbarian Mongolian hordes by the Great Wall.

Until recently China's isolation has been all but complete. Now the isolation is broken down from every point and can never be restored. Hence the desirability—the necessity—that those two cultures, the East and the West, so diverse in quality, should seek to understand one another. China has been sending her thousands of students to the West, is avidly reading Western literature, and is building schools at home. Should

not the West make some reciprocal effort? But to do this we must be prepared to grant some merit to cultural achievements different from our own; to have some interest and some standards of judgment other than those of Main Street, Broadway, or the Bowery.

The education of American youth through the fire-cracker can be made a generalization to cover more than a generation; it is typical of the contact of the West with the East through the ages. Throughout ancient history and down well within the modern period, at least to the eighteenth century, this contact is either clothed in mystery or known only by suggestion or isolated fact. Yet a survey of these contracts will be more helpful for our purposes of gaining an understanding of the present complicated and unhappy situation than will an outline of Chinese history. This latter may be gained from the many excellent works on the subject and carries little significance for the present, little understanding for the Western layman. But a sketch of the various stages of approach between the East and West is essential for any successful interpretation of the present-day problem.

THE PERIOD OF THE ADVENTUROUS TRAVELER

Such contacts as may have existed between ancient civilization and China are matters of speculation. The Arab traders had frequent contacts with the land of Sin, supposedly their name for China. The prophet Isaiah mentions the land of Sinim, presumably the same region. With the Greeks—though as yet these are largely matters of conjecture—much more intimate contacts are at least suggested. Even the casual visitor or observer in a museum will be struck with the similarity in Greek and Chinese art, especially in the decorative motives. These may, however, be a common possession of all primitive peoples. The small figures of from six inches to two feet in height, many centuries old, now being found in the tombs exposed by flood and earthquake in Shensi, Kansu, and the

provinces of the northwest, are strikingly similar to the pottery figures of early Greek periods.

Far more significant than the evidence of such handicraft is that of the fundamental similarity of institutions. The position of women—even of those of professionally immoral character—is much the same as those of Greece. The general organization of the home and the arrangement of the house are similar. So too are the household shrines and deities. The house faces south, to have full measure of sun in the winter and as little as possible in summer. The women's apartments are separate from the men's. The women are not permitted to social entertainment or even to home meals when guests are present. They use cosmetics extensively, and of much the same character as those used by the Greeks. The arrangement of marriage by parents is identical. The method of heating by portable braziers, of travel by litters and mule cart, and the use of umbrellas are all similar. So are many of the street customs; the puppet shows, the public story-teller or bard, the street jugglers, the drama—all are strikingly similar. Anyone staying at a Chinese inn soon becomes acquainted with other customs akin to those of the Greeks. Here, the long, noisy drinking bouts late into the night, with the added amusement of game and chance through the guessing games of the fingers, are identical with the Greek custom. Here also is the conventional reversal of custom—for the reveler who loses the contest must drink the wine.

Professor Giles points out that the primitive Chinese systems of music were so similar to those of the Greeks that the early Jesuit fathers argued that the Chinese borrowed their music from the Greeks. There is also similarity in the calendars used by the two peoples. A vast amount of evidence of this character has, indeed, been piled up to prove the contact between the Greek and the Chinese,[1] but it is all circumstantial evidence, based on similarity; there is no proof of direct trans-

[1] See Giles, *China and the Chinese.*

fer. Some use of silk—imported, probably, by various though unknown stages—is one direct evidence of contact.

The evidence of contact with the Romans is more direct, but that of influence much slighter. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius, in the second century of the Christian era, sent envoys to Cochin-China to open trade; and the Emperor Theodosius, in the eighth century, is recorded as having sent an envoy to the Chinese Court. Also, during the seventh century the Nestorians from Syria fostered the earliest Christian movement in China. Meanwhile, quite early in the Christian era, there developed the first great influence of foreign countries on China —the introduction of Buddhism from India. A constant interchange of religious devotees between India and China followed. In the arts and sciences, in literature, in architecture, in mathematics, and in music, as well as in the whole religious and philosophical life, India profoundly influenced China. But this gave no additional contact with the West.

The first extensive contacts with the Mediterranean countries came also as the product or by-product of religious zeal. During the Tang dynasty (618-917 A.D.) the Mohammedan religion made numerous contacts with China through Arab traders. Following this dynasty came the Sung dynasty, and after the Sung, the Mongol conquerors gradually took possession of China; Mohammedan influence thus became stronger, and the trading contacts more numerous.

The Tang dynasty is considered the Golden Age of Chinese culture, and it is contemporaneous with the Dark Ages in Europe. Western historians have pronounced the Chinese during this period, "the most civilized people on earth." The Mongols were inferior to the Chinese in culture and represented an attack on Chinese civilization similar to that of the Teutonic tribes on the Roman Empire. As in the latter case, so also in the earlier conquest of Grecian civilization by the Romans, "Captive Greece took captive her rude conqueror," and Kublai Khan became one of the great Chinese rulers. In

fact, this combination of barbarian strength and a rich civilization proved of world-wide conquering power. The Mongol Empire under Kublai Khan and Genghis Khan extended from the Polish marches and the gates of Vienna to the shores of the Japan Sea—from India and Arabia to the frozen north.

The Great Mongols ruled over an Empire the greatest in extent the world has ever seen; greater than that of Alexander or of Cæsar or of Napoleon. While their names were a terror to Europe, and Europe's culture seemed threatened with complete extinction, this was a flourishing period of expansion for Chinese culture. This also was the period of first direct contact with the West, for the account given by the great Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, of his visit to the great Khan brought China to the general attention of Europe. The opening sentence of his account conveys to us of the twentieth century something of the thrill which it gave to a benighted Europe during the early period of printed books:

> Now am I come to that part of our book in which I shall tell you the great and wonderful magnificence of the Great Kaan now reigning, by name Cublay Kaan; Kaan being a title which signifieth "The Great Lord of Lords," or Emperor. And of a surety he hath good right to such a title, for all men know for a certain truth that he is the most potent man, as regards forces and lands and treasure, that existeth in the world or ever hath existed from the time of our First Father Adam until this day. All this I will make clear to you for truth, in this book of ours, so that every one shall be fain to acknowledge that he is the greatest Lord that is now in the world, or ever hath been. And now ye shall hear how and wherefore.

While the entire adventure of the Venetian was doubted during the more sophisticated period of the nineteenth century, yet the tale is now vindicated. The story is told that on the deathbed of the great traveler he was admonished by his father confessor to confess his sins of lying, but that he stoutly refused, saying that he had not told the half. Less critical centuries accepted his tale, in whole or in part, and the general concep-

tion of China as a land of untold luxury, power, and mystery dominated the European mind for several centuries. It was this splendid conception reënforced by the subsequent accounts of the Jesuits which led the French Encyclopedists of the eighteenth century to use the excellencies and glories of the Oriental civilization as a foil to the evils of the European reality. To them China became Rousseau's ideal of pristine virtue and excellence. Voltaire's account of China in the *Philosophical Dictionary* is chiefly an indirect criticism of Christian Europe.

THE PERIOD OF THE TRADER

The long period of the isolated traveler was succeeded by that of the European trader. The realities of this trade filled in the vague outlines of grandeur pictured by Marco Polo. Holland had succeeded to Venice as the mart of the world largely because of contact with China and the Far East. Silks and spices, gorgeous brocades, jewels, and carved ivory gave substantial evidence of this grandeur. In humbler but very substantial ways Holland became the home of many of these transplanted exotics. That Holland has long been the land of cultivated flowers is no doubt due to these early contacts; and that the porcelains and chinawares and like products had a similar origin is evidenced by the potteries of Delft and other wares. While the actual transfer has not been traced, in all probability the lens which gave origin to the telescope and the microscope came through the same channel at this same time. The actual transfer of paper-making and its accompaniment of printing, from blocks as well as from movable type—both arts long known in China—has recently been traced by the late Thomas Francis Carter in his admirable study, *The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward*. These are some of the arts and sciences of the remote Eastern culture that filled the minds of the eighteenth-century encyclopedic idealists.

The second stage of relations with the West may be termed the commercial period, since such interests not only excluded

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all others, but determined all relationships of governments and all knowledge of the people concerned. The curious work of artistic handicraft, sometimes of great merit, which even to-day one often comes across in isolated villages or commonplace homes in England or the United States, Holland, or France, are evidences of the widespread influence of those early commercial days. Such articles are not those that are distributed by modern commercial methods, but are the wreckage of the earlier day of the sailing ship and the merchant adventurer, borne afar by the currents of this venturesome commerce.

The century that saw the exploration and settlement of American colonies saw also the development of trade with China. These two were parts of the same movement. The Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company were formed and operated in the same period as the Dutch West India Company, the English West India Company, and the Virginia Company. While the American companies developed along political lines, the commercial aspects became of slight importance. Because of the older civilization and the greater population with which they had to deal, the East India Companies, while they developed into political companies—as witness the East India Company in India—yet became of far greater importance in the commercial field. The Dutch East India Company at one time possessed one hundred and fifty trading ships, forty ships of war, and ten thousand soldiers; while it paid a dividend of forty per cent. The British East India Company had the power to "acquire territory, coin money, construct fortresses, form alliances, make war and peace, and exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction." It was in the exercise of these and similar rights and powers that the Dutch, the English, and other Europeans came to China during the seventeenth century. The above enumeration of the rights and powers given to these companies indicates the origin of some of the present difficulties. The British East India Company was formed in 1600; it came to China as an extension

ALTAR OF THE TEMPLE OF HEAVEN

A DRAGON SPIRIT SCREEN. THE DRAGON REPRESENTS HUMAN ENDEAVOR; THE PEARL, PERFECTION

See jacket to this volume

Peabody Museum

EARLY AMERICAN SHIPPING



DESTRUCTION OF THE FACTORIES AT CANTON BY A MOB

of the India trade in 1637; its monopoly in India was dissolved by Parliament in 1813, and in China in 1833. The strife for the further exercise of these sovereign rights in China by the individual English trader led to the so-called Opium War of 1837. The first of the treaties granting the powers which are now disputed by the Chinese was made in 1842. But little more than half a century earlier the Americans had also got into difficulty with this same East India Company over a Chinese product, and had held a Tea Party, similar to the Opium Party of 1838, which later had numerous consequences. But how differently we view the series of events in the antipodal continent, though how similar in character and occasion! This, however, is long ahead of our story.

Even in the earlier contact with the Chinese, the European nations used the same methods that they used in the West. The conquests of Peru and of Mexico, the series of Indian wars, do not, it is true, have their counterpart in the Orient; because then the Europeans were dealing with a far more developed culture. And yet the story of the East India Company in India does not read very differently from the account of the conquest of the American "savages." And everywhere the methods of violence so depended upon in the new West were resorted to with humiliating consequences in the old East. The exclusiveness of China and Japan grew out of the character of these earlier contacts. This is not to say that the Oriental did not have, even before this early acquaintance, a sense of superiority and of condescension which irritated the European. But the European was tolerated and admitted. Only after display of bad manners and of shocking cruelty was he relegated to the one trading center in each country. During that period the inferiority complex had a "reverse English." But the West had the brute force—and used it.

This commercial invasion of the Orient took place about the same period, by the same people, using the same methods, as the exploration and settlement of the New World. Not

content with trade, the Europeans from the first treated the natives with cruelty, employed the same high-handed methods used with the American Indians—though far less successfully —and seized cities and land as a basis for trade.

The first of the visitors were the Portuguese. Arriving on the south coast of China in 1515, they soon had three settlements. Welcomed at first with kindness and with a desire for trade, their brutal treatment of the natives led the Chinese to drive them out. This exhibition of bad manners was not wholly gratuitous, for to a considerable extent it grew out of failure to understand strange customs both on the part of the Chinese and the Europeans. The Chinese, as well as the Europeans, were accustomed to look upon all people other than themselves as inferior; but the former also interpreted the bringing of goods for trade as a form of tribute; demanded obeisance before magistrates and prostration before the representatives of the Emperor, and the observance of many customs, strange, annoying, and perhaps humiliating to the Europeans. Yet it should be noted that the *kotow* which caused so much opposition among the early English was a form of ceremonial greeting between equals as well as toward superiors. Various forms of tribute, of "squeeze," took the place of taxes.

The first Portuguese expedition, having reached Canton in 1517, was expelled. A second one, coming in 1522 from the Portuguese East India colonies, was also repelled. In the next quarter-century settlements were made in Amoy, Foochow, and Canton—the old trading ports allowed the Arabs during earlier centuries. Massacres followed in these centuries, and in 1553 the Portuguese were confined to the barren peninsula of Macao. Here they continue to control to the present day. Here, too, flourish in exotic luxuriance, under the protection of a Christian power, all the vices of both civilizations. On one of the rocky elevations of the city stands the ruin of an old cathedral. Making harbor after the dangers of a tropical typhoon, and first sighting the cross surmounting the ruined façade of the church,

a Christian official wrote the hymn, "In the cross of Christ I glory, Towering o'er the wrecks of time." But to the Chinese this settlement but typifies, in its history and in the present character of this Christian reservation, their pragmatic objection to Christianity—the contrast between its profession and its concrete realization.

Thus early began the political conflict which grew out of the commercial purposes of the foreigner. The Malay peninsula at that time was tributary to China. The Portuguese had seized the kingdom of Malacca, which they made the basis of their attack on Canton.

Two excerpts from the early Chinese records, the first from the report of the Cantonese Mandarin, the second from the records of the Ming dynasty, give in vivid colors the interpretation of these events by the Chinese and indicate as well some of the basis of misunderstanding on the part of the Europeans:

Suddenly there arrived two great sea vessels which went and anchored near the Post-house, saying that they had brought tribute from the nation of Fo-lang-Ki (Franks), this being the name of a country and not of a cannon as previously reported. The masters of the ships are called Ka-pi-tan. All the persons aboard had prominent noses and deep-set eyes, wearing turbans of white cloth round their heads after the custom of the Mohammedans. The news was immediately conveyed to His Excellency the Viceroy, who gave orders that as these people knew nothing about etiquette they should be instructed for three days regarding ceremonies at the Mohammedan mosque: after which they were to be introduced into his presence. As it was found that the institutes of the Ming dynasty contained no mention of tribute being received from the nation in question, a complete report of the affair was despatched to the Emperor, who sanctioned the despatch of individuals and presents to the Ministry of Rites. In consequence of disrespectful behaviour in the capital, the interpreter was condemned to death, and the rest of the party sent back as prisoners to Canton to be expelled from the country. During their long stay in Canton they showed a particular liking for the study of Buddhist writings. Their cannon are made of iron, and are five or six feet long. . . .

After the Franks had come with soldiers and conquered the country, the King of Malacca fled and sent envoys to inform the Imperial Government of this disaster. The Emperor published an edict blaming the Franks and telling them to return to their own country. He also ordered Siam and neighboring countries to go to the rescue, but because they disobeyed these orders the Kingdom of Malacca was destroyed.

Shortly after these events the Franks sent envoys to the court, but when they arrived at Canton, the governor imprisoned them, because their nation had hitherto not been numbered among the tributary countries, and asked for instructions from the Government. The Emperor ordered the governor to pay them the price of their goods and send them off.[1]

This account of the Portuguese approach to China but typifies what might be written of each of the other European powers, and gives the opening scene of this long connected drama—a drama of greed and still baser qualities, but also a drama of heroism and high endeavor. Even so superficial an account reveals too something of the emotional content which enters into the use of the term "foreign devils"—a term which was first used during that period to convey the impression made by these "friendly" traders.

The Spaniards seized the Philippines in 1543. Coming from the West, they called them the Western Islands—in contrast with the Portuguese, who came from the East and therefore called them the Eastern Islands. Thus literally did West and East meet. The Spaniards showed the same cruelty to the Chinese traders in the Philippines that they revealed elsewhere; and gave a more compelling demonstration in the massacre of all the Chinese in Manila, which they had founded in 1571. The consequent antagonism of the Chinese and the preoccupation of the Spaniard in the Philippines kept the latter from securing any permanent foothold on the Chinese coast.

Little more successful than the Spanish, so far as China was concerned, but much more so in the entire Far East, were the Dutch, despite the opposition of both Portuguese and

[1] *The Vanished Empire,* by Putnam Weale, pp. 128, 129, 130.

Spaniard. For, to be sure, these Christian nations were no more assiduous in demonstrating the qualities of the Christian nations to the Chinese than they were among themselves. Frequent if not constant warfare at home apparently justified a hostility abroad that was little better than open piracy.

The Dutch reached the East Indies in 1599, founding a settlement which was to become the basis of their prosperity throughout the modern period. In 1622 they made an attempt to seize Amoy as a basis for their trade with China. They were driven off, but established themselves on the islands of Formosa, opposite. Here they set up a dominion over two hundred villages, and later turned their attention to Japan and the East Indies rather than to China.

With great significance for American history, the English had diligently sought throughout the sixteenth century a northwest or western passage to the Far East. But with the capture of a Portuguese galleon in 1592 the secret of the easier route was revealed, and England's march to the Far East began. Thus, by an act of war—or of piracy, legitimate in those days—the results of a century of explorations were appropriated by a most aggressive nation. Their first foothold was established in India—later to become the keystone of the British Empire. The first Englishman to reach China arrived in 1620—the year the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock. The first commercial contact was made seventeen years later, accompanied by the use of cannon. A Chinese fort was actually captured, but no profitable barter ensued. Occupied at home with constant warfare, her overseas energies absorbed in the expansion in the American Colonies and in India, England gave little attention to China until the latter part of the eighteenth century, when India had become established as a great empire under the East India Company and the American problem was settled with the independence of the Colonies. But the important contact between the English and the Chinese came later.

Several events of great influence on these relationships,

quite outside the line of commercial development, occurred meanwhile. One was the conflict in Europe, especially that between England and the Catholic powers of the Continent, and the various religious and dynastic wars which involved practically the whole Continent. These conflicts were carried to the Far East as they were to the American continent. And they gave, to the Chinese especially, and to the Oriental in general, the impression still commonly held of the warring, fierce, and destructive Christian peoples. In turn, the conception of the Chinese which the Westerner tends to hold to-day —that they are a people who will become reasonable, in a Western way, only when force is applied—was also developed. The conflict of the warring Christians was not limited to the hostile Protestant and Roman Catholic countries, but was most acrimonious at times between the Jesuits and other Roman Catholic orders, especially the Dominicans. The various Protestant bodies had not yet arrived on the scene.

The second of these important influences was the decline of the power of the Ming dynasty and the final triumph of the Manchus in 1644. Throughout the early period of the incursions of the fighting traders in the South, the power of the Ming emperors was gradually disintegrating. Often unable to control their own representatives, they were as ignorant of the character and power of the people with whom they had to deal as these latter were of the Chinese. Furthermore, neither the Ming dynasty nor the Manchu dynasty was able to protect its seacoast either from foreigners or pirates, and the Japanese gave them at times as much trouble as did the Europeans. Following the fall of the Ming dynasty, all the ports of China were open to the foreigner. Here, however, another of the ever-present difficulties between the foreigner and the Chinese arose. The exactions of the local officials in taxes and fees were so heavy, and at times so seemingly unreasonable, that conditions were little better than before. Soon the Dutch were compelled to give up Formosa and to confine themselves to one

port in Japan; and the foreigners were gradually excluded from the old Arab trading cities along the coast. Canton and Macao alone remained as of old.

The third of these significant influences—transpiring during the eighteenth century—was the power of the Christian Church, especially that branch under the Jesuits. Francis Xavier had died on an island off the coast of China, in sight of the promised land. The Jesuits had begun their work in 1583, gained great influence in various parts of China, and were alternately persecuted and fostered. They had introduced many things besides religion, especially the developing natural sciences. Among such novelties were types of firearms. Also under their direction the famous astronomical instruments of the observatory in Peking were made. In our own time these were seized by the Germans during the Boxer Rebellion and later restored by the Treaty of Versailles. For more than a century the Jesuits were fostered and even protected by the Manchu dynasty. It is reported that before the fall of the Ming Emperors one hundred and fourteen members of the royal household were Christians. The final downfall of the Jesuits was due quite as much to their conflict with the Dominicans over the toleration of ancestor worship as to religious hostility. This seems quite a modern situation. But, the Pope having sided with the conservative and orthodox Dominicans, and the Jesuits being quite out of favor in Europe, the conflict was over by the middle of the eighteenth century. No doubt this liberalism in the attitude of the Jesuits toward Chinese social customs and ideals did much to give them their favor; so also did their learning and their toleration. For a time it seemed to observers as well as to those within that China might become Roman Catholic; but with the growth of strength and confidence on the part of the Manchus, and the fear of the political aspirations of the Catholic church both in Japan and China, the period of Christian prosperity came to an end.

The Russians entered on the Chinese scene during the

latter part of the seventeenth century, threatening a new attack on Chinese seclusion from the north. A Russian embassy had been received in Peking about the middle of the seventeenth century; and a Chinese return mission was sent to Moscow in 1680. Between Russia and China a state of war existed from 1682 to 1689; this was eventually settled with the aid of a Jesuit missionary. Under Peter the Great friendly relations developed; and thereafter considerable overland trade flourished. These friendly terms continued until the period of general foreign aggression on China during the nineteenth century.

From 1702 trade by sea was again limited to the port of Canton, and there developed a series of restrictions on foreign trade far more burdensome than the earlier ones, which were largely of a local character. The real object of these restrictions was to protect from outside interference the exceedingly delicate structure of a very complex social state founded on observance of unchanging custom; a state having a weak central power and harassed internally by pirates, bandits, and frequent local rebellions. In that they had no knowledge of the excellence of Chinese culture or of the powers of the Emperor, all foreigners were barbarians in Chinese opinion. Also, they had no manners; no observance of form, where form was all-important. Hence, the very existence of this great social system would be endangered by the presence of the foreigner. On the other hand, neither the ruling powers nor the people had any conception of the forces embodied in Western culture and represented by the barbarian trader.

The Emperor appointed a representative in 1702 to oversee the foreign trade in Canton. In mid-century this supervisory authority was enlarged to a group. In 1757 an Imperial edict prohibited foreign trade at every port other than Canton, and restricted the trade in Canton to a close corporation of thirteen members of the celebrated Co-Hong; a corporation which was presided over by a representative of the Emperor, who transmitted all the orders of the Emperor through the

members of the Hong. These merchants had their several establishments or *hongs*. Here were employed a retinue of servants, clerks, interpreters, that made a city in itself. The foreign merchants had their factories, which were concentrated on a factory street. But all business and all political and other negotiations were conducted through the Hong.

Thus began the business system which—in its essential feature of business through a go-between, a "comprador"—though antiquated, survives to-day. In truth this antiquated system of indirection—of monopoly, of secrecy, of squeeze or commission, of indirect dealing between merchant and customs—is one chief source of misunderstanding and distrust at the present time. Yet on this system was built up the reputation of the Chinese for honesty and good business. One head of the Hong, Hoqua by name, ruled for forty years and became a man of international influence. Trade was permitted only during certain limited periods. The merchants must live in a central house, the Consoo House; no women were allowed; no visits into the country were permitted.

The English had in the meantime built up a similar monopoly in India, all trade there being concentrated in the East India Company. When the East India Company and its rival, representing the independents, were united in 1702, their monopoly was extended to the China trade. When the monopoly of the company was destroyed for India in 1813, the restricted privileges were continued for China until cancelled by Parliament in 1833; whereupon important political incidents followed. The chief articles of the English trade were tea and silks as exports from Canton, and opium as an import. The trade was very extensive and the profits large—one hundred per cent on the tea over a long period of years. The legitimate trade in opium by the East India Company for the half-century preceding the Opium War was $500,000,000, of which sixty per cent was profit.

The Dutch had now been driven out of the China trade;

the Portuguese had sunk to an inconsiderable power; the other European nations at this time did not count in the China situation. Meanwhile the American trader had appeared and, especially during the Napoleonic Wars, had built up a very worth-while trade, which wrote a great chapter in American history but had little influence in China.

With the growth of trade grew also misunderstandings. As yet foreign governments had had no contact with the Imperial throne. The contacts with the country were all commercial, and of the very restricted character indicated. These restrictions grew more onerous and the exactions more burdensome, arbitrary, and eventually unjust. Cases of violence, or of violation of Chinese regulations, could not be avoided. When offenders were caught, they were subjected to Chinese punishments—often disproportionate and cruel. Chinese conception of family unity even made any member of a foreign ship responsible for the misdeeds of any other member. Smuggling, especially of opium, increased all along the southern coast. The wealth which the tea and silk trade brought into China was taken out by the opium trade. Harsh living conditions, unreasonable restrictions, and financial exactions in trade exasperated the foreigners; rebellion and internal warfare threatened the Empire.

THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL CONTACTS

England determined to attempt political negotiation. Under George III, Lord Macartney was sent with a mission to seek better trade relations and to request or demand that a permanent British trade delegate be allowed, that trade be permitted, that warehouses be established at Peking, and that three new ports be opened. The Mission was accepted as one bearing tribute, but it failed in its object.

How far the two countries were apart, what were some of the difficulties to be overcome by the foreigner, and what some of the limitations in the views of the Chinese, are sug-

gested in the Imperial answer to the Mission's request, from which a few sentences can be quoted:

> If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization—our ceremonies and laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transport our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby. . . . As your ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This, then, is my answer to your request contrary to our dynastic usage which would only result in inconvenience to yourself. I have expounded my wishes in detail and have commanded your tribute envoys to leave in peace on their homeward journey. It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that by perpetual submission to our throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter.[1]

A little later a letter to King George makes the rebuff even more personal:

> I do not forget the loneliness of your island, cut off from the world by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of the usages of our Celestial Empire. I have consequently commanded my ministers to enlighten your Ambassador on the subject and have ordered the departure of the Mission.

Perhaps an earlier declaration of independence was not more insulting to George III. Mr. Bertrand Russell, quoting this letter, suggests, however, that "no one understands China until this document ceases to seem absurd."

A second attempt, in 1813, was not even so successful as that of 1793. Lord Elgin, the leader of this mission, refusing to kotow, was speedily sent out of the country. After abolishing the trading monopoly of the East India Company in Canton in 1833, Great Britain sent commissioners under Lord Napier to supervise the free trade, to open up China to trade,

[1] *China in the Family of Nations*, by Henry T. Hodgkin, pp. 52, 53.

and to assert national equality. Napier failed to comply with the procedure required by the existing agreements, was sent back to Macao, and there was taken ill and died. Two years of quiescence followed; but in 1836 a more vigorous British representative was appointed. Two years later an Imperial High Commissioner came to Canton from Peking to suppress the opium trade, which was proving so demoralizing to the Chinese and so disastrous to government finance. The Commissioner was ordered to destroy all the opium in possession of the foreign traders and to guard against subsequent importation by requiring bond. The British refused to give up the opium. The Imperial Commissioner then declared martial law and so effectively applied a blockade that the entire foreign colony was without food and capitulated in a few days. The opium, to the amount of 20,291 chests, valued at about $6,000,000, was destroyed. The British colony removed to Macao and appealed to the home government to redress the wrong.

Another event had occurred, however, which precipitated matters. In a search for contraband liquors in Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, the British killed a Chinese. The Chinese demanded redress, enforced this demand with a blockade, and threatened to take Hong Kong in reprisal for the murder. So, on November 3, 1839, there occurred the first naval battle between the British and Chinese. Thus opened the Opium War, that dragged on until the fall of 1842. The Chinese were as yet unconvinced that they had any equals. But after the English had taken several of the coast forts, some on the Yangtze, and had threatened Nanking, the ancient capital, the Chinese capitulated. As a result, five treaty ports were opened; Hong Kong was ceded in perpetuity; an indemnity of $21,000,000 was paid; a uniform and fair tariff of five per cent was established; extraterritoriality and equal status of diplomatic representatives were granted. Opium was not mentioned.

Perhaps it is unnecessary as well as impossible to assign merit and demerit in this conflict of interests. If the situation

is understood, this is sufficient. The motive of the Chinese was undoubtedly the suppression of the opium traffic. This pernicious evil had grown on the nation during the preceding century. Earlier use had not been seriously detrimental; but when introduced with tobacco from the Philippines, the habit of smoking the drug was developed. The foreign traders cultivated the lucrative trade. Opium had now come to be the chief item in British commerce, while its use was demoralizing the Chinese stamina and depleting the country of its precious metals. And by the English, the war was fought primarily for better trade conditions and for recognition of national equality. While reparation for the lost opium was demanded, opium itself formed a mere incident. As this first European war was fought for the recognition of the national equality of the British by the Chinese, it seems as though the British might have a more sympathetic appreciation of the Chinese attitude in the present crisis.

The first of the treaties now called "unequal" by the Chinese really settled none of the questions it opened. Neither side was satisfied either with the treaty or with the outcome of the war. The Chinese were still convinced of their superiority over the foreigners, still undesirous of opening their country to them or of doing business with them.

The Cantonese proved quite unwilling to carry out that part of the treaty which compelled the opening of Canton to free trade. The merchants and the populace in general resented the part of the British in forcing opium upon them. These unsatisfactory and unfriendly attitudes continued for some years, the British meanwhile seeking to obtain a revision of the treaties. Making no progress by negotiations, Britain readily entered into an alliance with France for a war on China, France furnishing an occasion in the execution of a French subject without extraterritorial protection. At that time Britain and France as allies, were just completing the Crimean War (1854-56). The Indian Mutiny delayed British action for a year; but

the second war was eventually fought in 1857-58, and prolonged into 1860. The Allies were, of course, successful; and then followed a second series of "unequal treaties." The Russians took advantage of the war to settle their boundary disputes. Treaties with each of the four powers contained the "favored nation" clause, consequently differences in the treaties are of little significance. The treaties provided: (1) for the residence of ambassadors, their families, and staffs at Peking; (2) rights of diplomatic immunities; (3) religious toleration; (4) opening the Yangtze to trade; (5) opening of numerous other trade ports; (6) extraterritoriality with clearer provisions; (7) a tariff of five per cent.

Delays in the signing of the treaties and the complete failure of the Chinese to recognize the significance of the occasion, together with old methods of duplicity, led to a complete break. The British and French took summary vengeance. The beautiful winter palace of the Emperor, built under the direction of the Jesuit fathers, with suggestions of the gardens of Versailles, was completely destroyed. While this act of vandalism is one of the greatest blots on the name of the Western powers, it had its desired effect. Perhaps no other single act of the West is so clearly remembered, more often mentioned as an evidence of the character of the Westerner, or carries greater influence to the present day. A large indemnity was paid the British; and Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, was ceded to them. To the Russians were granted the maritime provinces north of the Amur. Thus the gradual stripping of China by her Western friends proceeded.

There can be no doubt that the two sets of treaties following these two wars were agreed to by the Chinese; or that they were agreed to under compulsion as the vanquished in war. They are unequal in the sense that all treaties following wars are unequal. Furthermore, while it is now commonly stated that these treaties were willingly entered into by the Chinese, a reading of contemporary documents reveals their unwilling-

ness and resentment. Ignorance of Western customs, Western influence and power, Western technique and forms in diplomatic intercourse, very greatly handicapped the Chinese in these negotiations and settlements.

These two wars, of 1839-42 and 1857-60, and the two sets of accompanying treaties are the basal events of the nineteenth century in the relation between China and the West; in the opening up of China to Western influence; and in the creation of the present situation in so far as the psychological attitude of the Chinese may be considered the determining quantity.

A second aspect of this political period, little less significant than that of the two wars and the subsequent treaties, is that of the aggressions on the territory of China by the Western powers. In 1913 I was visiting villages in the hinterland of Canton as far inland as the incompleted railroad and the ordinary transportation would carry me. In one village, recognizing the noise of a "loud school," I yet detected a different quality; instead of each child memorizing his own lesson by shouting at the top of his voice, here the children were reciting in unison with even more than customary vigor. The school was in the village or clan temple.[1] There, before the ancestral tablets, clothed in the scant garb of a tropical summer day, their plump little bodies streaming with perspiration, these urchins were reciting the long list of foreign aggressions which had resulted in the loss of Chinese territory. The conclusion was an emotional appeal for the salvation of their country by recourse to arms. The lesson was taken from the new republican primer. Those children are now twenty to twenty-five years of age; and since the incident itself was repeated in many schools, I cannot be persuaded that the Nationalistic or Cantonese movement of the present day is due to Russian Soviet influence.

To understand the present-day situation as well as that of the nineteenth century, one needs to go over this list of incidents in some greater detail than did the schoolboys.

[1] See illustrations opposite page 72.

Mention has already been made of the fact that the Portuguese had taken possession of Macao as early as the close of the sixteenth century; that Russia had seized the province along the Amur and other important steppes along the northern Manchurian and Mongolian frontiers; that in 1839 Britain had taken Hong Kong and, as the result of the war of 1857-60, had demanded a large section on the mainland opposite Hong Kong, called Kowloon.

During the same period that war in the north was waging with the English and the French (1857-60), war in the south was being conducted against the French and the Spanish. The occasion was the murder of French and Spanish missionaries in Annam. The result was a large monetary indemnity to the Spanish ($4,000,000) and the cession to France of Saigon, three provinces of Cochin-China, and the outlying island of Pulo Condor. From this foothold France recognized the independence of Annam from China, to which country Annam had been tributary since the Han dynasty. Though pledged to respect the integrity of Annam, France first transferred much of this territory to Cochin-China and then assumed a protectorate over the rest.

One incident may be narrated that illustrates how the occasions for these territorial aggressions may arise, and also the combination between gunboats and missionaries which the Chinese so much resent and the people of the West find so difficult now to understand. The French Catholic missionaries in Tientsin had the custom in their orphanage of paying a small sum to anyone who delivered a child to the asylum to be cared for. Unscrupulous or starving people were not too careful about where they obtained such "orphans"; and in several instances children of well-to-do Chinese were kidnapped for the purpose of obtaining this small monetary reward. Rumors to the effect that the missionaries were stealing children for all sorts of evil purposes spread through the countryside, and infuriated mobs collected. Before the uprisings were quelled,

the French consul was killed, the cathedral and mission were burned, and the Sisters of Mercy were murdered. As this was in 1870, when France was occupied with the Franco-Prussian Wars, heavy indemnities were demanded and paid; responsible officials and supposedly guilty persons were punished; but no force was used at this time. The move toward the absorption of Annam began shortly afterwards. A subsequent war between France and China in 1883 added much additional territory and enabled the French to consolidate their southern empire. Through misunderstandings a second war immediately followed —in 1884. China paid an indemnity, and France made further territorial gains.

The onward march of Japanese territorial aggression began in 1871. The Liuchiu Islands had been under the joint suzerainty of Japan and China for two hundred and fifty years. The loss of life among citizens of these islands located on the Island of Formosa gave the Japanese the double opportunity of exerting a claim to the Liuchius and, at the same time, of invading Formosa. The British Minister acted as arbitrator; and in 1881 China paid an indemnity and lost the Liuchius. Korea had been a vassal state of China since the early years of the Manchus (1637); but in 1876 Japan recognized the independence of Korea. As a result, revolts, expeditions, and conflicts between Japanese and Chinese followed at intervals. Undoubtedly Japan was fearful that Korea might fall into the hands of European powers—which dénouement would threaten the peace of Japan. Events justified this fear. The conflict of interests and the insistent policy of Japan brought on the Chino-Japanese war of 1894. The Liaotung peninsula, the Pescadores, and Formosa were ceded to Japan, while Korea was recognized by both as independent. China paid a huge indemnity. Russia, France, and Germany intervened and forced Japan to withdraw from the Liaotung peninsula (Port Arthur and Dairen). China paid another indemnity. The subsequent war between Russia and Japan—chiefly over this identical territory—resulted

in both the peninsula and Korea passing to the control and later to the ownership of Japan. Through the control of the South Manchurian railway and treaty privileges connected therewith—another result of the Russo-Japanese war—South Manchuria has come under the actual control of Japan. Large Japanese centers have grown up; large bodies of Japanese troops are quartered; the coal mines, railways, and a modern commercial development are in the trust of the Japanese.

The English had meanwhile been making progress with China's dependencies. Burma had been a vassal state of China since Kublai Khan (1287). When the French seized Cochin-China in 1862, Great Britain, to protect her interests, seized lower Burma, adjoining. When the French occupied Annam in 1886, again to protect her interests, Britain seized upper Burma. China agreed by treaty to recognize the accomplished status. Perhaps in recognition of these favors, Britain in 1890 established a protectorate over Sikkim, a nebulous dependency of China adjoining Tibet. In 1895 France again enlarged her southern Empire at the expense of China; and Great Britain in 1897, in consideration of waiving her "objection to the alienation by China, by the convention with France of the 20th of June, 1895, of territory forming a portion of Kiang Hung, in derogation of provisions of the convention between Great Britain and China of the 1st of March, 1897," obtained further territory and railway privileges from Burma into Yunnan, which might make possible a next step. When Russia took Port Arthur, after forcing Japan to drop it when the Japanese had taken it from the Chinese, Great Britain obtained "a base" at Wei-hai-wei. The bay and all the surrounding lands are yet in the hands of Great Britain.

As a reward for its disinterested service in compelling Japan to relinquish the Liaotung peninsula in 1895, but nominally as a punishment for the opportune slaying of two missionaries in 1897, Germany compelled the cession of Tsing Tao. Subsequently, this concession was used as a base for

obtaining hold on much of the mineral wealth of the most populous and most destitute province of China—Shantung.

The story is not all told, even in outline. Russia worked in these areas; first, around the north of Manchuria and the territory of the East Manchurian railway; second, in the territory of Outer Mongolia, where, since the formation of the Soviet Republic the progress of absorption has been more rapid; and third, in the remote region of West Turkestan. Now most of the latter territory is definitely organized under the Soviet sway.

The third aspect of the political period corresponding to that of the wars and treaties, and of the territorial aggressions, is that of the concessions. All three are different forms of the assault of the Western powers on China—successive stages in the humiliation of China; and all constitute periods in the historic background that it is necessary to glimpse, at least, if we are to understand the present problem and the attitude of the Chinese. Historically, China had surrounded herself with a ring of dependencies, with the same purpose as, but far more effective than, the Great Wall: namely, protection from the assaults of foreign influences, cultural as well as military. Through the period of war (1839-1860), direct attack had been made from the sea and her seclusion had been penetrated. During this second period the ring of surrounding and protecting dependencies had been stripped from her. The third stage was that of penetration by means of concessions and spheres of influence. The Chino-Japanese War had revealed, through the complete collapse and defeat of China, the latter's powerlessness; had portended its ultimate break-up. As the European powers had successfully completed the partitioning of Africa, each was now anxious to get its share of China. The spheres of influence were the first step. Recognition of these was obtained, for one reason or another, from successive Chinese rulers or officials. In this way Russia laid claim to North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia; Japan, to South Manchuria,

Inner Mongolia, and Fukien; Germany, to Shantung; Great Britain, to the Yangtze valley, Tibet, and Szechuwan; France, to Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan, the provinces in the south. Little else is left.

The procedure by which the spheres of influence are made realities is by means of concessions. The most important of these is for a railway which in time would dominate the economic life of the given region. A railway makes banks necessary, and thus a hold is gained on the commercial life through the offer of Western facilities. Railways demand coal; and while concessions to open up the coal fields were usually secured by one means or another, these were seldom favorable to the Chinese. The railways are built with the assistance of foreign loans, chargeable to the Chinese government. Less crude than were the earlier seizures of territories, such advantages were now taken as leases only, and in the form of concessions. The German appropriation of Tsing Tao in 1898 provides an illustration. Under this agreement Kiaochau was leased to Germany for ninety-nine years, political jurisdiction over the territory to be exercised by Germany. A neutral zone fifty kilometers in breadth surrounded the leased territory, and in this zone Germany might move military forces, but China could do nothing there without Germany's consent. A concession for two railways crossing the entire province of Shantung was granted. Germany was to have the first option on any undertaking in which foreign assistance was needed. In the course of time most of the mineral lands came into the possession of Germans, chiefly in the form of leaseholds, often without any compensation either to public or private concerns. This, indeed, deserves the term "concession."

Russia's first step in this move in the newer mode was to seize Port Arthur and the surrounding territory; later, by successive steps too intricate to trace here, to lay claim to all Manchuria. Here Japan's interest was involved as well as China's, and Japan took up the "white man's burden." In the

need for her own security, however, Japan proved the real friend of China, for she assumed the burden of repelling the most threatening of all the European aggressors. By waging the Russo-Japanese War, she proved her ability as a defender, besides demonstrating what had scarcely been dreamed before either by European or Asiatic powers—that the Oriental could defeat the Occidental in a struggle of brute force.

Whenever one power gained a concession, other powers demanded similar compensations for their injured dignity and for restoration of the balance of power.

In two distinct periods, one following the Chino-Japanese War in 1895, the other following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, these rivalries for concessions were concentrated. The unsavory details might be strung out at great length. One phase, at least, is worthy of passing notice. The powers (which term does not include China, but does include Japan, so anyone may judge what constitutes "power" among modern states) negotiated among themselves rather than with China about these concessions. Finally, to protect their respective interests, the powers evolved the diplomatic term of "non-alienation," meaning that China would not cede to any other power than the contracting one any concessions of any kind whatever without consent of the specially favored nation.

Thus France obtained such a declaration for all land bordering on her Chinese Empire of Tonkin, and also for the island of Hainan; England obtained one for the entire Yangtze Valley; Japan obtained one for Fukien, and finally—as a part of the twenty-one demands made in 1915 for the remaining "unprotected" coast of China—for about one-half of all China's coast line. It was further demanded of China the reservation, in the interest of Japan, of all those portions of China not staked out as claims by the European powers.

Thus the *reductio ad absurdum* of this policy was reached —there was nothing left of China. And, indeed, this shortly would have been the result had not the World War been pre-

cipitated as the results of the same attitudes in Europe. The lessons and the results of this war have brought a complete change of policy on the part of the powers in the Far East; and on the part of the Oriental a change of attitude no less significant—which, indeed, is the text of this chapter.

One may naturally be curious as to how such a series of disasters as is sketched here could happen to any government; one may even be skeptical that the blame should lie wholly with the foreign powers.

In truth, throughout the nineteenth century the Chinese —and particularly the Chinese Government—continued to look upon all foreigners as inferiors, their presence in China as undesirable, and any form of diplomatic approach as an indication of servility. Representatives of foreign governments were, until late, expected not only to bring tribute but to recognize the overlordship of the Emperor. With constantly diminishing power, there was a corresponding sensitiveness for the externalities of power.

Moreover, the Chinese Government was not prepared to conduct diplomatic negotiations of the modern type. While a fundamental purpose of diplomacy—to outwit and gain an advantage over a friendly neighbor—was probably the same with all parties, the Chinese did not know the technique of the modern game. Until late in the last century there was no minister of foreign affairs. During the earlier period foreign negotiations were conducted by the cabinet as a whole, acting as a foreign office. During much of the latter part of the nineteenth century that redoubtable statesman, Li Hung Chang really controlled foreign affairs, though he was only an official of the province of Chihli. For long also the Emperor was a minor, and was not allowed to receive foreigners. Furthermore, China had no diplomatic representatives abroad until 1877. Throughout the nineteenth century, culminating in the Boxer rebellion of 1900, China yet resented the destruction of her isolation and regarded those outside the isolating barriers as

inferiors. Perhaps in more or less unconscious forms and limited to the more conservative elements these views still prevail. The very able group of younger diplomats, mostly Western trained, have done much to check the tendencies of the last century, much to direct the world's attention to the problem of China.

The American reader doubtless has been wondering what the part of the United States has been in all this. From the British point of view, the United States has long been playing the rather inglorious part of an accessory after the crime. We took no part in the two wars which Britain had with China in 1839-42 and 1857-60; but our treaty of Nanking in 1844 contained the first full statement of the principle of extraterritoriality, and the favored-nation clause in treaties gives to the United States all the privileges gained by the wars which other nations have fought. This latter is true, and probably serves to deter the nations from forcing even greater aggressions on a helpless China. American traders and merchants and missionaries do, no doubt, uphold and profit by conditions secured by others —but which in themselves neither the general opinion of the American people nor the policy of the American government would approve. At the same time these are privileges which the American government would demand or protect on the most-favored-nation principle.

But there is another side of the situation which is far more creditable, for America has traditionally played the rôle of friend of China. Due partly to a kindly democratic feeling of fair play for all peoples and a liking for the Chinese as good business men, partly to antagonism toward European or early British methods and to resentment at the harsh dealings of European nations with China, the American policy has in general been more just and friendly than that of the other nations. It will be said by the European that it was more to our advantage to be so. This statement is quite true, but it becomes especially so in the light of the policies of European

countries. The development of these relations will be traced in a subsequent chapter.

THE PERIOD IN WHICH ATTITUDES OF MIND ARE THE CONTROLLING FACTORS

The story of the Republic is to be told in Chapter VI. Its history has been neither a happy nor a successful one. Nor, indeed, has been that of the Western World during the same period. With the World War in Europe, the relations between China and foreign powers passed into a stage in which purely political factors ceased to be the controlling power, and psychological considerations became far more important. The chief facts with which Western powers have now to deal in their contacts with China are the states of mind, the emotional reactions, and the purposes and convictions of the Chinese. There are numerous factors which have created this situation, but which can here be no more than enumerated.

Six or eight years of experience with Western forms of government demonstrated to the Chinese—both to the educated and to the illiterate—that the promise of a millennium with the establishment of a republic was illusory. Life has not been easier, justice is no more assured, comforts—and even the bare necessities of life—are no more certain. Famines have been frequent, civil wars have been continuous, brigandage is rampant and on the increase. Taxation—or, rather, extortion—is heavier; life itself is more difficult and less assured. With this disillusion has come a resentment against the West and a skepticism concerning Western institutions.

The World War intervened. With it came a disillusionment concerning the moral quality of Western civilization. If this was the flower of Christian centuries, they wanted none of it. At least, the people wanted none of it. But the militarists did, and got what they wanted—that is, the discarded munitions of war, purchased, perhaps, with funds with which others of the same discredited Western powers would furnish

them. Masses of people do not reason with great exactitude. When the Chinese people see these munitions of war coming from the West, see foreign nationals loaning the money that enables some of these armies to continue, find foreign nations encouraging one or other of the warring factions, find the foreign nations resorting to the same argument so discredited at home—that of military force—there is abundant justification for their disillusionment. They realize that they are helpless in this maze of militarism, as helpless as the West was in 1914; and, as is natural, they forget their own responsibility in the contemplation of that of others.

Then China's own part in the war was a disillusionment. Chiefly through the influence of America, she was persuaded into the war when she really had nothing at stake. When, at Versailles, the American President forgot the promises made to China by our accredited representative to induce her to enter the war, and when China's interests as well as America's promises were forgotten, it was the keenest disappointment of all; for China had depended upon the friendship of America.

When the Washington Conference was called, in fact to rectify this act of injustice to China, again fair declarations of a friendly policy to China were made. The nations declared their willingness to correct the obvious injustice of the tariff limitations and to negotiate concerning the extraterritorial privileges. But that was six years ago. The net result is the abolition of the foreign port offices in China, the unconfirmed promise of greater tariff privileges or even of autonomy in 1929, and the re-cession of Shantung by Japan. The Chinese are not unmindful of the fact that the fulfillment of all these promises was held up because one Western nation—France—withheld her signature in order to gain another financial concession from China which had no relation to the major concessions; and that the rectification of the one injustice that was adjusted was at the expense of another Oriental nation—Japan.

The demonstration that the Western powers were still

willing to resort to force to protect their contractual treaty rights, which, from the Chinese point of view, were unjustly gained because gained by force, when at the same time they realized that these Western powers would never have resorted to force with a people possessing any military power, was another disillusionment. The use of military force by the British, resulting in loss of life in the student massacre in Shanghai in 1925, at the Shameen in Canton, and at Wan-hsien on the Yangtze in 1926, and by the British and the Americans at Nanking in 1927, are demonstrations of power which produce exactly the opposite effect from that which the Westerners wish to create. The net result is the conviction that the Westerners are barbarians who have no arguments except brute force, that they are no different in kind from their own discredited militarists, that the Chinese can hope for no justice from the West, and that the only escape for China is through the development of the same kind of brute military force. Recently a British Foreign Minister cynically remarked to the Chinese representative, "When you have the same naval power as Japan you will receive the same consideration." The devolution of Western diplomatic authority into the hands of military and naval leaders has brought to an end the period of political negotiations. The Western powers are now dealing not with a government, nor even with several governments; they are dealing with a people. And the facts of determining importance on one side are not those of a political, but of a psychological character; and on the other, that the responsible negotiations are in the hands of military men. Not so much what the politicians propose but what the people think constitutes the determining consideration now to be dealt with in China. Attitudes of mind now constitute the facts of importance with which Western diplomats and Western peoples have to deal.

The Chinese villagers have a folk tale which, in the light of the previous sketch, has a wider significance than that of

village life. A poor peasant, plowing his even more poverty-stricken lands, struck an obstruction at the end of a furrow. The plow, made of a sharpened bent limb of a tree, was broken, but an old metal bowl was unearthed. The unlucky cause of the accident was taken to the village hut with the hope that it might prove some compensation for the loss of the plow. Starting to market the next morning, the peasant threw his lean purse—a string of cash—into the bowl. Later, upon taking it out, he found another string of cash in its place. He continued to withdraw the strings of pennies, to find a new one each time. The peasant finally realized that he had found a magic bowl of which he had often heard in the country legends. This good fortune could not long be concealed, however, and the secret soon leaked out. Envious neighbors immediately set up claims to the bowl, and even sought to change the boundaries of the peasant's little patrimony, of one or two *mou*. Finally, the case reached the *hsien* magistrate. Covetousness overcame rectitude, and the magistrate confiscated the bowl on the ground that it was public property. The outraged peasant clamored for justice, so that the ancient father of the magistrate inquired into the cause. Testing the virtues of the bowl, the unfortunate old man fell head first into it. The dutiful son pulled him out, only to find a duplicate father in the same predicament. Filial piety is a strong virtue, but after five or six parents had been rescued, the last one was left to his fate—to be buried with the bowl. The worship of an ancestor is an exacting social obligation; the support of a parent is a heavy economic burden; but the moral involved may not be limited to the land of ancestor worship.

Heaven will not tolerate a sovereign lacking in virtue.

—*Confucius*

If you have a piece of good steel, put it in your knife blade.

—*Chinese proverb*

CHAPTER VI

THE REPUBLIC

No one can sketch the history of China during the nineteenth century without seeing clearly the reason for the Revolution and the founding of the Republic. The corruption and inefficiency of the Manchu régime threatened the very existence of the nation. The weakness which in external relations revealed itself in successive losses of territory, continuous piling up of indemnities and of foreign loans, revealed itself also in domestic affairs. Here privileges, favoritism, oppressive taxation and exaction, tyranny, extravagance, and complete inefficiency reigned. The outstanding events of this distressing period of the decline of the Manchus have been mentioned in the preceding chapter.

To understand the establishment of the Republic and its checkered career, three other factors must be considered: the character of government under the Empire; the attempt of the Manchus to save themselves; and the differences between the North and South.

CHARACTER OF GOVERNMENT UNDER THE EMPIRE

Under the old régime the Emperor, the Empress, the Regents, or whoever might represent the Imperial authority, was supreme. Formulated with the advice of a Grand Council selected by the Emperor or the Manchu overlords, and expressed in edicts, their will was the will of Heaven. Such edicts were valid throughout the Empire, while all without its jurisdiction were barbarians entitled to no other consideration than might be granted through condescension. True, after the first war with Britain, force and treaties had compelled a more reasonable procedure; but until the last quarter of the century there had been little change in attitude, and that was assumed

rather as a matter of caution than of recognition of the equality of other nations.

Through viceroys or the governors of the eighteen provinces, the will of the Throne was transmitted to the people. In their respective areas, viceroys or governors ruled supreme. The annual tribute to the Throne, mostly in grain or in kind, and the maintenance of a reasonable peace within their respective territories were about the only demands made upon the people. Any disturbance of sufficient importance to reach the attention of the Throne was liable to cost the viceroy or governor his position. This privilege, or custom, of mild rebellion protected the rights of the people and constituted a crude form of government by public opinion. Those who have visited the old Chinese cities, their narrow streets built with occasional breaks like forked lightning and with frequent gates, have realized the practical use of both these devices in controlling public disturbances.

In each province was maintained a small garrison of Manchu soldiers, whose antique equipment—chiefly bows and arrows or swords and spears—was sufficient to overawe and control the unarmed mobs. Except for outside interference, there was no need for a modern armed force. And none indeed was ever provided until the drastic lessons of the war with Japan in 1895, and the territorial aggressions of other powers following indicated that the choice lay between national extinction and modern armament.

Under the old régime the councillors, viceroys, governors, prefects, and in fact all imperial officers were chosen through the old examination system, which at least called out the best intelligence and the men most thoroughly informed concerning the traditional standards of Chinese government and conduct. While the intermediate units, the district, or *hsien,* and the cities were under appointees of governors, the local units—chiefly villages—were practically self-governing. So long as they paid the necessary tribute or tax, proportioned to the pros-

perity of the year, they were let alone. If the tribute was too heavy and injustice long prevailed, the people rebelled; thus the extravagance and abuse of government were held in check.

Justice was decreed by the personal will of magistrates, selected by the same examination system because of familiarity with tradition and advanced through the favor of higher officials. While this tradition was similar to what the Anglo-Saxon called common law, there was little of what the West would call legal procedure. As with all the Orient in contrast with the West, justice—and even government itself—is of men and not of law.

The functioning of the village, the clan, or the family, a patriarchal form of democracy, has rendered unneedful the elaborate machinery of government necessary in the West wherever large numbers of people live together. As described in Chapter III, this primitive democracy becomes the salvation of the country in times of disturbance, and even now, in these discouraging times, affords hope for the future.

THE EFFORTS OF THE MANCHUS TO SAVE THEMSELVES

During the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the Emperor Kwang Hsu was on the throne and the one really strong character in the ruling dynasty, the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, had gone into nominal retirement. In the conflict with the French in the extreme south during the preceding decade, the Chinese army had shown some strength; but in the brief conflict with Japan the utter incompetence of the army and the government was revealed. The disaster not only brought national humiliation and increased the suffering of the people—it brought also the loss of Korea to Japan, of the Liaotung peninsula to Russia, and extensive "leases" of territory to Great Britain, Germany, and France.

Instigated by some of the southern reformers and abetted by some of the ablest and far-seeing of his advisors, the Emperor issued a series of decrees in 1898, providing for the reorganiza-

tion of the central government and for financial, administrative, judicial, and military reforms. If put into successful operation, these would have rejuvenated the government and brought about those changes essential to the survival of the dynasty. A modern educational system was decreed; a national system of railways was outlined; provision was made for industrial and mining development. Such signs of reform and modernization did not come from the heart of either the people or the ruling class. The Manchus had been too long steeped in corruption and in indolence to adjust themselves to the demand of the modern world. When the Manchus first seized the Imperial power, in the seventeenth century, the old Chinese sage who conducted the negotiations remarked that he had provided for their ultimate decay and elimination, since he gave them power, wealth, and idleness, with no obligation. This prophecy was now speedily fulfilled.

The conservative Manchus, alarmed at the threatened loss of their privileges and control, rallied around the conservative Empress Dowager, who came forth from her long retirement. She secured the appointment of her adherents to strategic administrative positions and checkmated all the proposed reforms. The Emperor called upon Yuan Shih Kai, who had emerged from the Japanese conflict the strongest and ablest figure in China, to assist in carrying out the reforms by bringing force to bear on some of the Empress' appointees. Whether through inability, disinclination, or treachery, it may never be known, but Yuan failed the Emperor, and the latter was seized and placed in confinement for practically the rest of his life.

The reactionary movement found its counterpart among the masses of the people in the Boxer Rebellion. The Empress Dowager and her reactionary supporters worked on the ignorance of the masses and turned their fanatical fury away from the responsible Manchus against the foreigners. The results were the widespread massacre of the foreigners in the northern provinces, the intervention of the foreign powers, the march

OUTER MONGOLIA
DESERT OF GOBI
INNER MONGOLIA
SINKIANG
MANCHURIA
CHIHLI
Dolonnor
Palisade
Moukden
Changkiakow
Great Wall
Chengte
Chinchow
Kweihwacheng
Newchwang
Anhsichow
Hwang R.
Tsunhwa
Peking
Soping
Tatung
Suchow
KWANGTUNG PEN.
Port Arthur
Yulin
Ningwu
Paoting
Tientsin
Great Wall
Ningsia
Chengting
Hokien
SHANSI
Weihaiwei (Brit.)
Chefoo
Taiyuen
Chengkiakow
Tsingchow
Wei R.
Shunteh
Tsinan
Kuku Nor
Sining
KANSU
Kwangping
Tungchang
SHANTUNG
Tsingtao
Pingyang
Yenchow
Kiaochow
Lanchow
Kingyang
Weihwei
Ichow
YELLOW SEA
Hwang R.
Tsechow
Imperial Canal
Pingliang
Hwaiking
Tungchow
Puchow
Suchow
Shen R.
Honan
Kaifeng
TIBET
Sian
HONAN
Hwaian
Chenchow
Hanchung
Nanyang
Yingchow
Yunyang
Shuning
Fengyang
Chinkiang
Hingan
Nanking
Sinyang

SZECHWAN
Tatsienlu
Chungking
Fow
Yangtze
Shinan
Kingchow
Wuchang
Yangtze
Anking
Hangchow
Shaohsien
Ningpo
Yenchow
EAST CHINA SEA
CHINA
Changteh
Yungshun
Kiukiang
Nankang
CHEKIANG
Chuchow
Wenchow
Lingyuen
Tsunyi
Szenan
Shihtsien
Tungyen
Changsha
HUNAN
Nanchang
KIANGSI
Yuenchow
Tating
Szechow
Chenyuen
Paoking
Hengchow
Yenping
Kweiyang
Tungchwan
KWEICHOW
Liping
Yungchow
Kanchow
FUKIEN
Foochow
Cheling Pass
Hinghwa
Yongchangfu
Yunnan
Kwellin
Shiuchow
Chuanchow
Taihoku
Teng Yueh
Shunningfu
YUNNAN
Kingyuen
Pinglo
Fukien or Formosa Strait
Taichu
TAIWAN
Karenko
(FORMOSA)
KWANGSI
Szengen
Wuchow
Samshui R.
KWANGTUNG
Canton
Chaochow
Swatow
(Japan.)
Tainan
Sunchow
Nanning
R.
Chaoking
Kongmun
Taiping
Kiang Hung
Mandalay
Salwin R.
Mekong R.
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
Kwanghai
Macao (Port.)
Hong Kong (Brit.)
Limchow
Hanoi
Kwangchow (French)
Luichow
Gulf of Tongking
HAINAN
SIAM
INDIA
SCALE OF MILES
0 50 100 200 300
WILLIAMS ENGRAVING CO., N. Y.

to Peking and its capture by the allied forces, culminating in a dictated peace. An indemnity of $335,000,000 in gold was saddled on the Chinese people, and the foreign powers obtained the right to maintain a military garrison at Peking and military guard along the railway to the sea and the Great Wall. These events became, in turn, additional causes for the dissatisfaction of the Chinese people and assured the speedy downfall of the Manchus. While these tactics of the Manchus, in turning the wrath of the people from their own shortcomings against the foreigners, was a real cause in the founding of the Republic, it is yet to be revealed whether the militarists of the present day are going to be successful in a similar movement, taking advantage of far more intelligent guides to public opinion.

By the drastic lessons of the Boxer Rebellion, the party of the Empress Dowager became convinced that reforms along the Western lines offered the only salvation. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1904-05 reënforced this belief. Commissions were sent to the West to investigate, and in 1906 a series of reforms were promulgated. Reforms looking toward universal education, initiated at this time, have been discussed elsewhere. Of significance here, however, is the fact that, had these plans been carried out, a ten-year period would have procured a literacy of a fraction of one per cent. Administrative, financial, military reforms, had they been reforms in reality and not simply in name, were far more important. Most significant of all were the promises of the establishment of a National Assembly, later—in 1907—of a bicameral parliament and of provincial assemblies, and finally of a constitutional government. In 1908 a nine-years' program for the introduction of constitutional reforms, admirable in every detail and indicating reform and modernization in all the essential features of government, local and national, was announced. Had this really been put into operation, or any honest effort toward that end been shown, there would have been little occasion for the Revolution. The dilatoriness of governments in dealing

with changes in the fundamental attitudes of people is proverbial. In the fullest degree this dilatoriness was shown by the old government at this juncture, just as it has been more recently shown in the attitude of foreign governments in dealing with present-day China. The reforms of 1908 were for the most part on paper only.

The Emperor died on November 14, 1908, and the Empress Dowager on the day following. The new Emperor was an infant; the Regent was as progressive as he dared be; the Manchu nobles in power were reactionary; the people were vastly dissatisfied. Despite the opposition of the Manchu governing clique, the reform movement gathered force. During 1908 the provincial assemblies met for the first time and, though far from representative, became centers of livelier agitation for reform.

Late in the same year, delegates from a number of these provincial assemblies met in Shanghai, held numerous conferences, and petitioned the Emperor to grant a parliamentary form of government within two years instead of at the end of the nine-year program of reforms, promulgated a year previously. While the petition was first rejected by the Grand Council, later a national assembly was agreed to in the name of the Emperor and called for the following fall, with the promise of a parliament in 1913 instead of 1917. Realizing that the Manchu nobility, especially the Grand Council, was the chief reactionary influence, the Assembly petitioned also for a cabinet responsible to the Assembly—or that the Council should be made responsible. Recognizing the handwriting on the wall, the Emperor and his advisors capitulated and appointed a cabinet and a prime minister. The prime minister appointed was a most reactionary official and notably corrupt; and most of the other cabinet officials were little better. The intelligent public and the reform leaders with the powers of a liberal and efficient government now almost within their grasp, were bitterly disappointed. The conviction that the Manchu

régime was hopeless was now forced upon them; also, that its habit of taking away by trickery any promised reform was an incorrigible one.

Meanwhile the Manchu government had evaded the promises made to foreign powers concerning loans and financial reforms, by the same species of trickery that it had employed with its own dissatisfied political elements. These latter were further exasperated by the corruption and inefficiency shown in the handling of the great national railway projects. The government had promised, as a reform, the building of a national system, the elimination of foreign control, and the extension of lines under government direction. Gross incompetency, selfish personal aggrandizement, and petty corruption of all sorts in various provinces, revealed the hopelessness of the situation in so far as the Manchu government was concerned. It is sad to note, however, that during the fifteen years of the Republic no further progress has been made in the realization of these plans, and that the inadequate system then in excellent operation has all but disintegrated under the ægis of the militarists.

The final events moved rapidly in 1911. Assassination of Manchu officials occurred in southern provinces; open violence against the railway officials broke out in the far western provinces; and finally, on October 10, in the very heart of China—at Wuchang—the open rebellion was precipitated. Before following the devious course of republican history, further insight into the situation may be gained by a consideration of some of the differences between the North and the South.

THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

Developing first in the north and west, Chinese civilization was for centuries confined to north of the Yellow River and for further centuries to north of the Yangtze. By the third century before Christ, as time is counted in the West, the sway of the Emperor from his capital in Shensi had been extended

to the Indian Ocean. For some centuries China was divided into two kingdoms, one in the north and one in the south; and for several additional centuries into several kingdoms, as sectional interests and power predominated. Even after the coming of the Manchus in the seventeenth century, the disintegrating power of the Ming dynasty survived for long in the south.

From time immemorial the North has been subject to invasions from the barren steppes of the farther north, and has had to withstand continuous pressure and frequent attack from the barbarian hordes without the limits set by the Great Wall. Several consequences have followed. The North has received a larger admixture of Tartar, Mongul, and Manchu blood than has the South, with a resulting difference in racial stock. The North has had to defend itself from outside attack and is therefore more militaristic in sentiment, in habit, and in experience. Superiority in physique, obvious to the most casual observer, gave the northern people, at least in the earlier days, military advantage as well. The South, more protected from invasion, less inclined to physical contest, and more under the influence of the religion and philosophy of India, has been more the home of Chinese arts and literature. Although the original cultural stimuli came from the North, yet Chinese poetry, literature, painting, and the ceramic arts have flourished more vigorously along and south of the Yangtze than in the North.

Spared the invasions of hostile barbarians the South earlier came into contact with the outside world of culture through commerce. Much of the hostility engendered during the period of dominating commercial contacts of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries was due to the fact that the government was in the hands of officials from the North, who lacked the commercial interests and understanding of the South.

For the same reason, the South developed traders, sailors, navigators, and a commercial life that brought them into con-

tact with many foreign peoples and regions. From the South have come the people who have spread out in commercial pursuits, penetrating all the regions of the East Indies, the Malay peninsula and the islands of the sea. Later, it is these same regions that have sent their immigrants to the countries of North and South America. The Fukienese control the business in the Philippines; the Ningpo guilds form the strongest commercial elements in Shanghai; from Amoy and Swatow have come the enterprise to build up Singapore and the rubber industry of the Malay States; from Canton have come the merchants of the Chinese colonies the world over, as well as the characters of Bret Harte, the lurid scenarios of the films, and the delectable dishes of Broadway and the Bowery.

From the South also come the first generation of students who broke the iron-bound traditions and went to the countries of the barbarians to learn. Long familiar with the arts and sciences of the West, as practiced by the sailor, the trader, or the missionary, the southerner was more inquisitive concerning the sources of differences between himself and the foreigner. Even the early Arab trader brought to this region, in more remote centuries, a breadth of view and a toleration not found in the North—and later stamped out chiefly because of the incorrigibly bad manners of the barbarians.

The term Cantonese has long been used to cover the trader, and the immigrant from this southern region; but the inhabitants of Amoy, Foochow, Swatow, and all their tributary villages have long had similar influences brought to bear on them. Familiar with foreigners, they came into contact with foreign political ideas and the advantages to industry and trade of modern forms of government.

Then there are the linguistic differences which separate the North and the South. Due to the fact that their culture came originally from the North, that the government has come from the North, and that the official language was the language of the northern rulers, the Peking dialect—or the Mandarin—

has become practically a national language; whereas in the South, where remnants of the original inhabitants are pushed to the shore by the Chinese invaders, various dialects yet prevail. In succession as one works north, the Cantonese, the Swatow, the Amoy, the Foochow, the Ningpo, the Shanghai, dialects predominate. Understanding one of these dialects gives its possessor no use of the others. But in the North, and inland from Shanghai, practically one language, with slight variations, controls. Perhaps the situation has forced on the South the command of other languages; but it has also served to keep North and South apart. In both North and South, however, the common written language has preserved the cultural unity.

The South, for long brought into contact with foreign political ideas, has been far more receptive than the North to revolutionary political concepts and programs. When student as well as trader began to go to the West, dissatisfaction with the incompetent Manchu régime became general. Agitators and revolutions sprang up. For some time before the collapse of the Manchus, revolutionary reform ideas had been working in the South. Excluded from home, revolutionists worked with great success—financial at least—upon the Chinese colonies abroad. Especially from the colonies in America, Western Europe, and the Straits Settlements did they draw funds more important then than inspiration. Tardy reforms of the Manchus would not satisfy these southerners; much less would sham reforms quiet these agitators.

THE REPUBLIC—1911-1913

The leading events of the Revolution are soon rehearsed. On April 11, 1911, the Manchu general commanding the garrison at Canton was assassinated, and an unsuccessful attack was made on the Viceroy's Yamen. In August, open revolt broke out in Szechuan—directed against the government's railway policy. On October 9, houses of conspirators in Hankow were

raided; incriminating documents including lists of disaffected officers and men were found, together with bombs. To forestall the fate that awaited them, the revolutionaries mutinied on the following day, seized the gates of the capital—Wuchang—and drove out the Viceroy and the commanding general. The adjacent cities of Hankow and Hanyang, together with the arsenal, were taken. Thus the revolution was begun somewhat prematurely. Outstanding leaders were lacking, and no one was anxious to assume leadership. The revolutionists chose as their leader Colonel Li Yuan Hung—until that time not a member of the revolutionary party—who was destined twice to become president of the Republic. Li retained leadership until authority was assumed some six weeks later by the committee at Shanghai, which repudiated the selection of Li by the Hankow committee and elected Sun Yat Sen.

The Manchu army, conveniently assembled for maneuvers near Peking, was speedily sent to the center of disturbance. Within a short time Hankow was recaptured and burned; Hanyang, with the arsenal, was retaken; Wuchang was made untenable; and the revolutionists were compelled to sue for peace. Meanwhile, however, uprisings had occurred in many other cities, notably in the provincial capitals. Shanghai was among the first to declare for a republic; and early in December, Nanking, the ancient capital and the last of the Yangtze cities, fell. Canton had revolted in November, and Sian—the yet more ancient capital—added a more sinister touch by massacring the Manchu garrison. Otherwise the revolution had been without much shedding of blood. On December 3, the foreign powers proposed an armistice, which Yuan Shih Kai accepted for the Manchus.

YUAN SHIH KAI AND THE REVOLUTION

To understand the events immediately following—or, in fact, the entire early years of the Republic—a bit of intricate Chinese politics must here be explained. This incident is

significant as illustrating how much more important personages are than principles in Chinese affairs, and also how the Chinese tendency to compromise rather than to seek downright decision colors all the troublous history of the Republic to the present day. Yuan has been earlier mentioned as the one Chinese military leader who emerged from the Chino-Japanese war with a reputation for ability and with the special enmity of the Japanese as well. To him was given the task of organizing a modern army. Yuan's part in the betrayal of the Emperor when the latter attempted to put through his reforms in 1898 has also been mentioned. When the Empress Dowager dethroned and imprisoned the Emperor, Yuan was made governor of Shantung. He did not side with the Empress in abetting the Boxer Rebellion, and wisely kept the modern trained army out of that struggle. This, naturally, the foreign powers never forgot. At the conclusion of the Boxer troubles and with the conversion of the Empress Dowager to modernism, Yuan was made governor of Chihli—the province of the capital. Here he also retained the command of the modern army, now grown to six divisions and 120,000 men. The Throne now ordered the increase of the army to 360,000 modern trained men, this expansion to be accomplished in the period of 1905-1911. Soon, however, fearful of the growing power of Yuan, the Throne issued an edict prohibiting the holding of dual civil and military office. As this was issued for Yuan's benefit, he was soon deprived of the control of the army. Upon the death of the Empress Dowager in 1908, the Regent, brother to the late Emperor, whom Yuan had betrayed, fearing to wreak complete vengeance, banished Yuan to his home province. This was on the ground that Yuan had an affection of the foot which prevented him from retaining office.

After having held the highest offices in the land, Yuan remained in retirement until the difficulties of 1911 prompted his recall. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the Regent and the Manchu nobles now called upon Yuan to take

command of the army which he had created, and to suppress the rebellion. Yuan replied that the same affection of the foot which had compelled his retirement some years earlier now prevented him from accepting active military service. A preemptory order was issued, on October 18, that he cure himself without delay. The reversal of the military fortune of the Revolution, mentioned above, took place. A definite military decision for the Manchus might have been forced, if the tendency to compromise had not come in. Perhaps, also, Yuan was still nursing a sore toe.

The National Assembly now elected Yuan prime minister, and the Regent gave him supreme command of the troops. The National Assembly promulgated a new Constitution on November 2, excluding all members of the Imperial family from the cabinet and declaring amnesty for all political offenders. The revolutionary convention at Shanghai demanded the abdication of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of a Republic. This convention also repudiated the selection of General Li as president. On December 28, the revolutionary council at Nanking elected Sun Yat Sen as provisional president. Arriving from Europe but three days previously, Dr. Sun had taken no part in the revolution except in prefatory agitation abroad.

Intricate negotiations and maneuvers followed; the outcome alone is worthy of notice. The revolutionary side had no experienced leaders; the Manchu party had no leaders of conviction. Without having any definite conception of what a republic meant, the people demanded the end of the Manchu misrule. Dr. Sun, as well as his supporters, recognized his own inexperience and the need of a strong executive if the republican movement was to succeed. With a generosity and a broad-mindedness that goes far to explain his subsequent popularity, and with the approval of the Committee, he offered the presidency of the new republic to Yuan Shih Kai on condition of his acceptance by public oath of the Republic and of the Constitution. Edicts providing for the change of government

appeared; Dr. Sun resigned on the 14th of February, a new provisional constitution was promulgated on March 10; Yuan took the oath as president on the same day; while General Li was elected vice-president.

The occasion for the delay in the transfer of authority was due to the demand of the revolutionists that Yuan come to Nanking to take the oath of office before the convention. This he agreed to do, but a serious revolt of troops at Peking opportunely prevented fulfillment of the plan.

It is said that the Oriental never places himself in any position without being first assured of a loophole for escape. In none of the edicts is the Empire definitely terminated or the Manchus deposed. As characteristic of some of the earliest documents quoted is the edict of retirement, the last edict issued by the Manchus in the name of the Empress Dowager. "The majority of the whole people are in favor of a Republic. . . . Such being the general inclination, Heaven's ordinance may be divined. How could I dare disregard the wishes of the millions for the glory of one family . . . the Emperor and I will retire into leisure to pass easily through the months and years and to see the consummation of wise government. This will indeed be excellent!"

YUAN SHIH KAI AND THE PRESIDENCY

There were many obvious advantages in the compromise reached. The Revolution had occasioned very little bloodshed and had avoided civil war. The abdication of the hopelessly discredited Manchus had been accomplished by peaceful and legal means. The new president was the ablest and most experienced administrator and military leader among the Chinese. His leading military supporters were in command of the army; they were experienced and loyal to him. He was backed by an able and loyal vice-president. Both the old National Assembly (two years old) and the new revolutionary assemblies agreed upon the essential reforms. Foreign powers were

favorably inclined, and foreign interests were ready with financial support. The country was tired of misrule; the people were oppressed with taxation. All demanded the change. There were certain fundamental weaknesses, however. The people were ignorant of what a republican form of government involved and were not prepared to participate in its operation. The revolutionists were skeptical of the loyalty of the president to republican forms, and justly so. With all his ability and experience, the president was an opportunist, at heart a monarchist, and probably seeking his own advancement quite as much as the welfare of his people.

After all, in a revolution or rebellion, the winning side defines who the patriots are.

With very imperfect electoral machinery, a new parliament was elected in 1912-1913. The original revolutionary party, amalgamating with four others to become the Kuo-min-tang, or the "People's Party," now controlled more votes than any other party, though still not a majority. The new president was immediately and continuously in conflict with the parliament over questions of international loans or the appointment of cabinet and other officials without parliamentary approval. In fact, the tempestuous history of the republic is largely a struggle between president and parliament for power. The revolutionists believed in a parliamentary form of government which left the president little power. Yuan Shih Kai is the only president who has really exercised any power, and consequently the only one who has accomplished anything during his administration. That the revolutionists have been so committed to the parliamentary government explains their subsequent interest in the Soviet form of rule. Even as I write, the overthrow of the latest leader, Chiang Kai Shek, to show any ability to command and to unify is based on the ground of his defiance of committee rule.

After the early revolutionary days, military control in the southern provinces had been left in the hands of the Kuo-min-

tang leaders. With the parliamentary obstruction to incite them, they now become insubordinate. Yuan Shih Kai was too experienced a military leader to misunderstand the importance of this situation. He superseded these southern leaders with his own appointees. This policy led to open revolt. The northern forces were everywhere successful, and the recalcitrant southern leaders—including Sun Yat Sen—were banished or fled the country. Known as the second revolution, this revolt fixed Yuan firmly in the executive chair, for the time being put down the rebellious forces, and secured the recognition of the foreign powers. The new parliament elected Yuan as president for a term of five years, and Li as vice-president.

Dr. Cheng in his *Modern China; A Political Study* summarizes the situation and explains some of the considerations involved, as follows:

> Yuan Shih Kai, though he was supported by the governors in the North as well as in the South, and enjoyed the confidence of scholars throughout the whole country, commanded no majority in Parliament, in which the Democratic or Revolutionary party was dominant. To get himself elected, it was necessary to bribe the members of that party and even to threaten them with a military demonstration. To do them justice, it should be pointed out that neither the bribe offered to them nor the threat of military pressure was the sole consideration that made them eventually vote for Yuan Shih Kai and against the presidential candidate of their own party. They feared, and feared rightly, that a defeat suffered by Yuan would lead to a revolt by his followers against parliamentary authority, and that an insurrection at that time would shake the foundations of the newly born Republic and delay its recognition by foreign powers.

Notwithstanding the practical realization of the need of a strong executive, the revolutionary party in its various constitutions endeavored to curtail all the powers of the president and aimed to make parliament supreme. The new parliament endeavored to carry out this policy from the first, and blocked any effort towards an efficient government or an active executive. In turn, the president proscribed the members of the

YUAN SHIH KAI AND FAMILY FOR WHOM HE WOULD FOUND A DYNASTY

MARSHAL CHANG TSO LIN

Lucy Calhoun

MODERN ARMY PASSING THROUGH THE EMPEROR'S GATE

Courtesy of Canton Christian College

PRESSING FARMERS INTO SERVICE

Kuomingtang and unseated its members. The rump parliament, after languishing for a while, was dissolved in January, 1914.

To the South, this parliament remained the supreme authority. In reality it was replaced by a Council of State, which drew up a new constitution. This new constitution in turn transferred all executive power from parliament to president; left the legislative power largely in the hands of the Council—by edict, as of old; extended the presidential term from five to ten years; and, in effect, gave the president power to select his own successor. The rejected members of the old parliament adjourned to Canton; and, according to the theory of the revolutionists, have kept alive the semblance of constitutional continuity to the present Nationalist movement.

During this year (1914) the president reinstated the worship of Confucius and the annual State worship in the Temple of Heaven. When this was followed in 1915 by a movement looking toward the restoration of the monarchy, with Yuan as Emperor, the designs of the president could no longer be concealed. Military and civil governors were directed to declare for this move; citizens' conventions and mass meetings were organized. Modern propaganda methods, in rather crude form, were introduced, and the semblance of a popular demand was created. The Council of State requested the president to declare himself emperor. The American constitutional adviser issued a pamphlet arguing that a limited monarchy was the only form of government that would succeed in China. The President ascribed to the popular demand and fixed the date for the coronation as February 9, 1916. Meanwhile, open revolt had broken out in the south and many of the president's military subordinates were deserting him. The coronation was postponed, but the republican leaders demanded Yuan's resignation. The controversy was ended by the sudden death of the president on June 6, 1916. No definite cause for the death has ever been assigned.

THE MILITARISTS—1916-1927

What might have been the source of successful administration under a strong executive like Yuan, remained as the one legacy of the first president to plague his country to the present day. Yuan had replaced the republican and the local military governors with his own military nominees. As long as a strong hand could hold these in check this scheme afforded an adequate basis upon which to build up a unified administration. That strong hand was now gone. The military governors had no local control and in fact few had any local attachments or loyalties. The civil governors, also appointed from Peking, likewise lacked this local attachment as a rule, but had too little influence to serve as a check on the military governors. The troops were mercenary soldiers, drawn from northern, or at least provinces other than where they served. Whatever patriotism or loyalty to society they might otherwise have had was thus eliminated. Their loyalty was to the paymaster alone. Thus the militarism which has since plagued China, grew out of Yuan's plan to reëstablish an Imperial power, and was left since his death with no controlling hand.

There has followed a period of struggle between relatively strong military leaders, maintaining mercenary armies out of whatever local revenues they may be able to control or such contributions as they may be able to extort. The situation differs little in principle or effect from the feudal period of medieval Europe, when might made law and government; except that few if any of these feudatory rulers have any interest in protecting their own people. The only people they recognize are their soldiers, whose loyalty is with difficulty retained by the meager and dilatory wage. Neither these leaders nor their armies respond to national patriotism, and few of them even to local patriotism; fewer still to the real welfare and interest of the people. This irresponsible feudal militarism constitutes the underlying fact of importance during the period intervening between the death of Yuan Shih Kai and the successful

northern push of the southern or Nationalist army during 1926-1927.

The confused shifting of parties and leaders is of significance only in understanding the characteristics and consequences of militarism. Foreign observers are likely to attribute much of the apparent confusion to the strangeness of names of persons and places and factions. In truth there is little more significance in the shifting scenes than now remains in similar details of Froissart or other medieval chronicles. Yet to understand the present, the main moves must be sketched.

At the death of Yuan, General Li became president, with Tuan Chi Jui as prime minister. The president, a genuine republican, reëstablished the Nanking constitution in 1912 and re-convoked the dissolved parliament—which, as of old, devoted itself to the perennial discussion of a strong parliament versus a weak executive. The prime minister was hostile both to parliament and to the projected constitution. Proposed participation in the World War became a second point of real controversy, the prime minister favoring and parliament and the president opposing the suggestion. The president dismissed the prime minister who had raised the standard of revolt. Basing his opposition to China's entrance into the World War chiefly on the grounds that such action would strengthen all militarists in China, the president was forced to take this action against Tuan or resign himself. The president called to his aid the commander of the northern army, General Chang Hsun. To complete the complexity of the situation, this general now seized the palace and restored the Emperor; and for a few days the Manchus again were enthroned. Tuan, the real heir of the Yuan Shih Kai policy and force, was reappointed prime minister, suppressed the insurrection, and came into complete control. President Li, deserted by his friends and subordinates, surrounded by his enemies, compelled to act against his principles in dissolving parliament, finally resigned. General Feng Kuo Chang, who meanwhile had been elected vice-president by

parliament, succeeded to the presidency. General Li had received the support of the southern provinces; General Tuan, of the northern ones; the old parliament had been dissolved and a new one summoned. The authority of this new parliament has never been recognized by the South, which situation has been one of the causes of the latter's recalcitrant attitude. The new parliament elected the new president, Feng, now the third incumbent, to fill out the unexpired five-year term of the first president. The new president and the premier had been commanders of the first and the second Imperial armies under Yuan and had been his leading subordinates. Thus was the militarist tradition perpetuated.

Upon the coup of General Chang and the threatened restoration of the Manchus, the southern provinces organized an army of relief in 1917. This formed the beginning of the southern army movement, now grown into such proportions. Even upon the speedy restoration of the Republic by Tuan, these provinces remained skeptical. The president whom they recognized had been forced out, and two henchmen of Yuan were in control.

The familiar situation quickly developed. Tuan and Feng soon came to complete disagreement and headed different factions. Tuan became the recognized head of the "Anfu" party, which openly relied upon Japan for financial and political aid. Huge Japanese loans were contracted (*yen* 250,000,000) on the security of about all the available national resources, and were used to strengthen the military power of the Anfu group (1918). Tuan assembled a "Tuchuns' parliament," which replaced Feng with Hsu-Shih-Chang. The new president—also a friend, official, and supporter of Yuan Shih Kai—was of the scholarly type of the old mandarins, but surprised his supporters by immediately issuing a mandate, urging peace among all warring factions. The Versailles conference now took place, and China was represented by delegates both from North and South.

The outstanding result of the conference, so far as China was concerned, was not the commendable part which the Chinese delegates played, but the revelation of the attitude of the Western powers. The first revelation was what the Chinese considered to be a betrayal of their cause by President Wilson. China assumed that the American minister spoke with authority in persuading her to come into the World War on the ground that association with the Allies would assure recognition of China's rights and result in equality of treatment among the powers. The second revelation was no less disturbing. To secure the coöperation of Japan, the British, French, Italian, and Russian governments had secretly agreed to support Japan's claim to Shantung as her portion of the spoils of war. Neither China nor America had been made aware of this deal. When President Wilson consented to the arrangement as an accomplished fact, China's disillusionment was complete. The Chinese considered that they had been betrayed by all of the Western powers. The chief purpose of the Washington Conference in 1921 was the readjustment of this wrong.

Great indignation sprang up against the Japanese, and a national boycott against Japanese goods was instituted. That the Anfu party in control was pro-Japanese did not make them any more popular with the masses.

Tso Kun, a notoriously corrupt militarist, became head of the Chihli party on the death of Feng. In combination with Wu Pei Fu, an able army commander, and Chang Tso Lin, the Tuchun of Manchuria, the Anfu party was completely broken up, and in 1920 the Chihli party came into control. The next step was natural. The Manchurian Tuchun and the Chihli party broke over the spoils. Chang was defeated and, withdrawing within his territories outside the Great Wall, where he was safe from interference, declared the independence of Manchuria.

The amiable and inefficient president, hopeless of having any influence on the situation, resigned in 1922, and General Li,

upon assurance of support by the factional leaders, became president for the second time. He again recalled the old parliament, but the Chihli party refused to support it. As usual innumerable moves—political rather than military—followed. Within a year President Li was again forced to flee. This time a new factor entered, for Peking was seized by Feng Yu Hsiang, the Christian general, who headed the army in control of Peking. From the first Wu Pei Fu had failed the president, and now was in open opposition. The Chihli party seized the seals of office from the fleeing president, and Tsao Kun, after unprecedented acts of bribery which involved the whole parliament and brought open humiliation upon the nation before the whole world, was elected president on the 5th of October, 1923. In this election the government revenues from railways, excise taxes together with exactions on merchants and banks, totaling upwards of $15,000,000, were expended. The corruption was so open, the negotiations were so prolonged, that the little respect left for the republican government was largely lost. No good could be expected of such a régime, and none followed. The South was now definitely lost, and the northern parties—since so obviously the only object was loot—were hopelessly divided. Parliament was so debauched it could command no respect.

Trouble had also broken out in still another angle of the confused situation. Some years earlier, the Anfu war lord in control of Shanghai, the most lucrative position in China, had been made governor of an adjoining province, Chekiang, continuing to retain control of Shanghai. The Chihli party governor of Kiangsu, the province in which Shanghai is located, resented this situation, which, with the disintegration of the Anfu party and the downfall of the Chihli party, could not long exist. So in 1924 this new war broke out. Chang Tso Lin immediately took part on the Chekiang side, Wu Pei Fu becoming head of the Chihli or Peking forces.

Treachery, or the traditional desire for negotiation and

compromise played a determining part on all sides. The Tuchun of Chekiang was betrayed by several of his generals and fled, first to Japan and thence to Mukden. General Feng suddenly deserted Wu Pei Fu, seized Peking, and deposed the president, declaring for universal peace. Returning to Tientsin, Wu Pei Fu called for help from the South, but the Shantung governor declared himself neutral, and assistance was cut off. The Manchurian war lord, Chang Tso Lin, the Christian General Feng Yu Hsiang and even Sun Yat Sen—who had been forming an army to attack Wu Pei Fu—now came together. Wu Pei Fu now withdrew up the Yangtze. Chang and Feng selected Tuan Chi Jui as provisional chief executive. This was in 1924.

This alliance could hardly persist long. General Feng soon withdrew to the northwest, where his contacts were with the Russians while his sympathies were with the South. Marshall Chang Tso Lin remained in practical control of Peking, though he himself remained in Mukden; with Tuan remaining in immediate control. Factions of the Chihli army retained control of Shantung and Shanghai, under generals all but independent. Wu Pei Fu—armyless—withdrew up the Yangtze. This war brings the situation through 1925 and the greater part of 1926.

Meanwhile a new force behind an old idea appeared upon the scene. The southern or Cantonese faction, still clinging to its old concept of republican or parliamentary government and realizing that the appeal of ideas is insufficient, now resorted to force. This brought about an entirely new alignment with at least the aspiration of a settlement of the nationalist question, and hopes of the elimination of the militarists.

The thread of the story can best be carried through the years 1926-1927 by following the fortunes of the Nationalists' cause. Before leaving the discussion of the militarist period, let us consider briefly the cost of militarism.

THE COST OF MILITARISM

We have seen that the old Chinese army, equipped mostly with spears and bows and arrows, lasted until the Japanese war; and that Yuan Shih Kai was given the authority after that disaster to form a new army. At the time of the Revolution the army numbered about 500,000; about equally divided between modern and old style troops. The revolution immediately increased the number of troops to 800,000. The incessant conflicts since then have continuously increased the number of armies and the number of soldiers. By 1920 the various factions enrolled as many as 1,370,000. The totals during 1926-27 have been conservatively estimated as around 1,600,000. At times there have been as many as twenty independent armies. At times, too, general disarmament of troops has been agreed upon, and even provided for in foreign loans—as in 1923. Such funds have either been used as payment in arrears, or the soldiers disbanded have been reënlisted.

In other countries the economic loss of armies is largely that of the men drawn from productive employment. This is not so true of China. The withdrawal of the men from the surplus village and even city population may in a way be an advantage. At least, in all central and north China the rural population can readily stand such depletion with economic advantage. From this point of view the wage of a soldier may be looked upon as an unemployment dole or a form of poor relief. But it is an expensive form at best. The average cost of a soldier for a year has been estimated at $375, while the average income of a farmer or village worker is estimated at $50 (silver) a year. The actual expenditure upon munitions of war, on useless and expensive equipment, becomes a staggering burden; for to a country as bankrupt and as poverty-stricken as China, this useless expenditure of more than half a billion a year constitutes a burden greater than all the indemnities. Late in 1927 the support of the Nationalist army alone is costing about $30,000,000 per month.

WESTERN SOLDIERS GUARDING AN "INTERNATIONAL" TRAIN

Courtesy of the Dollar Steamship Line

CHINESE AIR PILOTS

Methodist Prints

GENERAL FENG'S SOLDIERS AT WORK

Methodist Prints

GENERAL FENG'S ARMY GOES TO SCHOOL

A still greater burden, if not an actual economic loss, is the foraging and looting of the army in whatever region it may be quartered or fighting. The soldiery, frequently unpaid for long periods, make amends by looting. Most of the soldiers that make up these regional armies are drawn from provinces remote from the scene of their employment. Hence, they have little or no compunction as to preying upon the natives. Only a few armies have set up a different record. The great service which the Christian general Feng performed was to keep his army under discipline and to prevent looting. This army was usually kept long enough in one quarter to raise its own food through extensive crops. I have visited this army; seen its well-kept streets and quarters; inspected its schools and shops; talked with its soldiers, officers, and commander. Granted that an army was necessary, this was a model army. The United States Army commander in that region pronounced the camp to be as well kept as any he had ever seen. The commanding general, illiterate to middle life, had learned to read and was learning English. The walls of his headquarters were plastered with Confucian and Biblical texts. No liquor was allowed in the camp or at the table. The soldiers made and repaired their own clothing and some of the equipment; they manufactured soap—even tooth brushes and tooth powder; they set up fully independent communities. They assisted the people of the countryside, fought disease, insects, and floods; made roads; established schools, policed the country. They formed the one army that the population of a region would petition to come.

In more recent years the southern armies have established a similar reputation, and the army of General Yen, the model governor of Shansi, has a similar record. But all other armies have proved a dreadful scourge wherever they have been, until the people are willing to welcome any army that will drive out the preceding one—while praying for release from the scourge of militarism. Where even the most prosperous farmer scarcely rises to the possession of an animal and cart, the march of an

army through the countryside will so devastate it that recovery will not come in years.

The patriotic reason assigned by the militarists for their activities is that unification of China can only come by military decision. The course of events since the formation of the Republic does not seem to bear out this statement. The old Empire was unified in form, but in fact the provinces were practically semi-independent under their viceroys. The republican government gives to the central authority great powers. Whether that central authority shall be the parliament, a committee—as the south now advocates—or the president, is the bone of contention between the northern and the southern parties. But the nation and the people have been without experience of such a government; the country is so vast that any military force that conquers any considerable part of it breaks apart of its own weight; no government by a committee has ever succeeded long or on as large a scale. Apparently—so far as the fifteen years' experience shows—neither decision by force nor highly centralized executive and legislative power can succeed at the present stage of development.

The militarists have not solved this problem. They have created a greater one—political power has been transferred from civil to military officials. By law the soldier is exempt from civil jurisdiction and by practice the militarist himself becomes the government. He levies taxes or exactions at will, seizes property of farmers or merchants, peremptorily impresses farmers, coolies, workmen into the army, and substitutes arbitrary military authority for government. It is a question how long the people can endure such a system without the whole structure crumbling. Furthermore, the militarists have become the chief obstacle to the solution of the outstanding problem for which the Chinese people demand attention. As long as courts and laws give way to military jurisdiction, foreign powers can hardly be expected to relinquish the privileges of extrater-

ritoriality. So long as the militarists control the custom houses and the ports and exact whatever dues they wish for the perpetuation of the same military evils, the foreign powers can hardly be expected to consent to tariff autonomy. So long as the concessions are the one safe residence for foreign and native merchant alike, neither can be expected to be enthusiastic about the cancellation of the concessions.

At the same time, the foreign nations are far from blameless in responsibility for militarism. As advisers, technicians, military experts, or soldiers, foreign nationals are now to be found in all the armies. While this is no responsibility of government, it is of foreign peoples collectively. The equipment of the new armies is largely that of the left-over munitions of the World War. The armies now have modern high-powered rifles, guns, airplanes, tanks, and even some gas and liquid fire equipment. Obviously these are not Chinese, though, to be sure, each major faction has its arsenal, with up-to-date Western machinery. There is scarcely a Western nation that is not guilty, either as a government or through its nationals. Notoriously Russia has been supplying one army and Japan another. Germany and the Continental powers are indiscriminate in their merchandizing. England sends airplanes for commercial purposes—and they are immediately seized by the military. Consignments of munitions have come through American sources, though all authorities have been alert to prevent such transactions. But the major blame and responsibility rest upon the Chinese, and they alone can put an end to this evil.

Militarism remains the most important problem. Perhaps the most difficult task, and at the same time the most useful one, in the program of the Nationalist party, is the suppression of militarism. As in their success lies the chief hope of the elimination of this evil, let us complete the short story of the Republic with an account of the Nationalist movement.

NEITHER EMPIRE NOR REPUBLIC

One erroneous interpretation commonly made should be avoided. The political change now going on in China is usually thought of as a transition from an empire in the European sense to a republic in the American sense. Neither part of the comparison is correctly stated. The empire was never one in the European sense but in the Asiatic sense. A more correct conception would be that of a feudal monarchy; but again—not feudal in the European sense. The empire consisted of the control of a small conquering foreign people who usurped all official positions and constituted a large garrison of permanent occupation. This dominating class had long since become purely parasitic and had lost all military and most administrative efficiency. The transition was to a constitutional government whose form is not yet determined but is labeled "republican."

But those striving to form a constitutional government were divided between two camps. A conservative group headed by Kang Yu Wei endeavored to maintain the Manchus under a constitutional monarchy. After the establishment of the Republic this party was continued under the leadership of Yuan Shih Kai and Tuan Chi Jui. More recently it has been represented by Wu Pei Fu and now by Chang Tso Lin. On the other hand the party led by Sun Yat Sen and now identical with the People's National Party has striven for a republican form of government in which the executive should be wholly subservient to the parliament or now to a commission.

When one contemplates the lack of exactitude in the application of that term "republican" in the West and the limitation of inefficiency of every variety to which these Western forms are subject, some toleration might be expected of this large-scale effort with an Oriental people who, even if not typically Oriental in many of their characteristics, are yet subject to the limitations of these long dominant conditions. Especially might such toleration be expected of Americans,

since the impelling influences and the ideals formulated as goals are both so largely American in their origin. The change in the dominant attitude of most Americans resident in China from 1912-13 when compared with the present, is far greater than any change in Chinese conditions.

This contrast between the Chinese tendency to conceive of political or social processes in very general and fluid or personal rather than fixed and institutionalized procedures as with the Westerner, is very marked and very important. Herein arises many if not most of the political misunderstandings between China and the West. The Chinese tendency always is to agree upon or establish a general principle and then to leave its application to a very general and variable personal adjustment, rather than to be bound by the exact and meticulous regulation which the West elaborated for its own control and guidance. This is true of political administration, of practical procedure, or diplomatic negotiations and contacts. Despite the rigidity of Chinese custom there is greater social flexibility in the Chinese procedure than in the Western.

The political misunderstandings of a century ago arose out of the attempt of the Chinese to force their vague, personal, inchoate, *laissez faire* method of political and judicial procedure upon the West. The West rebelled and by force of arms maintained the right to control its own nationals. The West is now engaged in forcing its fixed and definite and technical exactitude in governmental administration, in the judicial application of law to individual cases, and in all diplomatic interchanges upon the more or less helpless Chinese, whether they wish it or not. A century ago the West thought the Chinese stupid in trying to force its ways upon it. How shall the present attitude of the West toward China be considered? If we are not willing to allow the Chinese freedom in determining their own relationships, why not at least treat the entire problem of our relationship with them as a human problem, rather than one to be bound in the rigid forms by diplomatic red tape?

The good workman does not change his lines for a slow apprentice.

Let there be men and the government will flourish; but without men government decays and ceases.

—*Chinese Classics*

The commander of the forces of a large state may be carried off: but the will even of a common man cannot be taken from him.

—*Confucius*

CHAPTER VII

SUN YAT SEN, THE PEOPLE'S NATIONALIST PARTY, AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

MENTION has been made of the tendency in the worship of the dead to make of ancestors a collective soul which embodies the spirit of the entire group; and also of that tendency by which, in the worship of a notable, a sage, or an emperor, the soul of the departed is ennobled or semi-deified, much as a holy personage may be raised to sainthood by the Roman Catholic Church. Such an apotheosis is now going on in the case of Sun Yat Sen. Modern methods of political propaganda, together with modern methods of communication, publicity, and educational organization, have all facilitated this movement, until the present one goes on far more rapidly and efficiently than any in the past. Dr. Sun's picture is saluted each morning in all schoolrooms by innumerable pupils, until something of the veneration due Confucius is now given to the modern sage. As the portrait of "the reigning monarch" is displayed in the schoolrooms of many European countries to vivify patriotism in a personal way; as Kemal in Turkey and Mussolini in Italy and Lenin in Russia have been raised to a political apotheosis resembling the omnipuissance of a god through the universal distribution of the portrait of the man; so the process of deification of Sun Yat Sen is fostered by the same methods. Posthumous power is given a visible and tangible center in a national mausoleum, an embalmed body; the posthumous personality is preserved by a personal testament which has become a political message, memorized by the millions of individuals composing a people noted for their tenacious memories.

The most clever of psychologists are those wielders of

modern propaganda methods. They take their lessons and gain their insight from traditional Chinese practical wisdom, from the modern Soviet experience, from the psychological learning of the West, and from the efficient practices—since disavowed—used by the West during the World War. So much may be said on the method side.

Method, however, is not all; for lying behind all this technique is a personality—the personality of a man who believed in a great idea, who was devoted to an unselfish and patriotic cause in a land where such elevation is all too rare, and who labored, with passing success during his lifetime but with surpassing success in this posthumous state, for the development of a modern political statehood worthy of his people and of their past and devoted to securing the political and economic welfare of the common man. The ideal, as well as the personality, has gripped the imagination of his countrymen; and this adulation, not to say worship, of Sun Yat Sen has become a phenomenon of world-wide significance. In a sense not possible to any Western country, the memory of Sun Yat Sen has become identified with the spirit and purpose of nationalism. A factual presentation of the background thus becomes of importance.

LIFE OF SUN YAT SEN

The biographical facts are soon told. Sun Yat Sen (Sun Wen) was born near Canton in 1866. As a boy he studied in an American mission and learned English at an early age. Later he studied medicine in an English mission hospital in Hong Kong, becoming a licentiate in medicine in 1892. He established a practice first in Macao and then in Canton, but was more interested in revolutionary than in professional activities.

Dissatisfaction with the inefficient and corrupt Manchu régime had long prevailed. Its complicity in and forced consent to the alienation of portions of Chinese territory, the

DR. SUN YAT SEN

MODERN TRAINED OFFICERS

CANTON—OLD STREET

CANTON—MODERN STREET

payment of high indemnities, and the repeated humiliation of the nation, led to profound dissatisfaction. As early as the Sino-French War, in 1884, Sun Yat Sen determined to organize the revolt. Following the defeat suffered in the Chino-Japanese War, in 1895, Sun began the formation of the Revolutionary Party in Canton. Discovered by the Manchus, twelve of the eighteen conspirators were executed, while Sun escaped at night over the wall.

Through agitation in the Chinese colonies abroad, Sun began the organization of a revolutionary army. Though an exile for most of the time, he became the head of the revolutionary movement and barely escaped being kidnaped in the Chinese Legation in London, and deported (for execution) as an insane person. Even in those early years the movement had a twofold aim: the overthrow of the Manchus and the removal of the restrictions placed on Chinese nationality by the foreign powers. The Boxer Rebellion, which followed in 1900, was an unintelligent effort of the ignorant masses to accomplish, in a blind way, the same result. By the skillful manipulation of the Manchus, the popular wrath was turned from them wholly against the foreigners, with the result that both evils were allowed to persist. The intellectual classes now began to take a part in the movement. Many reforms were forced from the Manchus and, intensified by the example of Japanese success over the Russians in 1905, by the excessive aggression on China by Russia after the Boxer Rebellion, and by Japan after the Russo-Japanese war, the revolutionary movement grew apace. The incidents of this period have been narrated in the preceding chapter.

Meanwhile, Dr. Sun's part was chiefly that of an agitator abroad. Returning in the midst of the victorious revolutionary effort of 1911, he became the first Provisional President of the Republic, on January 2, 1912. Some few weeks later he resigned this position to the more experienced and forceful Yuan Shih Kai. Even then Sun announced again the anti-

imperialist design of the Republic and demanded the return of the concessions.

Sun had always been greatly interested in the extension of the railway in China as a means of modernizing the country, and he was appointed by the new President to draft plans for such a system and to secure the necessary international financial backing. With the outbreak of the Second Revolution (really an anti-revolution) in 1913, this appointment was cancelled, and Sun was again compelled to flee the country. Residing for a while in Japan, then in Shanghai, engaged in revolutionary activities, he returned to Canton, where a definite movement of revolt against the succession of military oligarchs at Peking had begun late in 1917. The remnants of the early constitutional party, meeting in Canton in 1921, erected a new Nationalist government, which they claimed to be the legitimate republican government, and elected Sun Yat Sen as President. Here, again, the split which seems inevitable in all Chinese parties occurred. General Chen Chiung Ming, the local military Governor, who had been responsible for establishing Sun in this new political position, now drove him out (1922). Early in the following year, with the aid of mercenary soldiers from two adjoining provinces, Sun was able to return and succeeded in reëstablishing a local revolutionary government, now claiming to be the National Republican Government. Successful with new schemes of taxation, some of them far from admirable, the new government was set up, with new factors soon entering into the problem. These factors were: a definite policy for a reformed republicanism, national in scope and designed to eliminate all the northern and militaristic factions; a program of military aggression to gain this end; and an alliance with Russian Soviet influence, a use of Russian Soviet personnel, and a practical demonstration of methods borrowed from Soviet Russia. From this time on Sun Yat Sen and his influence became identified with the new Nationalist movement.

A fact of importance to be noted is that during all of this

struggle, while the northern or governmental forces continued to borrow money and munitions from foreign nations, Sun continued to depend on contributions from the Chinese, chiefly from the colonies abroad. He observed this principle, resisting the temptation to depend on foreign aid, until the Russians came with monetary assistance in 1924 and the years following. As this assistance was, presumably, not in the form of loans, but of voluntary contributions for use against the same "imperialism" which has antagonized the revolutionary party of China, it was never regarded in the same light as other foreign aid.

In 1923 Sun came into contact with the Russian leaders and was captivated by the personality and the suggestions of the persuasive Joffe, the emissary of Soviet Russia. As a result of these conferences between Joffe and Sun this public statement was issued:

> Dr. Sun Yat Sen holds that the Communistic order, or even the Soviet system, cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not exist the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence; and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun Yat Sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.

Whether conditions or opinions had so changed between early 1923—when this was issued—and two years later, in the weeks before Dr. Sun's death, that the demands then formulated for the Nationalist Party fully express his changed opinions, is difficult to state. Certainly, with the successful northward move of the Nationalist Army and the incorporation of more radical elements, there came to be a radical left wing committed to Communist doctrines and the Russian spirit of class destruction. This, however, is a later story. At that time (1923) Sun accepted the suggestion that the Russians

could furnish the very element lacking in the southern movement that was essential to success. He had previously been convinced that the southern cause needed new blood, new leaders, new ideas. The Soviet's methods of propaganda that would excite the masses; their machinery for training the necessary youthful leadership; their shrewd practical knowledge of psychology, which enabled them to formulate catchwords and phrases that would render concrete a political or social objective and arouse the emotional response of the people; their ability to get at the youthful prospective intelligentsia by appeal to free development of natural instincts, which traditional social conventions sought to restrict, and thus to turn them against any form of authority—all satisfied these needs of the somewhat ineffective revolutionary movement. How much was contributed to this union by Sun's realization of the approaching close of his career, due to age and disease, will never be known. Whether a fear that this was the last hope of success, whether despair at the continual blocking of his hopes, whether lack of confidence in the ability of the Chinese of themselves to accomplish their aims unaided, impelled him to more complete acceptance of the Russian point of view will perhaps never be revealed. The alliance was made, with the resulting good and evil of subsequent events; of resulting good and evil for the Chinese, which only the future will unfold.

Dr. Sun went north early in 1925 to further the purpose of calling a people's conference or convention to repudiate imperialism or to unify China—whichever his followers are inclined to emphasize. In Peking he was operated on for the organic disease from which he had long been suffering, and some time after—March 12, 1925—met the death which was the inescapable outcome of the disease.

THE THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES

Sun Yat Sen is now called the "Father of Chinese Nationalism"—nationalism in the Western sense, and not yet achieved.

The principles advocated by Sun—the "Three People's Principles"—are quite simple: Nationalism, Democracy, Socialism (or social welfare). Literally, this third principle means "the people's livelihood," and is not accurately interpreted either by Socialism or Communism.

Dr. Sun derived his principles directly from Lincoln's "government for the people, of the people, and by the people," and gave them a Chinese interpretation in a Chinese setting. The first principle means "the people's clanism," by which he meant that the diverse elements into which the Chinese people are divided, together with the outlying regions of Mongolia, Tibet, etc., should be welded together into a national unity as the Chinese families form a clan; that the unity of the family, which forms the basis of Chinese social life, should be the archtype of a political unity no less effective and binding; that the moral obligations of family loyalty, that now so often clash with the larger group loyalties, should give way to the formation of an effective nationalism. Such a nationalism has never before existed in China, largely because these narrower loyalties of clan and family have prevented. To accomplish its organization two things were necessary. The first was the removal of the Manchus, accomplished by the revolution of 1911. The second was the removal of those obstacles to nationalism created by the foreign powers, and the recognition and treatment of China as an equal by all those powers. This "principle" involves the abrogation of extraterritoriality and of the concessions, the return of leased territories, the restoration of former vassal states of China to a condition of independence, the recovery of tariff autonomy, and the redrafting of treaties on a basis of equality. This one word or "principle" involves practically all the questions under dispute with the foreign powers. Foreign peoples do not yet quite realize how much is involved in this new "nationalism" of China; how the demand for it, the concrete meaning of it, the antiforeignism of it, has, through the educational methods devised and the

enthusiasm aroused by the student class, permeated great masses of the Chinese people. As foreigners, we do not fully realize how entirely independent of the feasibility of the changes involved, how regardless of the attendant difficulties, how indifferent to the practical obstacles in the way of their immediate realization, and to the foreign financial interests at stake, the vocal masses of the Chinese are in demanding the materialization of this very concrete aspect of nationalism. All the easier is it for them to make this demand because it involves them in no sacrifice and, so far as the masses realize, no obligations. In such unfortunate position have foreign powers and foreign nationals placed themselves because of failure in the past to recognize the importance of native customs, elemental principles of justice, and because of this inconsiderate pursuit of material ends without thought of ultimate consequences.

The foreigner is now saying, "First put your own house in order, first establish an effective, honest, and unified government which is able to exercise jurisdiction over its own subjects, before claiming the right to this jurisdiction over others." To this the answer given by Sunis: "Of the two slogans, 'Down with Imperialism!' and 'Down with Militarism!' the cry, 'Down with Imperialism!' is the more vital. It is the root of roots. Recent events have already proved that militarism is no more than the marionette of Imperialism." The foreigner may charge that the Chinese are now unwilling to listen to reason. The only answer that can be made is, "Quite true; the situation is no longer a matter of reason, but of emotions." As the foreigner once would not call upon reason but used force, so the Chinese have now ceased to call upon reason but apply emotional force, with all the physical force that emotions can command. The foreigner must either reckon with these or apply more force—with all that involves.

The second of the Three People's Principles is democracy—democracy in the sense of a unified government, expressing the will of the people; the elimination of militarism, involving the

education of the masses in letters and in political affairs; the removal of sectionalism, and the working out of an effective machinery of government.

This second principle involves two aspects: the political powers of the people and the machinery for their realization. Universal suffrage furnished the foundation, but the foundation only. To this Sun added the initiative, recall, and referendum. He was familiar with Western governments, and with their limitations; the failure of political forms to accomplish their ostensible objective. Yet he had the faith of most reformers—peculiarly a possession of the Chinese—in institutional or social forms in themselves, or even in the intellectual conception of them. Later he fell under the realistic influence of the Russians. He divided his compatriots—all people, in fact—into the bad, stupid, commonplace, average, wise, talented, prophetic, and philosophic; and admitted that his people were not ready for democracy. The solution was to be found not in the old class control, but rather along the dictatorship lines of Russian experience. The world is now witnessing the practical working out of this doctrine. The stage of tutelage or of political training which Sun held must necessarily intervene between the stage of militarism and that of democracy. How long must it last in China?

On the structural side of government, Sun added to the traditional Western phases of legislative, executive, and judicial, two additional features which are peculiarly Chinese—the examining and inspecting functions. For more than two thousand years China maintained some form of an examination system for the selection of public officials. In recent periods this system had come to have little relation to the actual needs of society and the duties of office. Like the conventional educational system of the West, it probably did select native talent, though it did little to develop it or to equip it with the needs of office. In 1905 this obsolete system was abolished. Long before this, however, England had borrowed the idea in the

civil service examinations, and America followed—afar off. Yet there is a principle so essentially sound in this practice that Sun was well within the cultural traditions of his race in insisting on its revival in modernized form.

The inspecting or censoring function also has the sanction of ancient custom in China. For two thousand years the Imperial organization maintained, perhaps intermittently, some form of a board of censors whose duty it was to see that government was carried out efficiently. The tendency of the modern government activities in China to develop "inspectorships," more or less effective, is well known. In the early national period several American states experimented with the same idea. The need of such a function even in the west is indicated by the numerous congressional and legislative investigation committees. But, as a rule, in the Western states the function is merged with the administrative boards of the government. Thus is constructed the "Five Phase Constitution" of the Kuomintang, as the second of the People's Principles. This they conceive to be the second great objective of the revolution; second in point of sequence of attainment; second as dependent upon the preceding realization of the principle of nationality; second in real importance; second in that it will take a longer time for its accomplishment and in that it will be a matter of continuous evolution.

Democracy to Sun Yat Sen, always meant some form of committee government as opposed to a strong central executive. From the earliest days of the Republic he opposed a parliament to the executive, and would have both president and cabinet creatures of the parliament. As the parliament could never agree upon anything, Yuan Shih Kai carried on practically as an absolute monarch. In fact, now, as throughout the period of the Republic, most legislation has been by edict of president or cabinet; and in this sense the cabinet may constitute a committee government. The Soviet idea of committee control of executive and of military leader fits into the previous beliefs of

Sun remarkably well. As these committees are self-constituted and are peculiarly adapted to the control of the most voluble of agitators or propagandists, the system is peculiarly adaptable to a revolutionary period and lends itself to the control of the masses of the people by a small determined group of revolutionists. Such is the present state and interpretation; how well it is adapted to Chinese conditions, with their long traditions of a weak central government, of extensive provincial authority, and of large measure of village autonomy, remains to be seen. Irrespective of what the theory may be, effective machinery of government can only be worked out by practice. So it will be with the "principle of democracy," which in itself is not necessarily bound up with any given form. The great difficulty in this problem is that the Chinese are by temperament inclined to settle all such matters by theoretical considerations only, rather than to allow sufficient time for experience to determine what is efficient in practice.

The third principle, "the people's livelihood," is usually translated as "socialism"; whatever the catchword may be, it means the improvement of the condition of the masses of the people. By this principle Sun would solve the problems of land and capital; bring about a proportional distribution of land, and a control of capital in favor of society. Recognizing that the great bulk of the Chinese people are farmers, and that their livelihood and the welfare of the whole nation depends upon agriculture, Sun hoped to bring about an equalization in the distribution of land. Fortunately in this respect there has never developed a feudal system in China, as in Europe; there is no large segregation of land in the hands of the few, as in Mexico and various European states; the tenantry system is not an excessive development; the money lender, while an evil of growing significance, has never got hold of the land as in India. But the amount of land is not adequate. Due to antiquated methods of tillage, unwillingness to leave ancestral homes, inability to bring barren land under cultivation, lack of modern

tools and systems of agriculture—as well as an increasing proportion of tenantry, due to famine, brigandage, and floods—the land problem is becoming very serious. Sun was much influenced by the single tax idea—again one which fits in well with Chinese culture, since, outside the cities and indirect taxation, the only tax the people know is the land tax.

Sun's ideas on capital were in one sense "communistic," but, as will be seen further on, gave evidence of a full realization of the need of capital for the development of China and of its dependence, for that, on foreign nations.

So far as the general improvement of the condition of the masses of the people, through organization of laborers and peasants was concerned, the aims of the revolutionary group fitted in well with the Soviet principles. For the organization of the industrial classes and of the peasant class for political ends, which forms so important a part of the Soviet program, had already been begun by the early Revolutionists. By 1920-21 the labor unions of Canton had been well organized, were contributing to the strength of the revolutionary government and were improving the condition of the laboring classes. Through personal contact with them at that time, before there was any suggestion of Soviet influence, I know that they were desirous of obtaining aid and advice from American labor organizations, that their aims were substantially those of organized labor in America, that they were chiefly concerned in improving the living conditions, and hence improving wages of the laboring classes, and that even then, with these moderate aims, they were looked upon with great antagonism by foreign interests, since they were interfering somewhat with the free use of cheap native labor by foreign employers or of the products of such labor under native control. At any rate, socialism, or communism, in the Western sense, had not entered into the program of "social welfare" at that time. Probably no definite program, other than general improvement of labor and social conditions, had been thought of. In fact, in Sun's earlier volume the com-

plete use of capitalism and industrialism to this end was contemplated. How much Soviet influence has modified these purposes and methods of procedure is still undetermined. Certainly the third principle is not necessarily synonymous with either communism or socialism; will not be attained either through the establishment of a committee or socialistic régime; and in the very nature of things will remain long after the other two principles have been attained, as one of the chief obligations of any government, one of the chief needs of Chinese life.

DR. SUN'S WRITINGS

Dr. Sun wrote little; but there are three works in English which contain the essence of his teachings and which afford a most interesting contrast. The first is entitled *The International Development of China,* published in English in 1921. The second is the *Manifesto of the Kuo-Min-Tang of China,* issued from the National Convention, Canton, June 21, 1924. The third is *China and the Nations,* written by Wong Ching Wai and published in English translation in 1927. Wong Ching Wai is Sun's elected successor as chairman of the governing committee of the People's Government of China. This volume was written as an official statement of the views and purposes of the People's Party and of Dr. Sun.

The first of these volumes is devoted to a presentation of an elaborate plan for the material development of China, quite wonderful in its scope. The essential features consist of the following: three large ports on the eastern coast; three extensive railway systems, with these ports as rail heads, penetrating into the remotest parts of China; the manufacturing of the necessary cars and locomotives; the development of the food industry, the clothing industry, the housing industry, the motor industry, the printing industry; the accompanying development of the mining of iron, coal, oil, copper, of smelting plants, and of the manufacture of machinery essential for these. The northern port is to be on the Gulf of Chihli, north of Tientsin; the

central one on the Gulf of Hangchow, south of Shanghai; and the third, the port of Canton. The northern railway system is to begin at the new port and run westward at the base of the foot-hills—penetrating the undeveloped and sparsely settled regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, the north-western provinces and Tibet to Turkeston. Branch lines are to bring the remoter parts of this vast area into connection with the main line, forming a system seven thousand miles in length. The second line penetrates the central part of the country to the vast, densely populated region of the western province of Szechuwan and involves the building of many cross lines as well as development of river ports, flood control, deepening of channels, and water conservancy in general. The third system performs the same service for the southern and the isolated southwestern provinces, also densely populated. One hundred thousand miles of railway, one million miles of roads and additional development schemes costing billions of dollars, for a country possessing practically no capital whatever, constitute a daring scheme. The plan was proposed to the Versailles conference and to various Western governments and officials, with the suggestion that the Western nations apply one half the sum devoted to the prosecution of the World War—that is, $60,000,000 a day—their war machinery, organization, and mobilized engineering and construction forces, to the modernization of China.

In order to facilitate these colossal adventures, Dr. Sun advised that "all matters that could be and are better carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and protected by liberal laws"; that the "hitherto suicidal internal taxes (*likin*) must be abolished"; that the "cumbersome currency must be reformed"; that "the various kinds of official obstacles must be removed"; and that "transportation facilities must be provided." For the larger nation-wide enterprises which must be national monopolies, "foreign capital has to be invited, foreign experts and organ-

izers have to be enlisted, and gigantic methods have to be adopted. . . . During the construction and the operation of each of these national undertakings, before its capital and interest are fully repaid, it will be managed and supervised by foreign experts under Chinese employment. . . . As one of their obligations, these foreign experts have to undertake the training of Chinese assistants to take their places in the future."

Whatever may be thought of the practicability of the total scheme, certainly the conditions proposed under which it was to be worked out appear to be reasonable and with no anti-foreign hostility. Sun Yat Sen has always been characterized by the foreigner as a visionary. Considering China's financial condition, the lack of capital, the poverty of the masses, the inability to fit the old business system to large modern enterprises, the vastness of the scheme itself, the term "visionary" seems not inapplicable. Certain other aspects of the suggestions give further color to this charge. To the ordinary theory of railway management, that a railway to be successful must pass through regions of large population, he retorts that the profitable railway is one which extends from a region of heavy population to one of very sparse population; to the conclusion of the geological expert that China has neither copper nor oil, he opposes the popular opinion that it has vast wealth in these minerals that only awaits development; the conclusions of engineers concerning control of rivers he brushes aside in favor of his own schemes.

Nevertheless, when the economic expansion of China does come, it must be along the lines drawn, filling in—step by step, no doubt—but minute portions of the vast sketch which Sun has outlined. Dr. Sun's proposition was a challenge to the post-war statesmen. Either too involved in their own petty schemes of revenge, or in the larger work of bringing order out of chaos in the Western world, they were quite unable to turn their attention to this menacing cloud on the horizon, now grown to the proportion of an international storm. Even yet

the vision remains a challenge to Western statesmen, and to Chinese politicians as well, a statesman being a politician viewed from a distance. If some Western powers would challenge the Chinese to the practical carrying out of some one item of Sun Yat Sen's plan—by the devotion of the sum now used for maintenance of military forces in China and for the surreptitious arming of the Chinese militarists; if these militarists would match the capital and managerial ability thus furnished by turning their mercenary armies into labor battalions for the construction of railways, of highways, or of flood controls—some coöperative movement toward the solution of China's economic problem toward the adjustment of the international difficulties caused by the Chinese situation and toward the practical realization of the nationalist dream of Sun Yat Sen could be made.

Unfortunately, international affairs are not conducted on such informal, undignified, and human bases; hence, the suggestion is also visionary.

The other volume which sets forth the ideas of Sun Yat Sen and of the Nationalists is of a very different character. Far more virulent in spirit, it breathes only hostility to foreigners (except the Russians), recognizes no disinterestedness in the policy of any people except the Russians, and maintains a most uncompromising spirit of criticism and of irreconcilability throughout. Whether this difference is due to the fact that the volume is largely composed by the more uncompromising radical Wong Ching Wai; or to the fact that it is the proclamation of a political party, such as our party platforms; or to the influence of the Russian Communists; or to the realization of Dr. Sun, during his last days, that political visions at home and reasonableness in argument with foreign powers had got him nowhere with the republican revolution, is perhaps impossible to tell. The volume is called *The Report of International Problems; Prepared for the International Problems Committee of the People's Conference of Delegates in Peking, in April, 1925.*

At this conference Sun Yat Sen had hoped to have a unified China attained, or at least a unified demand for the redress of all the international wrongs which China conceives she suffers. Quite in the tone and the emotional power of the Declaration of Independence, it is directed almost wholly against the "imperialism" of foreign powers; by this term meaning essentially the economic exploitation of one country or people by a more powerful one. In fact, this document has much the same effect on the youth of China that the Declaration had on the youth and on the politicians of America for two or three generations after the American Revolution.

The larger part of the book is devoted to a survey of the international relations of China for the past hundred years, such as is given in Chapter V of this volume. The successive territorial aggressions, granting of concessions and leases, exactions of indemnities, demands of unequal treaties and of extra-territorial rights, are all passed in review. A chapter on the definition of imperialism is given; one on the influence of imperialism on world policies; one on China's revolution against imperialism; one on Russia's attitude toward the Chinese struggle; and one on resolutions.

This statement of the aim of the Republic has now become a militant revolutionary document; the efforts of foreign nations to arrive at any amicable and just solution of the problem of China are treated with complete skepticism. As for the Washington Conference—"Bargain with them? Bargain with a tiger for its skin!" The conclusion reached is that "from the Washington Conference to the present day (December, 1926) the powers have pushed their encroachment policy even more strongly than they did between the Boxer War and the Great European War. They have concentrated their attention on Chinese home politics, with the purpose of preventing a Chinese racial revival. Unless we can resist them with sufficient power, China cannot continue to exist."

That the American people may have a clear understanding

of the uncompromising character of the Chinese Revolutionary Party—which, to judge from this document, has little or no faith in any foreign powers except Russia; which makes little if any discrimination between the attitude of the United States and that of the other powers; which recognizes no general change in recent times either in attitude or policy—it is necessary to have some knowledge of this document. Such an understanding enables one to realize why it is that the Chinese, in current expression, use a term signifying foreign aggression: "The foreigners are devouring our country."

This document defines the "Open Door" policy, in which America takes so much pride as indicating the desire to protect China, as signifying "that China should welcome the powers when they come to exercise their encroachment." "Integrity of territory" is defined as "partitioning of territory"; "equality of opportunity" as "everybody has a share." Even admitting the amazing series of aggressive acts by which China's rights have been infringed, it is quite impossible to follow the reasoning that "political ascendancy is designed to protect economic invasion"; that "economic penetration means failure of the means of livelihood," the end of which is "not subjection but race extinction"; that "modern imperialism is cutting down the livelihood of the people"; and that "when the people's livelihood is cut off, the result is race extinction." That even the economic policy of imperialism seeks the destruction of the people with whom it would trade, and that even imperialistic designs could be advanced by the extinction of a people, constitute a stretch of logic quite impossible to conceive. This reads as a very different document from Sun Yat Sen's argument of five years earlier; but it marks the development in thought and the change in attitude on the part of Chinese revolutionary leaders during this time. So much is due to the dilatoriness of the powers in rendering justice to China, their unwillingness to relinquish any of the ill-gotten advantages except to the argument of force, their inability to get together in an attempt to

work out with China this complicated situation on the basis of mutuality of interests and the principles of justice and fair dealing.

THE NATIONALISTS' DEMANDS

At the expense of repetition, it is desirable to give here, in this summary of the Nationalists' platform, the "Resolutions concerning International Problems drafted for the People's Conference," containing the last formulation of Sun Yat Sen's position.[1]

First. China must resume possession of all the territories she has lost.

Second. Those states which were formerly vassal states of China, such as Chosen and Annam, must be restored to their original national status, independence, and equality. The question of their federation with China, they shall be free to decide.

Third. You must regain all the concessions.

Fourth. You must regain all the leased territories.

Fifth. You must regain control of all the railways now controlled by foreigners and all the Chinese territory in their vicinity.

Sixth. You must abolish the present arrangements concerning the Legation Quarter in Peking. The military armaments,[2] together with the troops and police, of the Foreign Powers, must be withdrawn.

Seventh. You must abolish all spheres of influence.

Eighth. You must no longer consent to the stationing of foreign military and police in Chinese territory.

Ninth. You must withdraw from foreign boats and vessels the right of navigation in China's inland waters.

Tenth. You must abolish extraterritorial rights.

Eleventh. You must regain tariff autonomy.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NATIONALISTS

To what extent do realities agree with theories? Now that the Nationalists have been in control in the south for several years, what have been the results of the experience? By

[1] *China and the Nations,* by Wong Ching Wai, pp. 135-6.
[2] Especially the Seven Forts of the foreigners in Peking are meant.

such results the American people will be far more influenced in forming their judgment of the character of the southern government than by the statement of their principles. Far less inclined to be satisfied with a theoretic statement of a problem or the formulation of political ideals than are the Chinese, they demand to know how these ideas will work, and how their proponents actually exercise the power which they enjoy. Shall they take the recent excesses at Nanking, the looting of foreign property, the attacks on the lives of foreigners, the seizure by force of the property of the Hankow concession, the driving out of missionaries, the closing of mission schools and hospitals, the evacuation of the sick from hospitals and their abandonment on the sidewalks and streets because impossible or unjust demands of labor made in the name of the New Nationalism have not been complied with—shall all these be taken as the first fruits, or as the full harvest, of this great patriotic endeavor?

No doubt these must be taken as partial results—by-products—of this movement. But there is another side of the story which should not be lost to sight. The Nationalists have given in Canton some demonstration of their hopes and ambitions, some testimony of their ability, some evidence that a new spirit is evoked and that a new career for Chinese nationalism may be ahead. Following the determination of Canton to cut loose from the northern militarists, three types of government emerged. The Chinese are not given to that exactitude in social organization, or in affairs in general, that is an intellectual as well as a practical demand in the West. In fact, the Chinese tendency is always to avoid that definitive settlement of a situation or statement of a case that does not allow an escape into an alternative. So there gradually emerged the "People's National Party," the direct embodiment of Dr. Sun's principles and the skeleton of a national government which has since put on much flesh; there was a local government of Canton, an effective, functioning government which might extend its

powers; and a Canton Strike Committee which might furnish effective pressure of a non-political character when necessary and either assist or obstruct the workings of the other two (at times it has done one; at other times, the other).

The effectiveness of the Strike Committee is evidenced by its influence in the Hong Kong strike. As a result of the shooting of fifty or more Chinese by the British and French on the occasion (June 23, 1923) of a demonstration over the expulsion of the mercenary Hunnanese soldiery who had held and bled the city for years, a boycott against the great commercial city of Hong Kong was instigated. Even yet, four years later, the boycott and strike have not been wholly allayed. The British trade entering Canton shrank to one tenth its former amount; in fact, since this latter amount represents merely the going and coming of the daily steamer, continued for the sake of form, the trade practically disappeared. British goods arriving by other than British ships were confiscated by the Strike Committee. Servants were withdrawn from Shameen—the foreign settlement of Canton—and practically all normal life in the settlement ceased. Hong Kong, one of the proudest cities of the British Empire, has been prostrate almost ever since. One fourth, perhaps one third, of the Chinese population left the city; the shipping trade of this port—claiming to be the second or third in the world—was cut in half, the remaining half being chiefly the mere entry of the port by vessels in transit; banks and business houses were ruined; business was at a standstill, until the British Government came to the rescue with loans of millions. The same defection of servants and laborers paralyzed normal home and business life as in the smaller settlement at Shameen. The Chinese coolie had at last made his power felt—the power of organization and numbers.

Even as early as 1920-1921, these labor unions of Canton had organized eighty trades, had erected a large central building wherein each union maintained a room and dormitory; were maintaining schools and a hospital for their members. Now,

after the Shameen incident, they exercised a tremendous power. That organized coolies could seize and paralyze foreign trade, bring the life of a city like Hong Kong to a standstill, seize British goods that were brought in—despite the strike and its boycott of foreign goods—and sell them to pay expenses, indicated that a new era had opened in China. The unions raised more than a million dollars gold in various Chinese colonies abroad to maintain the strike. Now the walls of the headquarters building—covered in 1921, when I first visited it, with general educational material—are covered with posters, anti-foreign, anti-imperialist, anti-Christian, as well as the more constructive ones for the rebuilding of China. Coöperating with the other two organizations, local and national, they sponsor courses of instruction to their members and to the villagers around on the value of trade-unionism, on the history of the dealings of foreign nations with China, on "Imperialism" in general, and on China in particular. While the trade unions lack the cohesive power of the old Chinese guilds, and are useful more in the case of emergencies—such as a boycott against goods, British or Japanese—yet the progress of the Nationalist movement north in 1926-27 has shown that their organization of the coolies and of the handicraftsmen can become a powerful instrument of public opinion and of popular force, not always easily to be restrained and controlled when once aroused.

The second of these new types of organization, and for some years after 1918 hardly to be distinguished from the National Party government, at times under control of the militarists, is the local government of Canton. For some years this government was under the direction of Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat Sen; then, for some subsequent years, under that of Dr. C. C. Wu, son of Wu Ting Fang, for most of the past generation Chinese minister in Washington. Under these two mayors much has been done to make Canton a modern city, and to keep up-to-date Canton's claim to being the most progressive of all Chinese native cities. Here the Bund, with its buildings

of eight and ten stories, of substantial modern structure, gives Canton's waterfront an appearance similar to that of the cities of the foreign concessions. In 1920-21 the old city walls were razed, and broad boulevards took their places. Many other wide streets were cut through thickly congested quarters. As advantage was taken of the numerous fires to widen streets and compel the erection of modern buildings, the rumor soon got abroad that the new government was starting fires in order to build new streets. Out of the grounds of old Yamens or palaces, parks were made. On the new paved broad streets, trackless trolley lines to the new suburbs were installed. These new suburbs, with attractive modern residences and grounds, replaced the million graves that had encircled the city's high grounds just outside the walls. For a small sum each grave was removed to public grounds on distant hills, and the city derived much revenue from the lands thus vacated. The new streets, with their sidewalks built under the upper stories of the buildings, with their arched façades, with balconies on the upper floors, resemble to a marked degree the arcaded streets in Spanish and Italian cities and in those of other sub-tropical regions.

Out of the increased revenues, gained by more effective financing and more honest administration, this program of improvement was maintained, and much support was given to the southern army and the new Nationalist government. Many features of the port improvement, which formed so important a part of Sun Yat Sen's general scheme for national development, are under consideration. A large system of docks on the side of the river opposite the main city; bridges connecting the two parts of the city; deep water channels; a port for large sea-going vessels at Whampoa, a few miles from the main city, and a dredged channel to the sea; water works and railways, form parts of this comprehensive scheme. Predatory militarism held these plans in check for much of the period, for the mercenary Yunannese soldiers held the city and bled it of funds

until 1925. Earlier than this Dr. Sun had been betrayed by his own general-in-chief, who held the city for months. A considerable portion of the funds raised by the local government must be devoted to the support of the Nationalist army. But the efficiency of the southern government in municipal affairs at Canton has constituted a most powerful argument in its favor among Chinese of other sections. The local government consists of the mayor and the council, appointed by the provincial government. The members of the council are chosen to represent various classes—merchants, laborers, schoolmen, the professions, bankers, etc., thus embodying the soviet idea.

On this efficient local government, the People's Nationalist Party finds its real basis. Denied the control of customs, of the salt revenues, of the railways—from which sources the northern militarists have drawn their support—the southern forces have had to rely on local revenues, supplemented by contributions from Chinese patriots abroad. The system of revenues developed in Canton was extended to the province. No one feature of the southern government has been given more prominence in the press than the notable success of T. V. Soong, the finance minister. Soong is a graduate of the Harvard School of Business Administration of 1914, and a brother-in-law of Dr. Sun. Chiefly by compelling a greater honesty in administration of the ordinary revenues, especially in tea and silk, and through administrative efficiency in extending the scope and in the collection of local revenues, these were so increased that the amount turned into the government became each month greater than for an entire year under previous conditions—and this despite the great shrinkage in foreign trades. As the revenues from the latter, however, were yet under control of the northern government, this forced cessation of imports had little effect on local revenues.

The National Government is administered by a National Government Council; under this are the various ministries, most of which are conducted by boards or committees. Two of them,

however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, are held by individuals. The Minister of Finance has just been mentioned; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, until the split between the left and right wings, following the Nanking affair of March 25, 1927, and continuing as such for the left wing, was Eugene Chen, an astute Chinese born in Trinidad, educated in an English school and using English as his native language.

The members of the National Government Council form the self-constituted National Political Bureau, which appoints the members of the National Government Council and from which emanates all the power of this revolutionary "republican" government. Of these Political Bureaus the leading members are the two ministers just mentioned, the widow and the son of Sun Yat Sen, the commander of the army, General Chiang Kai Shek, until his resignation in August, and one or two other more or less temporary members.

Whatever may be said of the democracy of the government, the ideals have appealed to the Chinese people as have those of no other faction, and its honesty of purpose has commanded general approval. To the support of the patriotic organizations has been added that of the labor unions, of the newly forming peasant unions—now said to number membership in the millions—and of some provincial armies, revolutionary in sentiment. With the addition of these latter has come trouble; for most of the soldiers are mercenaries, the general in command is at heart a militarist and opportunist, and the spirit pervading the forces seems so radical and destructive that it is difficult at times to distinguish them from marauding bandits. This combination is undoubtedly responsible, under extreme Communist incitement, for the most regrettable Nanking affair of March 25, and for the subsequent split in the National forces. What will eventuate remains for the future to disclose.

The dominance of the Political Bureau and of the army under its direction constitutes, no doubt, one of the contribu-

tions of the Russian Communists. But in his later years, Dr. Sun experienced a change of views regarding the Revolution. In his earlier efforts he had expected that a constitutional government, under parliamentary control, could be set up. Years of disappointing experiences—with parliament, with militarists, with the northern factionalists, with his friends and supporters, with the people—convinced him, at last, that successful establishment of a republican form of government, of democratic ideals of society, was not so speedily or so easily to be attained. Consequently, he promulgated his theory of the three stages through which free political institutions in China must pass: "Militarism, Tutelage, Constitutionalism." That the militaristic stage is about complete, or that it would be completed shortly by the victorious southern army, was his belief. The control of the Political Bureau so opportunely introduced from Soviet Russia, the organization and instruction of the workers and peasants through the propaganda bureau are stages of the state of Tutelage. Eventually, Dr. Sun held, the state of Constitutionalism will be reached and on a basis far more stable than that attempted by the early revolution.

Whatever may be the excesses of the extremists, whatever methods may be used to obtain some of their objectives—such, for example, as the control of the concessions—it is well for the Westerner to bear in mind, in order to preserve his balance of judgment, that Dr. Sun, his followers, and the spokesmen of their Russian advisers, have repeated again and again that "our immediate goal is simple: to abolish the unequal treaties and to unify China under an honest national government." But they persist in believing that the elimination of imperialism is a pre-condition for either honesty or unity of government; while the Western powers persist in believing that the honesty and unity of government are a pre-condition to the relinquishment of the unequal treaties. Therein lies the present problem of China.

Finally, it is also well for the foreigners to realize that the

teachings of Sun Yat Sen now have practical national acceptance; that the militarists—like Marshal Chang Tso Lin—can no longer withstand the pressure to adopt them; that Dr. Sun's picture is now universal in public office, school, business office, shop and factory; and that his will, as appended, is now memorized as a sacred text by all Chinese:[1]

For forty years I have been engaged in the democratic reconstruction of China. It has been my cherished aim to elevate China to a state of freedom and independence. The experience of these eventful years has deeply convinced me that in order to attain this great end we should and must enlist the support of the common people at home and gain the sympathetic coöperation of those nations which are treating us on a basis of equality.

The revolutionary movement has not yet succeeded. It is imperative that all my fellow-workers, basing their efforts upon my "Reconstruction Plan," "Outline of Reconstruction Policies," "The Three Democratic Principles," and "Manifesto of the Kuo-Min-Tang at the First National Convention," do continue to exert their ardent energies toward the achievement of our common cause. Lately we advocated the calling together of a People's Convention, and the abolition of unjust treaties with foreign nations. Attend to them with vigilance, so that they may be realized in the shortest possible time!

(*Signed*) SUN WEN

[1] Sun Yat-Sen's parting message to his people, from *Program for the Reconstruction of China,* page 22.

I know that birds fly! I know that fish swim! But who can measure the ways of the dragon?

—*Confucius*

When brothers fall out, then strangers are able to take advantage of them.

He who rides a tiger cannot dismount.

—*Chinese proverbs*

CHAPTER VIII

RUSSIA AND CHINA

AN OUTSTANDING fact which Americans must grasp if they are to understand the situation in China, is that Russia's contact with China dates from the early period of European influence; that this influence has been as intimate and as penetrating as that of any of the European people; that because of the Tartar influence and the infusion of Tartar blood in both Russian and Chinese people there exists a bond of sympathy, affinity, and understanding that does not exist elsewhere; and that Russia has been a territorial aggressor on China second to no other power. If the outlying dependencies of China may be counted as component parts of China, Russia and China have a common boundary line of several thousand miles. In fact, these outlying dependencies of China—Turkestan, Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria—were either conquered or raised into buffer states between China and the people who have since been absorbed into the population of the Russian colossus; or, as with the Tartars from Turkestan and the Manchus from Manchuria, they have brought the border territory into the old Empire and furnished to the Chinese people the machinery or the personnel of government for the periods designated by their respective dynasties.

RUSSIA'S HISTORIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA

The days of the Tartar Emperors in China had long since ended when the Russians, in the late half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, extended their power over the remnant of that once virile people. The Russians with their Cossock bands reached the shores of the Okhotsk Sea as early as 1636, but the Tartars yet separated them from the Chinese. Then, for a half century, the Cossacks,

with a fierceness and a brutality matched against that of the Tartar, applied these methods to the more peaceful Chinese. Struggle for the Amur region and against the native inhabitants, afforded an attempt to conquer all Manchuria, and brought the treaty of 1689, to which reference has already been made, and which was the first treaty made by China with a Western power. This gave Russia an approach to the Pacific and control of a long coast line and an all but uninhabited imperial realm. In this treaty it was specified that trade was to be free across the border, while extraterritorial privileges were made reciprocal. As this region, almost uninhabitable by civilized people, was remote and inhospitable, little more was done until the nineteenth century.

Then came one of those impasses between European powers which in time caused China to suffer as a pawn in European politics or enabled her to play off one power against the other. The series of incidents occurring between 1854-60 occasioned in turn both conditions, the one as discreditable to European morality—if not to European prestige—as the other. The Crimean War was now engaging Europe, with Russia on one side, England and France on the other. The Siberian Governor-General was an empire-builder, able to take advantage of the situation and of the other powers. An expedition down the Amur mapped out new territory for Russia at China's expense, and enabled the former to guard against any attacks of the English and French in this region. In reply to the protests of the Chinese, the Governor-General gave solemn pledges of friendship; but he erected a string of forts along the Amur—if not on Chinese territory, at least threatening it. The English and French aggressions on China now taking place, in the war of 1857-60, the Chinese were constrained to yield to Russia the territory north of the Amur as far as the Great Bend. While China was thus engaged at close hand with England and France, Russia recompensed herself for her humiliation in Europe by occupying the Pacific Coast as far south as Korea.

She also occupied Saghalien (where she first came into contact with Japan), began the development of Vladivostock as a great naval port, and played the part of friend to China in the peace negotiations of 1857 and 1860. For this dubious friendship the Russian claim to the Amur region and the province bordering on the Pacific was acknowledged as valid.

One vision of empire realized but leads to grander dreams. The Russian Empire, which now stretched across two continents, must be consolidated and made secure against attack. A period of development of the Siberian Empire, as abundant in agricultural possibilities, as rich in minerals, and more extensive than the great western region of the United States, now followed. The Trans-Siberian railroad, with its five thousand-mile-reach with but one break, was completed before the close of the century (1898). And the empire-builders were ready with a new vision. A railroad to be built in all-Russian territory necessitated a very long detour to the north of the Amur territory, whereas a line directly across Manchuria to Vladivostock—conveniently located far south, through the foresight of providing Russian ownership of the maritime province of Amur—would save several hundred miles. Here was a new objective, and the Chino-Japanese War of 1895, now conveniently staged through the Russian manifestations in Korea, provided the occasion. The victory of Japan enabled her to lay claim to Korea, to prevent its falling into the hands of Russia, and to take from China, on the convenient terms of a lease, the Liaotung peninsula, with the fortifications of the open port of Port Arthur. Russia again played the part of friend to China. With the help of France and Germany, she compelled Japan to renounce her claim to the Liaotung peninsula to Russia; and, as a reward for this friendly service to China, was given the right to build the direct line of a thousand miles of railroad across Manchuria from Manchuli to Vladivostock, with a branch line from Harbin to Port Arthur. As Russia was authorized by this friendly treaty to guard the railway with sol-

diers, she soon had many troops on the ground; and seizing the convenient occasion of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, sent six army corps into Manchuria—claiming, for this act of friendship, favors both from the Allies and from China. The new railway lines were pushed through with the greatest celerity. The Chinese Eastern Railway, as the Russian line across Chinese territory was called, was completed in 1903, the line to Port Arthur at approximately the same time. Russia now had her warm water port, had practical control of Manchuria, had become the dominant power in Asia, was the profiteering friend of China, and was threatening Japan at the Korean border. The subtle intrigue known as modern diplomacy, which accompanied and, in fact, secured each of these steps, would make a long story if adequately narrated. This type of manipulation continued throughout the intervals of peace, and laid the bases for the inevitable periods of war which followed.

The march of Russia was as slow, as inevitable, as inexorable, as that of a glacier. The fate of one ancient empire, Korea, was settled as but a small pawn in the game. The ruthless division of the northern province of China, during this period, made it apparent that the larger part was soon to share the same fate. Japan's position appeared but slightly unlike until, through the Russo-Japanese War, the difference was made evident. While this war was primarily a struggle between Japan and Russia, the immediate prize of the struggle was actually, though not nominally, China's province of Manchuria. Korea was absorbed into the Japanese Empire; Russian pretentions in Manchuria were, for the time being, checked. China was given a respite; in fact, a new lease on life. But the Japanese victory over Russia—the first victory of Oriental over European in modern times and comparable to those of the Crusades (twelfth century), of Genghis Khan or of Tamerlane (fourteenth century)—has a far greater significance than items mentioned in the Treaty of Portsmouth. It marks an epoch in the history of Oriental peoples. They will refer to this as West-

ern peoples refer to the fall of Rome or the subsequent fall of Constantinople—both warnings of the changing tides in the affairs of men.

Russia immediately began to recoup her strength to renew the struggle. She completed and reinforced her railway lines outside of Chinese territory, and encouraged the development of Siberia as America had her great West. England's friendship for Japan, shown through her alliance of 1902, which compelled her to go to the assistance of Japan if more than one power attacked her, made the Russo-Japanese War inevitable, and the Japanese victory possible. Its continuance, with the encouragement which it gave to Russian aggression elsewhere, particularly in Central Asia, where it came in conflict with British interests, made it both possible and advisable for Russia and Japan to get together and decide peaceably what neither could obtain alone through conflict. The division of Chinese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia followed.

America's part in this tangled situation has been noted. As the break-up of China, threatened by the various and comprehensive claims on Chinese territory by European powers and Japan, following the disastrous Chino-Japanese War, was checked by Secretary Hay's re-statement of the Open Door policy, so now the peaceful appropriation of these outer provinces of the Chinese Empire by means of railway concessions was checked by the announcement of Secretary Knox's plan for the internationalization of the railroads of Manchuria. Perhaps a diplomatic bluff, the plan has never been agreed to and is perhaps unworkable, but at least it procured delay.

As offering an even more direct route to the warm sea, the Chihli Gulf, than did the Manchurian route, and as more remote from Japanese influence, Russia now turned her attention more to Mongolia. This is the route by way of Peking and political manipulation. Strikingly enough, the great plans for the material development of China by the patriot Sun Yat Sen were based upon a network of national railways, the chief

of which was from the Gulf of Chihli by way of Peking along the northern mountain rampart of China, by way of Mongolia, to the far western territories, now held to their Chinese connection by the vaguest of ties. Strikingly enough also, it was apparent that Russia was dreaming along the same lines.

Now intervenes a greater drama than that of Eastern Asia—the World War. Subsequent to the War, the relations of China and Russia are now to be followed along two lines, one perfectly obvious and much heralded, the other subtle and hidden even from the Chinese. One is the Soviet influence on and assistance to the Nationalist Movement; the other is the practical, political, and material hold retained and developed on Manchuria and Mongolia, the old Russian dream of empire. As this latter includes the more superficial one, and is a direct continuation of the course we have been tracing, let us note the first line of development.

RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

As with all other nations, Russia's relations with China are guided by considerations of two distinct types: first and most fundamental, the self-interest of Russia; second, and in varying degrees, considerations of an altruistic character, more or less friendly to China. These latter have been now so emphasized, both by Russians and by Chinese, that there is a tendency to disregard the former interests. Nevertheless, the old aggressive "imperialistic" policy of Russia persists, and should not be lost sight of in the activities of individuals assisting China in her present struggle for national unity and for freedom from restrictions imposed by foreign powers; nor should this be concealed by the much-advertised policy of friendship for China by Soviet Russia. The urge to national expansion, both territorially and in national influence, so strong in the English, German, French, and American, is no less strong in the Russian. In fact, because it has always been a continuous expansion over contiguous territory, over races somewhat

related ethnically to certain component strains in the Russian nationality, territorial aggression or expansion seems to have been more urgent and irresistible on the part of the Russians than with any of the other nations. Since the seventeenth century this expansion has gone on apace, directed either toward the south and a Mediterranean outlet, toward the south-east and an Indian Ocean outlet, or toward the east and a Pacific Ocean outlet. At the present time, the outlet to the Mediterranean is definitely blocked. Since the recent alliance with Afghanistan, carrying with it defeat of the British policy, Russian influence has now reached the barriers of the Himalayas and the British possessions; but outlet to an open port on the Pacific Ocean has been blocked by Japanese control of Chosen and South Manchuria. The present line of least resistance is through China. Here this program of expansion has two main features: the first is the control of direct railway communication through Chinese territory to the sea-port terminus of the Trans-Siberian railway at Vladivostock; the second is the control of Outer Mongolia and its direct approach to Peking and the near-by sea south of Manchuria and the area of Japanese influence. Many believe that the two policies, combined with the general Soviet penetration of China, have nothing less in design than the Russification of all China. One need not accept this latter interpretation in an understanding of the present situation in China; but it is well to remember that Russia is subject to the same imperialistic urge as the other powers and in no less degree, and that her territorial and political policy outside the Great Wall is distinctly in accord with this general interpretation, even if it be granted that her policy in China proper is dictated by altruistic regard for the Chinese—or, perhaps, motivated largely by her antagonism to the other great powers.

Following the World War, with Russia Sovietized and renouncing all imperialistic aspirations, the Far Eastern Republic was formed out of eastern Siberian territory, and inherited and preserved Russian interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.

This republic has now been absorbed into Soviet Russia (U. S. S. R.), but the Russian economic claims on the railways yet hold. As their able negotiator, Joffe, stated: "Even if they turned over the Chinese Eastern Railway to China, this would not annul Russia's interest in this line, which is a portion of the Great Siberian Railway and unites one part of Russian territory with another." This gentle suggestion was made valid by a threat to cancel Russia's voluntary promise to withdraw all of the claims of Imperial Russia on China. These voluntary renunciations were of concessions, extraterritorial rights, etc., already denounced by China during the state of war, even as she had previously denounced similar claims of Germany and Austria. The Russians, however, still maintain their hold on the railway, in defiance of China's claim. The eternal triangle explains most international problems as well as domestic ones—Japan plays Russia against China to maintain her hold over Manchuria; Russia plays Japan against China to maintain her hold on the railways; China plays Russia against Japan to avoid being swallowed up altogether. At the present moment Japan and Russia seem to have an agreement which allows each to profit in its own sphere in Manchuria, both, of course, at the expense of China; Russia in operating control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Japan in complete possession, as she long has been, of the South Manchurian Railway and building or assisting Manchuria in building north and south lines which cross the Russian sphere in north Manchuria and strategically cut the main Russian road.

The Mongolian problem is less tangible, but fraught with far more serious possibilities. Mongolia is a vast semi-arid territory inhabited by only about two million people, mostly of nomadic habits, long tributary but under little or no direct administrative responsibility to China. Having long been a buffer state between China and Russia or other peoples outside the empire, its value to China lies largely in this fact and in its location, so near to the northern capital. The Suiyuan Railway

penetrates the Great Wall only about forty miles from Peking; Kalgan, in North Mongolia, is only about one hundred miles away; while Urga, capital of Outer Mongolia, remote and approached only by caravan, is two hundred miles distant.

Immediately following the Revolution and the founding of the Republic, Russia recognized the independence of Mongolia and received concessions for building her railways; but the World War breaking out not long afterward, these events in themselves were of little significance. While the Chinese Republic placed a stripe for Mongolia in the national flag, the attitude of the Mongolians was far from friendly. The last years of the Manchus had witnessed a growth of Chinese administrative influence and effort, and the early years of the Republic saw its renewal. All this, together with new trading and commercial activities, aroused the suspicion and hostility of the Mongolians, who had no desire to have their wild independence curtailed for the modern political privilege of paying taxes. The Russian counter-revolutions under Kolchok and Ungern involved Mongolia. The Allied intervention, especially that of the Japanese, aroused suspicion and antagonism. The Russian reactionaries expelled the Chinese control, the Japanese withdrew to Vladivostok, the Allies left altogether; and Soviet Russia set up a Soviet Republic in Outer Mongolia. The Far Eastern Republic became a part of Soviet Russia in 1922; Soviet Mongolia allied with it. Thus the status remains to the present, Mongolia more Russian in control than Chinese.

RUSSIAN COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

As of far more popular interest and immediate importance, the friendly relations of Soviet Russia with the Chinese revolutionists and nationalists deserve careful attention and analysis. Because it is more subtle, more conflicting, and more involved with personal elements not altogether amenable to control by government policy, and also because primarily under control

of the super-national organization, the "Third International," which is using Russia just as it is using China, appraisal of this situation is even more difficult than the continuance of the old imperialistic policy of territorial expansion.

With the suppression of the counter-revolutionists, the founding of the Far Eastern Republic and its inclusion into the Union of Soviet States of Russia, a new policy in dealing with China was announced. As already explained, the territory seized by Czarist Russia was to be returned; the Chinese Eastern Railway was to be given up without compensation—later defined as meaning that the political jurisdiction or sovereignty was relinquished but financial and administrative rights were retained; the territorial concessions in the treaty ports were to be returned without compensation, though here again this relinquishment related to political jurisdiction, which had already been denounced by the Chinese, and not to financial ownership; the indemnities, especially for the Boxer troubles, were to be remitted, though their use is largely controlled by the provision that the decision of the Remission Board, composed of two Chinese and one Russian, must be made unanimous; and the unilateral treaties were to be given up, as they had also been denounced by China. Similarly, treaty provisions between Russia and other powers, that were not fair to China, were to be cancelled. These, indeed, were excellent and just things to do; were fair to China; were the things which China is now demanding of the foreign powers. They are the things which the foreign powers will have to relinquish ultimately; the things which had far better be done in the spirit of friendship than under compulsion. In doing these things, or in recognizing them as accomplished facts, Russia did set an example for other powers, did give an external evidence of her friendship which other nations have not paralleled. But, as indicated in the several instances, many of these acts are not nearly so significant in reality as in appearance. However, they have had tremendous influence on the Chinese. Any other nation was in

the position to gain the same favor had it desired to do so by the same means.

In order to obtain some governmental recognition of the Soviet Republic, not yet given by any government, and also quite consciously—as is now proved—to turn the tables on the great powers by arousing Chinese antagonism to them, these offers were made through various representatives. Finally, in 1922, Joffe—a representative of unusual ability who had played an important part in Russian negotiations in the West—was sent to China and became a great influence through his personality, particularly in university and government official circles. Joffe was followed shortly by another persuasive representative, Karakhan, a man of very different type, yet also of ability. Armed with the threat to recognize Manchuria as independent, as they had previously done for Mongolia, if negotiations were not concluded, Russia secured recognition and came into possession of her legation quarters at Peking; and by a clever out-maneuvering of the other powers, Karakhan became dean of the diplomatic corps. With the prestige of these victories over the foreign powers—gained through moral superiority in dealing with China as well as through diplomatic astuteness—Karakhan, and Russia in general, came to exercise very great influence.

A new technique for influencing Chinese public opinion now developed. Conversations with professors, lectures to students, public and private discussions in the tea houses and restaurants frequented by the politicians and newsmongers, articles in popular publications, news material through the news agencies—better organized for this purpose in China than in any other country—all these avenues of influence were systematically cultivated by the Russian agents. Through the secret societies, lack of a large reading public, traditional methods of disseminating news by word of mouth, China was particularly a fertile field for sowing the seed of the new and disruptive ideas by surreptitious methods, or by methods more or less

under cover. In these earlier years this revolutionary or disruptive influence was largely confined to the intellectual and student classes, or at least to the educated classes, and perhaps might have remained so but for the turn events now took.

In 1923, after five years of renewed effort in rejuvenating the Republic and of fruitless opposition to the militarists of the North, Dr. Sun Yat Sen again fled to Shanghai, being driven out by a faction of his own party. Convinced that the revolutionary party needed new blood and the Republic a complete overturn in organization and methods, he fell in with the masterful Joffe, who had already shown his skill in many rounds with European diplomats. Sun had sought for aid from abroad, even from America, as had also the leaders of the rising labor party. Unrestrained by such principles of propriety as might control a Western government, and finding fertile ground for the growth of their own radical ideas, the Russians were amply prepared for this opportunity. The suggestions of Joffe, followed by the persistent and shrewd advice and assistance of the past masters of propaganda, soon brought about a revival of the flagging revolutionary cause simultaneously with a tremendous growth of Russian influence. Following his conferences with Joffe and the reorganization of the Revolutionary party, Dr. Sun went north, and completed the alliance with the new Russian Ambassador, Karakhan, even more able, because less scrupulous and less influenced by the old culture, than his predecessor. Undoubtedly, after this turn the Russian influence became much more pervasive; after the death of Dr. Sun, early in 1925, and his speedy apotheosis, the revolutionary force received new power; after the massacre of students at Shanghai, May 30, 1925, the Communistic spirit, the spirit of patriotism, of anti-foreignism, of intolerance, seemed to fuse. Thus the crop from the Russian sowing, after careful cultivation, was speedily harvested.

The term "propaganda" has now become a term of opprobrium; but in reality, as a method of adult or mass education,

it means nothing more than paying attention to the interests, emotions, and ideas of the people with whom one deals, rather than the determination of action on the basis of one's own preconceived ideas. As has been emphasized from the earliest chapter of this volume, this is exactly what the Western people, in dealing with the Chinese, have not done. M. Borodin, the Communist adviser of the Nationalist party, has recently remarked, with great pertinence, that when the English come to pay as much attention to and take as much interest in the Chinese as they do in their racing ponies, then they will get along better in China and do much better business. In general, the Russian, the German, and the Japanese have given much more attention to a study of Chinese character and psychology than have the English or the American. Results at this juncture proved the value of this attitude. Sun Yat Sen conceived the idea that the force of the new Communism, added to the old revolutionary party, would make the combination necessary to success. And indeed this prevision seems to have been true.

In addition to the comparatively small number of enthusiasts, the Russians made certain other contributions of greatest importance, which supplemented Chinese strength, amended traditional Chinese weaknesses. Among these were the power of organization, leadership, the training of the large group of indispensable secondary leaders, the furnishing of definite objectives, the formulation of these objectives into catchwords which might appeal to the masses, and a technique for arousing mass enthusiasm and antagonism. Some of these are essential to the success of any government or of any social movement; some are subject to perversion, and to use for destructive rather than constructive purposes. Both results followed; so that, from the Western point of view, there is much of good as well as much of evil in the so-called Soviet or Communist influence on China.

The Russian promises to China in a general way were confirmed by the treaty of 1924 and by the sending of advisers and

helpers. The first efforts of the Russians were directed to the furnishing of a few leaders and advisers, both in civil and military affairs. At Canton was organized the Whampoa Academy, for the training of the younger officers of the army along the lines so successfully worked out in various centers in Russia. Into these picked young men were instilled the habits of discipline, submission to military authority and devotion to the common cause, together with the idea that their first allegiance is to this common cause as represented by a political committee rather than by a military commander. In general, this idea of the subordination of the military to the civil authorities, the accompanying of every army with a political adviser, was one of the features of Soviet Russian organization which made their political scheme so powerful.

In the land of militarists of a medieval feudal character, such as China, this was a feature much to be desired. If the Soviet influence in this respect can become dominant, it will constitute a constructive factor in the upbuilding of a Chinese nationalism. The recent break between Chiang Kai Shek and the Hankow extremists, following the Nanking incident in March, 1927, had the disadvantage of establishing the more conservative Chiang as a rebel against the civilian control and has more recently (August) been followed by the withdrawal of Chiang, and the reassertion of the Committee rule. The radical wing has used this aspect of the situation to great effect and to the weakening of the conservative tendency. To many of the young enthusiasts among the students, they have made Chiang to appear as but another of the militarists.

Another constructive feature of the Soviet influence has been the use of young men for administrative purposes. In both wings of the Nationalist party, as it now exists, a very large number of young men hold important positions. In much of China, especially in the North, the old conception that only those of mature age should hold any important position still dominates. Consequently, conservatism tends to prevail; few of

the returned students, or of those specially trained, particularly among the numerous younger element, can obtain positions of authority. The younger group thus inclines to become dissatisfied, and to yield their sympathies if not their influence to the radical element. These conservative ideas tend also to preserve the old routine, the old inefficiency, the old complaisance toward formalism and corruption in office.

Emphasis on efficiency in office thus forms a third constructive feature. This is not to say that there are not many efficient officials among the northern faction, nor that many of the students trained in the West, as well as those trained locally, are not efficient and honest. But at least they are not numerous enough to control or largely to affect the operation of government or men of business. Old traditions of family, group, or party loyalty, the old idea that public office is an opportunity for private enrichment, that friends, particularly relatives, must be cared for, are all too strong for any but the most progressive, the most courageous to withstand. Then, too, the control of the militarists has been particularly corrupting, since they recognize no obligation, no right, above their personal will.

A further contribution of the Russians was that of a few revolutionary catchwords, which would crystallize political sentiment and make it effective. Realizing fully the value of slogans and the inability of the great masses to grasp principles, they set to work to create a few simple appeals to the emotions of the people which even their limited knowledge and experience would permit them to understand. Sun Yat Sen had coined the three principles, Nationalism, Democracy, Social Welfare; but they were lacking in content which the people could understand; also, the machinery to get these slogans in the mouth of the people was lacking. The students afforded the machinery and the motive power, the Russians furnished the fuel. Imperialism came to mean the British, the Japanese, the Americans, the missionaries; the unequal treaties came to mean the concessions, foreign goods protected by tariff, even foreign

education; extraterritoriality came to mean the foreigners. The unparalleled poverty, the exceedingly low standard of living and rate of wage, the suffering due to militarism, the exorbitant burdens of government due to corruption, are everywhere prevalent; it is easy to lead the uneducated masses to believe that these are all due to the presence of the foreigner and to the evils expressed in the slogans—unequal treaties, imperialism, and foreign aggression. In truth, one reason for removing the injustices and the evils for which foreigners are responsible, and which are real, is that the masses as well as the leaders may realize that the fundamental evils are so deeply seated that the removal of these restrictions, created by foreigners, is only the beginning of their obliteration. The Russian influence has done much to initiate the change. But as it will be realized that all these evils were recognized, in principle, at least, in the Washington Conference if not earlier, and that remedial efforts were then promised, it may be said that the Russian influence merely accelerated this movement. To the Chinese it is admitted that this acceleration is as yet largely "in principle."

Another of the Russian contributions is that of methods of "deepening the revolution." In this type of organized propaganda the Russians have become expert. The method of working through trained and probably paid experts has been explained in the chapter on the students. The Russians claim to follow natural and scientific as well as psychological law. The Russian "cell" is but an application of the parable of the leaven in the measure of meal. All educational institutions have experienced the influence of these new methods; very many of them have been subjected to it.

But the process is to reach further. The revolution is to be deepened, from the student class to the workers, and from the workers to the peasants. This second stage, especially in the cities of the center and south, has been reached. Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, afford evidences of this fact. It is the rebellious worker that has done in these cities what armies

could not accomplish—brought foreign trade to a standstill. No one conversant with the facts but would be forced to admit that the standard of living of the Chinese workman is incredibly low; that the standard of wage is hardly at subsistence point, even of this low standard; that there can be no improvement of general conditions in China without revolutionary changes in wages; and that ultimately these low standards of wage and of living must deleteriously affect the West. But methods of changing them have been revolutionary, to say the least; demands for doubling or tripling wages at once leave both business and private houses paralyzed; demands for three years' back pay on this basis, as have already been made, can have no result other than complete collapse. The Chinese adeptness in passive resistance produces a most effective strike; in fact, such non-coöperation becomes a "general strike," enforced by influences over which the foreigner has no control. Even in Hong Kong, British territory, the general strike has produced a paralysis in one of the world's greatest ports of trade, which has been maintained now for over two years. At any time or place or institution such a strike may be invoked, and there is no recourse, no insurance against it, and seemingly no remedy—except the complete withdrawal of the foreigner or the resort to military force.

The "deepening of the revolution" to the peasantry is another matter. Yet, despite the ignorance of the peasantry and the lack of rural wealth and of any large landholding class, the Chinese tendency to clan organization and to secret organization renders them more liable to this movement than any other people. The activities of the Red Spears, now, during the campaign of 1927, are an illustration in point. First in Honan, ever the most disturbed of provinces, then, later, in provinces along the Yangtze, these, or similar, organizations of farmers to protect themselves against the lawless military are being turned, by means of propaganda, against any of the landed gentry who may exist in their regions. A few larger

holdings of farm lands exist in many regions; the money lender who accumulates lands, or at least mortgages, exists almost everywhere. In these days of rapidly changing moral standards, it is easy to turn the wrath of the farmers from an armed enemy without any wealth to one who possesses much wealth but no arms. M. Borodin may well ask, "How can one communize poverty?" It is evident that there is not enough wealth to go around; it is also evident that the little accumulated, which is essential to the production of more, may easily be dissipated so that all are reduced to the level of the lowest. To this end the militarists are contributing most; but the deepening of the revolution to the peasants, with the consequent destruction of the old village structure based on the control of the elders, is also a most disastrous contribution.

Before closing this inventory of the good and evil of Soviet influence, an indictment of a most serious character must be made. In the attempt to undermine all forms of accepted authority, all standards of traditional ethics, the Communists have read their psychology aright in holding that, if they can break down the standards of personal restraint by an appeal to natural instincts, the rest will follow. A recent writer asks: "Who ever heard of a farmer turning Bolshevist?" The question indicates the extent to which people allow their preconceived ideas to influence their judgment of new events. Certainly in Russia many of the peasants did turn Bolshevist, as many a looted estate will bear testimony. In China, wealthy land owners are few; even well-to-do farmers are not numerous. But famine, looting soldiers, bandits preying upon unprotected rural wealth even of the most modest character, have left large areas of the countryside stripped of the very necessities of life. Such country people, victimized by any of or all these forces beyond their power, furnish ready material for propaganda. Similar to the secret organizations of peasants during the Boxer and the Tai-ping rebellions, there are now appearing, in many regions, the "Red Spears"—composed, as already shown, of

farmers organized for self-protection. Armed perhaps only with agricultural implements, perhaps with such firearms as may have been obtained from defeated, dispersed, or deserting soldiers, they have made themselves feared even by the soldiery because of their ferocious bravery.

In some regions where the Communist propaganda has been at work it has been easy to persuade the harassed population that their ills are due to their more fortunate brethren who have accumulated some land and wealth, and so to turn their wrath against the well-to-do farmer as well as against the mercenary and unpatriotic soldiery. Thus they become but another addition to the appalling number of banditry, discontented, and dislocated elements. Banditry, oftentimes, is but a seasonal employment for the hard-pressed or starving peasantry. The Communist doctrine furnishes them with a justification and an additional incentive to lawlessness and crime; thus, Communism is affecting, to some extent, the most stable class in China.

Local strikes in industries, especially factories; general strikes of all laborers in a community, or of all laborers employed by foreigners; even the excesses of mob violence may, perhaps, be condoned by the argument that only thus can the starvation rate of wage be improved. Furthermore, the fact that the city folk have means of protecting themselves from violence may afford some further justification for the stirring up of class hostility as the only means of bettering the appalling conditions of poverty among the masses. But what justification there may be for stirring up hostility against the slight accumulation of wealth on the countryside, when it involves the destruction of the social structure which has formed a substitute for central government, a basis of their religious, moral, and family customs, the medium which has held together this people for so many generations, it is difficult to see. The greatest evil which Communism is inflicting on China, and the one which the Chinese will most bitterly repent of and suffer

from the longest, is this effort to "deepen the revolution" to the peasantry.

The other evil of Communism, equally reprehensible, is the influence on the student body, later described in the chapter on Education and the Student Class. Certain religions have increased their hold upon the people by making a direct appeal to the sex instinct and its unrestricted gratification. The teachings of the Communists in their methods of appeal to the student class offer the first illustration, on a large scale, of the attempt to build up a political structure on the same appeal to unlimited license in sexual indulgence. That this appeal should be given the alleged sanction of modern biology and psychology is, of course, a perversion, though the immature student is in no sense prepared to assume this critical position. To be told that unlimited sexual indulgence is commended by modern science, by modern psychology, and by patriotism, and that any restriction upon these instincts, so easily accentuated, is only another form of the arbitrary authority which is a part of modern capitalistic society, of class control and of outworn religious doctrine, has its immediate and desired effect. When self-control, reserve, will power, obedience to higher instincts and to ethical and moral codes worked out through generations of human struggle are thus broken down, such youthful materials become putty in the hands of their manipulators; for these latter have at least read their psychology aright so far—that, these primary inhibitions having been destroyed, any other anti-social teachings are readily accepted.

While I was in Russia, testimony was given that the same methods were used in gaining control of the youth in the new Communist training centers; but I had always been somewhat skeptical of the validity of this testimony. The evidence given by Chinese educators as to what is going on in their own schools, inclining the older generation of teachers to give up in despair, is too authentic and too general to doubt. The long-run influence of these teachings is one of the greatest evils

which the Communist propaganda will have to its discredit. The outward and the mass effects of Communism are the more obvious, and therefore the more easily understood and counteracted. The more insidious ones are under cover, and, because unnatural rather than natural, produce effects which are more vague and vastly more difficult to eradicate.

That the Communist element did furnish a new vigor and push to the Nationalist movement is not to be denied. The new organization, the new leadership, the trained groups of secondary leaders or under-officers, the committee management —all contributed to this result. With their success came a growing boldness and an attempt to control the Kuomintang, which hitherto they had assisted, inspired, and advised. Success in a radical movement always inspires a greater radicalism. So it was here. As the southern army moved north, in its continuous success it was emboldened to greater extremes. In Hunan, traditionally the most radical and extreme and independent of all Chinese provinces, it found a ready welcome. Soon the extreme element was in local control, and adopted an extreme policy. Missionary schools, even the mission medical schools which have been transferred to complete Chinese control, were forced to close; government schools became centers of radical propaganda; and the constituted authorities were defied. Now, strikes are instigated; and triple wages, payment of the excess wage from one to twelve years in arrear, and control of employment by laborers, are among the demands. Foreigners are forced to leave. Practically all foreign business, at least of the powers having treaties, is closed; so are all the foreign schools; and, because of lack of financial support and of administrative control, so also are most of the native schools. Communist excesses are perpetrated in the country; and both the country and the city are subject to greater or less terrorism. The army moved further north on its victorious career; the extremists were emboldened; and a division grew up between the moderate and extreme sections

of the Nationalists. The excesses occurring in Nanking were more lamentable for the Chinese than for the foreigner. In all probability, so far as evidence is available, these excesses were deliberately staged by the extremists, since the division of the army which took possession of Nanking was a portion of the Hunan army, incorporated with the Nationalists after they had reached Changsha, the capital of Hunan. In this incident at Nanking, the consulates of England, Japan, America, were violated; English, Japanese, and American citizens were massacred; much foreign property was looted; women and children were mistreated; a general massacre of foreigners was prevented only by the barrage laid down by the American and British gunboats. This latter caused general indignation among the Chinese, and the report was spread that great numbers had been killed. Later, the truth that only a very few had been killed by the firing of the warships was established; and the casualties among the foreigners were also found to be few.

The most regrettable loss was the slaying of Dr. John E. Williams, Vice-president of Nanking University, well known for his labors among the Chinese and his great sympathy and admiration for them. While such a tragedy cannot be condoned, it is after all but an incident in a great struggle, tragically deplorable, but perhaps unavoidable when such primitive and hostile forces are let loose. No satisfactory explanation is possible—other than that it was the brutal act of an irresponsible soldier, armed with the destructive forces of death and taught to use them. In this connection it may be well to quote the recent remark of General Gallin, the Russian adviser to the Nationalist Army, that "the Nationalist soldiers are now as well trained in the modern efficient methods of causing death as are the soldiers of any European power."

Lamentable in any construction which may be placed upon it, this Nanking irruption precipitated a crisis among both the foreigners and the Chinese. Among the Chinese it caused the split between the conservative and the radical wings of

the Nationalist army and group. The radicals, on whom the responsibility for these excesses was placed, remained in control of Hankow. While they possessed very little military strength, through prolonged negotiation they were able to obtain the support of the Christian General Feng Yu Hsiang and later to force the withdrawal of Chiang Kai Shek. The weeks and months of the present summer have been devoted to the endless complication of negotiations to which Chinese factions are so much given, in the effort to unite all the factions of China in a Nationalist policy.

Another major incident in the aftermath of the Nanking incident was the forcible search of the Soviet quarters in Peking adjoining the legation. Effort was made to have this appear as a violation of the embassy. This it was not, as the quarters searched were immediately adjoining the legation itself, in the general section of the city assigned to foreign legations and hence called "legation quarters." The search was conducted by the Chinese authorities for the purpose of discovering noted Chinese Communists, as was actually done. In addition there was discovered a mass of evidence showing the undoubted extent of Communist propaganda and plots, involving even the Philippines, and some—though perhaps inconclusive—evidence of plans for an uprising in Peking similar to that in Nanking, to occur shortly after the search was made.

The Chinese being greatly influenced by prestige, and much of the success of the Communist propaganda being due to the success of the Russian Ambassador, Karakhan, in bringing about the treaty between China and Russia in 1924, in gaining possession of the old Russian embassy, in becoming head of all the foreign diplomats in virtue of being made an Ambassador, and in conducting the propaganda, so distasteful to the foreign powers, from their very midst in Peking and under forms which they were forced to recognize, the effectiveness of this search by Chinese authority pricked the bubble of presumed Russian infallibility

and invulnerability. The loss in prestige by the Russians was far more significant than any direct evidence which was found.

This discussion of the Russian influence should not be closed without a word about one other of these able representatives—Borodin. Combination of philosopher and man of action, unaffected and sympathetic in manner, forceful in personality, many if not most of his expressed views command assent by the unbiased observer by their reasonableness and their penetrating insight into Chinese affairs. He disclaims the possibility or the desire of introducing Communism into China. He has said, as recently as June, 1927: "China is a country which is itself backward; a country where we must make up for much lost time during which other nations have pushed forward. We must first provide such elemental things as good government, honesty of administration, safety of life and property, roads, harbors. People who have not seen China cannot realize how elemental are some of our first tasks. . . . Our program is and has been the program of the Kuomintang. This is not a Communistic program. It is a program so moderate as to seem almost backward when compared with the program of many 'Capitalistic' governments operating in countries which are further advanced."

To the first of these statements almost any foreign "die-hard" in China would subscribe; to the remainder of it almost any unbiased observer, whose views are not bound up by the fear of financial loss, would likewise agree. But at the same time—in fact, in the same newspaper that published this statement—there appeared the categorical statement from Moscow: "(1) Land questions in villages should be settled by a poor peasants' soviet, and authority should be vested in the tenants and the peasants' soviet. (2) Communist influence in towns should be extended by arming laborers and peasants. (3) The plenary session of the central executive community upholds the policy pursued by the Hankow government and Nationalist party for bringing the laborers' and peasants' revolution to a

successful consummation." Yet Borodin is a representative of this Moscow group and the influential adviser, not to say dictator, of the Hankow section of the Nationalist party. The two policies are irreconcilable.

As in most human affairs, so in the Russian or Soviet influence in China; there is a mixture of good and evil—a contradictory and apparently irreconcilable combination.

To complete a thing, a hundred years is not sufficient; to destroy, one day is more than enough.

One should not blacken the whole page with one stroke of the pen.

—*Chinese proverbs*

CHAPTER IX

AMERICAN POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO CHINA

THAT the "Open Door" policy in China and the Monroe Doctrine for the Western Continent are the only two fixed principles in the foreign relations of the United States, and that all else is opportunism, is a statement frequently made. That a consistent policy with regard to the Far East, especially China, has been followed by the United States is true, and it is quite important at the present juncture that the American people should be aware of it. But in the discussion of this question another principle is also of importance.

A truth that should always be borne in mind in the discussion of international policies is this: that people *en masse* or in their organized forms of governments, as well as individuals, are moved primarily by self-interest. But that such self-interest, when enlightened, may also be the interest of other countries is a truth no less significant.

America's interest in China was and is primarily economic —the desire for the exchange of commodities, advantageous to both countries. The important fact to notice—and the fact that has distinguished her policy from that of most other foreign countries—is that America has always believed and acted on the belief that her economic interests would be better furthered by people independent in their government and in their relations with foreign countries, and strong in their own government and efficient in trade. That the American trade with China and the Far East in general developed immediately after political independence had been gained and grew out of the conditions resulting from the prolonged revolutionary struggle, was undoubtedly responsible for this attitude when first taken. The Napoleonic wars first stimulated and then, as they culminated for the United States in the War of 1812,

hampered trade; both stimulus and restriction reinforcing the conviction that America's economic interests lay with independent and strong peoples in the Far East.

The famous "Open Door Policy," in this light, ceases to be a purely altruistic policy put forward by the American government in the later nineteenth century; on the contrary, it becomes—as indeed it always has been—a policy of enlightened self-interest, pursued from the earliest days of American trade immediately following the American Revolution. In fact—as is pointed out by Tyler Dennett in his *Americans in Eastern Asia,* the outstanding authoritative work on this subject—the policy was first clearly stated by the Chinese in their own self-interest. In the treaty of 1843 with the English, the Chinese text of the treaty inserted the following statement:

> Formerly the merchants of every foreign nation were permitted to trade at the single port of Canton only, but last year it was agreed at Nanking that if the Emperor should ratify the treaty, the merchants of the various nations of Europe should be allowed to proceed to the four ports of Foochow, Ningpo, Amoy and Shanghai for the purposes of trade, to which the English were not to make any objections.

Thus the principle of equality of trade privileges, for which the English have been given or have claimed credit; the "open door" policy, for which the Americans, at a much later date, have been given or have claimed credit; and the policy of "the favored nation clause"—which the Americans were supposed to have inserted in their own treaty of 1847, following the first treaty of the English (1842), but which the American admiral (Kearney) had given earlier statement—really find their first formulation in this statement of the Chinese. At the present time the Chinese are strenuously objecting to this "favored-nation clause." As with the American "Open Door Policy," so this equality of treatment of all the foreign powers is first stated by the Chinese in their own interest; and, in fact, this situation but repeats that of America and the "Open Door."

A nation's best interest in the long run, is found in the best interest of other nations. At least, if such a generalization be challenged, this is true of the relations between the United States and China. Furthermore, mutual and enlightened self-interest forms a much more lasting and substantial basis for international welfare and good will than do sentiment and emotion, regardless of their high quality. To clarify and to make helpful America's present attitude to China, this statement cannot be too highly emphasized.

From the days of the earliest trading, America has merely sought in China the same privilege of trade enjoyed by any other nation. This desire, when looked at from the point of view of the Chinese, becomes the "most favored-nation" principle, against which China now so vigorously protests because of its subsequent abuse. When viewed from the standpoint of other foreign powers, it becomes the "Open Door Policy," which ran counter to the special interests of some upon occasions when they were forcing territorial or other specific favors from China. The Open Door policy meant that America preferred that China keep her own door open, but on terms of equality for all nations.

The chief problem in America's dealing with China is whether the equality of treatment was to be gained in coöperation with the European powers or in coöperation with China. Up to the time of the first treaty, good relations depended upon harmonious coöperation with China. Since the treaties of 1842-44, for the most part there has been coöperation with the powers; which, for the most part also, has been beneficial to China as well as to the United States. At times, as when Secretary Hay reaffirmed the Open Door policy, a non-coöperative policy was necessary on the part of the United States, whose interests as well as China's were jeopardized by the threatened break-up of China. The question is now raised by many, whether the non-coöperative policy is not again the more advantageous, both for China and for America. Even if it should

be so decided, it is to be noted that the change is not so much in regard to our relation with China as to our relations with the other powers. This can best be judged in the light of previous experience. At the expense of some repetition it seems desirable to make a brief summary of America's relation with China.

DURING THE PRE-TREATY DAYS

During the earliest period, from the close of the American Revolution to the first treaty of 1844, the American government gave no instructions to its occasional consular representatives. The American merchants engaged in the China trade did not desire the government to intervene, and looked upon the presence of an occasional warship as a menace rather than a benefit. Relations for more than half a century were wholly in the hands of the merchants themselves, unprotected for the most part by any government representative or representation, and having no treaty right whatever. Yet America's trade with China prospered then as perhaps never since; and on the whole the Americans were on as good terms with the Chinese as at any later time. The remarkable thing to note, in consideration of the present cry of the business men for protection, is that for this half-century, when they were left alone, they prospered most. This policy, despite exactions and corruptions of the Chinese authorities, and frequently lawlessness on the part of American sailors or merchants, was grounded upon the mutual interests and the good will of trade; and these were sufficient to maintain a working basis for over half a century.

Accounts of early American shipping days have been many and popular during the past few years. Numerous books and magazine articles have made the details of the early maritime achievements of the Americans well known to the present generation. To a large extent these maritime ventures were connected with the trade with the Far East. Upon that trade many of the most substantial fortunes of Boston, Philadelphia,

and New York are founded. Besides these ports, Albany, Salem, Providence, and other minor Massachusetts and Long Island ports, Baltimore, and Norfolk participated. This trade sprang up immediately after the close of the Revolutionary War, due to the fact that there were idle ships and sailors from the Revolutionary privateersmen, a market for tea and perhaps other goods, and a desperate need on the part of the young nation for any activity which would improve her economic welfare. The trade developed first as a merchandise trade but later as a carrying trade, in which New England especially participated. The size of the vessels used was as remarkable as other characteristics. Many of them were under one hundred tons burden and employed less than a dozen men in the crew. One was of fifty-five tons only, and made the voyage with a crew of seven men and two boys. That these smaller vessels sailed from Albany or some similar port may furnish a partial explanation of their size. But the American trade could compete with the British, largely because of the smaller size and the greatly reduced expense both of investment and of operation of the American ships. In fact, they were able to compete in India, as well as at Canton, with the great East India Company itself. The commerce was not with China alone, but—especially when the carrying trade developed—often involved European and particularly Mediterranean ports, South America, the Northwestern coast of America, India, and the East Indian Isles.

From China these ships brought tea chiefly, with silks, china-ware, and cotton goods; from the East Indies, spices; from India, cotton goods. The West, especially America, had little to furnish the East; the Orient, not the West, was at that time self-sustaining. In contrast with the present, when the conditions are reversed, this situation will furnish some explanation of the reversal of attitudes in East and West. For a while Americans found the fur trade profitable, but after the early generation this ran out. It had begun by chance, with a

cargo of seal-skins, in 1788. It died out before 1830 with the disappearance of the seal and the greater importance of the European market. Meanwhile, this trade had taken Americans to almost every island of the Pacific, to many of which we might have laid claim by right of discovery. Later on the ice trade to India flourished. While there was some demand for a mixed cargo, picked up at various ports, the import of bullion was the only way to balance trade. China was a great consumer of silver. But soon a far more profitable article of trade was found in opium.

The importation of opium was forbidden by the Chinese government from 1800, for by that time not only was the demoralizing effect of the drug upon the population evident but instead of foreign trade bringing a steady inflow of silver, as it had earlier, now silver was steadily withdrawn, in addition to the articles of produce, to satisfy the demand for opium. Opium smuggling, in which the Chinese officials connived, replaced the legitimate trade; the government received no revenue, and the increased price but increased the economic drain and the inducement to smuggle. While this trade was chiefly in the hands of the English, especially of the East India Company, Americans also participated; and although American consular officials, naval officers, and the more responsible merchants all opposed the trade, they were powerless with reference to their own nationals, as were also the Chinese. Owing to their smaller vessels, the Americans especially participated in the local carrying trade—that is, smuggling. While during the earlier years of the legitimate trade Americans had imported opium chiefly from Smyrna, now they acted chiefly as transfer vessels between the larger English vessels and the Chinese customers, often officials. Mr. Dennett estimates that the American share in the opium trade was about ten per cent, and that this also constituted about ten per cent of America's entire trade with China. At the time of the culmination of the difficulties which led to the Opium War with England,

Americans owned about 1,540 of the 20,283 chests of opium which were destroyed by the Chinese commissioner, thus precipitating the war.

With the formulation of the first treaty between the United States and China, the provisions of which were drawn up by America's representative, Caleb Cushing, the American government agreed not to extend the newly-gained right of extraterritoriality to any American engaged in any way in the opium trade, but to hand him over to the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities. But America had little if any control of her nationals in China, and the participation of individual Americans in the outlawed trade continued—as it has intermittently to the present day. (This year, 1927, has witnessed the conviction of a minor American consular official for opium smuggling.) The difference between American and English responsibility for the trade is first, that of a much smaller interest, and second, that the American government and its officials have always used their influence and authority against the opium trade.

The relation of American traders to their own government, to China, and to the foreign powers during this period needs a word of explanation. Soon after the trade began, the French Revolution took the small French trade interests away; and shortly after the Napoleonic wars terminated, the Dutch and other Continental trade also; and it greatly curtailed the trade of the British. American trade profited greatly by all this. Through this situation it became a carrying trade with Europe rather than a strictly merchandise trade with America. Following the close of the Napoleonic contest and the War of 1812, while the trade greatly flourished for a few years, with the revival of British interests, the disappearance of the fur trade and the passing of American business into the hands of a few large firms, the importance of the Chinese trade greatly decreased for a generation.

Throughout the period of the first half-century to that of

the Opium War (1839-42), American traders depended wholly upon the private adjustments they might make with the Chinese. They were unprotected and also uncontrolled by a powerful trading monopoly, as were the English until 1833, when the East India Company's monopoly in China was dissolved. Though Colonel Shaw, the supercargo of the first American voyage, was later made consul, and other consuls succeeded him, their residence in Canton was intermittent, they received no salary from the government, their fees never exceeded $500 a year, and they had no actual authority over their nationals, as had the consular representatives of European countries. American individualism, often lawlessness, ruled in the contacts with the Chinese. But, as is shown by correspondence and petitions to the American government, the Americans in China greatly preferred this freedom to the occasional protection of a war vessel, against which they protested, or to the protection or authority of a consul, which they ignored. At times they appealed for protection to Chinese authorities against the action of the British, both before and during the War of 1812. Imprisonment of seamen by the British occurred before the war, as did the employment of deserters by the Americans, and even the issue of questionable papers of citizenship. As a matter of fact, international procedure—even between Western powers—was not then very clearly developed; that with China, not at all. It was a period of privateersmen in war, with easy transition either way. The Americans came with the pioneer spirit, and sometimes with frontiersmen morals, owing allegiance to a government with little foreign experience and no foreign policy, and scarcely concerned at all with Oriental relations.

The American policy ultimately shaped itself with reference to the pursuit of trade, adjustment to Chinese conditions, no use of force against the Chinese, but conciliation at all points; demanding only one thing—treatment as a nation equal to that accorded any other.

With the opium incident which precipitated the war, Americans had little to do, as the opium in possession of Americans had been surrendered to the British Commission. The demands of the Chinese Commissioner seem at the present to be entirely just. Upon refusal to surrender the opium, foreigners, both British and American, were imprisoned—that is, besieged—in the factories of hongs. The American consul agreed to engage that American merchants would not thereafter participate in the trade, an engagement which he had no power to carry out. The American merchants refused to evacuate to Macao with the British in order to compel the Chinese to capitulate, and requested the admiral commanding the American fleet not to use force or to come to their rescue, though somewhat earlier they had petitioned Congress for the presence of the fleet and a Commissioner. Petitions to Congress from merchants engaged in Chinese trade approved the sending of the fleet to suppress pirates, but opposed any use of force against the Chinese. "The result of more than one attempt of our British neighbors to improve their position with the Chinese has been, upon each occasion, the imposition of further restraint upon all foreigners; and such, we believe, would follow any negotiations on the part of Americans based upon the established usages among other nations." So ran their petition. This is one of the earliest clear statements of the difference between the American policy and that of other countries in dealing with China. The principle was fully observed in the negotiations which followed; and accorded, with slight exceptions, with the policy of the American trader during the preceding half century.

To repeat, these principles were: maintenance of trade relations of mutual benefit; accommodation to Chinese customs and desires; no use of force; recognition of Chinese authority; demand for most favored treatment guaranteed to any other nation.

EARLY TREATIES AND FORMULATION OF THE AMERICAN POLICY

America's treaty relations with China began in 1844. The American merchants residing in China protested against a treaty. "As Americans we are now on the very best terms possible with the Chinese; and as the only connection we want with China is a commercial one, I cannot see what Mr. Cushing expects to do. He cannot make us better off and we may lose all the advantages we now have over the English," wrote one. The Chinese Imperial Commissioner called attention to the fact that the Chinese government had extended all the trade privileges of the English treaties to other nationals, and as all the Americans asked was that they receive the promise of the same treatment as the most favored nation, why should they have a treaty? But the American plenipotentiary, Caleb Cushing, was determined on treaty recognition of America—not only as equal with other nations but also as an equal of China, and he succeeded in giving the first clear formulation of the American policy.

The American Commissioner had the advantage of the English experience and of their two treaties and the subsequent trade agreement, also that of the good will of the Chinese toward the Americans, also that of the shrewd ability of a New England lawyer. The result was that the treaty drawn practically established the type of regulations which prevailed until the next period of warfare (1857-60) and even thereafter. Embodying the principles which yet form the groundwork of American and Chinese relations, they are marked by fairness to China. England's privileges had been gained by resort to arms, signed under compulsion, and guaranteed by a session of territory. Cushing worked out the principle of extraterritoriality, by which personal jurisdiction was substituted for territorial, thus protecting China from any further diminution of territory on grounds other than mere might. Chinese prestige was protected in that these grants were a substitute for the

ordinary laws and rules of international intercourse concerning legations, consuls, etc., which China did not recognize. The advantages which Britain gained by the cession of territory and the building up of the port of Hong Kong, Cushing gained by a series of detailed regulations of trade. It is often charged that America then began the policy she has since pursued, of taking shelter under English protection and profiting by her wars. To this two answers may be made: first, that England was glad immediately to take advantage of the privileges and the clearer definition of foreign rights secured by Cushing's ability; and second, that at any time since—including the present—she has been privileged to take shelter under the American policy of building up trade by making the Chinese as strong as possible, and in charge of their own doorways. In pursuit of this policy, the American treaty made the Chinese officials responsible for the customs collections and similar regulations, whereas the English treaties had left these with the foreigner as a constant source of trouble. With regard to the opium difficulty, and violation of the treaties in general, the American treaty provided in no equivocal terms for subjects which had been evaded or omitted altogether from other treaties:

> Citizens of the United States who shall attempt to trade clandestinely with such of the ports of China as are not open to foreign commerce, or shall trade in opium or any other contraband article of merchandise, shall be subject to be dealt with by the Chinese government without being entitled to any countenance or protection from that of the United States.

It cannot be claimed that this provision actually prevented the smuggling of opium, for the American government had now washed its hands of responsibility; and the Chinese authorities, with whom responsibility now lay, were either undesirous of disturbing the illicit trade or unable to do so.

The difficulties arising from this situation were greater in regard to other matters. The English treaties had provided for

concessions which were direct encroachments on Chinese territory and sovereignty. The American treaty provided, with reference to residences, cemeteries, churches, and hospitals, that, "The local authorities for the two governments shall select in concert sites for the foregoing objects, having due regard for the feelings of the people in the location thereof." While this principle protected Chinese sovereignty, many difficulties occurred in its application; and American citizens, aside from the missionaries in the interior, have generally availed themselves of the residential protection found in the English or other foreign concessions.

While the American government, through its political system, was little better prepared than the Chinese to carry out these principles, yet the foundation of a national policy had been well laid. The principles of the English treaties were along the well-tried lines of European policies in dealing with Oriental African or subject peoples. The principles of the American treaties were shaped in the light of the revolutionary struggle with England and of the principles of the European system as applied during the long Napoleonic struggles. Moreover, the principles of the Declaration of Independence were yet vital forces. Furthermore, traders had long evidenced that Americans were less troubled with race prejudices than were the Europeans, approaching China through India and the East Indies. The principle of the "most favored nation" treatment had, however, been vindicated—without any diminution of Chinese sovereignty further than that involved in the definition of rights or privileges already granted.

During the two decades that elapsed between the two treaty-making periods (1840-1860), the Far Eastern situation became a political or international problem for America; American officials assumed a prominent rôle in events; and a new phase of the American policy was clearly defined. During this period European governments were confronted with revolutionary movements; England and France later engaged in the

Crimean war with Russia; England and America had come near to a break over the Oregon and Nicaraguan questions. America was involved in the dispute over slavery; none of the powers were desirous of a conflict among themselves over China; so in order to form a common policy, a spirit of compromise prevailed. To understand the events of this period some additional factors should be kept in mind. Owing either to the inability or the disinclination of the Chinese authorities, the early treaties with China had not worked out well, and Britain had not attained the benefits she had anticipated. America had expanded to the Pacific Coast, had assumed the physical outline she now possesses, and had come directly into contact with the Pacific problem. The overflow of human drift material from the California gold rush put a large element of unruly and lawless foreigners, especially Americans, in the China ports; steam communication by land and sea was being developed. The clipper ship era began about 1840, and these speedy sailers were only replaced by the steamship; thus China had been brought nearer by more than half the voyage. Above all, China suffered a revolution, the Tai-ping Rebellion, which threatened her destruction.

Most of the issues which the new American representatives faced in China were with the European powers—particularly Great Britain—rather than with China herself. The first of these were over the concessions, especially Shanghai, and involved the question whether they should belong exclusively to the single foreign power, or whether American nationals might reside in them under the rights guaranteed by the treaty with China of 1844. Successive American consuls and commissioners fought this out with the British representatives from 1845 to 1855 and established the following points, all of which were controverted at first by the British position. That other foreign nationals might acquire and hold property in the concessions granted to the British or French; that while the municipal government might be British or international, sovereignty

was Chinese; that titles could be conferred by the Chinese, and taxes (though remaining nominal) should be paid to Chinese authorities; that Chinese nationals might reside and own property in the concessions. Subsequently it was recognized that the establishment of these principles had much to do with the growth of Shanghai into a great international city; also that it was thus prevented from becoming a British possession not greatly differing from Hong Kong.

The second series of important events had to do with the Tai-ping Rebellion (1850-64), which threatened the dissolution of China. When the rebels had taken the Yangtze valley, set up a new kingdom in Nanking, and taken Shanghai, with the departure of the Imperial officials from Shanghai there were no authorities to collect customs. The British advocated a policy of no custom duties and of making Shanghai a free port, such as Hong Kong. While the American merchants also favored this policy, the American Commissioner insisted on the payment of duties, even at the expense of stopping trade. The outcome was the setting up of the customs machinery under a foreign staff. This staff was later taken over by the Imperial government, as its own officials and the revenues remaining above the expense were later turned over to the Imperial government.

Much popular sympathy for the Tai-ping rebels existed both in the United States and in England. The main objectives of the rebellion had been the expulsion of the corrupt Manchu régime. Had the rebels remained free from the excesses and excrescent growths in which any revolutionary movement in China is bound to result, the outcome might have been different. However, due largely to the independent action of clear-sighted representatives, the American official position—differing, as it did, not only from the British but from that of the local American merchants and the popular view at home—came to prevail. This policy and the reasons for it are clearly stated by the American Commissioner, Humphrey Marshall:

It is my opinion that the highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China, maintaining order here, and gradually engrafting on that worn-out stock the healthy principles which give life and health to governments, rather than to see China become the theatre of widespread anarchy and ultimately the prey of European ambition.

Marshall feared a partitioning of China between Russia and Great Britain. The enfeebled and helpless Imperial government had appealed to Russia for aid, which had been promised. Britain had changed her attitude of hostility to the Tai-ping rebels and was now coming to an understanding with them by which she might become a protecting power and receive a monopoly of the Yangtze River trade.

The wisdom of this policy of Marshall's, and its opportuneness even in the present situation in China, is indicated in other sentences from the same report:

I think that almost any sacrifice should be made by the United States to keep Russia from spreading her Pacific boundary and to avoid her coming directly to interference in Chinese domestic affairs; for China is like a lamb before the shearers, as easy a conquest as were the provinces of India. Whenever the avarice or ambition of Russia or Great Britain shall tempt them to take the prizes, the fate of Asia will be sealed; and the future Chinese relations with the United States may be considered as closed for ages unless now the United States shall foil the untoward result by adopting a strong policy.

This was in 1853. The weakening of the Tai-ping forces; the impending Crimean War, involving the European powers most interested in China; the demand of the merchants for trade under almost any settled condition; the insight and persistence of Marshall and his successors, brought success to his contentions. The rebellion was put down finally, with some aid from these very powers; the integrity of China and of her government was preserved. The second principle of America's policy in China was now clearly stated and indicated: that the best interests of America are to be obtained through a strong

Chinese government; through recognition of its sovereignty, through the preservation of its integrity either against internal disintegration or aggression from outside.

In the light of popular sentiment in America at the present time, a clear understanding of this fundamental principle of American policy is most important. Also, in the light of the expressed views of the American business community in China, and of the attitude of some American officials, should Marshall's reply to the demands of the Shanghai merchants against his policy be read:

> It is my purpose to perform punctiliously every obligation assumed by the United States under the treaty, and to refrain from embarrassing the public administration of Chinese affairs by throwing unnecessary obstacles in the way. No precedent, no example furnished by other powers, will induce me to forego the faithful and honest execution of our plain international obligations.

In addition to the main principle, two minor aspects of policy were reasserted: sympathetic tolerance of Chinese conditions; honorable fulfillment of all national obligations. To these were now to be added the clarification of one other principle.

The instructions to the new American Commissioner (1854) recommended coöperation with the other foreign powers; and as this policy was developed in succeeding years, it completed the main principles of America's policy in the Orient. Commissioner McLane was able to effect a settlement of the Shanghai customs dispute with the plan of a foreign inspector and a native and foreign staff selected with the inspector's approval, appointed by Chinese authority and not by the foreign consuls, as had been advocated. The plan adopted has given satisfaction to the present time. In pursuit of the same policy the American Commissioner took the initiative in calling for the redrafting of the treaties, now due after the lapse of the specified twelve-year period, and proceeded with the

British and French representatives to Tientsin. Upon refusal of the Imperial representatives to receive them, they approved a coöperative military effort. This recommendation was disapproved by the American government, but before the disapproval reached him, the Commissioner had left China on account of ill health. The solution of the customs difficulty at Shanghai was adopted in the new treaties for all China, and was one of the first fruits of the American coöperative policy.

Meanwhile, in this same year (1854), Commodore Perry succeeded in opening up Japan to foreign trade, and pushed his policy of aggressive acquisition of land and political rights in the Orient. American prestige had been enhanced in the eyes of the Europeans by these aggressive acts, and by the attempt of one Commissioner to follow out Perry's scheme for the annexation of Formosa and other islands. A new administration at home and a new Commissioner in China (1857) put a sudden end to any such territorial ambitions and to any participation in a coöperative policy such as was then contemplated. The policy of coöperation was not to be at the expense of the other principles of policy already established. However, the policy of coöperation was soon to bear other fruits.

Britain and France were determined to use force to bring about a satisfactory condition in China. The Crimean War was over, and the Allies took up the China problem together. The first American Minister-plenipotentiary, sent out by the Buchanan administration in 1857, was instructed to coöperate, but not to participate in any use of force. Giving moral sanction to the action, the American representative accompanied the British and French in their attack on Taku and Tientsin and on their progress to Peking; gave assent to the British demands, which were much harsher than his own; and under the favored nation clause profited greatly by the very harsh British terms, which were thereby substituted for the provisions of the American treaty, signed but eight days previously. By this British treaty of Tientsin, the foreign nations were to be permanently

represented at Peking by diplomats, though the Chinese feared that on account of the rebellion still in progress this concession might cause the overthrow of the dynasty; many new treaty ports were opened up; the Yangtze and coastal trade was opened to the foreigner; a new tariff schedule was guaranteed, with the abolition of local dues; and the opium trade was legalized, thus bringing to a successful conclusion the British contention begun in 1839. To this latter the American representative agreed—though against his instructions from the home government—on the grounds that the legalization would be far better than the open violation of previous treaties by American traders who participated most extensively in the smuggling trade and even in internal distribution of the drug, with no restraint whatever from the American government, which had no means for enforcing any authority over its nationals in China.

The first fruits of the policy of coöperation were: the loss of that leadership in the China situation which America had assumed between 1844 and 1858; the assumption of the dominant leadership in Eastern affairs by Great Britain; the establishment of this British treaty of Tientsin of 1858 as the basis for all foreign contacts with China; the complete decline of America's political interest in China for more than a generation. The chief gain was a general recognition of the more friendly attitude of America toward China, as revealed particularly in the events of the preceding few years as well as in the treaty of Tientsin itself. In the eyes of the English, and probably of all foreigners, the Americans had suddenly fallen from their previous high estate to one of complete ignominy.

This position was somewhat relieved by the one bright spot in this period—the famous "blood is thicker than water" incident, though quite in contradiction to the entire spirit of American policy in China. In going to Peking in 1859 to exchange ratifications of the treaties, the new American Minister found himself, in company with the French and British,

at sea before Tientsin, as had his predecessor just a year before. The British and French were now bent on a punitive war. The forts at Taku had been rebuilt, and proved much stronger than the British anticipated. Owing to an adverse tide, the unexpected strength of the opposition and the wounding of the British commander, the conflict was going against the British through their inability to get some of their crafts into action. The Commander of the United States frigate *Powhatan,* Commodore Tatnall, placing the American Minister adrift in a barge so as not to create too great international complications, exclaimed: "Blood is thicker than water. I'll be damned if I stand by and see white men butchered before my eyes!"—and towed the British barges into action.

However, the Americans refrained from further participation, and the third gain of the reversal of policy was that we did not participate in the indefensible war of 1860, or in the even less defensible punitive destruction of the Winter Palace which followed.

CHINA BECOMES A PART OF THE PACIFIC PROBLEM

The Civil War in America now fully occupied the attention and energies of the people; yet, due to two great personalities, this period is one of great importance in Sino-American relations. Anson Burlingame served as Minister to China from 1861 to 1867—the longest term, as yet, of any American representative. William H. Seward, Secretary of State throughout that period, had great visions of America's developing power in the Pacific area and a strong program for carrying out these visions. So far as China was concerned, no new principles were involved, but a reformulation and a strong statement of these policies resulted. As with previous representatives during the preceding decade, Burlingame was instructed to coöperate with the other powers; in addition, he personally favored this policy by disposition and by his thorough grasp of the situation. Finding the representatives of the other powers favorable to

his general proposition, his strong personality enabled him to push through a program which involved the clear recognition of the sovereignty of China over the concessions and treaty ports, which had been gradually ignored in the eyes of the foreign residents, assistance to the Imperial government in putting down the Tai-ping Rebellion, and, in general, the substitution of diplomatic action for force.

After six years of service Mr. Burlingame resigned to accept the headship of a Chinese governmental Mission to America and to Europe. The tour of this Mission through the United States in 1868 resulted in the first general education of the American public in Chinese affairs. There also resulted the so-called "Burlingame treaty" of 1868, drawn up by Secretary Seward. While merely supplementary to the treaty of Tientsin, the document was rather a fervent statement of America's attitude toward China and her interpretation of previous treaties than a diplomatic agreement. The provisions for toleration of religious beliefs and practices, for establishing and maintaining schools, for rights of residence and travel, were made reciprocal. The treaty disapproved of any commercial exploitation of China that involved the use of force, and stated in most uncompromising form the full sovereignty of China, notwithstanding the seeming infringements through the concessions and extraterritorial rights. Here was the first popular formulation of the full American program, the outgrowth of a campaign of popular education with no commercial interests directly involved and no show of force whatever; namely, the preservation of the sovereignty and integrity of China; the equality of privileges and treatment of all nations in China; disavowal of the use of force and proffered coöperation with other powers in this program.

Burlingame proceeded to England, where, with the change of ministry from Palmerston to Gladstone, he found a favorable attitude toward his program. It should be noted here that England had fully carried out her policy of force, and had

learned that there was nothing further to be gained except by a policy of conciliation and of coöperation. The Continental powers, not having achieved a similar position, were not so cordial. However, the program was never fully considered; for Burlingame died of pneumonia in St. Petersburg while urging his plans on the Russian government.

In view of present conditions, Mr. Burlingame's own statement of the achievements of his treaty is worthy of record. The meaning of these articles was explained by Burlingame:

> In the first place, it declares the neutrality of the Chinese waters in opposition to the pretensions of the extraterritoriality doctrine, that inasmuch as the persons and the property of the people of the foreign powers were under the jurisdiction of those powers, therefore it was the right of parties contending with each other to attack each other in the Chinese waters, thus making those waters the place of their conflict. The treaty traverses all such absurd pretensions. It strikes down the so-called concession doctrines, under which the nationals of different countries located upon spots of land in the treaty ports had come to believe that they could take jurisdiction there not only of their own nationals, not only of the person and property of their own people, but take jurisdiction of the Chinese and the people of other countries. When this question was called under discussion and referred to the home governments, not by the Chinese originally, but by those foreign nations who felt that their treaty rights were being abridged by these concession doctrines, the distant foreign countries could not stand the discussion for a moment. And I aver that every treaty power had abandoned the concession doctrines, though some of their officials at the present time in China undertake to contend for them, undertake to expel the Chinese, to attack the Chinese, to protect the Chinese, although the territory did not belong to them. China has never abandoned her eminent domain, never abandoned on that territory her jurisdiction, and I trust she never will.[1]

Other aspects of Seward's Pacific-area program must now be mentioned. In 1867 the Alaska Purchase removed the menace of a Russian force on the American continent, and—as Seward thought—founded coaling stations and outposts on the

[1] Quoted by Tyler Dennett in *Americans in Eastern Asia*, pp. 382-83.

way to Asia. A policy of coercion toward Japan, less tolerant than that adopted toward China, had opened up commercial and political relations with that closed empire. The annexation of the Sandwich Islands was urged; a coöperative policy of force in the opening up of Korea was approved. Seward was a whole-hearted expansionist, and the most prominent as well as the first great advocate of the "Pacific destiny" of the United States. But most of the features of his policy awaited a future day for realization, while his China policy revealed no new principle. Meanwhile, a new phase of America's relation to China had developed.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA BECOME AN AMERICAN DOMESTIC PROBLEM

The "Coolie trade" had grown up in the West Indies, Panama, some South American countries, Hawaii, and the Straits Settlement—wherever cheap labor was demanded. While carried on in the form of contract labor, with a Chinese as contractor, yet in many respects the trade differed little from the old slave trade. American shipping had engaged in it. True, conditions under the American flag were far better than under the Portuguese and other flags which also profited by this evil business. The death-rate on the voyages was held around ten per cent rather than around thirty-eight per cent, as with the Portuguese. But the entire business was so offensive that Congress prohibited the trade under the American flag in 1862, as England had done some years earlier.

The same year that the Burlingame treaty was made, Chinese immigration became a political problem in California and served as an issue upon which to elect a state government, opposite in political sympathy to the national administration. From that time until the close of the century the subject of Chinese immigration became the one outstanding feature of the relation between China and the United States and an important domestic political problem, especially as related to

the Pacific coast. Nor was the issue always confined to political discussion. Violent treatment was often visited upon the helpless Chinese immigrants. Though they had done much of the rough labor in the gold-digging period, and had furnished nine tenths of the labor in the final stages of the first transcontinental railway construction, with the industrial depression of the seventies the prejudice against cheap labor became most violent. Opposition against coolie labor culminated in the agitation of Dennis Kearney and the sand-lot meetings in San Francisco; in several places, then and later, Chinese fell victims to the rage of mobs; and America in turn became obligated to China for indemnities for the loss of life of peaceful foreign nationals. To be noted also is the fact that for dilatoriness, evasion, and lack of frank and friendly dealing in the settlement of these indemnities, the record of the American government was little better than that of the dying monarchy of the Manchus. Nor, indeed, was the record of the government in observing treaties solemnly made, or in breaking these treaties without consent of the other party, or in using the relation of the government to a friendly foreign power as a mere matter of internal political consideration, any better than that of the Chinese government. The whole record for the last three decades of the nineteenth century is little better, looked at from the abstract, than that of the Manchu government.

Even President Cleveland did not hesitate to sign a bill on the eve of his second candidacy—wholly out of considerations of political expediency for his party—which violated treaty agreements with China without consent or as much as giving notice. For those who had laid so much stress upon the lack of good faith of the Manchu officials, struggling for existence, some humility is due if the records of the ninth and tenth decades of the nineteenth century in America's dealings with Chinese immigrants are kept in mind. The Chinese government and well-informed Chinese do keep this unfortunate experience as a memory. The Chinese, as a people, were no

more anti-foreign then, or even now, than Americans, as a people, were anti-Chinese during the period of labor agitation. The Burlingame treaty was modified in 1880 to provide for the change in temper of the American public, and again in 1888 as well as in 1894, the conjunctions with presidential or Congressional elections being significant. Evasions or direct violation of previous treaties continued until, finally, complete exclusion was provided by law. During most of the Harrison administration, following the bad faith of the previous one, friendly relations between the governments practically ceased. The Sino-Japanese War now occurred, and America's sympathies were thrown toward Japan for this—and for many years afterwards; until the menace of Japanese immigration, and the vision of a military menace conjured up in the minds of many, again turned American sympathies in a general way from the Japanese and toward the Chinese.

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY REVIVED

During all of this period—from the Civil War to 1895—America's relations with China were viewed as a domestic problem, and handled in complete isolation from any other aspect of the Chinese or Oriental problem in general. A series of momentous events was to restore these relationships to their international setting. The complete defeat of China by Japan in 1895, followed by the rapid development of foreign demands and aggressions on the former, in the shape of concessions, leased territories, and spheres of influence, served to foretell the speedy break-up of China. The demands of Russia, Germany, and France on Japan, indicating the break-up of any united policy of European powers in the Far East, also served as a premonition of the Russo-Japanese War, soon to follow. The recurrent suggestion of the annexation of Hawaii, with its approval by the Harrison administration, and the subsequent rescinding of the act by Cleveland, had revived American interest in the Pacific problem. The sudden development of

the war with Spain precipitated affairs, and Hawaii was now annexed, largely as a matter of military necessity. The same situation precipitated the seizure of the Philippines; and after a short war and a speedy evolution of policy, the permanent possession of these islands, with their constitutional status yet undetermined.

All these events combined to restore the China-American relations to the status of a major international question. Fortunately, at the time, the men needed were at hand—John Hay in the State Department, and, as special agent in China, W. W. Rockhill.

The outstanding consideration of this situation was the replacement of the old concert of the Western powers *vis-à-vis* China—from which America had disappeared, with the close of the Burlingame days of the Civil War period, for the isolation of the immigration problem period—by a working agreement between Russia, Germany, and France, of virile, not to say hostile purposes, not only inimical to China, but also to Japan and Britain. In the face of this situation, John Hay proposed a return to the plan of coöperation by the assertion of the Open Door policy. Contrary to popular impression, John Hay did not create the Open Door policy; for, as previously explained, this policy had been clearly formulated in 1843-44, and had, in practice, been the one demand of the American policy from the earliest contact of traders. What Hay did was to join the Open Door policy with the policy of international coöperation. What Hay proposed (1899) was that none of the powers that held concessions, leases, spheres of influence, or any other special rights in China, should exact greater charges—custom duties, freight rates, harbor dues, and all similar charges—from any foreign national than from their own. The five interested nations, together with Italy, with slight exceptions agreed; the Open Door policy become one of coöperation, America again was restored to her "most-favored-nation" treaty position, and China was saved from dismemberment.

The entire problem was, however, far from solved. The struggle for Korea and South Manchuria was still to go on; the Russo-Japanese War, to determine this point, was soon to occur. While Russia could not hold her French and German allies in the struggle which was to come, this was because England and Japan had already been forced to defensive alliance, which kept other European powers out of the Russo-Japanese struggle. But the combination did hold in its relations to China, as was soon to be tested by the Boxer Uprising. No combination of influences could save the declining Manchu régime, with its corruption and inefficiency. But the foreign powers, by their continued aggressions on the territory and sovereignty of China, gave the Manchu régime a new lease on life. For the Manchus were clever enough to turn the popular wrath caused by the burdensome taxation, the corruption of officials, the utter inability of the Manchu government to do any of the things for which it was tolerated, against the foreigners who were the aggressors, but who, while responsible for the aggressions on China's territories, were in no wise responsible for the hardships and the suffering of the people. The result was that the Boxer uprising became an antiforeign offensive, which compelled intervention of foreign troops to protect the foreign nationals beleaguered in the Peking Legation. While the central and southern provinces remained neutral in this brief conflict, many remote regions were involved and many foreigners lost their lives. The United States forces participated in the relief expedition, but not in the punitive expeditions which again disgraced the names of several powers, whose soldiers fell to the level of the ignorant Boxers. In the negotiations which followed, the United States exercised its influence to moderate the demands of the foreign powers, to maintain the sovereignty of China in the collection of the indemnities through the customs, and to maintain a concert of action among the powers. While strong influence was exerted

to draw America again into an alliance, instructions to her representatives were always to avoid any such policy.

The result of both the Hay Open Door note and the Boxer indemnity negotiations was to strengthen the policy of coöperative treatment of China, and on the basis of this to secure equality of treatment for American interests and to preserve and strengthen Chinese sovereignty. This coöperative policy was soon to fail, probably because America did not continue the leadership gained by Hay's policies. Soon Japan and England were in alliance; France was backing Russia; Germany was playing first with one side, then with another. The result was the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese Revolution, and, finally, the World War.

Hay supplemented the earlier declaration with the pronouncement, in 1900, that the American policy

> . . . is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.[1]

These two pronouncements have been termed the Monroe Doctrine of the Far East. The first declaration received the approval of Japan and of the European powers—except Russia; by the latter the disintegration of China was at least stopped. In 1904, at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Secretary Hay again issued a note urging that no aggressions be made on Chinese territory as a result of this war. President Roosevelt played an active part in bringing the war to a close and again looked after the interests of China.

These amicable relationships reached another stage during the negotiations following the Boxer uprising. Foreign commentators, desiring to minimize the value of America's ultimate

[1] Quoted by Edward Thomas Williams, in *China: Yesterday and To-day*, page 423.

relinquishment of a large portion of the indemnity required for the Boxer excesses, have often represented America's part in these negotiations as that of an exacting, not to say exploiting, enemy. To those who know the facts or will take the trouble to examine the records, the contrary is clearly the case.

The American government, recognizing the liberal intentions of the Emperor and of the reform element now overpowered by the Empress Dowager, consistently held the attitude that the Chinese government had been overpowered by the Boxer Rebellion and that it was not in sympathy with the movement. During the subsequent negotiations American influence prevented the indemnities exacted from being more onerous than they were. Li Hung Chang, who conducted the negotiations on behalf of China, in reference to this situation, wrote, "I tremble to think what might have been China's fate, but for the stand taken by the American government."

During President Roosevelt's incumbency—in 1908—a full half of the indemnity remaining at that time unpaid was remitted. The Chinese government designated these funds for educational use, chiefly that of sending students to America. Thus, both as cause and effect, this act has been of tremendous influence in demonstrating the good will of America toward China and in developing on the part of China a good will toward America. Later, in 1924, the remainder of the indemnity was also remitted.

In due course the Revolution came and the Chinese Republic was established. The part played in these two events by students trained in the United States or in American mission institutions in China was very large, and in the early years was recognized. That this part is now forgotten, for the time being, is perhaps but natural in view of the vast change in political conditions. That change we are to discuss in the last chapter. But it may be assumed when the present period of emotional excitement is past, this aid, given through America, will be remembered. There are too many of the leaders of the present

order who have themselves been recipients of this training—this friendly guidance and assistance—to permit aberration of judgment, a consciousness of present unfairness, criticism on the part of some, or a cautious policy of government, to blot out the remembrance of those earlier significant years.

The point of greatest insistence in the various pronouncements of Secretary Hay regarding China, was the preservation of the "integrity of China." On several occasions this was defined as the sovereignty of China with reference to territorial integrity. In 1908-9 another phase of the problem arose over the control of the railways of Manchuria and the claims put forward and the jurisdiction exercised over these railways by Japan and Russia respectively on the basis of their special treaty right obtained during the preceding period. As these rights were in derogation of China's sovereignty and injurious to American trading rights as well, and threatened to provoke another conflict, Secretary of State Knox put forward his plan for the internationalization of these railways. By this plan China's sovereignty would have been restricted only so far as financial commitments demanded, and equality of treatment of foreign nationals would have been secured. The plan did not receive the approval of the interested parties, Japan and Russia, and consequently came to nothing. The basis of Secretary Knox's argument was the preservation of the "jurisdictional integrity" of China.

Immediately after the establishment of the Republic of China, welcomed by most of the foreign powers, their relationship with China came to a focus over the problem of loans. The American government had insisted upon participation in this *consortium* of powers, or of bankers representing the powers, both in order to protect American interests and to further its policy of coöperation of powers and of the protection of China's integrity. This agreement was made on the part of China by Yuan Shih Kai in violation of the wishes of the new parliament and aroused great opposition on the part of many

of the republican leaders. The American administration changed at this period from Taft to Wilson and immediately (1913) President Wilson withdrew the support of the American government from the American group of bankers in the sextuple consortium, on the grounds that the agreement which gave the international bankers large supervisory powers over their prospective investments was an infringement on the "administrative integrity" of China, established by the Hay pronouncements and subsequent agreements. This act resulted in some hardship for the Chinese government and produced a marked division of opinion in China, but in general received the approval of the Chinese people.

The World War was now precipitated, and relations with China, as all other international relations, were determined by this catastrophic event. Preliminary to China's entrance into the war one important incident in America's relation with China's occurred. On November 2, 1917, the American Secretary of State signed the Lansing-Ishii agreement with Japan in which the United States recognized the "special interest" of Japan in China. Coming as this did after the presentation of the "Twenty-One Demands" by Japan on China in 1915, it was immediately hailed as an abandonment of the long-established Open Door policy, and the recognition by the United States of a Japanese sphere of influence similar to the Monroe Doctrine. This interpretation was repeatedly denied by Secretary Lansing, but the general international discussion which followed constitutes indubitable evidence that the agreement *could* be so interpreted. It took the Washington Conference to straighten out this situation. Here, in 1922, Japan agreed to a statement that this declaration of the Lansing-Ishii agreement did not connote special privileges, or exclusive preference, or political domination, or territorial aggression, but only Japan's special interest of contiguity, not inconsistent with the Open Door policy.

China's entrance into the World War followed that of

America, and was secured largely through the advice, even the insistence, of American representatives. When during the Versailles Conference the secret agreement between Japan and the Allies guaranteeing Japan in the possession of all former German possessions and rights in Shantung came to light, the background of the Lansing-Ishii agreement was revealed. For this agreement was but an attempt to bind America in advance of negotiations to the secret promises of the Allies. President Wilson objected to the agreement, as not binding under the changed conditions. His attempt to appeal to the Italian people to reject a similar secret agreement in favor of the Italian government was promptly rejected, and the Italian delegation withdrew from the Conference. The Japanese delegation threatened to withdraw also if the promise of the Allies was repudiated. President Wilson consented, the Versailles treaty was signed, and Shantung was left in Japanese hands. The Chinese people were greatly incensed. Their representative refused to sign the treaty. A Japanese boycott was instigated, the government was overthrown, the Student Movement in politics was initiated, and great resentment was felt at the desertion of America. It was quite generally felt that China had entered the war not only at the invitation but at the urgent insistence of America's representatives with the promise that China's rights would be cared for. The outcome proved Japan to be in full possession of Shantung with far more rights than Germany had ever claimed and with the twenty-one demands—which little less than completes political absorption—hanging over China.

The Washington Conference (November 12, 1921—February 6, 1922) formed the sequel. An Imperial Conference in London of all the British dominions (1921) had recommended a conference on the Pacific to consider the Anglo-Japanese alliance against which a strong public opinion had been aroused. The American government had decided to call a disarmament conference and as the same major parties were interested, com-

bined the consideration of the two major problems. The outcome met most of China's demands. Shantung, its railways, mines, and all the former German rights were returned to China, thus righting the great wrong to China and clearing America and the Allies in general of the charge of disloyalty or at least of unfair treatment to China. Conferences to consider the problems of the tariff and of extraterritoriality were promised. While the tariff conference was promised within three months, a delay of three years was occasioned through the insistence of France on the preliminary settlement of the gold-franc question; namely, that the indemnities due France by China should be paid in gold not in paper francs. The Commission on extraterritoriality to investigate and report within a year was similarly delayed. Thus the conferences were postponed three years with results considered elsewhere.[1] Provision was made for a similar consideration of the retention of foreign troops or police on Chinese soil. Foreign post offices in China, with the exception of Japanese post offices in Manchuria, were abolished in 1923. Certain rights of communication—wireless, etc.—were returned.

The provision made for making public all treaties, notes of agreements between China and foreign powers, all government contracts, concessions, franchises with foreign nationals, was a distinct safeguard. Provision was made for the return of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain and of Kwang-Chow-Wan by France—but later these offers were so hedged in by reservations as to be worthless, and nothing has been done. The annulment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance also furnished an additional safeguard or removed a menace to China.

These were all specific gains. Of more importance, however, is the general gain in status through the clear definition of the Open Door policy, the abandonment of the spheres of special interests, the recognition that the Lansing-Ishii agreement no longer has force, and the pledge of the eight powers

[1] See Chapter XIII.

involved to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial and administrative integrity of China. Thus through the Washington Conference the United States carried its policies regarding China through to the final stage of adoption as the coöperative policy of the foreign powers *vis-à-vis* China.

Survey of the historic relations of one's own country with other countries does not often bring complete satisfaction or approval. But America's official relations with China are clear and commendable; her attitude has been uniformly just and friendly; her policy has been helpful, and at times of vital assistance. That she could not act with greater decision in the recent past, or with speed sufficient to please the Chinese or their somewhat impatient American friends, is due to the complexity of the present situation and the limitations of diplomatic relations. The relationship of the American people to the Chinese has always been friendly. Considering the fact that so little is known of the Chinese by the average American, curiosity is often expressed both by home and foreign observers as to why this friendly attitude should exist. It is sufficient for the argument to note here that it has existed throughout this period of the modern political development of China. That this friendly attitude should not be lost by either Chinese or Americans during the present perilous period of transition is recognized by leaders of both peoples to be of the greatest importance.

Surveying this entire record suggests some interesting observations. With the exception of the one instance of the Boxer uprising, where China was the aggressor, the United States has never participated in a major action of force in China, and with the exception of the negotiations necessitated by that incident and the treaty formulated at the Washington Conference, has never been party to joint negotiations of a treaty with China. Furthermore, an examination of the treaties would disclose the fact that with the exception of extraterri-

toriality, none of the rights exercised by the foreigner under the unequal treaties, are secured by the provisions of the unequal treaties, but by the right of the "most favored nation clause." The one exception, of extraterritoriality, is a major exception, but, as has been shown in the text, this was a substitute for the British plan of territorial concessions, and in the absence of any recognition of diplomatic procedure on the part of the Chinese, furnished a safeguard for them which seemed as an acceptable *modus vivendi* for almost a century. With the exception of the acute period of the immigration problem, which after all is a domestic problem, America's government record in dealing with China is a clean one. On the occasion of the early treaties the American commissioners were careful to point out that the right of extraterritoriality secured by treaty was no derogation of Chinese sovereignty but a delegation of power during a period not otherwise provided for. Repeatedly expressing the belief that such exemption was temporary, since 1902 the government has been on record as willing to negotiate for the abrogation of these privileges.

One further general comment is pertinent. The policy of coöperation with other foreign powers has been necessary in order to obtain general agreement on policies dealing with China; but independent action on the part of the United States is necessary if the policies of the United States are to receive the adherence of other countries.

But the purpose of joint action so far as the United States is concerned is to secure the general acceptance of the principles of the American policy. Occasions arise when this can be done only by taking the initiative—which means an independent policy. In fact, such occasions not only arise—they can be created.

An impressive fact to consider is that the great periods of progress in America's relations with China were not only the periods in which this coöperation was secured but that the coöperation was secured through initiative and through

strong personalities as Secretaries of State and able representatives in China. In 1843 Daniel Webster was Secretary of State and Caleb Cushing was Commissioner to China; in 1853 Edward Everett was Secretary of State and Humphrey Marshall was Minister to China; in 1867 William H. Seward was Secretary of State and Anson Burlingame was Minister to China; in 1898 John Hay was Secretary of State and W. W. Rockhill was Commissioner to China; in 1908 Theodore Roosevelt was President and Elihu Root Secretary of State; in 1921 Charles E. Hughes was Secretary of State, and he was largely responsible for the achievement of the Washington Conference.

The applicability to the present situation of the principles elaborated in the preceding discussion is considered in the concluding paragraphs of this volume.

The object of learning is the increase of knowledge.

—*Confucius*

What one knows, to know that one knows it;
What one does not know, to know that one does not know it;
This is true knowledge.

Learning without thinking is labor lost;
Thinking without learning is perilous.

—*Confucian Analects*

To learn what is good, a thousand years is not sufficient: to learn what is evil, an hour is too long.

Without going outside your door you may get to know all about the Empire. Without looking out of the window you may know of the Heavenly doctrine.

—*Chinese proverbs*

CHAPTER X

MODERN EDUCATION AND THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

WITH the decay and final abolition in 1905 of the old examination and educational system, went the underpinning of the old structure of society. While that learning had long been possessed of little vitality, as under similar conditions in the West, certain justification for it was found in tradition and in the formal values it preserved. Since the days of the Tai-ping Rebellion the needs of government revenue had led to extensive corruption in the selection of officials through this examination system, but the forms of selection and of testing for promotion existed and functioned, though in an inadequate manner. Combined with the functions of a censorship on officials performed by boards of higher officials, it served as an instrument for determining qualifications for promotion. Thus not only was social and political life kept within certain rigid formulas which ensured its perpetuation; but, with the exception of occasional periods of disturbance, official control of society was kept from the hands of militarists and of professional politicians. As is noted elsewhere, since Chinese society never develops that sense of accurate precision in social relations outside of the fine formal relationships of the family, the application of this system of ethics became not a matter of technical exactitude, as in Western law, but wholly a matter of equity. Consequently, social control, which in the West became an elaborate legal system of procedure and precedence, in China always remained a far more fluid determination of equity in the spirit of the Confucian classics, to be applied by officials and magistrates selected on the basis of their knowledge of the classics.

Much of the trouble of the recent generation is due to

the fact that when China came under the influence of Western learning and culture she abolished these examinations outright and thus the structure and the content of the old learning suddenly disappeared. While for a brief period of five years (1900-1905) some effort had been made to substitute Western learning for the ancient in these examinations, neither was the mastery of Western learning sufficient nor did the pressure for rapid change permit a gradual devolution of the one into the other.

Combined with the political changes now going on and the exigent pressure of the West on the East, the transition brought about the elimination of the old type of official, broke down the restraints which kept the official within certain bounds, turned over the control of social organizations to the politician and—since there was nothing now in social standards to prevent it—paved the way for the militarists. That the untrained and undisciplined student should now rule and control teachers in the land where, above all others, age and scholarship had so long been revered, constitutes an aspect of the present revolution that brings despair to the Chinese educator. That in the land where formal examination for fitness for office had so long and so completely prevailed, students should now successfully—and all but universally—rebel against any examination, any test of fitness for any office, and should hold any grading of students on the basis of attainment, any awarding of aid on the basis of ability, to be an infringement of liberty and of the "principles of the Revolution" is indeed in itself so complete a revolution as to be startling in its consequences. The hope of salvation from the anarchy, political and educational, into which the youthful Chinese student body has inadvertently precipitated their country is to be found in experience and in the teachings of Sun Yat Sen. The future will reveal one of the chief merits of "Sun Yat Sen-ism" perhaps not clearly to be noted at the present time—Dr. Sun's respect for the past of Chinese culture

and his attempt to preserve in the present transition some of the fundamental merits of the old order.

Dr. Sun's analysis provides for five functions of government. To the traditional executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the West, he adds those of examination and of censorship. These constitute the great political functions of the old examination and educational system. If Sun's ideas are really put into practice by his followers and they in time become anything more than hollow political shibboleths, there will be some reëstablishment of the system by which office is filled on the basis of fitness for performance of the duties of the office and of that by which office is retained and promotion obtained on the basis of actual performance as determined by some system of examination, inspection, or censorship. When that day arrives, Sun Yat Sen will have brought about a rehabilitation of his country and a consummation of the Revolution to which he gave his life.

One or two generations in China must solve the problem of readjustment for which the Western world took several centuries to answer. The development of nationality, the introduction of modern science with all its revolutionary ideas, the introduction of the modern industrial system based on mechanical power, a religious reformation—all are taking place at the same time. All this constitutes a tremendous responsibility for the educational system. The situation calls for patient understanding by the West, for sympathetic tolerance, and for an attitude of helpfulness rather than one of exploitation.

Commercial, industrial, and political contacts have all had their educational value. For many years there have been direct educational contacts with the West. Of these the educational efforts of the missionary organization, beginning in 1835, are the oldest—and the most significant and extensive. Foreign governments, especially the Japanese and the German, have also maintained a few modern schools. Many students have been sent to foreign lands. The contact of Chinese edu-

cators with the modern educational system of Japan, especially since the China-Japanese War of 1895, has also had profound influence.

ORIGIN OF THE MODERN SYSTEM

The modern public educational system in China dates from 1898, when the Emperor Kwang Hsu, under the influence of a group of reformers, issued his famous edicts. These included a modification of the old examination systems and the establishment of a complete system of schools. While a number of schools were successfully established, a reactionary movement soon gained sway, resulting in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Though the immediate effect of this movement was the abandonment of the modern schools, the Empress Dowager, who had formerly headed the reactionary party, in a few years became an advocate of reform and of modern learning. In 1901 she ordered that the provincial examination halls be turned into modern colleges. Other edicts established systems of middle schools in each prefecture, of primary schools in each district, of normal schools in each province. The combination of the new and the old did not work well; so in 1905 the old examination system was abolished.

The Russo-Japanese War took place during this period. The success of the Japanese brought great prestige to Western learning among the Chinese. Large numbers of Chinese students had been going to Japan during these preceding years. After the war the number of such students in Japan at any given time increased to 15,000 or 20,000.

The present system was actually established at the close of 1905, when a Ministry of Education was created by edict. This was approved by the Imperial Throne in 1906. The Ministry was divided into five departments: namely, general supervision, technical or special education, publication, industrial education, and finance. These departments were divided into bureaus, the departments being in charge of the senior

secretaries and the bureaus in charge of the junior secretaries. Besides the Minister of Education, also called President of the Ministry, there were two Vice-Ministers, with numerous assistants and a few national inspectors of schools. The powers of the Ministry were large. It was to issue a code of educational laws, to appoint the twelve national inspectors, to nominate provincial commissioners of education; it was to have the power to remove any educational officer from office. In fact, it had almost absolute control over the educational system. Many sets of regulations were drawn up, the most important dealing with the detailed organization of the national school system and with its administration. In the provinces and in the smaller local areas, provision was made for provincial and local inspectors and for provincial and local boards for the promotion of education. The contrast with a highly decentralized system, in which practically all schools were private in control, was complete.

Much of this elaboration of educational system was an ideal only, giving basis to the criticism frequently expressed—that it was merely a paper system. Yet these regulations formulated the standards and ideals toward which government and people have since been moving.

REORGANIZATION OF EDUCATION WITH THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC

Political revolution broke out in October, 1911. The provincial Republican government was organized January 9, 1912. Very shortly the new government issued a dispatch to the various provincial authorities indicating the policy of the Republic toward schools. Fortunately the period of political disturbance was short, but in places much of the work accomplished during the preceding six years was largely undone during these brief months. In those provinces where the political and military disturbances have been continued from time to time, educational development has been greatly retarded even

to the present day. For instance, in Kwangtung, which had been one of the most progressive regions educationally and politically, little progress was made in education from 1914 to 1920 because of the reactionary political forces in control under the military government.

The most important educational changes recommended by the new government involved:

First: The alteration of the curriculum so as to encourage the spirit of democracy instead of that of reverence to the old Manchu authorities.

Second: The enlargement of school facilities by the opening of large numbers of new schools, especially primary schools.

Third: The increase of emphasis upon handicraft work and physical exercise.

Fourth: The introduction of co-education in the primary schools.

Fifth: The elimination of the ancient classics from the lower schools.

In the spring following, when Yuan Shi Kai was elected President, a permanent ministry was formed; a national conference on education made recommendations; a revised scheme of education was adopted by the national assembly; and the new ordinances were issued by the President.

THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION

The organization of the system has remained in all essential points in force to the present time. It is as follows:

The lower primary school includes four years, carrying the child presumably through his seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth years (Chinese). Translated into our own method of treating the age of the individual, it comprises the sixth to ninth years of physical age and the first four years of our elementary school. Where it has been found possible to make school attendance obligatory, it is this period of the lower primary school which is compulsory. Following the lower primary is the three-year higher primary school, paralleled

occasionally by a higher primary industrial school. Above the higher primary is the four-year middle school, paralleled occasionally by an industrial school with a course of the same length or shorter, and by the normal schools. As these normal schools frequently, if not usually, have a preparatory year, their program occupies the student from the fourteenth through the eighteenth year. To enter the higher schools from the middle schools requires usually one year of preparatory study. This is often extended into two, occasionally into three years. The scientific technical school requires a two-year preparation. The law school and the university may require two years or the usual year for preparation. The higher normal school is presumed to take the student directly from the middle school, though frequently it also requires the one preparatory year.

THE PRESENT SCHOOL SITUATION

Owing to the weakness of the Central Government, the prevalence of militarism and the disturbed condition of the country, there has grown up a double administrative control, or rather, a substitution of a provincial for the national system. By national law the minister of education appoints in each province a commissioner of education, who in turn appoints minor administrative officials, inspectors, heads of schools, and teachers. This commission is responsible to the civil governor as well as to the National Minister of Education; but since, under the prevalent militarism, civil governorship is usually combined with the military governorship, educational funds are frequently misappropriated, school officials go unpaid or but inadequately paid, and the system tends to break down. In many provinces of the center and south, a division of education under the local governor, and independent of the Provincial Bureau of Education of the central government, operates more successfully because it has more support and more funds. However, the conditions are chaotic, and vary greatly from province to province and from year to year.

The last year for which general statistics are available (1923) showed nearly 6,500,000 children in government schools, about 500,000 in mission schools, and a very large number in the old fashioned private schools. Investigations in 1921 in two or three regions, including Nanking and Canton, showed half as many children in these old schools as in the new government ones. In the old school the teacher is paid by the pupil or by the class. The average annual salary of the elementary teacher of government schools is $160 ($80 gold). Unfortunately, this is seldom all paid, and yet more rarely paid on time. The subjects taught are more numerous than in our Western schools, and the hours are longer.

The middle schools numbered 547 in 1923, with a total attendance of about 100,000. The same tendency to overload the curriculum, the teachers with hours of teaching, and the pupil with hours of recitation, is found here as in the elementary schools. The length in years is not sufficient, so that only thirty per cent of the graduates are able to enter college or university direct. Consequently, preparatory years—one, two, or even three—must be provided.

So far as figures are available there were in 1925 thirty government institutions of higher learning, forty-eight provincial institutions, twenty-seven private, and twenty-six mission schools. For several years the government and provincial institutions have had wholly inadequate support. For the present year (1926-27) most of them have been closed for all or part of the year, due to lack of government support or to the antiforeign agitation. The students of the middle schools are most amenable to the efforts of the agitators, and these groups often force the students of more mature age to abandon their work. Such conditions are no doubt of temporary character, for if the educational system is to retain any qualifications as such, there must be a change. In a few schools of each type, under strong headship, conditions have remained more nearly normal and work has continued, though under difficulties.

To understand fully the educational conditions as well as the outline of the system, attention must be given to three recent aspects of the intellectual situation: the renaissance movement, the mass education movement, and the student movement.

THE RENAISSANCE, OR THE "NEW TIDE"

To the modern intellectual movement in China, the term "New Tide"—taken from the title of a magazine of the new thought, published by some of the faculty and students of the National University at Peking—seems more appropriate than "new birth." In its origin, largely literary in character, the new movement fused with various intellectual and social reform movements, and in 1919 with the political reforms. Hence the "tide" represents an entire and genuine social revolutionary period, comparable only to the European Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Since so many of the aspects, especially of recent manifestations, create alarm among the foreign friends of China, particularly among those who have been responsible for introducing modern education among the Chinese, some detailed analysis will be helpful to the understanding of modern beliefs and tendencies in China.

The literary aspect of the movement is fundamental. The classical language of the Chinese was a dead language before the opening of the Christian era. The beginning of the famous examination system was for the purpose of selecting officials who could understand the classical language of the official edicts and regulations. Successive revivals of Confucianism created well-established codes of conduct, as well as a classical literature with which officials and literati must be familiar.

Even with the abrogation of the old system, the novel ideas of the new learning gained little control until the beginning of the modern literary movement, about 1916. While the classical language had always been considered the only medium of learning—of history, chronicles, commentary, philosophy,

and official correspondence—there had long been a limited literature of folk poems, plays, and tales. From the time of the Ming dynasty popular novels had greatly multiplied in number. In brief, the renaissance movement is the elevation of this popular language of the Mandarin dialect (Pei-hua) into an accepted literary language. This transformation is similar to the service performed by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio for the Italians and by Chaucer and Wyclif for the English—the substitution of a local dialect for an obsolete classical language as the living medium of literary expression of a whole people.

A number of influential and radical magazines—*The New Youth* (1915), *The Weekly Review, The New Tide*—soon became the instruments of transformation. Since the literary movement coalesced with the political (1919), the text books for the millions of children, the enormous number of the more or less ephemeral newspaper publications, the broadsides, posters, and similar instruments of political propaganda, are all printed in the Pei-hua. The language of popular speech, becoming literary, has become also an instrument of popular reform. While the transition itself has been going on for long, perhaps for centuries, the consummation of the movement centered in the group of teachers and students of the National University from 1915 to 1920. Though there are many participants, the outstanding leader on the literacy side is Dr. Hu Shuh, one of the earliest products of the "returned indemnity students" sent to America.

Had the movement remained wholly literary, its significance would be far less. Dr. Hu has suggested that the movement be termed "revaluation" rather than renaissance; for all the old standards of China as well as the newer ones of the West are challenged and subjected to critical tests.

This criticism of long-accepted Chinese standards has been most disconcerting to the Chinese. Most so of all are the attacks upon the family system. The subjection of the youth to the elders, the traditional betrothal system, the marriage

system, the subjection of women, are not only attacked, but—by most of the adherents of the new movement—completely repudiated. The forms which this repudiation may take may be most disturbing. Many had advocated a social system of free love in place of the old system of child marriage and of concubinage, and to this phase of the movement the subsequent Soviet doctrines closely affiliated. From the earlier attempts at absorption of Western learning there had existed a group of advocates of the Positive philosophy of Auguste Comte. To this group was now added a far larger group of positivists, pragmatists, rationalists, who subjected all intellectual ideas as well as social institutions to the critcism, oftentimes quite destructive, of logic and reason. From this group have come the chief attacks on Christianity, so distressing both to the native Christians and to the missionaries; and from them, too, the widespread anti-Christian movement of the present day has, no doubt, largely sprung. Yet these facts must not be overlooked—that never before have the Chinese intellectuals given so much attention to Christian teachings; that if Christianity is ever to gain a genuine hold on the Chinese, it must slough off its peculiarly Western accumulations, and it must adapt itself to the peculiar Chinese mentality. This New Tide movement is exactly the type of thought activity that preceded and produced the Reformation of the sixteenth century in Europe. If danger to religious thought lies in this movement, it is due rather to the pragmatic and rationalistic character of Chinese mentality, and indicates clearly that if religious appeal is to be made, far greater success is promised along practical ethical and social lines than along those that are purely theological. However, the attacks are no greater on Christianity than on Confucianism and the older religions of China.

In fact, the movement includes every phase of thought and of "experiment in the new life." Advocates of every type of literary form, of every system of philosophical thought, of every aspect of social organization and experimentation, of every

mode of political organization, from monarchy to anarchy, may affiliate with it. The renaissance, or New Tide, though not to be identified with any one of these, may be inclusive of all. This free range of speculative thought is but a natural reaction to the centuries of slavish restriction imposed by the examination system.

The political phase now assumes the greater importance. In a way it may seem as though the political connection of the intellectual movement was purely artificial or accidental. But that is because of the Chinese tendency to the dramatic. When the Versailles Conference decided against China and in favor of handing over Shantung to the Japanese, a pro-Japanese government, "the Anfu clique," was in power in Peking. When the decision became known in Peking—May 4, 1919—the students of the capital, led by those of the National University, attacked some of the pro-Japanese ministers, and looted and burned the house of one. A Students' Movement then sprang up all over the country, and a boycott of Japanese goods was instigated. Though thousands of students were imprisoned, strikes and boycotts resulted throughout China; and after three months of agitation the government gave way, dismissing three of the ministers and releasing the students. May 4 became the first of the National humiliation days.

Through this situation the students and professors of the National University, hitherto largely interested in other aspects of the new renaissance, were precipitated into the political movement and have remained at the head ever since. The Kuomintang and other radical political parties became advocates of the new tendencies in literature, thought, and social experiment; the intellectual leaders became involved in the political controversy. This fusion must be kept clearly in mind in order to grasp the significance of the present political situation and its tie-up with various phases of radical political and social experiments. When the Soviet Russian influence came, in 1923 and later, it found the ground partly prepared, and at least an atti-

tude of intellectual toleration toward the most extreme doctrines.

During this year (1926-27) both faculty and students of the National University are dispersed and are to be found in about every party and faction, concerned far more with social and political transformation than with study. In forming an estimate of this Renaissance movement and of present intellectual, social and political conditions in China, one other fact must be kept clearly in mind: so far the movement has been almost wholly critical and destructive. What the constructive stage may bring forth remains yet to be seen. Unfortunately, foreign observers in contact with the situation see only the destructive phases and have—or at least express—little confidence in the ability of the Chinese to reach a constructive stage. Chinese intellectuals, on the other hand, have a profound faith in their ability to create a constructive stage—intellectually, socially, politically.

THE "POPULAR EDUCATIONAL" MOVEMENT

The great masses of the Chinese people are illiterate. With a literary language that is a dead language, and schools using this language only, any other condition would be unthinkable. But China has become a democracy with the realization that the masses must somehow be educated. The new literary movement has made of the vernacular the literary language. Practically all magazines and papers, and most books, are now published in the vernacular. The Mandarin is the popular language of two thirds of the people. The problem now is to make it the literary language of all, and to make all literate in it. The classical language is one of great complexity and difficulty. The vernacular language is far less so. In the earliest years of the Republic a commission was formed to simplify and unify this language. The commission selected about seven thousand characters, the pronunciation of which it hoped to make uniform throughout the country. By the introduction

of a "phonetic alphabet" it sought to make feasible the task. At first little progress was made. The acceptance of the vernacular as the literary form made a wider movement possible.

With the two hundred thousand coolies in the labor battalions in France, the Chinese Y. M. C. A. introduced a popular education movement. Scientific experiments had already been undertaken to discover the one thousand characters, most generally used. The coalescence of these various movements created the popular education movement. In 1921, when I visited government and private schools in ten of the provinces, scarcely a school was found, even among those of an elementary character, that was not conducting a free school for poor children, taught and supported either by teachers or pupils or both. This movement has now its own national organization, and is attempting to develop both machinery and methods for making the masses of the people literate. Through experimentation, it is believed that these one thousand essential characters can be taught through these "foundation character schools" in a few weeks' time, with an attendance of a few hours a week. Special methods have been developed through the use of the stereopticon, by which large numbers can be taught at once. Experiments were begun with the idea of producing one hundred per cent literacy, in this limited sense, in certain communities within five years' time. The military situation has interfered greatly with these plans. But the organization, the machinery, the methods, the popular enthusiasm, are all there.

While no doubt the hopes expressed are somewhat visionary, great progress has been made with the expectation that this will form one of the great constructive movements, once peaceful political conditions are brought about.

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

The three outstanding factors in the Chinese situation to-day are the militarists, the nationalists, and the students. Not so powerful as the militarists, yet—since they represent a

Methodist Prints

THE MAN IN THE STREET READS

Methodist Prints

POPULAR WARES

Methodist Prints

QUACK DOCTOR CURING RHEUMATISM BY STICKING PATIENT FULL OF NEEDLES



Methodist Prints

A MODERN CHINESE HOSPITAL

reconstruction force as well as one of political agitation—of far greater ultimate significance, is the student body. Perhaps no question regarding China is more frequently asked by the American public than an explanation of the student influence. A personal experience may furnish an explanation.

My cabin boy on the Pacific Mail steamer out of Hong Kong told in a few sentences the entire story of the present turmoil in China. In his characteristic broken English, which I shall not attempt to reproduce, he said: "Englishmen make big squeeze Hong Kong; make big squeeze Canton; make big squeeze Kowloon; make big squeeze Shanghai; make big squeeze Hankow; make big squeeze Tientsin. Englishmen always make big squeeze everywhere; make big squeeze India; make big squeeze Singapore. For a long time Chinese coolie-men don't know. Chinese student he know. Now Chinese student tell Chinese coolieman. Now Chinese coolie say, 'Englishmen no more make big squeeze; Englishmen must go.' "

Substitute all foreign powers for Great Britain, and all foreign Nationals for Englishmen, and the cabin boy's explanation states a fact of fundamental importance in the attitude of the informed and vocal Chinese of the present day.

Though the student body has been a growing social force for years, and has for some time constituted quite a social problem, its emergence as a political force has been indicated in the previous account of the incident of May 4, 1919. To understand the reason for this situation further explanation is necessary.

The scholar of the past took many years in the making; therefore he was usually a man of mature years and seasoned experience, who had spent many seasons in study and reflection. With few notable exceptions there were no advanced schools which these students frequented. Scholars were products of extended study and reflection, and of experience in subordinate positions of authority, rather than trained products of schools. That the present student is an immature youth, drawn from his home and association with elders and thrown into dormi-

tories where he associates with youths only, has made but slight diminution in his influence and repute. But this situation has made a great difference in the instability and emotionalism of student opinion, and in its susceptibility to the influence of mob psychology.

Some features of student life to-day will further explain their political interest and influence. Most of the middle schools and colleges of China are situated in the provincial capitals. In many of these capital cities twenty to thirty thousand students are congregated. They live in crowded dormitories, with few comforts, little better than emergency barracks. Teachers and administrators have little contact with their students, even in the classroom. For the most part teachers have little influence over the students. These latter are young when they leave home—thirteen to fifteen years of age. Perhaps the median age of this great student body is not over seventeen years. On the other hand, there are numerous students who are mature and who exercise great influence. It is sometimes said that the student movement is headed and maintained by a handful of students (usually extremists) in each student center. That conditions are ideal for the control of mass psychology and for developing such radical leadership is undoubtedly true. This sometimes occurs. But it would be a great misinterpretation of the situation not to recognize the genuine patriotic, political interest of the student body, no matter how immature; and the devotion and disinterested, even if sometimes unwise, leadership of these selected leaders. On the other hand, it is obvious, as it is also admitted, that the student movement is being used and being artificially stimulated by political leaders for political and partisan ends.

The general political interest and the glowing patriotism of the students are not to be denied. The newspaper reading room in any school is always crowded, no matter when one visits it. Other portions of the library evidence no such interest. The bulletin boards, which usually contain a school paper con-

THE NEW GOVERNMENT UNIVERSITY AT NANKING

Methodist Prints

A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION



K. L. Chen


WE DEMAND THE RETURN OF BRITISH CONCESSIONS
WE DEMAND RECALL OF BRITISH CONSULS IN SHANGHAI & HANKOW
WE DEMAND THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CULPRITS.
WE DEMAND THE INDEMNITY OF THE VICTIMS.
WE DEMAND ABOLITION OF THE MIXED COURT.
WE DEMAND THE RETURN OF THE ENGLISH AND JAPANESE CONCESSIONS.
WE DEMAND TARIFF AUTONOMY.
WE DEMAND ABOLITION OF ALL UNEQUAL TREATIES.
PEKING NATIONAL NORMAL UNIVERSITY.

Reproduced from Putnam Weale's Why China Sees Red. Dodd, Mead and Company, 1925.

STUDENT POSTERS

sisting largely of clippings of a political character and of editorials of a similar turn, also have continuous patronage. Student discussion is of the same character. There are few other student interests or activities to detract the student. Athletics are not generally popular. The various social and fraternal interests of American colleges and high school students are quite unknown. Schools are seldom co-educational. Political activity is the one vital human interest. Compliance with the student demand to make all schools co-educational will do more to temper the political interests of the students than they even dream of.

Consequently, the students are better informed on political topics than is any other class of the Chinese people; they have more interest in politics; they have time to devote to it. That the welfare of the body politic is the special charge of the student is the tradition of their class. In the past, Chinese ethics and religion were not to be distinguished from politics. But it is a new political consciousness that is developing in the mind of the present generation of students. That is a consciousness created in the West, not in the East; one we call nationalism. Whatever may be the virtues and the ills of excessive nationalism, China is now developing. But both in the form of the ideas themselves as well as in the influences which bring about their development, the West is responsible. President Wilson's self-determination of peoples furnishes the text for many a sermon and for innumerable soap-box orations. The influence of the many Western schools and teachers all tend in the same direction. But speaking louder than any of these words have been the actions of the Western powers in dealing with China. The Chinese are apt pupils, because they are great students. They are dangerous students because of their lack of practical political experience; but more dangerous still because of their tendency to accept or to follow logically a novel theory or belief independent of practical considerations.

Into this situation has come the Communist influence of

Russia, disruptive of the present situation, destructive of all traditional ideas, constructive of little, so far as a non-convert can see. The Communist influence has added to the political emotionalism and the nationalistic fervor of the student. Since the latter is chiefly in the form of antiforeignism, constructive results are not evident. In fact, the Communist influence is so against all authority that it has proved destructive of government schools and private schools as well as mission schools. Contrary to all accepted Chinese standards, the control of responsible authorities is flouted, the respect and obedience due to teachers has largely disappeared. Even among the teaching body itself administration is now usually lodged in a board or committee, constantly changing, unable to exercise any authority over students or to command the adequate respect and loyalty of colleagues.

As the schools were so organized that teachers had little contact with and no responsibility for the conduct of the students, it was easy for outsiders to intrude and to usurp that authority. One curious aspect of the situation is that the public agitation is largely through the students of the middle schools, more amenable to mob psychology, who force their assumed will upon the older students. These younger students are well organized, but naturally lack leaders. Outside agitators, paid or partisan, find it a fairly simple matter to gain confidence and assume leadership by calling for revolt against repressive authority.

Student organizations representing schools or cities or provinces have formulated general demands and have served them on school authorities and on the public. To the Western educator, as well as to the Western public, some of these demands of the Chinese students seem quite preposterous. Yet, like so many things Chinese which seem strange, there may exist underlying reasons which make the queer to be rational. One of the demands is that the student body may have a part

in making the curriculum of the school, either through participation in an administrative committee of the school or with power of rejection of a subject by the student committees. But the situation is not that of Western schools. The subjects of study are largely Western; hence, more or less foreign to the student's native culture. There exist no familiar handles by which he may take hold. Then, again, the text books in the higher schools, and occasionally in the middle schools, may be in a foreign language, which he understands indifferently. To the teacher also the subject of instruction is foreign, and his knowledge of it he has gained through a foreign language, which he may understand but little better than his pupil. He does not dare venture far from shore. He teaches by lecture, written out and dictated; the student copies. Very often this is all that the student has; with no explanation, no discussion, little supplementary reading possible in his native language, for it does not exist. In the sciences there is little or no laboratory experience; and such as there is, is usually by observation. This description is not true of the best schools, but it applies to the vast majority.

When to this situation is added the fact that the teacher is paid by the lecture hour and usually has no further responsibility or interest in the student—oftentimes being merely a "job holder" and compelled to teach in a subject for which he has little preparation—there is little wonder that the student objects to examinations and desires to have some part in the determination of the subjects he is required to study.

Demand for some form of student self-government has a similar explanation. The administration of the school receives its funds on the basis of a student *per capita*. As running expenses are largely fixed charges, the chances for a satisfactory financial showing depend on a full student quota. Consequently, since no student is expelled except in last extremity, there is little administrative control. Teachers are paid only

for instruction, and rarely manifest interest in the conditions of student life. As stated previously, students are housed in barracks, with little comfort, no oversight, no leadership except what they furnish themselves, little interest in athletics, and little opportunity for recreation of any kind; and to accentuate these deprivations, there is great overcrowding. There is indeed absolute need for student self-government, and for student participation in the conferences, to counteract arbitrary administration, which can be so lacking in understanding or sympathy. There are many schools, especially those of a quasi-public character, for which these statements need to be greatly modified; but on the whole they are accurate.

With the entire breakdown of discipline in many government schools in mind, and the remoteness of teaching and administrative staffs from actual and sympathetic and understanding contacts with the boys, particpation of students in self-government is absolutely essential to the proper functioning of the school. In the present extreme conditions, in many places students have taken entire control of student conduct out of the hands of the authorities. Among the demands concerning students' conduct and rights are those for complete freedom of speech, of publication, and of movement (no school regulation concerning compound or dormitory) and veto power over expulsion of any student.

Of the demands on the school administrations, similar explanations are forthcoming. Heads of schools are political appointees, dependent upon their political good standing for whatever support the school may obtain. The financial organization is wholly in the hands of the local administrator, so far as the faculty is concerned; but, as explained above, the students hold the whip hand. Since the teaching force is not in a position to exercise much if any influence on the administration, the student body does. Among their demands are control of fees, contribution of the administration to expenses of the student organization, abolition of scholarships based on scholarly work

(in the name of democracy), representation at all meetings of administrative bodies, and the right of referendum on administrative action concerning instruction or student control.

Some of these demands seem absolutely disruptive of school organization; and, in fact, in the present year (1926-27) few schools are in operation—and few even of these actually turn out worth-while academic work. But, as pointed out with reference to the two previous student claims, explanation if not justification is found in the type of present school organization. To this end, schools must be severed from political control. This the new National government is endeavoring to affect by the introduction of the University Organization of Education —similar to that of the University of France or of the State of New York. Support of schools must then be based on some standard of attainment, not on mere numbers in attendance. Both students and administrators will object to this; but until some of the old Chinese idea of scholarship and of actual attainment can be carried over into the new school, there is no possibility of an efficient school doing effective work.

The demand of the students for lowering of tuition fees is due to the fact that frequently the most efficient schools are private or mission schools, that attain their efficiency largely because they have the support which comes from tuition fees. The illogical as well as destructive character of many of the student demands is well illustrated, for their demands, in the name of democracy or communism, of anti-imperialism or of nationalism, are closing the few schools that remain. But experience, experiment, and time, together with a wiser organization of the government administrative system, will eventually bring about better conditions.

That the character of these student demands, so unusual from the Western point of view, may be clearly seen, a brief summary of the thirty regulations of the Students' Union of Hangchow in Chekiang is here given:

Concerning Politics

1. Students should have the liberty of joining political parties.
2. Students should have absolute freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and union.
3. Students should participate in patriotic movements.
4. Educational rights of sexes should be equal.
5. All anti-revolutionary education should be eradicated.
6. Educational autocrats who occupy high positions for selfish purposes should be overthrown.
7. Educational funds should be independent. (Free from seizure by militarists for other uses.)
8. In case of the dissolution of the school, the consent of the School Students' Union should be secured.

Concerning the School

9. Students' letters should not be examined.
10. Students' freedom of lodging, entering and leaving the school campus, and meeting visitors should not be restricted.
11. Tuition and boarding fees should be lowered.
12. Scholarships on basis of good records should be abolished.
13. Scholarships for financially poor students should be increased.
14. Examination should be abolished, emphasis to be laid on daily work.
15. The School Students' Union may appoint representatives to attend meetings of administrators.
16. The School Students' Union may appoint representatives to attend teachers' meetings.
17. School budget should be made public.
18. The School Students' Union should have the right of referendum over the resolutions concerning instruction and students, passed by the school authorities.
19. In case of expelling students the consent of the School Students' Union should be secured.
20. Students should have the right of initiative in matters concerning administration and instruction.
21. Schools should be made co-educational.
22. The School Students' Union may consult with the school to abrogate various unreasonable regulations and substitute practical "agreements."
23. Mission schools should not compel students to study the Bible, to pray, etc.

24. The School Students' Union may edit the publications of the school.

Concerning Students

25. The movement for selecting teachers by students should not be suppressed.
26. Schools should provide proper equipment for health work, engage good school physicians and lower medical fees.
27. Courses in social sciences should be increased.
28. Appropriations for library should be increased. More foreign and Chinese newspapers, periodicals and books of the latest editions should be bought.
29. The School Students' Union may manage things concerning students, *per se,* such as board and lodging.
30. Schools should offer a reasonable amount of monthly financial assistance to the School Students' Union.

The drawbacks to the present student situation, as a foreign educator sees it, are academic rather than political. The student is performing a great political service for his country, but aside from the political training he is getting very little education out of his schooling. The rather tenuous hold which the teacher or administrator has over the student has been mentioned. One reason for this and for the corresponding indifference of the student is found in the previously mentioned administrative feature borrowed from the Japanese and European systems—which, however, omit the necessary checks found in the originals.

The most serious feature of the entire situation is that the student is neglecting his studies and is getting very little of that training in the modern sciences which is supposed to justify his studentship and which his country so greatly needs. Patriotism alone will not suffice. Nationalism is not an entity in itself. Also it is evident to observers that China can never be strong until her government—local and general—is honestly administered. This can never be attained until the same enthusiasm for reform that is now directed by the student body against the

foreigner is directed against her own dishonest, corrupt, or inefficient officials. But herein lies one of the chief arguments for granting the demands now made by the aroused Chinese—not only that these demands are just; that China is entitled to her own national life with corresponding responsibility; but that this corruption and inefficiency are really a Chinese responsibility, and will never be remedied until these major foreign evils with their distracting influences have been removed. Then will arise the real test of student leadership, of student patriotism, and of the patriotism of the people as a whole.

Much is now being said of the returned students, especially of those trained in America. It is often remarked that they are taking little part in the present agitation. This can but be true so far as public agitation—especially street agitation—is concerned; for that is conducted almost wholly by students of the schools. But back of this present generation of the schools, exercising a restraining force, furnishing counsel and guidance, are many of the best of the returned students. Many also are in responsible positions of government, business, and education. When the time of deliberation and negotiation comes, it will be seen that the returned student will take a not insignificant part.

But at present it is not the returned student who holds the stage. Rather is it the meagerly trained, partially informed youth of the middle and higher schools. But numbers and enthusiasm and determination count. Their appeal is to the fundamental instincts of the masses—to self-protection, self-interest, group pride—which, with China, means ancestral pride; to personal rights and dignity—which, with the Chinese, means "face"; and above all, to mass emotion. On every street corner in all the larger cities youths are addressing small groups or crowds at all hours of the day and evening. In many cases young women students, casting aside the reserve of generations, are taking the same active part in political leadership and discussion. These street corner groups were the most conspicuous

sights in Chinese centers of population during the last summer. Occasionally huge mass meetings were held—one at Peking of 100,000, it was estimated. Yet in general the groups are small, usually a mere handful. But they were always attentive and usually responsive to the appeal.

The students in each institution are thoroughly organized, and each school sends delegates to local or city student councils. These councils usually exercise great, if not determining influence, over the entire student body of a community. In every such group there are certain to be radicals; but more often sober-minded judgment prevails. It is here that discussion takes place. Usually in each school, also, prolonged discussion takes place before any overt act. The penchant of the Chinese student for discussion is so well known that it is useless to argue the point that student actions are deliberate and not the result of unconsidered suggestion. The one case that came immediately under my observation—that of the students of Peking—certainly revealed an admirable self-control by emotionally excited youth after prolonged and serious deliberation. Because of the importance of action of the students of the capital—the largest body of students in the Republic—the situation was most delicate. It is true that the radical element which wished to precipitate immediate action and open hostilities was only denied control by a reorganization of the student councils, which left the extreme radicals as a small and inconsequential rump. The action of this student body certainly had a sobering influence upon the students of the nation, and carried conviction not only to related Chinese groups of merchants and officials, but to foreigners as well.

The student body brings pressure to bear on the laboring or coolie class by this constant popular education. It brings tremendous influence to bear upon the commercial and business class as well. Modern industry is not, as yet, well enough organized to make the industrial worker a great force. Perhaps Canton may be an exception to this statement. But the mer-

chants, the recently founded chambers of commerce, and the traditional guilds, exercise great influence. Even they have had to bow before the demands of the students. The pressure of public opinion, skillfully formulated and as skillfully guided by the student, has proved a tremendous power.

The possibilities of student contribution to the reconstruction of China is illustrated by the chief positive contribution they are now making, that of leadership in the new Nationalist army. Competent observers have long emphasized the fact that the Chinese soldier would become a good fighting unit, under competent leadership. As military observers have pointed out, what the army lacks is a competent staff of officers of the line—lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels. The contribution which the Russians have made is the machinery for training these officers, the Whampoa Academy at Canton with its staff of Russian teachers. The young men who have repeatedly filled this school are the students from the schools—now many thousands of them. Observers in the field have commented on the remarkable transformation which is made in the course of a few weeks' time when the disorganized soldiery of the North, perhaps with ten or twelve years' experience of campaigning, often deserting to the South, come under the leadership of this young student-officer group. It may well be that the chief service which this generation of students can perform is that of the political deliverance of their country; its future prosperity, even its political survival, depends upon whether they can also make the next constructive contribution—that of efficient government.

The leaders of the Nationalist Party are fond of saying that soon the period of construction will arrive—as soon as their forces have become supreme in the North. Many educators and leaders, not partisan, also fondly and firmly assert that the period of construction will soon dawn. Then will come the real test of the student—the returned student, and the student of this generation, who has wielded so great political power, but who has given so little attention to his studies. The

returned student is already taking a remarkably large and active part in the new Nationalist government. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the distrust of the new Nationalist government by the more conservative North is the larger part played by the younger men, and the elimination of the older type of administrator.

However, what is most needed in the educational situation is not more Western ideas concerning education, not even more Western curriculum, not revision of administrative plans, but a revival of the traditional Chinese educational ideals of thoroughness, of actual testing of ability, of actual attainment, and the rewarding of attainment with actual authority. In other words, education needs the application of Sun Yat Sen's fourth and fifth functions of government. The spirit of educational leadership in the Nationalist government promises this.

If you visit a foreign state, ask what the prohibitions are; if you go into a strange neighborhood, inquire what the manners and customs are.

—*Confucius*

Better one more good man on earth than another angel in heaven.

Better a bit of broken jade than a whole tile.

The road to heaven is easy to find, but myriads of people refuse to follow it.

It is better to put a lamp in a dark place than to light up a seven-storied pagoda.

—*Chinese proverbs*

He who overcomes others is strong;
He who overcomes himself, is mightier still.

—*Lao Tze*

Do not neglect your own to weed another's field.

—*Chinese proverb*

There are seventy-two sects, and each sect has some truth.

—*Chinese proverb*

CHAPTER XI

CHRISTIANITY AND MISSION WORK

THE chief commitment of America in China is in the Protestant missions. Of the twelve thousand Americans residing in China, more than half are missionaries or members of missionary families. The actual number of Protestant missionaries, according to the last records (1925), was 8,156, representing two hundred societies. Of this number about three fourths are estimated to be Americans. Of capital investment in China, American business represents about $70,000,000 and American missions about $80,000,000. The American Protestant missions annually invest in China from three to five million dollars. While it cannot be said of the total Western interest that the mission investments exceed those of business, certainly the chief cultural contacts between China and the West have been through the missions. The widespread interest in China displayed throughout America at the present time, which is now fostered by the newspapers and periodicals, yet finds its basis in the cultivation of the mission interests, for many decades, through the Protestant churches. Through their schools and the constant stream of students which they have sent to America, the Protestant missions have built up strong ties of cultural character, resulting in a mutual and reciprocal interest which forms one of the most powerful factors in the present situation. If the radical Chinese leaders were as conscious of the significance of these relationships in Britain and America as they are of the mission activities in China, their hostility might be tempered.

Both American and Chinese leaders should realize also that new methods of popular education have replaced the old. If following the relinquishment of control of mission institutions there follows a marked decline in mission interest and support,

this should not be attributed to change in mission methods alone. A far greater influence is the popular education through the movie news reel which has portrayed the hostile incidents in China, such as that at Nanking. Anyone who has witnessed the reaction of an American assembly to any such photographic reproduction, can readily see that the new method of visual evidence can undo in a few minutes a prolonged education through missionary efforts extending over years.

Although the Roman Catholic missions are strong in China, precede the Protestant missions in point of time, and now exceed them in number of native adherents, these interests are almost wholly of European origin. The French and Belgian missionaries of the various religious orders constitute the major working force and hence are not of so much direct interest to American readers. Though in recent years American religious orders have considerable representation in China, the Catholic mission interests have not formed so much of an educational factor in America.

The earliest approach of Christianity to China, as also to India, was through the ancient Nestorian Church. A large stone tablet covered with records of the old Nestorian Church was unearthed in 1625 and yet remains in the museum of one of the remoter provinces (Shensi). According to this tablet the Nestorian Church was introduced into China in 635 A.D., and flourished for at least two centuries—when, presumably, the tablet was buried. However, unlike its influence in India, all other traces of this early church in China have been lost.

Early Catholic missionaries had contact with China in the period of the Mongol Emperors (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries); but this ceased with the closing of the overland route. The founder of the Jesuit order, St. Francis Xavier, died off the coast of China in 1552, in the endeavor to bring Christianity to that country. His followers succeeded shortly after his death in establishing themselves. Other Roman Catholic missionary orders followed. During the seventeenth century these orders

became very powerful, did great service in introducing a knowledge of Western science and learning into China, and gained a strong hold on the ruling classes. The first Jesuit apostle was Matteo Ricci, who, through his knowledge of science and mathematics, came to have great influence with Chinese scholars. The Jesuit observatory at Sikawei, near Shanghai, which has contributed so much of practical value in meteorology and seismology to the present day, had its origin in the gift of a Chinese convert of Ricci's. It is assumed by many that Catholicism might have become a dominant influence had not a prolonged controversy broken out over the attitude of the Christian Church towards ancestor worship and other rites in which the more liberal and tolerant attitude of the Jesuits was overthrown by the conservative orthodoxy of the other orders. The result of a dispute over the use of a Chinese term for God, which was decided by the Emperor in one way and by the Pope in another, led to the popular view of the church as foreign and hostile. At present the Roman Catholic orders support about two thousand missionaries in China, the Church is organized into fifty bishoprics, and the converts number about one and a half million.

The first Protestant missionary was the Englishman, Robert Morrison, who came to Canton in 1807 on an American trading vessel, despite the opposition of the East India Company, which held the missionary idea to be "the most unwarranted project ever proposed by a lunatic enthusiast." While residing with American merchants, Morrison mastered the language, translated the Scriptures, and compiled a great dictionary; and the hostile East India Company was not averse later to using him as an interpreter. While many other missionaries followed, little could be done toward introducing Christianity into China until these missionaries could get beyond the confines of the foreign factories at Canton. This was not made possible until 1842, through the treaty of Nanking. At this time, after a generation of labor by these able men, there were only six

Protestant converts in China. The treaty of Nanking opened up five treaty ports, and soon many missionaries were at work in these centers. From then until the treaty of Tientsin, in 1858, their record was one of heroic labor and great hardship. By the time of this second treaty period, over two hundred missionaries, supported by twenty-four societies, were at work. Little progress had been made because of the hostility, ignorance, and prejudice of the people, and because the missionaries were confined to the limits of the treaty ports. Due to the opening up of the country by the toleration privileges of these treaties of the 1858-60 period, soon many of the interior provinces were penetrated and a period of great expansion followed, which continued—with occasional local uprisings—until the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. At that time more than one thousand native Christians, with two hundred and twenty-one missionaries or members of missionary families, were slain.

The connection between the spread of missions and the privileges secured through the "unequal" treaties of 1842-62 period forms one basis of the charge, now believed by many Chinese, of the imperialistic character of the missions. In so far as the missions have depended for their prosperity and success upon the provisions of treaties signed under compulsion, they are now considered by the Chinese to be contaminated with the same antinational poison. As the present period is rather anti-imperialistic than either antiforeign or anti-Christian, so the Boxer uprising was rather antiforeign than anti-Christian. Yet in both cases the connection between the foreign missionaries and the special privileges of the foreigner is so close that the missionaries do not escape the general hostility which is provoked.

Because of the isolated positions in which many missionaries live and work, they bear the immediate brunt of the opposition of the hostile Chinese. Business interests are largely confined to the treaty ports, with their greater security; but the missions are exposed to the risk of life as well as of property.

Consequently, the missions bore the brunt of the Boxer uprising. In the present difficulties, economic, political, and anti-foreign influences are equally important; so business interests are greatly affected, as well as missions. Were the missionary workers in interior places not recalled by government representatives as a matter of precaution, it is questionable whether mission interests, outside of areas directly affected by the virus of Communism, would have suffered much.

Since the Boxer Rebellion the mission interests, especially in their educational aspects, have developed greatly—until the outcropping of the present acute antagonisms. Various international and Chinese conferences, together with a National Christian Council and a National Christian Conference in 1922, have accentuated the Chinese basis of the Christian work, the necessity of coöperation between the national and denominational interests of the different missions, and the urgent necessity of a unified Chinese Church, to which the mission work could be speedily turned over. As lending significance to the native rather than the foreign character of Christian work in China, the Church of Rome has just consecrated six Chinese bishops. The disturbances of the recent years, particularly in the antiforeign aspect and in the emphasis on the supposed imperialist and antinational influences of mission schools, have greatly stimulated these tendencies.

The total Protestant missionary strength in China as given in the last figures assembled (1925), as 8,158, was an increase from 6,325 in 1918. Similarly, the number of mission stations had increased from 979 in 1918 to 1,133 in 1925. About fifty per cent of the total forces have begun their work within the last ten years. Of these, about one third are unmarried women.

The crucial character of the present situation (1927) is indicated by these facts: that in the interior only about five hundred of the missionaries have been able to remain at their posts; that all the educational work has been greatly hampered; that most of the lower and middle schools have ceased operation tem-

porarily; and that with one exception the twenty-six institutions of higher learning have been closed, or are operated by Chinese staffs alone, or are being turned over to the control of Chinese administrators. Great variability in estimates by responsible authorities exists, and these estimates are subject to modification. This situation will slowly change, in fact, is now improving, and the missionaries will be allowed to return to their posts.

WHAT MISSION WORK HAS CONTRIBUTED TO CHINA

In all fairness, even the most hostile Chinese or the most indifferent foreigner must concede that missions have at least been important. Whether for good or evil, depends largely upon the observer's point of view. An English statesman and former ambassador has recently stated that all of China's present troubles, and all of the troubles of foreigners in China, are due to the influence of American mission schools in China, and to the Chinese students educated in America. If an intelligent representative of a Western nation may hold such a view, it is not remarkable that the unenlightened Chinese peasant is led to shout that the missionaries "are devouring our country"—or even, at times, "are devouring our children"; that an ignorant servant should provoke a riot by reporting that his missionary masters were "gouging out and eating children's eyes" when a bottle of pickled onions was served. The intelligent Chinese, who may be hostile in part, believes that the mission schools denationalize their pupils; or, if wholly hostile, he may believe that missionaries in general are but the "running dogs"—the fore-runners or scouts—of the imperialistic business and political interests. All these beliefs must have some basis, however, slight. Some of them contain considerable truth; but none of them state the whole truth.

Again, mission interests may not have contributed along some lines where their devotees may believe they have contributed most. In a land as controlled for centuries as China has been by Confucian orthodoxy, mere formal belief in tradi-

tional moral or even supernatural codes will not constitute a novel force. Nor will a religion largely of rites and ceremonies, in a land with the choice of the elaborate rites and rituals of the various Buddhistic sects, constitute a regenerating moral force. A religion of formal worship and irrational beliefs has nothing to offer in a land as dominated by the grossest superstitions as is China. Only something which profoundly stirs the soul, by implanting the attitude and force recognized, though indefinable, as the Christian spirit, will be of avail.

But the missions have accomplished much, perhaps more easily recognized in their outward forms. Most of China's "modern education" and knowledge of Western science has begun with the mission schools. The early influence of the Roman Catholic missionaries has been mentioned. This has been continuous. The early students sent to the West were sent mostly under mission rather than governmental influence, as in Japan. The earliest and, to the present, most of the effective modern schools have been mission schools. With the exception of the students from Tsing Hua—the school founded, in 1911, from the remitted Boxer indemnity—and numbering in all about sixteen hundred, the larger part of the students coming to the West have received their early training in mission schools—or their inspiration from them. The mission schools have, in truth, furnished inspiration, example, and the stimulus of competition both to government and to private schools. Text books have been translated, curricula worked out, methods formulated, leaders trained, though too few. In every phase of educational work the mission schools have contributed, oftentimes as pioneers.

There are now sixteen Protestant mission institutions of collegiate grade; twelve of them complying with the standards of the Association of American Colleges. There are in addition four theological and six medical schools. In the sixteen colleges there were in 1926-27 over three thousand students, and in these professional schools more than an additional thousand.

Of these students about one third come from Christian families. Both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Churches maintain extensive systems of elementary and secondary schools. In such Protestant schools there are about 300,000 students. The attendance in the Roman Catholic schools is about 5,000 in the secondary schools and 250,000 in all. While the numbers in the government schools are probably ten times as large as these totals, it was the fear of the development of systems of schools largely under foreign control, dominated by foreign ideals and teachers and lacking in proper patriotic motives, that has led to the wave of antagonism to the mission schools which has arisen during the past few years. The mission schools frequently fly a foreign flag, though usually with the Chinese; use a foreign language largely; teach a foreign history; and without realizing that they are so doing, represent a foreign political culture. Whether this has served to weaken the Chinese patriotic or nationalistic spirit is another question, and is much to be doubted.

But there is no doubt that these students of mission schools have been more or less isolated from Chinese cultural conditions and, until recently, from current Chinese movements, in thought; with the result that they have now been all but overcome by the emotional appeals arising from the fervent and sometimes ill-balanced political tendencies of the times. Widespread fear has developed among the Chinese that there was being built up an *imperium in imperio,* fostered and perpetuated by a foreign school system over which they had no control. Such fear was very similar to that aroused against the early Catholic missions, with the secrecy of their rites and services, which led to their overthrow in the early days of the Ch'ing dynasty. But this statement is far from explaining the critical attitude toward the mission schools. As a matter of fact, many products of these schools are now numbered among their critics. One has only to become acquainted with the actual existing conditions to realize that many of the

STREET CROWD LISTENING TO AN EVANGELIST

A MISSION SCHOOL ROOM



Louis H. Dreyer

A MISSION PLANT

trained leaders in the present Nationalist movement, in its government and in its popular support, are products of mission schools, or at least of American schools. This situation forms the basis of the British Ambassador's criticism mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Allied to the educational service of the missions has been their contribution to medical service—in hospitals, in the training of physicians and nurses, in the general education of the public in certain aspects of health questions, and, above all, in the work of the medical missionaries themselves. There is nothing more impressive in all Christian work. The service of the medical missionaries constitutes an epic in itself, and the life work of any one of them would furnish a romance of Christian or humanitarian service of infinite interest. Here their work can only be mentioned. Its importance may be inferred from conditions. In a land of vast and over-crowded population, where life is at the margin of subsistence, where human sympathy therefore has had little room for development, where—through a huge infant mortality—great callousness among the ignorant has been developed; in a land inhabited and cultivated for centuries, where infections are on all hands—in the air, in the water, in the food, in the earth, in the homes, where ignorance and superstition have taken the place of medical science, the value of such trained workers can have no estimate put upon it. While many Chinese practices have a pragmatic value and the Chinese pharmacopeia, with twice the items of that of the West, must include numerous remedies of definite importance, it is quite impossible to estimate the amount of superstition and ignorance that thus enters into the life of the people. Through the missions, modern medicine has gained a foothold, a modern medical profession has been given a nucleus, modern hospital practices have been begun, and a sufficient proportion of each has been established in Chinese hands for it to continue, irrespective of what may happen to mission work.

In related ways modern philanthropic methods have added vitality to the ancient philanthropy of the family, the clan, and the guild. In this field of human assistance to human distress, as in almost every field, what is needed in China is an extension of the powerful traditional moral practices prevailing in the clan and family unit to the larger units of the community and the state. Such a transition, however, can come about but slowly. If it comes with sufficient speed to keep pace with the disintegrating forces of modern individualism, it will be well. Mission effort and activity have done something toward the stimulation of a wider humanitarian interest and philanthropic effort, which otherwise, except as indicated in clan and guild units, are woefully absent. But while these contributions to the social or community aspect of life are great, the stimulus given to the development of individualism is probably of yet greater importance. If one contemplates the gradual disintegration of the unity of family control—through the prolongation of student life, through isolation of students in school compounds, through sending students abroad, through delayed marriage, through seeking distant scenes of livelihood, through new marriage customs, through decline of ancestor worship, through complete rejection or novel interpretation of ancient beliefs and practices, through new intellectual, political, and social ideas—one begins to realize that the disintegration of the family unity is the most significant change now going on in modern China. This change underlies or accompanies all the economic, industrial, political, and social changes. And in a large degree missions have contributed to this disintegrating force. Whatever of unity and stability the new China may possess, replacing the well-knit unity and stability of the old, will depend upon the quality of the individualism dominating the new order. Modern missions have had a large share in creating this new individualism, have attempted to develop some of the new requisites. Whether this effort has been sufficient to withstand the strain is now being tested and will

ultimately be revealed. If it has been sufficient, there need be no fear for the immediate result of missions in China.

In other words, as previously suggested, the great need in China is for the contribution of what is generally recognized as the Christian spirit of helpfulness, of toleration, of sincerity, of endeavor, of coöperation, of brotherliness in every walk of life; and not especially the contribution of those externals of religion of which the Chinese have had their full quota for centuries. If the spirit has been contributed, this period of stress will largely tell; if not, and the work of missions be continued with that end in view, the need will still be great; but the continuance will require a reformation of methods, organization, and in some respects, of spirit and purpose.

One contribution of missions, largely the work of the past and not so essential for the future, is the service of interpreting the West to China and China to the West. While the earliest contacts were made by the venturesome trader, whose wares stimulated further interest and ventures, since the coming of the Jesuits in the sixteenth century most of the cultural interpretations have been given through the missionaries. While there were none to compete with Marco Polo, yet it was the report of the early Catholic missionaries, chiefly, that gave the highly idealistic conception of China held by Europe and the West during the eighteenth century. The early Protestant missionaries, restricted in their personal contacts, devoted much more of their time to efforts to master the language, literature, and culture than have later generations. Morrison, Legge, Williams, and similar representatives have furnished the Sinologues of the nineteenth century. Dictionaries, translations of the classics, works on the native religions and customs, and all the lore we have of this ancient people, have come largely through this source. Similarly, they have done much to put the science and the learning as well as the religion of the West into the language of the East. Not so much in this respect as might be wished; for in many

subjects there is a dearth of even good text books in the Chinese language. But the cultural knowledge of the West, with all the prestige it has acquired, has been largely given to the Chinese by the missionary. Only in this generation has there arisen a group of younger scholars among the Chinese competent—and interested enough in the task—to give to China an interpretation of Western culture.

A service somewhat similar to that as interpreter of the culture of the East to the West and of the West to the East is one seldom realized—that of interpreter of our governmental attitude toward China. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century the actual contacts with Chinese officials were for the most part made by missionaries; and as they were the only available intermediaries who could speak or write the language, the early treaty negotiations were conducted through them. First through the Englishman, Morrison; then, from 1830 on, through the Americans. "From that time onward, Bridgman, Parker, or S. Wells Williams actually transacted the greater part of the official business with the representatives of the Chinese Government for nearly forty years," writes the historian of American diplomatic relations;[1] who also continues: "For the remainder of the century, except for briefest intervals . . . it was these men rather than their titular superiors who, in most cases, had the actual contacts with the Chinese officials." The first American minister plenipotentiary, who came with scant respect for missionaries, wrote in 1856: "I am bound to say, further, that the studies of the missionary and of those connected with the missionary cause are essential to the interests of our country. Without them as interpreters the public business could not be transacted. I could not, but for them, have advanced one step in the discharge of my duties here; or have read, or written, or understood one word of correspondence or of treaty stipulations. With them there has been no difficulty or embarrassments."

[1] Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia.*

There is another function which the missionary performs inadvertently. That the missionary is the forerunner of commerce is much more clearly recognized by the Chinese than by either the foreign business man or by the missionaries themselves. Each missionary home or school or institution, with its extensive use of foreign articles and its free hospitality to its Chinese friends, is in reality a most effective commercial museum. Through their daily use of the multitude of implements of necessity and of comfort, they have become sales agents on a large scale. Protected by their treaty privileges of residence anywhere throughout China, they have carried this advance knowledge of Western wares into the remotest parts. Commercial salesmen could not have done this work of education nearly so well, since it is all the more effective because done indirectly and without expectation of material gain. The Chinese have been keen to realize this situation, and now connect the mission work with imperialistic capitalism, partly because of this obvious demonstration of their relationship. In periods of saner reflection, the Chinese will be able to look back and better to appraise this service.

REASONS FOR THE PRESENT OPPOSITION TO THE MISSIONARIES

In the light of all that the missionaries have done for China, it may be difficult to understand the widespread opposition to them at the present time. Several explanations of the problem, of quite diverse character, present themselves.

For the criticism that cuts the deepest, the missionaries have no direct responsibility; namely, certain aspects of the renaissance movement. This "New Tide" involves all the modern learning, but, most important of all, the rationalistic movement in thought. From this point of view, the religious attitude of mind is viewed as hostile to all independent thought, to free investigation, to modern science, to progress. Curiously enough, the most direct ammunition they have found for their argument that religion is opposed to science is furnished by

the anti-evolutionary controversy in the United States. As this same movement is responsible for much controversy and for the publication of controversial literature in China, it has been easy to direct the criticism of the rationalists particularly against American Protestant missions in general. Conversation with the radicals among the Chinese students does not leave the point in doubt. Specific resolutions on this point have been adopted by student conferences, and the argument is used in the "boring-in processes" among the students of mission institutions, despite the evidence of the great attention paid to the teaching of science in these institutions.

Related to the attack on missions on rationalistic grounds is that on pragmatic grounds. Such arguments are advanced by the same group of radical thinkers, and are usually combined in the same attack on missions and directed to the same student audiences. In brief, the argument is that of the inconsistency between the profession and the reality of Christianity, between precept and practice. In part this argument is based on the conception of a religion as a group possession, rather than of individual realization. The contrast between Christian civilization and Christian teachings is stressed. As Confucianism has been considered as a characteristic of Chinese civilization and as responsible for the good and evil found therein, so Christianity is judged by the totality of the culture which it claims to control. This contrast was greatly stressed by the events of the World War. The widespread propaganda carried on by the Allies, especially by the British, throughout China during the war became an important factor in the revelation of the practical aspects of Western life. Schools, chambers of commerce, all intellectual centers, were deluged with the account of German atrocities. With the entrance of the United States into the war, China was persuaded also to enter, with the advantages of confiscation of German property as a reward. One practical outcome, at the present time, is the common belief that the Chinese have a perfect right to confiscate the

property of nationals hostile to them. But the outcome in which we are here concerned is the widespread contempt for the pretensions of Christian civilization, and for its hypocrisy in being so shocked with the atrocities of Chinese warfare after the experience in Europe, in which the Chinese were so well instructed.

Several other features contributing to their disillusionment are of importance. The contrast between the life in mission institutions and in the treaty ports has been ever before them. The treatment and conduct of the White Russians formed but another illustration, reënforced by the life of vice to which many of these were compelled to resort. That many of the Western nations use their extraterritorial privileges to protect vice and to profit from such protection is well known, and not to be denied. There is a common belief among the Chinese that one of the chief reasons for insistence on the rights of the concessions and of tariff control is the protection of the foreigner in the matter of cheap whiskey and liquors, and of his interest in the opium trade.

Among the Chinese students sent abroad, particularly those from mission schools, disillusionment has always resulted from contrasting the protected and isolated life of the school in China with what is to be found in America and Europe. Many times the young student comes to believe that he has been deceived—certainly in regard to the dominant aspects of Western civilization,—and that there is a wide and irreconcilable gap between what Christianity professes and what Christian civilization actually is. Hence the ground is well prepared for the reception of the argument on pragmatic premises. Two weeks on a Pacific steamer, following life in a mission school, would be sufficient to produce such an attitude, even if there were no other experiences to follow. The crowding of these students into the larger urban universities in America, and many features of American student life, not to speak of life in general, complete the process. One cause

for this, more operative in the past than in recent years, is the total isolation of the student in mission schools from Chinese influences.

This pragmatic objection to Christianity has also been brought to the fore by the Nationalist movement, in the emphasis on the unequal treaties as the work of the Christian nations. Anti-imperialism has now become the great emotional force among all the student body; and, unfortunately, imperialism has been identified with the Christian nations chiefly, while—far more regrettably—the Christian missions have become identified with the imperialistic interests. No doubt organized propaganda has had much to do with this latter attitude. The action of the Seventh National Convention of the National Students Union, July 25, 1925, is one of the most significant indications of this type:

> The anti-Christian movement has publicly undertaken to fight against imperialism. We, the National Students Union, being one of the powerful organizations opposed to Christianity and to Christian education, have adopted the following concrete methods:
>
> 1. We decided that Christmas day, December 25, and the week December 22 to 28, should be observed as anti-Christian week. During the week when the Christians are trying to recruit followers, every Student Union should stir up the masses of people to carry on all sorts of activities against Christianity. We must make the anti-Christian movement, everywhere, work toward anti-imperialism. Most important of all, Student Unions everywhere should collect facts and materials regarding Christianity and imperialism in connection with the massacres which happened in Shanghai, Hankow, and other places. This can be used as concrete material among the masses. We should also print anti-Christian post cards, in lieu of various kinds of Christmas cards used everywhere.

There is much more to the same effect. Two sentences from the paragraphs following may give additional insight into the general attitude. One of these reads:

> They (students) should explain clearly that Christianity is the weapon of our oppressors, that the Industrial Department of the

Y. M. C. A. is an instrument used by imperialists and capitalists to cheat laborers, so that they will be content and will regard capitalists as their benefactors who take care of them so that the laborers may be slaves permanently.

That such an argument should have force in a land where millions are at starvation point continually, and this by presumably the most intelligent group in the community, but indicates how little emotions are amenable to reason. The second sentence directs that:

We should raise various questions with the evangelists, and then we should inform the public of the relationship between Christianity and imperialism; for instance, the missionaries, the officers, and the workers of the mission are foreign slaves and the "running dogs" employed by imperialists and capitalists.

The phrase "running dogs" is used continuously to indicate the inferior and contemptible position of all who are indirectly attached to the foreign political powers.

To realize the force of this propaganda, one must visualize the conditions in all government schools—in fact, now, after two additional years, in most mission schools as well. This is described in the discussion of student life,[1] and centers in the powerful Students Union of each institution, which has made itself independent of all control and in all save a few instances is far more amenable to the influence of outside agitators than to that of the constituted authorities.

The real question of interest here is: How did the mission interests become identified in popular Chinese thought with imperialist interests?

In part, because the missionaries have penetrated the country more thoroughly than have business men or other foreigners, and are thus the foreigners with whom the great masses of people are familiar; in part, because of their identification with foreign civilization in general, both by the masses

[1] See Chapter X.

and by the intelligent class, as pointed out in an earlier paragraph. Then, too, there has arisen an unfortunate identification of the mission compounds with the concessions; for in the same way they are subject to the protection of the extraterritorial rights—though seldom, if ever, these rights are actually called upon—and to the toleration clause in general. That the mission compounds carry special protection in times of trouble is well known to all Chinese; a knowledge used by the native converts and one which they will be very loath to lose. While there is a great diversity of opinion among missionaries as to the advisability of giving up extraterritorial protection—or, rather, since practically all agree that this privilege will soon be abolished—as to the effect on mission workers, few doubt that its abrogation will prove a great hardship in many regions, and, on occasions, to the native Christians. Practically all agree that mission property may suffer greatly, and that missionaries will be subject to exactions—perhaps of a monetary or property kind—whenever a military or hostile government comes into local control. All Chinese property has suffered greatly from such depredations during the last few years. Where but little property has been accumulated, as in most Chinese communities, recovery of normal conditions can be speedily made. But the mission compounds, in many cases, represent an accumulation of years of sacrificial giving and labor, and in most communities include the most conspicuous and substantial of buildings. This is particularly true outside the treaty ports, where they do not have the competition of the business plants. This very prominence furnishes one cause of attack, since the compounds are the most visible evidence of the dominance of the foreigner over the native.

The one aspect of the charge of imperialism on the part of the missions which will be most difficult for Americans to understand is that phase of mission work which is most vigorously and most commonly attacked; namely, the compulsory instruction in religion and compulsory attendance at religious

exercises. The prohibition of these activities is found universally in all the government regulations, North or South, provincial or general, and forms a part of all resolutions by students and educators dealing with the subject of foreign schools. The basis for this is simple and direct. Any action on the part of the foreigner which forces the Chinese to do or to think as the foreigner wishes, no matter to what subject it may relate, becomes imperialism. So the mission schools, by their very nature, are imperialistic. To answer this charge with the statement that pupils are free to attend the mission schools or not, as they please, and that in electing to come they have elected to receive the religious instruction which is required, does not satisfy the critic, and is looked upon as a specious evasion. To state that the Anglo-Saxon principle of freedom insures to the individual the right to propagate his religious beliefs by the establishment of schools, which pupils may attend if they wish, similarly fails. The argument that the Chinese constitution guarantees freedom of religion does not, they contend, apply. The foreigner is free to hold his religious beliefs and to propagate them through religious activities. But education is a function of the state; and if delegated to private agencies must be carried on as educational, not as religious, activities. This is the meaning of the provision found in all government regulations, that a school must have as its chief purpose an educational aim. The missionaries in general have long objected to this, on the ground that their schools had as their chief purpose the propagation of religion. Then, the Chinese educational authorities maintain, such institutions are not schools. The logic of the case lies with the Chinese authorities. But mission authorities are inclined to urge the acceptance of the Anglo-Saxin view that religion is an essential part of education, and that the liberty of the individual guarantees the right to conduct such schools if he complies with other regulations. To which the retort is made that this attempt to urge the Anglo-Saxon view of mission schools against the Chinese

view is but another evidence of imperialism. And the Chinese authorities hold the counters in the game. After a long period of protest and opposition, mission schools are now gradually giving in and those that remain open quite generally comply with the regulation. Had they done so a few years earlier, many of the present unpleasant circumstances might have been avoided, and the charge of giving in to compulsion might not have lent additional coloring to the charge of imperialism.

But aside from these influences, which tend to attach the stigma of imperialism to the missionaries, though some of them are clearly beyond their control, there are other reasons, inherent in the method of Protestant mission work, and perhaps only now becoming obvious to the more observant of the workers themselves. These may all be summed up in the observation previously made—that foreign residents in China have given little attention to the psychology of the Chinese or to what the Chinese were thinking; having their mind set, rather, on making the Chinese agree with what the foreigner thought. This constant attempt to dominate, even in the field of religious belief and practice, appears to the non-Christian as a form of foreign tyranny, or imperialism. Even the Christian convert has become more or less sensitive to this aspect of the situation. This midsummer (1927) I asked one of the most prominent of Chinese Christians if he thought that the missionaries ought to go. His answer was: "Many of them. Those who want to dominate; those who have the white man's superiority complex; those who are not willing to trust us ought to remain away, now that they have gone."

This impression—that the missionary is unwilling to trust the Chinese Christian—cuts far deeper than most Christians realize. A few years ago, when first the demand for government registration and inspection of schools was raised—following the evidence of a great system of mission schools, foreign-controlled, and in some regions more extensive than government schools—it elicited little attention from mission

schools but opposition, distrust, and even ridicule. Three or four years of controversy over the subject have resulted in converting the large majority of mission educators to the original requirements. But with opposition and the growing anti-Christian and antiforeign movement, these regulations have been greatly stiffened. Even recently the demands were for a Chinese principal or vice-principal and for a Chinese majority of the members of the board of control. Some months of agitation have led mission authorities to accept these drastic regulations—only to be confronted, in some provinces, with the requirement that no administrative officer and no trustee may be a foreigner. This continuous delay in meeting Chinese demands for the recognition of the parity of their rights and of their racial and national equality, together with the final acquiescence of the mission authorities in each step, when it is too late to take advantage of a less drastic requirement, has contributed to the belief that the mission authorities agree with the business and political interests, in giving way only to force. This attitude is what the Chinese conceive to be the reverse side of imperialism.

Another aspect of mission policy that is responsible in part for the present situation is the failure to make adequate use of the Chinese in the activities of the missions. Friendly critics of mission work have pointed out this defect for years. Their answer has frequently been that no properly prepared persons were available. The explanation which even able Chinese Christians give is that for the most part missionaries have been willing to make use of only second- or third-rate men, and have never been willing to associate able men with themselves. A policy which, to the missionary administrator, who perhaps dictated by financial limitations seems to the Chinese to have been dictated by fear of loss of personal prestige, or by pride of race or profession. Now that the present crisis has arisen there is a great demand for able Chinese to fill administrative positions, but they cannot be found in suf-

ficient numbers because they are in demand by their own people, to whose requests they naturally respond first. That the missionary is irritated by the unwillingness of his product to assume these duties that he would now like to thrust upon him, becomes but another cause of complaint to the Chinese. For, he says, such charges are unjust, showing a complete failure to understand the defects in mission policy in the past, as well as the hold of the new nationalism and the demands of patriotic service in the present.

The disinclination of the Chinese to assume public or group responsibility is, no doubt, a social characteristic springing from the family system; which tends on the one hand to limit moral responsibility to a small group, and on the other, to merge the social responsibility of the individual in a family unit. But this is only a very partial explanation of the present situation in mission organization. While the question of the employment of Chinese administrative officers in these institutions is largely a question of judgment regarding the past, that of the use of Chinese or foreigners in the rank and file is ever present. Here, again, the foreigner has not given sufficient consideration to the effect which certain policies might have on the attitude of the Chinese. A case in point, illustrative of the entire situation, came under my observation two years ago. In a long established mission school of one of the strongest of the American churches, teachers were needed. Funds available would have supported two or three Chinese teachers, just graduating from the mission university maintained by the same church. Instead, however, one missionary was sent. Since the new missionary could not do the work needed on account of lack of acquaintance with the language, he must give his time for a year or two to the study of the language and meanwhile cheap substitutes must be found. These were readily available from the rejected freshmen students of the university. The results were poor teaching in the middle school by incompetent teachers who could not do the work of the fresh-

man class in college; two or three dissatisfied college graduates, who betook themselves to the city and were thus lost to mission work after the investment of the large sums necessary to provide them with higher educational facilities for four or more years; an additional missionary, doing but superficial work for some years; finally, this present disturbance, which has at least sent him away from the field; and the conviction on the part of a large number of the Chinese familiar with the incident, that the missionaries were, after all, primarily interested in positions or "jobs" for themselves, just as they charge the Chinese.

Such incidents, which might be multiplied indefinitely, indicate the necessity for a careful revision of the mission policy after the present disturbances have subsided if the missions are again to function largely and helpfully in Chinese life.

Another criticism may seem captious—but, after all, we are interested in an analysis of why the Chinese have now become so critical of missions, not what the Westerner may think. There is an unconscious Anglo-Saxon masterfulness that may be Anglo-Saxon efficiency, or may be nothing more than the customary way of doing things with directness, but which offends the Chinese respect for form. The missionary is in charge; he is there to run the school or to teach. He does this in the English way or the American way, either of which has little consideration for the Chinese way. Every visitor has noted such situations: an efficient American administrator; running the institution with a high hand; giving little consideration to the feelings of his assistants and subordinates, because entirely unaware of them; subjected, if in his home land, to the opposition of similar wills—here met with meek subjection or toleration because there is no alternative; withal, doing an excellent work in so offensive a manner (to the Chinese) as to rob it of its finest results—the complete sympathy and appreciation of those for whom the work is done.

The extent to which the unconscious racial attitudes on trivial matters may determine important questions is illustrated

by an instance which came under my observation two years ago. In traveling with a graduate of a government institution, who evinced great hostility to mission schools, I pressed the inquiry for the reason until it was finally revealed. This young man had attended a government university in the vicinity of a mission university. Between these institutions, athletic contests were occasionally held. Athletics had been introduced into the government school by the aid of the American teacher and Y. M. C. A. secretaries; but because of the number of the staff and the intimacy of the training, the students of the mission school were always superior to those of the government school. But, not content with winning the games, the victors always celebrated with vociferous American college yells. As to lose in any contest is, to the Chinese, to "lose face"—than which there can be no greater humiliation—so, on the other hand, there can be nothing more rude or more crude than to triumph publicly over a defeated opponent. That educated professional man admitted that he long ago resolved that if he ever got a chance he would retaliate for these repeated insults, and that the opportunity had now come. We are inclined to say that the Chinese are "no sports," and need a training in sportsmanship. They are inclined to say we are barbarians and need training in ordinary politeness. At present we are solely concerned in an analysis of the Chinese attitude, not in the justification of either point of view. To the above explanation might be added the fact that, while humiliation of a rival is very bad form, there is slight disapproval, in Confucian ethics, of revenge on one who had done you an injury.

This attitude of triumphant Anglo-Saxonism is not a characteristic of the missionary alone. Among the Americans in the Philippines, the English in India, the Anglo-Saxon—wherever he may be found—has a superior self-assurance, especially in matters of conduct, that has made him a marked man—perhaps also has made him the successful man. Against this, since it is but natural, no objection may be raised. But when

the Anglo-Saxon goes into another land to persuade its natives to accept his ways of thinking regarding religion, or to offer to them some advantages of culture otherwise denied, when he goes as a representative of a competing culture, he would be wise to understand something of the culture for which he offers a substitute, something of the psychology which he seeks to change. In general, in their employment of administrators and persons in responsible position, in the selection of a teaching staff, in the recognition of foreign rather than native educational authorities, in the too exclusive use of a foreign curriculum and language, in an unconscious insistence on an Anglo-Saxon way of looking at affairs and of doing things, and practically ignoring Chinese educational efforts, the missions have made themselves vulnerable to the attacks which have recently come upon them in such numbers as to be utterly bewildering, and which have led many to despair of ever again reëstablishing their work on an effective basis.

What have been the specific reactions of the Chinese to the mission work? That there is a definite anti-Christian movement, as above indicated, must be admitted. But, aside from the opportunity which it offers to a radical Communistic or anarchistic group to stir up trouble, and aside from the anti-foreign or anti-imperial feeling which has also definitely arisen, this anti-Christian movement is more an intellectual attitude of a small class, which will always persist and always attach a small following. This following is, for the most part, such as exists in any Western country. With the settlement of the wrongs compassed in the term "imperialism," and with the exclusion of the Communist sentiment, which may be anticipated, this anti-Christian movement is not of profound strength, and is rather an intellectual than a markedly social dissent.

GOVERNMENT DEMANDS ON MISSION SCHOOLS

The chief strength of the opposition, in fact, now centers on the mission schools. The Chinese constitution promulgates

freedom of religious thought and worship; and most leaders, certainly those of the Nationalist group and many even of the radical left wing, have made it clear that they do not intend or desire to interfere with religious freedom. "The Government believes in the freedom of religious belief. But it will neither attempt to eradicate nor to promote religion, for religion is a matter of belief of a people with which the government does not wish to meddle," is the statement given in March, 1927, by a responsible official of the National government. Another official states his view more specifically: "Under the Nationalist government certain religions are allowed to exist and certain ones are not. The Mutual Good Association is anti-revolutionary and is ordered to be closed. Buddhism is a pessimistic and unworldly religion, being contrary to the Kuomintang principles, but it is neither anti- nor pro-revolutionary. It is non-revolutionary and is therefore allowed to exist. Christianity is an optimistic religion which enters into worldly matters. It is revolutionary, and is therefore allowed to exist and develop. We do not attack Christianity as a religion, but we do attack Christianity as being used as a tool of imperialism."

The imperialistic aspect of Christianity is found primarily in its schools; in the control of schools by foreign administrators and boards, in the use of foreign language, in recognition of foreign educational authorities and refusal to recognize Chinese educational authorities, in opposition to the control by the students through what they conceive to be the application of democratic principles to school affairs.

While the latter is primarily a matter to be discussed under education in general, certain aspects of the situation pertain to mission schools alone.

As has been already stated, in no feature are the mission schools more attacked as imperialistic than in their use of compulsion with regard to religious exercises and religious instruction. A further word needs to be said regarding the

compulsion now applied by the Chinese government. For several years, governmental regulations have indicated that elimination of the compulsory feature would be required of all registered schools. When it is recalled that two thirds of the pupils in mission schools are non-Christian, that in many regions mission schools are more numerous and effective than government schools, and that the evident purpose of the government authorities is to bring these schools under government control through registration, the situation may be understood. But now that the major schools have tardily acquiesced, the development of hostile sentiment has gone on more rapidly. They are now met with the demand, in many provinces or localities, and on the part of many people, that religious instruction and exercises be excluded from the schools altogether. This was at one time the position of the Japanese government. In fact, so far as public schools are concerned, it is the position of the American government and of the American people. The difference lies in the fact that America recognizes a large sphere of liberty to private schools, while China is inclined to declare education a function of the state and, in this respect, all schools to be public schools. Such is the attitude in many countries, though not reached in the United States. It may be that that position will be definitely assumed by the government in China. It is the position already assumed in some countries where mission work is carried on. While from the point of view of progress and of private Chinese endeavor in education this position is regrettable; yet if it be ultimately assumed, because of their tardiness and unwillingness in meeting far more reasonable demands of the Chinese authorities, the missions must share the responsibility. In the minds of the general mass of the Chinese people, the hostility of the missions to these regulations has accentuated their foreign character just as their insistence upon compulsion has led to their inclusion under the caption "imperialistic".

The other demands of the school regulations of the gov-

ernment, both North and South, are of minor significance to the missions. In general there have been six requirements: the board of trustees must have a Chinese majority and a Chinese chairman; the principal of the school must be Chinese; the regulations discussed above regarding religious instruction and activities; a school may not be dissolved without government consent, but may be dissolved by the government; it must have an adequate income; it must comply with government school organization, curriculum, etc.

The regulations other than these here discussed are admittedly reasonable, would be requested in most countries other than Anglo-Saxon, and should have been met long ago by the mission authorities without awaiting government compulsion. In fact, such a course of action had been urged on the mission for years by students of the situation, anticipating actual developments.

The dominance of radical factions in several provinces has led to the promulgation of far more drastic regulations, under some of which mission schools, or foreign schools of any kind —or, in some instances, private schools of any kind—could not operate. Such a situation actually accomplishes what the recent school referendum in the State of Oregon attempted; a measure which was overthrown by the United States Supreme Court, though the majority of the people of Oregon had voted for it.

Most of these provincial regulations require the daily observance of a memorial service to Sun Yat Sen, in which there is bowing before his portrait and a service of commemoration with a general patriotic service. Some mission schools have complied with this requirement and have found it quite possible to make of this service a source of training in citizenship. In some provinces or localities these regulations require that the schools should accept government appointment of one or more teachers to give instructions in "the Three Principles." When, as sometimes happens, these instructors are Communist agents, the situation becomes impossible, since the

object of these agents is either to break up the school or to inculcate ideas directly hostile to Christianity. While various methods of meeting this new problem—such as requiring the giving of the stipulated hours of instruction, which these political incumbents are unable or unwilling to give—have been adopted, the requirement itself, especially when coupled with a demand for ten per cent of the income of the school, as is sometimes done, renders the condition quite impracticable.

Other requirements of the local boards hostile to Christian schools are: the deposit of certain "reserve" funds in local Chinese banks; the appointment of principals of the school by the government party; the right of removal of any teacher by the government official; the prohibition of the dismissal of any student; the right of students to belong to any organization, or to leave or enter the school at will; and the dictum that all teachers must be graduates of the training school in party principles. In substance, these regulations often mean the complete destruction of any control of faculty or of student body by school officials.

When these are combined, as they often are, with regulations even more drastic or subversive of proper control of students, the impossibility of conducting a mission school, where the chief object is training in character, is apparent. In fact, the philosophy underlying all these demands is that any requirement which may express compulsion on the part of an authority with which foreigners have anything to do is imperialistic, and therefore is to be destroyed.

In the spirit of these regulations and inclusive of them all is a new general demand, which is assuming the proportion of one of the popular slogans expressive of the new radical demands. This demand, which probably would not have arisen but for the slow compliance with or open hostility to the early government demands by the foreign school authorities, is that all schools be "rendered" or "returned" to the government. "Unconditional restoration of educational rights" is a phrase

now used very frequently in political discussion and writings. To the more intelligent and the less hostile official or party member who uses the term it may mean nothing more than that all private schools, including mission schools, shall be compelled to come under government jurisdiction and accept the general regulations indicated above. With the general government regulation and the reasonable interpretation, mission schools might still accept and continue. But where this new demand means compliance with all local regulations and all student regulations, continuance of mission educational endeavor, even under Chinese Christian authority, would seem to be quite impossible. To many, however, especially to the emotionally excited patriot or reformer or agitator, the phrase assumes a much more sinister meaning—that of confiscation of all mission-owned school property. A considerable number of the same class have assumed that the cancellation of the concession rights meant the taking over of private property without compensation. Where government school teachers have gone with meager or no pay for months or even years; where the mission schools always have a finer plant than native schools; where these foreign institutions seem, to the local teachers, to have unlimited funds and always to pay their teachers; the temptation is strong to think that all that is necessary for continuance of such support and for obtaining good jobs is to "restore these schools to the government." This is not to say that the demand for restoration has no deeper basis; but the above attitude undoubtedly does exist.

THE OUTCOME

The entire situation must be visualized as one of extraordinary stress; one of excited and abnormal points of view; one that in time will assume a far more reasonable aspect. At present it is one of extreme difficulty, and in many regions does not offer to mission authorities any promise of speedy or satisfactory solution. If the regulations of the Nationalist or

Canton government of November, 1926, as outlined in this chapter, eventually prevail, adjustment certainly will be possible. When the question of the status of Christian schools was first before the leaders of the revolution, they replied that "as long as we have a Chinese Republic and as long as Christian schools continue to function as they ought there will be Christian schools in China."

On the other hand, since most of the mission educators have been compelled to leave their schools—and, in fact, most of the schools are now closed—many foreigners, discouraged by recurring difficulties, see only a "hopeless muddle"; others, even more pessimistic—the so-called disillusioned—see only "poverty, suffering, greed, lawlessness, oppression, ignorance, working toward the goal of national ruin and God's judgment."

Most of the missionary physicians have been forced to leave the country, with no one as a gainer and the suffering poor as losers. The only solution offered seems to be along the line of coöperation with government authorities, as in the matter of the schools. So great is the widespread opposition to enterprise of any kind under foreign control that prejudice of this Nationalistic character prevails over any other.

With reference to evangelistic work, while the present situation is crucial, the general hostility is not so pronounced and the future difficulties seem not so great. While there is opposition on the part of the Chinese Christian to foreign dominance of religious work, there is no great antagonism on the part of the general public. Practically all the missionaries who have left the interior fields report the attitude of the people to be very friendly. The government itself guarantees religious liberty. Most of the political leaders, even of the radical groups, have displayed little or no hostility to mission religious work. Many of the political leaders and some of the military leaders are avowed Christians. Many more of the people of influence are sympathetic to Christianity. Sun Yat Sen himself was a Christian.

But on the other side of the picture there is the distinct political hostility to mission schools; there is considerable opposition within the Christian Church against the continued supremacy of the missionary (this is especially strong, since the missionary usually controls the purse-string over church work); there is in places the general hostility to foreigners; there is the general anti-Christian movement; there is the Communist or Bolshevist propaganda, which is distinctly rancorous and subversive.

The most difficult part of the situation lies in the fact that open animosity is found in the student class, including in this class many who have received their education abroad. In most cases the opposition will be found on analysis to be based, not on anti-Christian feeling, but on hostility to the domineering attitude of many mission workers or the white man's "supremacy complex"; or on the efficiency, manners, and methods of the Anglo-Saxon; none of these factors having any essential relations to Christianity.

The only solution of this exceedingly difficult problem that can be offered is that if the great purpose of missions be accepted as that of founding a native Christian Church, most of the major difficulties will ultimately find their own solution. Such an attitude must mean that Protestant denominationalism will have little significance—and, consequently, that much of the enthusiastic support and financial assistance from America will dwindle.

To a very large extent in recent years Protestant mission work has become a cultural mission, rather than a religious mission in a narrow sense. In one respect, the cultural mission has accomplished its purpose. So far as the cultural mission is directed to individual ends and to preparing individuals for a personal career, there is no limit to its future. But in so far as the aims are social, and found in the acceptance of Western cultural ideas, the technique of Western culture, and in the preparation of a sufficient number of Chinese to direct and

carry on the work of the modern education of their compatriots, their purpose may be said to be accomplished. The Chinese now definitely wish to carry on this work themselves. While they will continue to welcome the coöperation of the Westerner, they definitely desire that the cultural training of their own people be under their own direction. Hence the necessity of the reformulation of the mission policy.

This entire situation indicates one other major consideration: nearly all the difficulties of the missions center around their material property. Because of this property, special treaty protection is necessary; when it is threatened with destruction, the power of the home government is invoked. These large properties are the visible evidences to the natives of the superiority and the specially favored position of the missionaries—of the special treaties; the contrast with Chinese dwellings and native institutions emphasizes the power of imperialism; they are regarded by the native Christians and are used, as are the concessions, as havens of refuge. They are symbols of the missionaries' life of comparative ease and luxury, which, to many Chinese, furnishes a motive for their presence.

To religious and educational work of a personal nature there is not now, and probably would not be, under any circumstances, much real opposition. Are the mission interests able to face the situation, reorganize their policies, relinquish the material evidences of their power? That is the question which now demands answer.

Schools, colleges, churches, and hospitals must become Chinese; but with all this there may be just as much welcome as previously for sympathetic personalities, for those who really wish to serve, for those who can adapt themselves to personal religious work or to teaching. This may be the great period of decision for Christian missions; and it may be far more important that Christianity become Chinese than that denominational mission work be perpetuated.

Government consists in nourishing the people:
And all virtue is in good people.

—*Pre-Confucian*

To administer the state on the basis of virtue may be likened to the northern star, to which all other stars pay tribute.

—*Confucius*

CHAPTER XII

A MODEL PROVINCE AND A BENEVOLENT DESPOT

THE complexity of the Chinese situation is again illustrated by the fact that one province, not far removed from the center of the country, has remained almost untouched by all the revolutions and counter-revolutions, plots and counterplots, military combinations and re-combinations, that have made the checkered career of the Republic. Governer Yen Hsi Shan of Shansi is the one governor who has remained in office since the Revolution, and he controls the only province that until 1927 has not been mixed up in the confused struggle of party and faction. Devoting himself to the efficient administration of his province and the welfare of his people, he has thereby earned the name of "The Model Governor." That Yen has become one of the major parties of the moderate forces has now been definitely shown by action. A study of conditions in this province will give, in concrete form, much of the background which needs to be supplied in following the play of political forces on the surface.

From the previous account of political events a general estimate of political conditions can be made. But the real life of the great masses of the people, the difficulties which confront an official sincerely desirous of helping his people, and the part which foreigners play in the situation, can be grasped only through a study of local conditions. A narrative of a personal visit to this province made a few years ago, may serve this purpose.

Some twenty-seven years ago, in front of the governor's Yamen at Taiyuan, capital city of the Province of Shansi, forty-three English and American missionaries were done to death by the soldiery of the Chinese government. Spurred on by the frantic mob, the officials, little less frantic than the ignorant

populace, were glad to find some persons upon whom to wreak their hatred of the foreigners. For it was to "the foreign devils" that they attributed the poverty, the hunger, and the oppression under which they labored—a belief which their officials were not loath to encourage.

To-day, across the street from the governor's Yamen stands the Hall of Meditation, sometimes called—in contrast with the old literary examination halls, once near by—the Self-Examination Hall. In this large building, on each Friday morning, the governor meets his officials, to talk to them on problems or policies of government, of education, of psychology, of ethics and morals, even of religion. On Sunday mornings, bodies of the soldiery are frequently addressed on similar topics by the governor or some other official, or by some visitor. Governor Yen is "the model governor" partly because he has ruled long enough to demonstrate the results of a definite policy pursued over a period of years, but more because of the benevolent ideals of the man himself.

Curiously enough, the governor attributes much of the advance of his people, much of the progressive character of his administration, to the backward condition of culture in the province of Shansi and to the ignorance of the populace. Even in education, in which the province has made more recent progress than any other section of China, the Commissioner of Education, as well as the governor, said that the improvement was largely due to the ignorance generally prevailing. For they argued that in the more enlightened and progressive provinces the people would not tolerate the arbitrary and high-handed methods which are here adopted to spread the results of modern culture. What will happen to this enforced educational progress when the result of these efforts has produced a more enlightened generation, able to judge and act for itself, is an interesting question.

The province itself is quite isolated, and only recently has been tapped by a branch railroad. On the other hand, it is

the region through which Marco Polo passed into China nearly eight hundred years ago. Then it was on one of the main lines of communication with the less cultured Orientals of the Near East. And it was in touch with Europe also, as Marco Polo's account gives evidence. In this region, as in others, he mentions the comparatively large colonies of Mohammedans, of Jews, and of Christians. Particularly of these last does he speak often. How these Christian and Jewish colonies came to disappear, and how the great Venetian got along with the benevolent despot who reigned in his time, would be interesting questions to pursue; but the pursuit would tell us nothing of our benevolent despot of the twentieth century.

The people of Shansi are no doubt less enlightened than those of the coast provinces. Certainly many more of the children in the schools wore the lock and chain around their necks in order to prevent the evil spirits from taking them from their doting parents, who at the same time would be likely to regard any hygienic or sanitary measures with that end in view as wiles of foreign devils.

Nevertheless, these provincials have the fundamental virtues possessed by the Chinese as a people. At the basis is their industry. No daylight hour seems to be lost by the farmer or by any of his family. In the city the voice of the handicraftsman—the apprentice's, if not the master's—is the last sound one hears before falling asleep and the first on awakening. Pupils in the schools recite from thirty-two to thirty-eight hours per week instead of the sixteen to twenty of our own school children. Thrift also is one of their virtues, common to all the Chinese. Not over one hundred and twenty *li* from the capital lies Taiku, for centuries the home of the bankers of China, now—alas!—a sacrifice to opium and rebellion.

The same spirit of good humor and fair play, the same ability for self-government, are shown in the democracies of these villages as elsewhere in China—the same loyalty to the

family group. On the other hand, the same ignorance and superstition prevail here that apparently form the basis of the conservatism of the rural population in all the provinces of the country.

At the mouth of a wonderful gorge some fifty *li* west of Taiyuan lies a temple by the side of a beautiful pool. This spot formed the western limit of the journeys of Confucius. Some twenty-six centuries ago, according to the story, Confucius turned back here because of the ignorance of the people; for hanging on a tree, he found a monk, self-destroyed through fear. This monk had been sent out by his abbot to pray for rain. After repeated failures, bringing repeated reproaches from the people, who argued that surely he or the gods themselves lacked power, the monk came to this magic spring, which flowed in a great stream from under the very foundation of the mountain. Failure of the gods to respond even here led him to take his own life. When Confucius heard the story, he sorrowfully turned back, for, said he, "A people so ignorant and superstitious would not receive my teachings." The tree on which the monk hanged himself still stands within the temple building, its trunk worn to a wonderful degree of polish by the reverent fingers of worshipers—for it is popularly believed that whoever touches the tree will have his immediate wish gratified. Whether this virtue of the wood is due to contact with the sage or with the superstitious monk—whether it is a popular recognition of the wisdom of rationality or of the virtue of faith—is an open question. But this is true, that our way was at times impeded, even over the new Red Cross roads, by the village processions going to the temples to pray for rain. And one of the difficult questions which the shrewd old governor put to me was: "Do not your missionaries teach the people to pray for rain?" It is an age-old situation, for even Socrates was accused of corrupting the people because he taught that rain comes from natural causes and not by the will of the gods.

Thus in many ways people and customs united to make the culture seem to us indigenous and unchanging from time immemorial. Marco Polo and Confucius appeared as contemporaries. The Confucian temple in which I was entertained during my two weeks' stay was the principal building in the city—a museum, a library, and an educational center combined. While the temple building was probably not so ancient, I have no doubt that the great bronze bell which tolled the hour was the same that the great Venetian traveler spoke of as sending its reverberations throughout the city. The midnight strokes were to be particularly noted, according to his account, for the guards were under order to slay anyone roaming the streets after that hour. Fortunately those times were long past in the day we visited the country villages—the midnight hour had struck before we reached our temple. While we were spared the fate of the belated wanderer of Marco Polo's day, we knew just how the author of *Ecclesiastes* felt when—perhaps after he had been out late one night—he wrote: "The doors shall be shut in the streets, when the sound of the grinding is low." It is quite impossible to tell accurately, or even to estimate, the age of a Chinese temple; but that bell certainly had survived the centuries. And, one was tempted to believe, so had the old Father Time who wielded the huge maul with which the hour was struck. Having noted slight irregularities in the striking of the hour, I went into the main court in which the bell tower stood and awaited the event. A few minutes before the hour, a tottering old man came from one of the pavilions and, climbing the ladder, seized the huge wooden mallet, all slivered from long use, and struck the required number of strokes on the rim of the bell. No conventionalized figure of Father Time could have better looked the part.

Confucius himself is still a living memory in Shansi. As we rode along one of the newly finished Red Cross roads in a Ford auto, my friend and guide, pointing to a walled town some distance across the plain, said, "That city was destroyed

once." As no building activities were evident, I inquired when this had happened. "Oh," said he, "back in the time of Confucius." One of those useless remarks was the only reply adequate, "Well, they've had time to rebuild."

The country itself, as well as its customs, institutions, and men, gives evidence of age. While most of the arable land is in the form of plateaus between the mountain ranges, yet it is of the loess formation, of uniform composition and texture, fertile to any depth to which it extends, cutting like cheese. Adjoining fields may be of different levels, yet each is perfectly level. The roads, through long use, may be—and usually are—worn deep into the soil. While they had not, in this central plateau, sunk to the great depth below the level of the fields that often occurs in the lower lands of other provinces, yet there were, even here, places where the road had worn down ten or twelve feet. By the reverse process, the stream banks had been built up as they were dyked year by year to prevent the fields from being overflowed. In one place we had the strange experience of seeing our road wind out from a rut ten to twelve feet below the level of the fields, climb up over a small river ten or fifteen feet above these fields, and then crawl down into the rut on the opposite bank.

Even in this high central plateau families occasionally live in caves cut into the bank of loess, where one field lies high above another, or where a mound or hillock of somewhat harder material had been left with almost perpendicular sides. In the lower lands, and in the mountainous region below the high central plateau which lies between the capital city of Shansi and the main railway line in the adjoining province of Chihli, many villages were composed entirely of these cave-like dwellings. Shansi itself lies in the dry belt, the rainfall being from fifteen to thirty inches and quite irregular. Consequently, erosion in the level parts is slight—though it is heavy on the hills, where the slight rainfall comes wholly in torrents and where there is no dense vegetation to hold the soil.

The ten million inhabitants of the province are really village folk. The capital, Taiyuan, is the one large city, having from seventy-five thousand to one hundred thousand inhabitants. Soldiers and students comprise almost half the population, a fact which does not make for peace. Not that they are a warlike people, but both students and soldiers are given to bugle-blowing on all occasions—the earlier in the morning the more meritorious the act. Most students and soldiers know how to blow the bugle and are proud of the accomplishment, or they are learning to blow the bugle and must learn outside of the proper hours reserved for those who do know how.

Though so large a proportion of the inhabitants are soldiers, the people do not appear to be at all military. One of their native proverbs is, "If you have a good piece of steel, put it in your knife blade." But the knife is not necessarily a sword; it may be a pruning-hook—only there are no bushes, and scarcely any trees. Moreover, those who are the soldiers are not engaged chiefly in soldiery. The model governor is too wise for that. If they were real soldiers, they would probably be bandits when not in ranks, or when A. W. O. L., which occurred more frequently. But the soldiers of the model governor are employed chiefly in building roads, or erecting buildings, or carrying materials for street construction, or planting trees, or going to school—chiefly industrial schools. We saw many of them—this was late in the fall—gathering the little berries or buttons, the seeds of the huge cedar trees. These trees are found only in the temple courtyards and in appearance resemble the cedars of Lebanon, except that their branches are so scraggly and their foliage so thin that they reminded one of an aged Chinese elder rather than of Solomon.

It has taken a long time to give the model governor a proper setting; for that setting is the province and the people, not his Yamen. The Yamen is a two-story modern building of brick, as unattractive architecturally as a mission school

building, and as uncomfortable as a Chinese one. The governor eats and sleeps in this unattractive Yamen, but he lives in the hearts of his people. Consequently, a visit to him in his Yamen was proper only after some contact and acquaintance with his people. Many times did the governor say: "I have only two objectives: to make my people happy and, in order to do this, to help them to a better living."

To this end he has instituted six reforms—three negative, three positive. The three negative are the abolition of queue wearing, of foot binding, of opium smoking. The positive ones are good roads, better agriculture and forestation, and modern schools.

Why bobbing a man's hair by cutting off his queue should be considered a great social reform may be difficult for a Westerner to understand. Perhaps it symbolizes progressive thinking, much as does the bobbing of a girl's hair in the Occident. It becomes the visible symbol of a complete break with the conventions, the standards, the ideals, of the past. It is an easy way to make men modern. It is a sort of social metonymy—the sign for the thing signified. Take a conservative, superstitious, ignorant, prejudiced, antiforeign Chinese. Cut off his queue, and he becomes an intelligent, progressive, foreign-imitating Chinese. Soon he will be wearing a wrist watch, drinking from a thermos bottle, sleeping on an air pillow, awakening to the music of an alarm clock—and the bugles! True, the queue may grow again, but that only gives the barber and the governor some more work. Besides, the new growth takes a long time; it will never grow very long; it is a nuisance while growing and causes much amusement among the by-standers; then, after all, one is apt to get it shaved off; it costs so little. So one gets the habit of queuelessness, so to speak.

Anti-foot-binding means the same thing with the women as anti-queue-wearing with the men. In addition, bound feet signify the same thing that high heels and pointed toes or any

style of deformed feet and constricted body do in the West—that the deformed does not have to work and so is above the social status of those who do. And those who are compelled to work must imitate the deformities of those who are not, to make it appear that they also belong to the superior class. But in Shansi the facts are against these pretenders, for laboring in the fields and in the handicrafts are found the women—all the women—and most of them with bound feet. So these bound feet represent a great economic loss, a tremendous amount of useless suffering; they stand for conservatism, ignorance, and superstition. The governor has a very clever method of bringing this reform to pass. As we shall see later, Shansi is the one province where all the children are in school. And every little boy of the province wears in the primary school a small brass badge which reads: "I will not marry a girl with bound feet." Now in Shansi every girl must be a marketable product and must be disposed of in marriage early, otherwise she is a great economic burden to her father's family, though she would be an asset to a mother-in-law. Thus, when every family in the land has a reminder constantly before them that in the coming generation girls with bound feet are not going to be disposed of in marriage, big feet become popular even more quickly than bobbed hair. Besides, there is a tax on young women with bound feet, and this tax goes to the support of schools for girls.

Prohibition of opium smoking and of the use of all opium products is quite another story. Shansi is the one province where opium growing was earliest stamped out. By common report it remains stamped out. Repeated inquiry as to how this reform was enforced brought the answer that the grower of the contraband opium was shot. To one coming from the land of the deferred and the indeterminate sentence, of juries that will not convict as being undemocratic, of officials that will not suppress crime because there is one law on the statute books which they do not like, and of similar refinements of a

polished civilization, this procedure seemed quite rude. Not that any foreigner would ever give assurance that the shooting was done. But all agreed that opium growing is effectually suppressed. Perhaps the procedure was much the same as the more recent experience in Canton regarding the suppression of gamesters. Here again the death penalty was announced for the crime of public gambling, after a given date. Since the previous government had stimulated gambling as a chief source of revenue, this seemed at once a difficult step and a harsh method. To my inquiry as to whether the extreme penalty had ever been inflicted, the sententious answer was given: "It was not necessary." Unfortunately, the suppression of opium growing is not identical with the suppression of opium using. For this is where the beneficent foreigner comes in—but not in my story. Suffice it to say that opium growing, with all its profit to the farmer and its revenue to the government, is suppressed; but opium using, with all its degradation to the people, all its impoverishment to the community, all its enrichment of the foreigners, is not suppressed. The suppression of opium using could not be entrusted to a heathen governor; that could be properly handled only by the intelligence and the moral conscience of an international conference of Christian Powers—which postponed its consideration!

Of the positive reforms, that in agriculture and forestation has made the least marked progress. The machinery of Western agricultural education has been transplanted. Agricultural schools and experiment stations have been established. The schools are teaching a considerable number of boys, subsidized to undertake the training—chiefly, to undergo the lectures. Some practical work is being carried on; some experimentation, in the way of seed selection, comparative tests of varieties for yield, endurance, adaptation to soil, etc.; some laboratory research; some attempts to improve implements of cultivation and of the manufacture of cotton and silk fabrics; some investigation of the oil values of seeds and nuts. But, after all, there

is no enthusiasm for and little insight into the complicated problem of modern agriculture. There are no outlets for the graduates of these schools except the few experiment stations, each manned by four trained men. For the most part, these stations were waiting for the farmer to come to them; but for this he had no incentive, as he had no understanding. Even when the agricultural school is of middle-school grade, the graduate cannot afford to go back to the little farms, and there is no farming on a large scale. Development here awaits the real passion for reform, which can come only when these trained experts win through the routine of a mechanical education and become infected with the same strong desire for reform which possesses the governor.

As to forestation, the situation is somewhat more promising—not that there are any forests, at least in the vicinity of the capital city. But afforestation of some of the hills has begun, and a scraggly beard of saplings fringes those that are distant enough from habitation. Most promising of all, however, is the fact that the soldiers are engaged in gathering and planting seeds, caring for the seed beds, transplanting seedlings, and, in general, performing the duties of foresters, in so far as this is possible without forests. As the greatest lesson the Chinese need to learn is the worth and satisfaction of service to the community or group as a whole, the training of soldiery in such services is far more valuable than all the military training which they can get, or than the military service which they can render.

The good roads program has already made great progress. More than six hundred miles of roads suitable for automobiles have recently been built. Whether they will be suitable for automobiles after being used a while by the Pekingese carts which have cut the old roads so deeply into the fields is another question. While the Red Cross has built some of its roads, the governor had initiated the policy years before, as his soldiers can testify. That at least eighty miles of this native-made road

can be traversed by auto, I can witness—for my native chauffeur took it all on high. However, from his manner of starting and of passing the teams and the pedestrians on the way, I have grave suspicions that this speed record was due not to the roadway but to his ignorance of how to shift gears. The experience of some of my friends the previous day lends color to these suspicions, though I had a different chauffeur—necessarily a different auto. However, there were no fatalities—at least, no human ones.

The old governor is right. Good roads, better means of communication, constitute one of the best means of progress. In fact, they furnish a suggestion to the foreign friends of China how best to bring in modern reforms—give an automobile to each *Tuchun.* It then becomes necessary for him to widen some of the streets—at least, the one leading to the Yamen. This necessitates tearing down the old buildings, building new ones with better fronts, and a street with drains or ditches, occasionally even with sidewalks. These streets must now be kept clean, and the soldiers gradually assume the duties of traffic policemen. Shopkeepers find an improved trade and keep finer wares. Handicraftsmen of the better grade gravitate there. They demand more and better material from the farmer, and he in turn realizes the benefit of better streets and roads. By this time the governor has tried his auto on the old country roads and has begun to work for new ones. In fact, he has one running a few miles into the country. Farmers use this also to good advantage and to the benefit of the townspeople. Even the soldiers find that they are more kindly received and their pillaging not so much resented when they are at work on the roads.

So the work of modern progress goes on, and this particular governor finds his two great aims partially realized; his people are getting a better return for their labor, and they are happier, even though they do not have a Ford of their own and can only dodge the governor's.

While hopes are high concerning large plans for irrigation and farm improvement, the great effort of the governor and his fellow workers is centered on schools. They are to be the chief means for reforming the people—for replacing the ancient civilization with a modern one. Among other instruments of modern government and education, Shansi has a bureau of statistics. Its business is to produce statistics. These statistics say that there are thirty-five thousand schools and five hundred thousand children attending them, and that there is nearly complete compulsory attendance for the four years of the lower primary school. Whether these figures are more reliable than any other educational or government statistics does not matter. What is of concern is that the governor has made a genuine effort to establish schools for the masses, that Shansi comes nearer to attaining compulsory schools and compulsory school attendance than any other province, and that this isolated province of little wealth—conservative as it is and with few foreign contacts—has in this respect become the model province of all China.

In 1917 a policy was adopted which looked toward the requirement of four years' compulsory schooling of all children, to be consummated in 1921 for the boys, and in 1923 for the girls. This entire length of time was divided into seven periods for the gradual extension of the system—a scheme for gradual development, frequently used throughout China. Unfortunately, Shansi was in the famine region of 1920-21. Where little or no rain had fallen for one or two years, it was all that the people could do to avoid starvation. While it was necessary to abandon the stages of development planned in the general scheme for this year, yet there was no diminution in the funds contributed or in the number of schools and of pupils when compared with the previous year. Considering the poverty and the suffering of the people, this is a remarkable record. My visit was in the fall of 1921, during which time a very satisfactory crop was being harvested. For the most part,

the village schools were closed in order that the children might help in gathering the crops. The work of the children on the farm and in the homes is, in fact, an important part of Chinese education, affording a practical training which the school cannot rival.

A visit to the country village school, in the typical rural regions not touched by the new roads, was not so simple as one might suppose. The provincial commissioner of education must accompany the visitor; the district magistrate also must represent the county. The attendance on the schools is supervised by the local police, who are under the chief of police of the county or *hsien*. So he, too, must accompany the guest. The entire party must be escorted by a squad of soldiers, with servants to carry the water jars and material for a Western meal. These elaborate arrangements were all a matter of hospitality and proper courtesy, not at all a necessity. But as it was, instead of two unknown visitors, as was my original desire, an imposing party of nineteen mounted men descended on the little village schools. Of course, immediate surrender of the teachers, schools, and children to such a cavalcade was to be expected. So at each village the entire school was drawn up along the roadside under their own officers, but accompanied by their teachers and the local police official. The school children were all in uniform, as befitting citizens of the new republic, so one could not suspect a padding of the school roll. Where living is so close there is no probability of the extra expenditure represented by a uniform or even a cap, unless such expenditure is demanded and justified. The school was always headed by the flag; patriotism has, indeed, become a very powerful motive. The children were under command of their own pupil officers, and their independence and achievement were invariably heralded by a bugle and sometimes by a drum corps.

The pupils had been summoned in from the work of the field to represent the work of the school to the foreign visitor.

A CAVALCADE VISITS THE VILLAGE SCHOOLS

A COUNTRY SCHOOL RECEIVES VISITORS

GOVERNOR YEN HSI-SHAN

A PROCESSION PRAYING FOR RAIN

As our route had at the last moment been reversed, some of these groups of children had awaited the approach of the visitors—standing at attention along the roadside—from early morning until late evening. No doubt actual work, with the whole village population in the sunny fields, would have been preferable to a day in school or to standing at attention, had it not been for the added attraction of a glimpse of "the foreign devil"—now merely an appropriate schoolboy term for a school visitor.

The welcome of the school children and of the police was not the only greeting; the village elders were usually at the village gateway with a greeting, a cup of tea, and a generous supply of sweet cakes. The working democracy of these little villages is the great political hope of the country. The hospitality and friendliness of the villagers is a symbol both of the open-mindedness of the people and of their international-mindedness—they believe in peace and in the essential union of the peoples of the earth on a neighborly basis. Such views are frequently proclaimed in the mottoes of virtue exhibited in many schoolrooms.

The children, and even the elders, were not the only ones who paid the penalty of discomfort for that day's work; Mongolian ponies, Chinese saddles, and Shansi roads do not make the most comfortable combination for the foreign visitor. By lunch time the mountains were reached and we arrived at the old Confucian temple. Proper deference to the old tree trunk with the supernatural power to grant the worshiper's chief desire, brought the longed-for relief. Soon after luncheon a Pekingese cart presented itself as the possession of a village Crœsus; and, the power of the police and the magistrate prevailing, it was commandeered for the foreign guest. The Pekingese cart is a heavy vehicle with solid wheels and no springs, made to traverse the roughest of roads with no damage —to the cart. There is an old proverb that since the Chinese could not make a durable road, they made an indestructible

cart. It has a covering similar to that of the old prairie schooners. In it one can neither stand, lie down, nor sit up in the Western fashion. One can ride "in comfort" only by sitting in the Oriental fashion—impossible except as a form of torture to any Westerner but a little child. Nevertheless, it has the advantage of distributing discomfort. By nightfall the entire complexion of the cavalcade had changed; in fact, it was no longer a cavalcade, but a string of Pekingese carts, densely inhabited by officials and guarded by a squad of soldiers, each of whom led a bunch of ponies. The purpose of this guard seemed to be to raise a dust screen to hide the occupants of the cart from the profane gaze. If so, the scheme was eminently successful.

During the course of the day fifteen villages were visited. In all of them schools were in operation. In twelve of the fifteen the schools were held in old temples, and in one case in an old monastery. This condition would certainly bear out the claim of the authorities, that during the last three years more than seven thousand temples in the entire province had been turned into schoolhouses. Thus were housed seventy per cent of the new schools of the past three years; twenty per cent of the whole number were accommodated in converted private residences of the better type; for only ten per cent were new buildings required.

In most places the adaptation of the temple for a school is a simple one. The attached pavilions, of which there are always two and frequently many, used for the priests and the temple keepers, make, with slight modifications, excellent schoolrooms. These rooms are usually about the proper size for a small class; they are lighted by having one entire side made of paper windows and doors, and can be slightly warmed by small braziers. The teacher's simple living quarters—often a room no larger than six by six feet—are usually adjoining. Such schoolrooms may be easily multiplied in most of the villages or clan temples, usually of the Confucian type. These

temples, belonging to the village or clan, have been used in the past for all types of clan meetings, perhaps for fairs and markets, perhaps as threshing floors, perhaps for an old-fashioned clan or Confucian school. So it is a natural thing to turn them into modern government school houses.

An old monastery spoken of above, inclosed by a huge high wall, with an entrance gate sunk below the level of the ground so that there was no visible entrance to the enclosure, held three schools. The monks still lived in part of the buildings, and the smoke of incense arose continuously. Yet one of these schools was organized as Boy Scouts under Christian mission influences, and sang most excellently and vociferously, "Onward, Christian Soldiers" in Chinese. The entire village and countryside turned out for this inspection, which occurred late in the afternoon, and evidenced their great pride in the excellence of the school. The Scout ideals were having a visible influence on the life of the community.

This conversion of the temple into a school seldom met with opposition. In one of the temples undergoing transformation, where the old people of the village had objected to the removal and destruction of the huge idols, these idols were being walled in and the school placed in front of them. Access to the idols could still be had through a rear door; but worship or incense burning would be almost impossible. The great idols serving as guards to the central idol had been destroyed, and the children were using the heads as footballs on the school grounds. The school to be opened in this temple was an interesting one—a higher primary, that is, for the fifth, sixth, and seventh year of schooling. No ordinary village can afford to pay for a school of this grade, so it is being supported by contributions from twenty-seven villages, these contributions being duplicated by appropriations from the country and the province. Such a school must be a boarding school, for, though the villages are within a circuit of a mile or so, roads are so bad—being for part of the year impassable—that the pupils

must live in the school. So the boys and girls of the wealthier families of these little villages are receiving the benefit of a full elementary education. This means that they have an opportunity to enter the middle schools of the provincial city. To these schools came last year, from the higher primary schools of the villages, more than eight hundred pupils. This is more than the middle schools can accommodate. In fact, the educational authorities of Shansi are discovering what the educational authorities of the United States and of all democratic school systems are also discovering—that when large provision is made for elementary education, and a channel opened for continuous progress to higher educational institutions, these higher institutions are soon overwhelmed with students. This situation is producing an economic burden which is staggering to the people of the United States; it has reached a stage which is greatly puzzling the authorities of Shansi.

Mention has been made of the large body of students in the capital city. To a visitor it appears that not only is half of the population made up of soldiers and students, but that half of the large area of the city is taken up with barracks and schools, chiefly the latter. Practically all the schools are boarding schools, which necessitates extensive dormitories. These, together with the numerous school and administration buildings and the accommodations for officials and helpers, make an extensive plant; for practically all these buildings are of one story only, and must be provided with adequate grounds and with guards, according to the Chinese style. In many instances the grounds are unnecessarily extensive.

There are many different types of schools; a university, with a strong engineering department, a men's normal, a girls' normal, a national normal, with eleven hundred students preparing for the village schools; an agricultural college, agricultural experiment stations, agricultural middle schools, a school of forestry; a technical school, a school of languages for the training of students for foreign lands and for officials; a school

for officials in service; soldiers' schools; a school of music, devoted to restoring the ancient music; schools of embroidery and of needlework, for the women; charity schools for poor children; numerous middle schools, higher primary, and lower primary schools. Altogether the city gives the impression of a great educational center. For a governor who was until recently illiterate, and who has only Japanese military training as a basis, this program bears remarkable testimony to his progressiveness; for almost every school is the result of the personal interest of the governor.

Contacts with the Western world have not always been helpful in meeting the complicated problems involved in the rejuvenation of this ancient civilization. The economic development of the province was to be insured by its one railroad, subsidized by the Chinese, but owned and operated through a concession to a French company. The mineral products of the province are very valuable; great seams of coal and iron are visible from the railroad for miles. The finest anthracite coal is delivered to the car for seventy-five cents Mexican money (37½ cents gold) a ton. But it costs four dollars to carry this ton down grade seventy miles to the main line railroad! Recently there has developed quite a wine and grape industry, but it costs twice the total local selling price of the product to get it out on the market.

Altogether the economic advantage of the railroad to the province is questionable. If one inquire what is the economic advantage to the owners, this is quite a different question. This railroad is said to be one of the two sources of importation of opium products into the province. The province itself has destroyed its former chief sources of income by prohibiting opium-growing and gambling. But it is the common report that every official and workman—all foreign nationals—on this railroad is amassing a fortune through the surreptitious importation and sale of opium products. Chinese officials have no authority to search the train, nor can they arrest the train

officials even when detected in the offense. Complaint to his government against the most notorious violator of the law—the conductor on the train—resulted, after a delay of more than a year, in his removal from the charge of the train. But this punishment was accompanied by his appointment as station master at the head of the line—an excellent position from which to direct the entire traffic!

A strong rival to the railway in this looting of the province through the sale of opium products was at that time the post-office system of a neighboring power. One of the strange impositions of foreign nations on the Chinese was the establishment of foreign post offices. Even this province, a thousand miles inland, had numerous Japanese post offices. Chinese officials could neither examine these offices nor interfere with any traffic which came through them. By treaty, the foreign nation owning them must collect customs on dutiable goods and remit the amount collected to the Chinese government; but the Chinese officials themselves had no authority. Besides, opium products could not legally be imported, and were therefore non-dutiable. We are having experience in the United States with that kind of traffic at the present time. Our situation would be comparable to China's in the past if England had her own postal system, with a parcel post, throughout the United States; if the United States officials had no right to inspect it; and if English officials were interested in furthering the illicit trade in liquor because of its being a lucrative form of commerce for her business men. The Washington Conference agreements corrected this latter evil in 1922 and all such post offices have since been removed.

Assistance from foreign nationals along other lines has not been more helpful. A national of one European government gained the governor's confidence and was appointed tutor to his sons. Finally it was agreed to send the boys to Europe in charge of the tutor, and to this end the latter was provided with a generous sum of money. In a foreign port the tutor

and the money disappeared, the boys being left stranded on shipboard.

The next experience was with an American "cowboy." This cattle dealer persuaded the governor that improvement in the breed of cattle and horses would be a certain means to economic progress. Again a large sum of money and a foreign trip. Few of the miserable beasts that eventually arrived survived long.

During and after the war, a national of one of the central powers—a man who claimed United States citizenship, though this claim was denied by our government—gained the confidence of the governor and became his adviser. The brilliancy of the man's ideas was matched only by their impracticability—and by his inefficiency.

Even the disinterested efforts of the missionaries to help the people were often puzzling to the governor. The strongest of these sects was an English body, doing excellent work, but following the very narrow educational policy of working only for their own constituency. At the capital city none of the stronger American denominations had any workers. The Salvation Army was active; so also was another sect, difficult to identify at first from the governor's description, or at least difficult to interpret. Later inquiry justified my earliest misgivings—for this was the sect somewhat scoffingly known at home as the "Holy Rollers."

The governor himself is a man deeply interested in moral and religious questions, and sincerely devoted to the welfare of his people. Despite his being a despot and the head and supporter of a standing army, he is a man of peace. His views, both in religion and, theoretically, in government—notwithstanding the occasional "firing squad"—were those of the Quakers. He believed in the "inner light" as a guide to action. In addition to building the Self-Examination Hall opposite his Yamen, he is instrumental in forming—not only at the capital city, but in all the county seats—clubs or associations of those

seeking self-improvement and the betterment of the people. These are called "Heart-washing" Associations, and have regular meetings, usually on Sundays.

One of his remarks to me was: "What you Christians call God, the philosophers call Conscience and we Chinese call Heaven, just as we speak of the Yamen when we mean the governor. What we all need is someone who will bring these three together. Why don't you send someone who will do this?"

As with many men of a reflective turn of mind, there is a strong strain of mysticism in the governor's mental make-up; and, like all mystics, and other men of reflective character, when burdened with responsibilities of a practical kind he is subject to periods of despondency. In the background of his mind there is always the question whether all these efforts are really helping his people. His contacts with foreigners have not greatly assisted in answering these questions. His knowledge of the Western world—especially much that he has heard during these last few years—has not allayed his doubts. His necessary dealings with the political powers at Peking and in the other provinces have not furnished any clearer answer. He is said to have "put his money on the wrong horse" (or dromedary) when he backed the Anfu clique at Peking in 1918-1919.[1] This is reported to have cost him half the provincial revenues for a year—in order to make his peace.

What the governor most wants to know is whether this modern culture and progress are really going to make his people happier. He wants to know whether democracy will assure their ultimate salvation. He wants to know whether modern education will aid in securing these things. What he said to me specifically was: "We have had these modern schools for several years; we are trying to get all the children into the schools. I can't see that the people make any better

[1] His experience in this fall of 1927 has been quite similar.

living, or that there is any less suffering, or that there is any greater happiness. What shall I do to the schools that they may help the people to a better living, and so to a happier life?"

How would you answer the governor?

The commission of Heaven is not irrevocable.

—*Confucius*

When you are away from home, behave yourself as if receiving a great personage; when employing people, behave as if assisting at some great sacrifice. Do not do to others what you would not have others do to you.

—*Confucian Analects*

"When a public official is neglectful, what should you do with him?"

"Cast him off," said the King.

"When in the whole kingdom there is not good government, what then?"

King Seuen looked to the right and to the left and spoke of other matters.

—*Mencius*

CHAPTER XIII

THE CHINESE PUZZLE—FROM INSIDE LOOKING OUT

CONSCIOUS of the good will of America toward China, of the general need of China for economic help from the outside, of the great achievements of Western business enterprises in building up the port cities, and of the genuine service which they render to China, the strenuous objection of the new China to the continuance of the policies which have made these things possible is distinctly puzzling to the American observer. This observer may have seen the impressive achievements of the modern cities of Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Tientsin, and have noted the large number of Chinese who prefer to live under foreign jurisdiction, rather than under Chinese authority just across the line. He at least has read about the striking contrast between the Chinese and the Western habits and customs, and wonders why the Chinese so object to the continuance of the home conditions upon which the foreigner is insisting. This observer of the puzzling controversy in China is interested in knowing what it is all about; what are the rights of extraterritoriality, of tariff autonomy, of imperialism.

In order to obtain any satisfactory answer to his inquiries he must try to look at these problems from the Chinese point of view—to see the Chinese puzzle from the inside. To give him this point of view is the purpose of this chapter.

During the last quarter of a century of the Manchu régime it seemed quite evident that the Chinese Empire was in process of dissolution. An English book which attained considerable popularity, and which was written by an important public official, was entitled, *The Break-up of China.* At that time the European powers and Japan were taking possession of such privileges as they could. While the attitude of the powers

has changed since that period, this reversal does not satisfy the Chinese, who want undone all that was done during that earlier period. Two or more generations of students have studied in the West, have become familiar with Western history, politics and international law, and know that, according to Western standards, China is considered inferior—even as China, not so long ago, considered all foreigners inferior. And, just as foreigners then resented China's attitude and justified their wars on China by that situation, so this new generation now is determined to secure recognition for China, even at a similar cost. They know that China is the only civilized country that is now subject to these restrictions; and, irrespective of the justification of the limitations upon China's political power because of conditions which may exist, they are determined that this inequality of treatment shall be adjusted. In other countries such purposes and attitudes are labeled "patriotism," and are supposed to constitute a commendable trait. Young China is determined that China shall be judged by the same standards that prevail in the West, and that, consequently, she shall enjoy the same rights and privileges. If the West is also determined that China, in its obligations, shall be measured by the same standards as the West, who shall say nay to young China's demands?

What is even more to the purpose is that young China has converted old China to her point of view. By becoming vocal in very modern ways, the young China has become spokesman for the great masses of China, as yet inarticulate. By agitation, by force of brute numbers, by mob psychology, by interference with the comfort and the wealth-getting of the West, now even by threatening the peace of the West, China has forced her problem upon the attention of the world.

Whether the Chinese point of view prevails or not—whether the demands of the Chinese for the abolition of extra-territoriality, for tariff autonomy, for the cancellation of the unequal treaties, for the recession of concessions, leases, and

settlements, for the elimination of Western imperialism, are granted or not—it is quite important that the Western public, as well as the occasional special student or diplomat, understand these problems and the Chinese position.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The most important of these differences between China and the West, and the one most difficult of solution, is that of extraterritoriality, or the right of consular jurisdiction. Extraterritoriality is the treaty right by which a foreigner carries into China, for as long as he may reside there, the right to be judged and controlled and protected by the law of the land of his citizenship. Extraterritoriality is defined as "an exclusive exemption from the observation of the local law"; or, as another international law authority adds to this definition, "granted either by usage or by treaty on account of the difference in law, custom, or social habits of civilized nations from those of uncivilized nations." The implicit justification conveyed in the last phrase is just the inference which causes the Chinese protest. As a matter of fact, however, such rights where most important did not involve—and never have involved —uncivilized peoples. The distinction would be more accurate if the phrase read "of nations whose political organization is territorial from those whose political or social organization is genetic." It is chiefly because the Chinese social organization is passing from a genetic basis of family or clan to the modern territorial one that this problem arises. The essence of the difference, has been explained elsewhere. Except to the extent that modern codes have been introduced, there is in China no fixed, unwritten law to which one may appeal for justice; no legal procedure, technically elaborated, to guide one.

Some light may be thrown on the problem by a comparative statement. In the old Roman Empire, the protection of the Roman law was a very highly esteemed privilege, not granted to every resident of the Empire or even of Rome. For

the most part, the resident from the colonies, or from the conquered territory, must be judged by the law of his own land. In other words, extraterritoriality of a limited sort was forced upon him. In countries where law was tribal or genetic—not political or territorial—this rule was quite generally enforced.

In recent times this procedure was given most definite form in the Turkish Empire. Here, since the law was largely Moslem and religious, only the faithful were entitled to its jurisdiction. All adherents of other religions under the Empire were organized under their own law, usually under a religious hierarchy. At first to the French was assigned the protection of all Westerners or "Franks." In time each particular country gained jurisdiction over its own people—the United States in 1835. These concessions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, termed "the capitulations," were granted by choice, since foreigners were not permitted the privilege of Moslem law. But here, also, such privileges had become the symbol of inferiority; and among the first acts of the Turkish government on entering the World War was the denunciation of the capitulations. Later, the Western nations recognized these abrogations in the treaty of Lausanne.

Japan had been constrained to grant extraterritorial privileges from early in the nineteenth century, but these were removed by the Western powers in 1898 after a period of gradual transition in which Japan changed her judicial procedure from the customary genetic basis to that of Western territorial law.

The Western powers have now given up the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction in every civilized or independent country except China. Siam, the latest country to make the transition, now has a system of "mixed courts," with foreign advisors or assessors, which offer suggestions for the Chinese situation. This fact of national discrimination is the chief grievance of the Chinese at the present time. That China has a huge population and area not readily brought under a new legal system,

that she does not have a staff of trained judiciary, that the military are practically in control and have abrogated all law, do not, for them, counterbalance these other considerations.

It will be recalled that the two wars with Great Britain (1839-42 and 1857-60) were the occasion for treaties out of which grew most of the problems outstanding to-day. The chief object in these treaties on the part of the Western powers was to obtain reasonable conditions of trade and equality of treatment as a nation. The hardships under which the trader labored were the seclusion in the hongs and factories of the trading port for a limited season, arbitrary dues, and the strange character of Chinese law. Under this latter count were specified: (1) that no discrimination was made between serious and minor offenses, between manslaughter and murder, so that an accident was punished as was a deliberate offense; (2) unusual and cruel punishments; (3) barbarous prisons and prison treatment; (4) personal determination of law with no legal procedure, so that no defense was possible to a foreigner; (5) collective responsibility for any act, so that any member of a colony or of a ship's crew became responsible for the acts of their least responsible members. The actual situation is described in a report of the East India Company's factor in 1821, as follows:

> Thus we see our situation, made clearly responsible for the acts of between two and three thousand individuals who are daily coming in contact with the lowest of the Chinese, and are exposed to attacks so wanton, and often so barbarous, as well as to robberies so extensive, that self-defense imposes upon them the necessity of attacking their assailants in a manner from which death must ensue. A great and important commerce is instantly suspended, whole fleets at times detained, ourselves liable to seizure, and to be the medium of surrendering a man to death whose crime is only self-defense or obedience to orders, or else to lend ourselves to the most detestable falsehoods in order to support a fabricated statement which may save the credit of the officers of the Chinese government.

So much detail of the background is given that there may

be no misunderstanding of the origin of these privileges. At the time they were granted they were probably of as great advantage to China as to the foreign powers. Granting the right to trade and to be in China, they were the effective means of a peaceful *modus vivendi.*

The right of extraterritoriality, or consular jurisdiction, was implicit in the British treaty of 1842 and in the supplementary agreement of the following year; and was clearly defined for the first time in the American treaty of July, 1844, and in the French treaty of October of the same year. The reason for the clearer definition in the American treaty, drawn by Caleb Cushing, was that the Americans, then at the height of the "clipper ship" trade, desired no territorial grants, either absolute, as at Hong Kong, or as concessions in treaty ports. They did desire full opportunity for peaceful trade under consular protection. Either by direct treaty or by the action of the "most favored nation" clause, a score of other countries have secured these privileges and yet preserve them.

The essential privileges are these: The consuls of the countries to which the privileges are extended have juridical authority over all cases in which both parties to the dispute belong to the consul's nationality, or where the complaint is made against a fellow-national by one of any other foreign nationality or by any Chinese.

In cases where the complaint is made by the foreigner against a native, the foreigner has the assistance of his consular representative also. "Actually, in criminal as well as in civil cases, an alien plaintiff who has a case against the Chinese never goes to a Chinese court in the first instance. The usual procedure followed by him is to go to his consulate and state his case to his consul, who will then approach a local Chinese authority for a judicial investigation." So states a leading Chinese authority. In addition, the right is granted to a foreign consul to attend all cases, to watch all cases, in the interest of justice; and, if he is not satisfied, to protest against the find-

ings. On the other hand, many Americans doing business in China, especially in inland regions, ordinarily find it more satisfactory to trust to Chinese customs in business matters, and to bring their difficulties before the local guilds or the more recently formed Chambers of Commerce, than to seek adjustments either before local magistrates or consular courts.

The pros and cons of the situation may be stated as follows: The Chinese argue: (1) that extraterritorial rights constitute an infringement on Chinese sovereignty; (2) that no other civilized country is now subject to them; (3) that they give foreigners business advantages which the Chinese themselves do not possess; (4) that consular jurisdiction for all but the treaty ports puts an intolerable burden of expense upon a Chinese plaintiff with respect to calling witnesses, making an appeal or having an actual local investigation, and that thus the foreigner is often protected in wrong-doing; (5) that under these circumstances it is impossible further to open up trade in the interior, as such action would mean further limitation on Chinese sovereignty; (6) that consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports often serves as a protection to the criminal and the vicious, whether foreign or Chinese.

The foreigner retorts: (1) that it is quite impossible for him to subject himself to the traditional Chinese law, to the personal dictation of a magistrate or of a military leader, with its occasional torture, its inexact rules of testimony, its unusual and cruel forms of punishment, its unwillingness to grant bail, its unhealthy and filthy jails; (2) that the modern courts are not numerous enough or well enough staffed to meet the needs; (3) that the codes now adopted treat the accused as guilty until he proves himself innocent; that this allows prolonged imprisonment before trial; (4) that the Chinese administrative officials have not yet come to respect the courts as superior to administrative demands; (5) that until militarism is eliminated and a strong executive and independent judiciary is established there can be no assured justice for either the Chinese or the

foreigner; (6) that in maintaining the much criticized right he is really also fighting the battle for the Chinese.

The difficulty in the satisfactory solution of the problem is that all these statements on both sides of the problem are true. With reference to the rights of foreigners as limitations on sovereignty, the Chinese are now inclined to argue that these rights were granted originally not in derogation of China's sovereignty but as a delegation of power by the territorial sovereign, in recognition of the fact that judicial procedure and the very conception of law was fundamentally different from that of the foreigners seeking to trade; consequently, that there exists the right to resume the delegated power as soon as the Chinese authorities become competent to administer justice and to protect life and property according to the methods and standards of the government to which the rights have been extended. This the foreign powers grant. Great Britain and the United States since 1902, and other powers more recently, have conceded this point, and twenty-five years ago agreed to cancel extraterritorial rights as soon as this stage should be reached. Furthermore, the powers have admitted this right in the case of Japan, by treaty before the act and by consummation in 1898; and more recently with the Turks, by treaty after denunciation of these rights by the Turks.

A further charge of the Chinese must also be conceded—that at times the privileges have been stretched beyond the original grants. This is notably the case of the Shanghai mixed courts. Here courts under Chinese magistrates had long been set up to care for the very numerous cases arising in the large native population in the international settlement—about eight hundred thousand natives to thirty thousand foreigners. Following the outbreak of the Revolution in 1911, the Chinese government ceased to function for a time, and these courts—with the accompanying jails and detention houses—were taken over by the foreign Municipal Council. Whenever a foreign national is involved, a foreign assessor sits with this court.

That this court should be restored to Chinese authority is one of the demands made by the present Nationalist agitators. Certain minor concessions have been made by the municipality, but the major question remains unsettled.

While the foreign powers have in certain instances stretched the extraterritorial privileges beyond the original limits, they have recognized in other instances that such privileges should not hold; therefore, that the original grants were only temporary and conditional. In cases of land tenure and transfer of property it is universally recognized that the law of the place should hold. Also in cases affecting customs dues, port regulations, and any questions relating to maritime trade, Chinese law is valid.

Another argument for the abolition of extraterritoriality now being advanced by the Chinese is that there are now more Westerners in China living under Chinese law than under the extraterritorial protection. The report of the conference on extraterritoriality, concluded in September, 1926, gives figures evidencing the opposite when all foreigners are included; namely, 254,006 foreigners with these rights, and 83,235 not possessing them. Of those possessing the rights, 218,351 were Japanese (largely in Manchuria); and of those without the rights 79,785 were Russian. Of the Western nationals 9,844 were American, 15,247 were British. Two other European groups, the French and the Portuguese, numbered over 1,000.

Many other criticisms are entered by the Chinese. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is subject to the same objection that was held originally against Chinese law—it is personal, not territorial. That the foreign national carries his own law with him, when everywhere else he must conform to the law of the land, is admitted by all to be defective—and temporary at best. The system is cumbersome; it is dilatory. Cases where two or more nationals are involved must be referred to different courts. A now famous case of piracy some years ago, in which three different nationalities were involved, necessitated trial in

three different consular jurisdictions, was referred back to three different countries and involved three totally different systems of law and of legal procedure.

The United States and Great Britain maintain regular courts in Shanghai, with right of appeal to higher courts. The American court has averaged about one case a day (three hundred and sixty-nine cases per year for three years), of which about one third are for breaches of Shanghai municipal law. But consular officials are seldom versed in law, and are uniformly overburdened with regular consular duties. Moreover, their regular duties are to protect the interests of their nationals; an obligation which does not accord well with a juridical duty of deciding between a claim of one of the consul's own nationals and that of a Chinese who is entirely ignorant of the laws and legal procedure of America.

Consular jurisdiction is an impediment to the growth of foreign trade. Because of these rights China now restricts the foreigner to treaty ports (fifty in number) and forbids residence or trade in the interior. As any relaxation of these regulations, or any increase in the number of ports, would constitute a further infringement on Chinese sovereignty, she is naturally disinclined to increase this privilege; in fact, she is determined not to do so.

As corollaries to extraterritorial rights, foreigners built up a system of post offices. The United States had one at Shanghai, Great Britain and France had several, and Japan had a system of three hundred, scattered all over China. As long as these were merely for the convenience of foreign nationals, there was little opposition; when they became channels for avoiding custom duties on a large scale, and for the smuggling of opium and opium compounds, they became little less than an international scandal. This latter use eventually became such an evil that the foreign post offices were suppressed by agreement of the Washington Conference in 1921.

Similarly, the right of protecting nationals has led to

extensive systems of foreign police in Chinese territory. Not only is this true of the concessions, where provision is made by treaty, but the Japanese and the Russians have built up extensive systems of local police along the railways in Manchuria—ostensibly to maintain order among their own nationals. On a much more extensive scale military garrisons are maintained. Provided for by treaty in the case of legations in Peking and along the railways to Tientsin and Shan Hai-kwan, these provisions have been made the occasion for large garrisons; these have been extended again, in the cases of Japan and Russia, to other large garrisons in Manchuria. On a similar basis Japan maintained a garrison of eight hundred men at Hankow, until it was withdrawn in accord with the provisions of the Washington Conference.

One aspect of the extraterritoriality situation has ever been a source of mortification to the foreigner and of reproach on the part of the Chinese. These rights have at times been perverted to protect vice or crime, and the foreign or consular courts have occasionally given illustrations of injustice and corruption quite equal to any that could be furnished by Chinese procedure. Many of the consular positions of the minor powers of Europe or South America are of value by reason of the protection which they can sell, through extraterritorial exemption, to vice and even to crime. This situation has been notorious for years in Shanghai. Even the records of the United States courts have been such at times as to cause shame to Americans. Long subject to investigation by Congress, these records have been smirched by judges, agents or consular staffs, and lawyers. Even as late as the present year (1927), while the subject is one of violent controversy, after the unhappy experience covering many years, there became public the case of a minor American government official guilty of the smuggling of opium, and of another guilty of bribery and of destroying, for $25,000, consular records of a similar case. Still another official in the past had by common repute a similar unsavory record, but held

his appointment for years. The influence of other able and upright judges has not sufficed to save the repute of American justice in this vicinity.

In Chinese public opinion, such records have gone far to destroy any sanctity which may hedge the justice of the Westerner, and form a part of the general disillusionment of the Chinese, which the local foreign resident will be loath to admit.

Among the privileges which foreigners have built up and now vigorously protect under these extraterritorial rights, and which are extremely irritating to the Chinese, are the exemptions from local and excise taxes. In addition, the foreign banks have built up a system of currency issue over which the Chinese government has no control; while insurance companies and various other forms of business, which in all other countries are under government supervision, are here protected from such control.

In pursuance of the agreement of the Washington Conference, a Commission on Extraterritoriality, which met in Peking and conferred from January 12 to September 16, 1926, made the following recommendations, signed by the representatives of Belgium, China, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States.

That China: (1) should complete and put into force codes covering criminal, civil, and commercial law; (2) should establish and maintain a uniform system for the regular enactment, promulgation, and recession of laws, so as to give definiteness now lacking; (3) should extend its system of modern courts, prisons, and detention houses; and (4) should make adequate financial provision for the maintaining of these.

That the powers: (1) *prior* to the reasonable compliance with the above, but after the principal items have been carried out, agree to a progressive scheme of abolition of extra-territorial rights, either geographical, partial or otherwise; (2) that pending the abolition of extraterritoriality, the powers:

(a) administer the Chinese law, so far as possible, in their extraterritorial or consular courts.
(b) should bring the mixed courts more in accord with the organization and procedure of the modern Chinese courts, and that mixed cases with Chinese defendants should be tried without presence of a foreign assessor.
(c) should correct abuses which have arisen in the extension of foreign protection to Chinese and to business which is wholly or mainly Chinese.
(d) should require periodic registration of their own nationals.
(e) should give full judicial assistance for execution of judgments, warrants for arrests, etc., for persons of Chinese jurisdiction, made by competent Chinese authorities.
(f) that foreign nationals should be required to pay such taxes as may be prescribed by competent Chinese authorities.

This Commission, after a thorough investigation, recognized the justice of the Chinese complaints of the various abuses of extraterritorial rights and recommended their immediate correction. It remains to be seen whether the foreign governments will follow promptly the recommendations of their own representatives, or whether—as usual—they will delay in accordance with the "least" favorable nation clause until force of circumstances take the decision out of their hands; and also whether such municipalities as Shanghai, for example, are answerable either to the control of China or that of the home governments.

Most of the existing treaties between China and the powers have dates of limitation, with a preliminary period within which either party may give notice of its disinclination to renew the treaty. In the case of Belgium such a juncture arose last year, and China declined to renew the extraterritorial provisions as she had a right to do. Even that legal procedure subjected the Chinese government to trenchant criticism from foreigners who consider these unequal stipulations forever binding on China until the foreigner releases her. In the case of the United States this treaty revision falls due within five years; that is,

in 1932. The outstanding question now is: Shall this revision, which obviously a large section of the American people would gladly grant, be delayed until forced upon us, as with Belgium —or shall the American government act more promptly, in accord with the principles of mutuality which it has already announced, and thus preserve something of the good will which would come from the voluntary agreement?

The alternative faced by all the foreign powers may be stated thus: Is it better to act promptly, and thus secure a moderate settlement of the difficulty by a gradual process of adjustment; or to delay, retaining special rights as long as possible, with the probability that when a decision is reached it will be one based upon unilateral action and an immediate and absolute transition? The former promises the retention of good will essential for business development; the latter may involve the use of arms and the beginnings of another war.

TARIFF AUTONOMY

The problem of tariff autonomy is much the simplest, the most definite, and the most readily settled of the outstanding points of controversy between China and the powers. In fact, since tariff autonomy has been recommended by resolution of the recent Tariff Conference, it may now be said to have been settled, "in principle."

Tariff restrictions by treaty grew out of the same situation as did the other problems. Previous to the treaty of Nanking, in 1842, the foreign trader had to settle the amount of duties to be paid by negotiation with the imperial authorities at the treaty ports, and with many of the other minor officials with whom he came in contact. Naturally these duties were variable, depending on the nature of the articles, the good will or whim of the official, and the influence of the ship captain. Luck, trickery, and bribery were the concomitants of trade. Ships' charges for carrying goods were heavy and arbitrary; every subordinate official had to have his fee; customs dues were exces-

sive; the consoo or hong fees often amounted to thirty per cent of the value of the goods; and the merchant was compelled to sell to his hong merchant only, who fixed prices without competition and settled all government charges out of the proceeds.

The treaty of 1842 secured the privilege of a uniform tariff of five per cent at all the treaty ports, later modified to five per cent *ad valorem,* and yet later with two and a half per cent added for collection. In 1858 a schedule of rates was formulated with a proviso for revision of rates every ten years, if demanded by either party. With the period of rising prices the situation became quite unadvantageous to the Chinese, but the tariff was not revised until 1902, and then again in 1918.

In comparison with tariff agreements between Western countries, several features may be noted. All other tariff agreements are for stipulated periods of time; the Chinese tariff agreement is indefinite. Compared with tariff of other countries, such as the United States or Japan, the rate is very low. Most other tariff agreements provide for a maximum and a minimum rate; here there is only an occasional revision. Most tariffs are for protection or for revenue; the Chinese tariff is too low for protection and inadequate for revenue. Furthermore, since 1901 practically all of the customs revenues have been used to reduce foreign indemnities, or, whenever there has been a slight margin, foreign loans. China is compelled to tax exports as well as imports, a procedure inimical to the development of foreign commerce. Such a tax is forbidden in the American Constitution; yet it may be said to be forced on China.

During the Tai-ping Rebellion, near the middle of the nineteenth century, in the absence of any proper government official, the collection of the customs in the Shanghai district was taken over by foreigners. At the end of the Rebellion the sums turned over to the Chinese government were so surprisingly large that foreign control was continued. For many years the administration remained under Sir Robert Hart, an Englishman,

and continued to set a standard of administrative excellence. To correct a very common misapprehension, it should be noted that, though the director and many of the staff are foreigners, they are officials of the Chinese government, and the service is, nominally, at least, Chinese. That, on his death, the Throne ennobled Sir Robert's ancestors for five generations is one evidence that this service was not considered a restriction on their sovereignty, but a service; in fact, perhaps the greatest that any foreign individual ever rendered China. The agreement that the customs service was to remain under the direction of a British national as long as British imports were larger than those from any other country was not made until 1898.

The real limitation on China's sovereignty is the limitation on the tariff rate itself, not on the administration of the service. Even with reference to the restriction on the rate, a common misconception should be corrected. Though the rate is only seven and one half per cent, or an effective five per cent, it is levied on the total amount of imports and exports. While rates are high in the United States and may run to one hundred per cent, they are levied only on a comparatively few imports. The total collection amounts to only five and one half per cent of the total value of exported and imported goods, with about the same, or less, in other countries.

A demand is now made, on the part of many Chinese, that the administration as well as the determination of the tariff rate be placed wholly in Chinese hands. It will be admitted that the arrangement now in practice, necessitated as security for foreign obligations, amounts to a restriction on China's sovereignty; but a debt with its necessary security is always a restriction. The real difficulty reduces to the same as with the other problem. So long as militarism, with its threat to the integrity of this or any other governmental service prevails, any change from the present system of collection might prove disastrous to the Chinese.

Few are found to defend in the open the present tariff re-

strictions. The existing situation is a matter of great injustice, and has been for a generation or more. The practical considerations which have caused the maintenance of the present practice are these: the chief imports into China are now, and for a long time have been, cotton yarn and cotton cloth. But both Japan and Great Britain are in a serious economic situation at home and their chief articles of export to China are these cotton goods. Therefore, any disturbance of this trade is liable to affect adversely industrial conditions in these countries. The immediate effect of allowing tariff autonomy would be to affect that balance adversely. Higher rates would not greatly increase government revenues, if at the same time the amount of imports were greatly reduced. The object would be to so adjust the tariff gradually that revenues might increase and that, under such protection, manufacture both of yarn and cloth might be strengthened, thus bringing more employment in order to decrease unemployment in village and country and to absorb the discharged soldiery. In this way both the rate of wage and the standard of living might be raised.

Another very great advantage that would come from increased customs duties has elsewhere been pointed out. In Chapter III it has been suggested that a large proportion of the present economic evils in China is due to the rapid displacement of the handicraft system of industries by the great and unchecked influx of modern machine-made goods from the West. If this is not regulated to a slower pace no adjustment can take place, and the economic injury will be very great. China will suffer all the evils of a hasty introduction of the factory system, as did England a century and a half ago; but it will not reap the advantages of a higher standard of living within its own boundaries.

As in other instances it is desirable to make clear the issue: the question is not whether the handicrafts must give way for modern machine process of manufacture; not whether the Chinese will in the long run be profited by the introduction of

cheap goods; not whether these changes are inevitable. The question is, do the foreign nations have any moral right to force the cheap machine goods upon the Chinese, by a control of Chinese tariff and other political conditions, and thus speed up and put out of Chinese control this economic readjustment which is destroying the industry supplementary to agriculture which keeps millions of the Chinese above the subsistence point; and in doing so, become an inciting cause to unemployment, starvation wage, militarism, and banditry. The question cannot be answered by quoting statistics of importation of cotton yarn to prove that textile weaving is on the increase when that may mean only that spinning has largely disappeared; nor by citation of treaty rights. The question is one of moral right, of complicity in injustice, and of the questionable use of force.

Much is being written about the evils of the new industrialism in the Orient; but in the respect just pointed out, Western industrialism has a responsibility in its relations to the Orient that it has not even begun to realize.

The recent Tariff Conference of 1925-26 passed a resolution recommending that the right of tariff autonomy be granted beginning January 1, 1929. This recommendation has not received the approval of any foreign government. China agreed at the same conference that at the same time she would abolish the *liken,* or local custom duties, exacted at many if not all provincial borders. Whether the grant of autonomy is conditioned upon the abolition of the *likin* is not made clear in the Conference agreement—and thus another occasion for misunderstanding and controversy is given. The *likin* are similar to the *octroi* locally collected in many European countries; except that in Europe these duties are on local goods, while in China the *likin* are on all goods. Thus foreign goods may have to pay several times, sometimes totaling twenty per cent; sometimes "as much as the traffic will bear."

Several considerations are obvious: First, that the agreement is made with a central government, which is practically

without power over the provincial governments which levy the *likin*. Here arises another opportunity for misunderstanding and charge of lack of good faith. It is perfectly clear that the central government cannot now carry out this agreement. Again, the provincial governments, especially the civil governments, must have some source of revenue. To weaken them is to throw them entirely into the hands of the militarists. To be sure, it is sometimes argued that to destroy the *likin* would be to destroy one element of support of the militarists; but if so, who is going to compel the militarists to observe the agreement to abolish the *likin?*

However, despite the difficulties remaining, the tariff problem seems likely to be removed from the field of controversy, and thus to point the way for the solution of the remaining problems.

THE CONCESSIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

With reference to extraterritorial rights and to tariff limitations, while originally justified by circumstances, conditions have so changed—and the attitude of the Chinese has so changed—that either radical modification or total abolition of these restrictions on Chinese sovereignty must shortly be brought about. While to many Chinese the concessions and settlements seem to be in the same class with extraterritoriality and tariff restrictions, they are in reality quite a different class, especially in so far as the foreigner is concerned. Chinese sovereignty is not denied—perhaps with the exception of Shanghai—and does not even need to be challenged. The concessions work to the advantage of both the foreigner and the Chinese who live in them far more obviously than do either of the former restrictions. To the foreigner the concessions represent much more definitely material rights, and they contain his real property and his home.

When trade first opened, the foreigner was not allowed to reside in the trading port, even temporarily; later he was

restricted in Canton to the "Consoo" house and the hongs. With the opening of the treaty ports in 1842, lands were set aside for the settlement of the foreigner. These lands were outside the walled cities, in which the foreigner was not allowed, and outside the Chinese settlements. On land uninhabitable by and useless to the Chinese, it was to the advantage of the Chinese so to provide for the foreigner. On the part of the foreigner, he could not remain in China unless he could control his home environment—and thus eliminate together the unsanitary conditions and the diseases common to the Chinese, but fatal to the foreigner.

To date, the foreigner has been granted fifty treaty ports; the right to trade in thirty-four other cities, chiefly in Manchuria; and rights of shipping in twenty-six ports of call on the Yangtze and the West rivers. In nineteen of the treaty ports land has been set aside for his permanent residence.

The terms "settlement" and "concessions" are used interchangeably, though there is a technical distinction between them. The concessions are perpetual leases of lands to foreign authorities, which in turn dispose of the land to their nationals or to others. The settlements are areas set aside in which foreigners may acquire property from the native owners. In addition, there are areas which the Chinese government has voluntarily set aside for foreign residence—chiefly in Manchuria; and there are a few cases—such as summer resorts—in which settlement has grown up by sufferance.

Most of the treaty port concessions have been acquired by Great Britain. To her credit, they are, for the most part, open to all foreigners—and, in some instances, to Chinese—on substantially the same terms as to the English. So far as the United States is concerned, in the past our government held three concessions; two of these, Shanghai and Tientsin, have been merged with the British concessions into International Settlements; while the third, Amoy, has been returned. The statement that America has no interest in the issue of the con-

cessions is true with regard to our government; but American business has profited by the British concessions even as has the British, and has quite as much at stake. In other words, the British right to concessions and the American right to settlements have thus been merged. True, our government has consistently followed its policy of "keeping hands off" Chinese territory. The statement frequently made that the American people have no part in the concessions states a government policy; but, since every American residing in or visiting China takes full advantage of what others have secured for him, the situation does not signify a moral attitude differing from that of other nationals.

The foreign concessions are usually directed by municipal councils, though—except in the cases of the two international settlements—the councils are under consular control. The concessions are not without the pale of Chinese sovereignty or the operation of Chinese law; though it is through the gradual unauthorized increase of "independence through usage" that most of the disagreement at the present time has been caused. Chinese law presumably controls Chinese subjects. But Chinese police officials are not allowed to execute their laws. Any powers of law to be executed on a Chinese citizen, even a refugee from justice, must pass through the hands of the concession authorities and be executed by their officials. In this respect the concessions have come to be havens of refuge, especially for those politically proscribed. In a similar way their property is protected from extortionate exactions, and the well-to-do Chinese have added greatly to the wealth and the prestige of these cities.

The Chinese have claimed that these settlements have become a refuge for Chinese criminals as well as others. This is denied by the foreigner, except in the case of the political offender, and in the abuse of consular jurisdiction mentioned above. On the other hand, there is no doubt much truth in the charge that political disturbances are fostered by the pres-

ence of havens of refuge near at hand. Had it not been for these the Republic itself would hardly have been founded.

In these concessions the municipal functions of Western cities have been instituted. Streets are laid out and paved; complete sanitary, water, and lighting systems have been installed; a police force—which in some cases, as at Shanghai, approximates a military force—is maintained. There is no doubt that an *imperium in imperio* exists. The question is, is it necessary? Can the conflicting claims of Chinese and foreigners be adjusted?

When it is realized that even Peking, with its million residents, and practically all other native cities have no sanitary system except the constant carrying of night soil in hand pails; that in most of these native cities the streets are built with no provision for vehicular transportation; that the congestion of population is beyond any European standard; that diseases fatal to the Westerner if not to the Chinese are rampant, with little attempt at control; it will be realized that the situation practically reduces itself to a choice of the foreigner withdrawing altogether or retaining some control over his residence. This latter alternative, however, does not necessarily mean the present situation.

That the presence of the Chinese adjacent to foreign living quarters is not the difficulty is evidenced by the fact already noted, that in many of the concessions the Chinese far outnumber the foreigners. Essentially it is a question of control of local living conditions. Perhaps it is only a question of good or stable government making fair attempts at modern sanitation. In Peking the majority of foreigners live in Chinese houses, or at least outside the foreign concessions, which here is limited to the legation quarters.

If no question of political sovereignty is involved, no question of contiguity of Chinese and foreign or of racial discrimination, it seems as though reasonable people might arrive at a practical solution of the problem. Much progress toward a

union of the several foreign concessions under a municipal council in which both foreigners and Chinese participate has been made in Tientsin.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the foreigner has stretched the original rights given him by treaty until they do challenge the sovereignty of the Chinese government; and, in the weakened condition of that government, shows no willingness to relinquish these accessions to their power. Repeated statements in diplomatic papers and in individual grants assert that there was no transfer of sovereignty in these concessions; that the political authority is derived directly from the Chinese government; that these grants included only municipal powers; that the jurisdiction over foreigners was consular, not municipal; that Chinese citizens in foreign concessions are under Chinese authority; and that there should be some participation in affairs which affect Chinese citizens.

In some cases—notably in the case of Shanghai—due to occasions on which the native government has dissolved as a result of rebellion or revolution, these conditions have been violated, and a political power has evolved, which was not contemplated in the treaties. A great modern city, one of the most enterprising and prosperous in the world, has grown up. Like the Hansa towns of the Middle Ages, the city practically asks for sovereign control. It owes no obligation to any foreign power; it recognizes few to China.

One can readily understand the point of view of the Shanghai business man. This great modern city has been built up by his energy. Its administration, a model of efficiency, has provided streets, order and protection, transportation, water, light, sewerage, all the municipal services of the most progressive cities. The simplicity of its city government, a limited oligarchy, has enabled it to function well as a business enterprise, but not as a political unit. With justice it aspires to be counted among the great municipalities of the world. But the fact remains that there has been gradually built up a usurpation

of political power, which, though it may have been justified by conditions, is not justified by political right; and that the Chinese, who form the bulk of the population and pay much of the taxes, have no part whatever in the government of the city—nor does the Chinese or any other government.

The position of the Shanghai citizen is peculiar, both in fact, as just described, and in theory, as held by the foreign residents. Following the Shanghai shooting of students in May, 1925, the diplomatic representatives of the foreign powers in Peking came to an agreement concerning a policy of adjudication of the difficulty with the Chinese authorities. To this the Shanghai authorities refused to accede, on the ground that the foreign ministers had no authority over the Shanghai municipality. As their contention was not successfully challenged by the foreign governments, this situation became but another illustration of the manner in which the anomalous situation in China has grown up. Taking advantage of disturbed political conditions and of the weakness of the Chinese political authorities, the original political privileges granted to a municipality have been stretched until they simulate those of an independent state. But if the municipality refuses to recognize any political sovereignty, the citizens do not; instead, they call lustily for the backing of military and naval forces of their country.

So far as America is concerned, the Shanghai situation is forcing to the attention of both government and people a problem which is far wider in its scope than that of Shanghai alone. The problem is whether the capital invested or business enterprise established in foreign countries, with a full knowledge of existing conditions, has a legal or moral right, when threatened with loss, to demand the protection of those interests by the use of the military and naval forces of their country, at the expense of provoking conflict with a friendly power struggling with civil war—or even with the prospect of precipitating a world war. From the business man's point of view, it will be unfortunate to force this question into the arena of political

discussion; for, if I understand the present temper of the American people, the answer will be an emphatic negative.

This position of the foreign resident in China, maintaining complete independence of Chinese law by treaties forced on the Chinese, stretching these privileges daily in the pursuit of profitable business, and demanding the military protection of his own government when these excessive rights are challenged, is the "Imperialism" which the Chinese now attack. The answer to this problem, in so far as it concerns America, should be given by the American people; not by the residents or the municipality of Shanghai; not by an American consul or diplomatic representative; not by the captain of an American gunboat, placed in an untenable position six hundred miles inland in a friendly country. There should be some reasonable solution.

At the Versailles Conference the Chinese delegates put forward the following proposals as a basis for such solution:

1. That the Chinese shall have a right to own land under the same conditions as foreigners.
2. That Chinese citizens residing in the concessions shall have a right to vote in the election of members of the municipal councils, and to be elected thereto.
3. That warrants issued and judgments delivered by competent Chinese courts outside the concessions shall be executed in the concessions, without being subject to any revision by the foreign authorities.
4. That in no foreign concession shall a foreign assessor be allowed to take part in the trial or decision of cases wherein Chinese citizens alone are concerned.

These very reasonable demands were not granted. The recent convention on extraterritoriality has recommended the legal rights requested. It is evident that the Chinese people are determined to recover these concessions and settlements. The foreign residents might well be satisfied if they were allowed to retain limited municipal control of a restricted region where they themselves might reside, granting complete

political control of Chinese citizens by the Chinese Government; or, better still, some form of municipal government by board or council in which both foreigner and Chinese should be adequately represented. If more than this is demanded, the American government will soon have to decide whether its obligation to protect the lives and property of its citizens carries with it the obligation to protect them in the usurpation of political authority in the territory of a friendly but helpless foreign power.

THE LEASED TERRITORIES

A problem much more difficult than the problems of the concessions, and one in which America fortunately has no part whatever, is that of the leased territories. This problem is the more difficult in that the action of the Western powers is less easily justified, and in that in certain notable instances these powers are in no mood to readjust matters in accordance with China's demands.

Practically all the leases are of recent origin, most of them dating from that period of general scramble at the close of the nineteenth century when the Western powers believed the disintegration of China to be imminent. Unlike the concessions, the leases are for a definite period of years, usually ninety-nine, and confer complete political and governmental powers upon the lessees. Within the period specified there is an alienation of sovereignty to the alien lessee. For the most part the leases cover ground for military or naval bases, but they sometimes include a large extent of surrounding area which may be made neutral, though under foreign control.

Thus Germany acquired Kiao Chow in 1898; Russia obtained Port Arthur and Talien Wan in the same year; and, to preserve the balance, Great Britain "leased" Wei-Hai-Wei in the north, and a large addition to Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, in the south. In the same year France obtained a lease on Kwang Chou-Wan, in the south.

France has since agreed to return her lease on condition that the others are returned, and Great Britain has agreed to return Wei-Hai-Wei. The Port Arthur lease was transferred from Russia to Japan, and was later extended from twenty-five to ninety-nine years; and the Kiao Chow lease, transferred to Japan by act of war in 1915, was later—as the result of the Washington treaty—returned by Japan to China. Japan holds that the Port Arthur leases are essential to the protection of Korea; and as long as Russia remains powerful in the vicinity, China is not likely greatly to object. In a similar way Great Britain holds that Kowloon is essential to the protection of Hong Kong, and is not apt lightly to change her mind. However, Hong Kong and Kowloon are on quite different bases, as Hong Kong was an uninhabited island when Great Britain took it over, while Kowloon is an inhabited portion of the mainland.

All these leases are direct infringements of Chinese sovereignty, and are justified only on the grounds of the political advantage or military necessity of the foreign powers holding them. As they were based upon the anticipated break-up of China and the rivalries of the foreign powers, only the development of military strength on the part of China would compel the cancellation of some of these leases.

From the point of view of China, these bases not only represent a derogation of her sovereignty, but they are positive injuries to the welfare of the country, especially in political power. The bases are always of strategic value; they weaken the Chinese defenses. In the event of war between China and one of the lessee powers, the latter would have the advantage of a military base within Chinese territory. In fact, that is the chief purpose; and no further argument is needed to indicate that these treaties are "unequal."

To defend the unequal treaties on the grounds that they were justified by conditions of a century ago, as some Western writers do, is pure camouflage. In the case of war between a lessee power and some other power, Chinese territory is made

the seat of war, even though China is neutral. This happened in the Russo-Japanese War, largely fought on Chinese territory, and in Japan's attack against Kiao Chow during the World War, when treaty protection was entirely ignored.

China presented her claims for the restoration of the leases both at the Versailles and the Washington conferences. In cases where the leases had been obtained in order to maintain the balance of power—now, for the time being, a thing of the past—the powers agreed to return them. But where obtained for strategic necessity, their decision was that the leases could not be returned at the present time.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND SPHERES OF INTEREST

From the bases established by the leases and the earlier territorial concessions, the foreign powers have reached out and extended their claims to preferential treatment over large areas of China's territory. Where these claims refer primarily to the exploitation of commercial and natural resources, the term "sphere of interest" is used. Where these claims are primarily political, the term "sphere of influence" is applicable.

At the time they were declared, such spheres were really claims staked out by the contending powers, in which the latter intended to make their interests permanent upon the anticipated dissolution of China. On the surface they are notifications, with the approval of the Chinese government, to all other powers that the announcing power maintains priority of rights in all economic exploitation, and to any devolution of political power. Various railway, mining, and other economic concessions usually followed; as also did the extension of post offices, police forces and military guards.

On the bases of such treaties many of the railways have been built and operated by European interests. Following these, most of the mineral exploitation—chiefly of coal and iron—is in the hands of foreigners. The Shantung treaty gave to Germany mineral rights extending ten miles on either side of

the railway lines. If local reports are to be believed, both Germany and Japan interpreted this grant as conferring power to take up mineral lands without compensation either to the government or to private owners. In years past, incidents of high-handed procedure in these regions that would have adorned the tale of any medieval robber baron were revealed to the writer. But the Chinese people were then inarticulate. Now that they have become vocal, the West is greatly astonished; and even those intimately associated with them—at least, as observers—profess not to understand.

In one respect these spheres of influence have been an advantage to China. They have at all events, caused other parties to keep their hands off the specified territories. The powers concerned have often negotiated among themselves concerning these spheres without any reference to Chinese authority. While such acts constituted a contemptuous ignoring of the sovereignty of China, the weakness of the country at the time permitted it. The practical disadvantage of the spheres of influence is, however, their obvious check on the economic development of China. This method of international negotiation, brought by the great powers from their experience with each other in Africa, is obviously applicable in China only because of the inherent weakness of the government, which renders it incapable of opposing these arbitrary limitations of its own powers.

With the development of a unified central government having some strength, these spheres of influence will either have to be cancelled or ignored. At present they constitute a part of the unequal treaties, the abrogation of which the Chinese are demanding on general political grounds. America has no interest in these whatever, except as their existence becomes a limitation on the "Open Door" policy which it advocates. In fact, the "Open Door" policy was restated by Secretary John Hay because of the creation of these spheres of influence. The powers themselves, recognizing the futility of their claims in

the light of present conditions in China, as well as the greater advantage of coöperation than of competition among themselves in dealing with China—as in the case of the recent banking consortium of the four, five or six powers—have agreed to coöperate in the financing of all enterprises in China on the basis of international participation.

At the Washington Conference ". . . the contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking, any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China."

As an international policy the "sphere of influence" is a closed affair. The memory of it, as well as the presence of numerous commercial evidences of its operation in the past, remains to rankle in the minds of the Chinese.

THE UNEQUAL OR "UNILATERAL" TREATIES

The outstanding demand of those engaged in the present Nationalist movement is for the abrogation of the unequal treaties. From the discussion of the previous topics it will have been made evident to the reader that the outstanding inequality is the absence of reciprocal advantages.

Regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, with the exception of the early Russian, Korean, and Japanese treaties, this provision was not reciprocal. The fact that the Chinese at that time were indifferent to the purport of these rights is no valid reason why they should forever remain so or should not seek to revise them on some reciprocal basis at the present juncture. The territorial concessions carried no reciprocal advantages; the leases were direct disadvantages. In the spheres of influence, the reciprocal aspects were, for the most part, ignored. In the tariff agreements, the only reciprocal feature was the advantage to trade; there were no reciprocal advantages in the permanent limitations imposed. The West can offer little evidence

in rebuttal to this phase of the argument, except that conditions in China were so abnormal, judged by Western standards, that the powers were justified, from their point of view, in making these treaties "unilateral."

The same argument is all that can be advanced in regard to the second reason for calling these treaties unequal and hence obnoxious—namely, that they were secured by force. That this force was applied through war, and that the treaties were advantageous to the vanquished in that they brought a return to peaceful procedures, is no satisfactory reason why the vanquished should not now agitate for a reconsideration on the basis of mutual equality.

Some of the later agreements were obtained through officials who did not fairly represent the Chinese people; some were even the result of fraud, of bribery, or of intimidation. The present generation of Chinese do not find such agreements satisfactory or regard them as morally binding. In almost any other country such maladjustments would have been remedied in time, through the display of force of one kind or another. Here in the minds of the Chinese lies one great objection.

All these treaties have been secured because China has not been able to make a sufficient display of force to protect her own interests. To the Chinese such procedure appears not only immoral but equivalent to a confession of the injustice of the cause in which brute force has been involved. Hence the demand for reconsideration.

Again, the treaties are unequal in that they limit China's freedom in economic affairs where she is most vulnerable. Not only do the tariff agreements limit her liberty, but these agreements cannot be modified without the consent of all parties; and it has been impossible, to date, to obtain this unanimous consent. In still another respect—a peculiarly galling form—these treaties are unequal: in that the so-called "favored nation clause" ties China's hands under the plausible cover of equality and fairness. The original provision of this character,

found in the British treaty of 1842, is illustrative of all that follows:

> It is further agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or citizens of such foreign countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to any enjoyed by British subjects.

Most of the "favored nation" treaties have been unilateral; some have been reciprocal. The Burlingame treaty of 1868 states: "Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nations."

America was then interested in cheap labor and in finishing her first transcontinental railways, largely built by Chinese. Very shortly, however, this situation was completely changed as a result of immigration problems, and Congress nullified these treaties by special Acts in much the same way as China now threatens to settle unsatisfactory treaties—to the moral indignation of the West. The Chinese Exclusion Acts followed. China is not greatly concerned with these now, recognizing that they constitute features of unequal treatment found necessary as a part of our domestic policy on immigration; but she does desire a similar consideration for her own problems.

Through the interpretation placed upon the "favored nation clause" mentioned above, China has come to look upon this clause, inoffensive enough to the Westerner, as a general affront, clinching—in ways most unfair to her—the unilateral privileges which may have been obtained by one nation through force, or by other means not now, in her judgment, justifiable.

Nations which have recently been brought to treat with others on the basis of equality rather than of force have reformed their treatment of China. For example, the recent treaty with Germany provides:

Germany engages to adopt the principles of equality and reciprocity as a basis of a new treaty of commerce and general relations to be concluded with China, and relinquishes therein, on her part, the principle of the so-called most favored nation treatment; and the said new treaty, when completed, shall guide all intercourse between the two countries in the future.

What China has been asking the United States for some time is: Why delay until war results or until unilateral action is taken by China before re-formulating the treaty relations between the United States and China? The Nationalist movement and antiforeignism are a formulation of this question to all the powers.

IMPERIALISM

To an American, the most difficult of all the Chinese problems to understand is China's objection to imperialism—at least, in so far as the charge is made against Americans. That the leases, spheres of influence, concessions, are the results of imperialistic ambitions he can understand; but America has had no part in these. That the tariff restrictions were part of the imperialistic scheme he can also understand; but America has never been unwilling to modify or relinquish these—and this has, in principle been done. That extraterritoriality is an inhibition on the Chinese sovereignty, he can easily perceive; and he is willing to act even more quickly than his government in renouncing these. This, he realizes, the Chinese know also. Why, then, should they charge America with Imperialism? Knowing that China needs economic assistance, aid to her industries, her agriculture, her mining and transportation, he cannot readily fathom her attitude of hostility to those who are willing to bring the assistance. Knowing that, as to recent years, China is far more militant than America, why should she call America imperialistic? Especially with reference to the educational, medical, and religious enterprises to which millions of Americans have contributed under the impression that they were helpful to China, why should these now be termed the works of imperialism, as though works of the devil?

The answer, while difficult of understanding, lies on the surface. All those privileges which foreigners in China possess; all those activities which they carry on, protected by these special privileges gained by themselves or by others through acts of force; even all those efforts which they make to urge others to their point of view, especially if at any time force may be called in to protect them in so doing, are evidences of imperialism. Imperialism is the accomplishment of any national purpose through the use, actual or implicit, of physical force.

Added to this is the display of bad manners by those who possess the protection of these privileges of which every Chinese who has come in contact with foreigners has had experience. In almost every instance of a radical anti-imperialist among the educated or student class, the explanation will be found in an experience of this kind. Within the year a Bishop of an American church, dressed in fur overcoat and cap, such as the Chinese wear, was walking down the sidewalk in a concession when he was hailed by the concession Indian police, upbraided and shoved off the walk. When he disclosed that he was a foreigner, most abject apologies were made—in the presence of Chinese. The incident is slight; many infinitely more offensive could be cited. When multiplied *ad infinitum* there is produced that psychological attitude of anti-imperialism which, as emphasized elsewhere, can be removed only by removing the cause—thus necessitating, on the part of the foreigner, either a change of mental outlook or a change of residence.

In this connection, Dr. Sun Yat Sen's definition of imperialism is enlightening: namely, "the utilization by any people of its political or military ascendancy, for subjecting to its economic encroachment some foreign country, or territory, or race."

TREATY REVISION

On the basis of facts set forth very sketchily in the foregoing, China is calling for a revision of treaties. The Western

powers have acknowledged the validity of the claim; but, in a manner characteristic either of diplomacy or of dealings with China, due to the shibboleth of "national prestige," continually procrastinate; until any merit which might inhere in these negotiations, in the spirit of justice, will be lost in the common assumption that the final dilatory act has been made only as a result of compulsion.

The chief objection voiced at this moment is that there is too great confusion, uncertainty and hostility in China; or that there is no governing power with whom to negotiate. In answer to this it may be pointed out that the foreign powers discover authorities upon whom to make demands. Furthermore, both North and South China were represented at the Versailles Conference and, at least informally, at Washington. Negotiations are now going on with both sides by Great Britain, and informally by the United States.

The difficulty in the China situation, as in all international misunderstandings, is the lack of the will to settle the difficulty. If a will to settle the problem rather than a will to preserve diplomatic technical procedure controlled the situation, the *impasse* might soon be bridged.

In the writings of Chwang Tze the great exponent of Lao Tze, the following allegory is given in illustration of the Chinese doctrine of passivity:

"The ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shu; the ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hu; and the ruler of the center was Chaos. Shu and Hu were continually meeting in the land of Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might repay his kindness, and said: 'Men all have seven orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating and breathing, while this ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them for him.' Accordingly, they dug one orifice in him each day; and at the end of the seven days, Chaos died." [1]

[1] *Chwang Tze,* Part II, Section VII.

Who is there who can make muddy water clear? But if allowed to remain undisturbed, it becomes clear of itself.

—*Lao Tze*

Even an upright magistrate cannot solve a family dispute.

However stupid a man may be, he is clever in blaming others; he is a dolt when blaming himself.

—*Chinese proverbs*

It is the way of Heaven to take from those who have too much and give it to those who have too little. But the way of man is not so. He takes from those who have too little to add to his own superabundance. What man is there who can take from his own superabundance and give to mankind? Only those who possess "the way" (*tao*).

—*Lao Tze*

He who overcomes others is strong: he who overcomes himself is mightier still.

—*Lao Tze*

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHINESE PUZZLE—FROM OUTSIDE LOOKING IN

THE previous chapters have presented a view of China—necessarily brief and partial, no doubt superficial and inadequate. The author has attempted to give the facts essential to an understanding of the present confused situation, and to give his own views only as the selection of facts indicates an interpretation. At the outset it must be admitted that this interpretation is at variance with that now given in some books written by those who, in respect to familiarity with immediate facts and because of close personal association with the Chinese, are well qualified to speak. But that very familiarity with the immediate situation, which so frequently goes along with a lack of interest in and knowledge of the past out of which the present has grown, may prove a limitation rather than an advantage in making an interpretation which has validity for the future.

If this present volume has any value, it is due to the attempt to state present problems in terms of their origin and environment and, thus minimizing the personal equation, to arrive at a more adequate appraisal of those essential elements which will prove not only influential in the present but of definitive value in the future.

That only those who live in close contact with the Chinese situation are entitled to give an opinion upon it, is a natural assumption. As a matter of fact, this nearness of vision may obscure the whole problem, or cause an intellectual "near-sightedness." Purely personal reactions to close personal contacts may warp the judgment on the totality of the situation. When such individuals are wholly absorbed in local or personal interests, such as a business enterprise, even if that enterprise be a newspaper to "tell the world" what long residents in

China think of the Chinese, views of the well-informed may be colored or distorted by the glasses through which they view passing events. Even when such interpretation is bolstered by considerable or even extensive knowledge of Chinese history and culture, it may lack real interpretive power because of immediate emotional bias.

More often it is true that such observers may have lived years in China without understanding a word of Chinese. Seldom does a resident of this type command any knowledge of the language; often he has no contact with the Chinese except such as business interest necessitates or brings with the servant class, the laboring class, the clerks, or with shrewd business men revealing no more of their personality or opinion than shrewd business demands.

Some years ago I was told of a missionary educator who had lived a generation in China and had never had a Chinese guest at his table. Surely one who seriously seeks to discover what these people think is as much entitled to speak on the problem of China as such old residents.

THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE DISILLUSIONED

Many who have lived in China long, on more or less intimate and friendly terms with the Chinese, often having great hopes of Chinese achievement as well as appreciation of Chinese characteristics, but who have recently come into close contact with the government of the Republic, the activities of the militarists and bandits, the career of the politician, and the acts of the Communist groups, finally have despaired of the future of China. Including officials, advisers, writers, educators, missionaries, these compose the so-called "disillusioned." To them China is a hopeless muddle, the Chinese totally incompetent, the political, social, and military situation one of complete confusion, from which the nation can ultimately be rescued only by some foreign power or powers assuming the task and applying force.

I recently asked a competent and friendly observer, an official of the government as well as an interpreter to the West, for an analysis of the situation. "How can one analyze chaos?" was the reply. Such represents a reasoned and unemotional reply, by comparison extremely mild. This group has had many notable accessions during the past year, and since its opinion cannot be passed over as incompetent, the position deserves a brief statement. This point of view is, in fact, one of such influence in coloring world news and in determining government attitudes and action, that some attention is necessary if one is to have a true picture of the Chinese situation. In its most acute manifestations, it receives, in the hands of foreign correspondents, the term "Shanghai-itis." A clever, well-informed, and brilliantly written presentation of it has recently been given by Rodney Gilbert in his *What's Wrong with China?* His answer to this question can hardly be summarized, for in the 140,000-word answer there is scarcely a word of appreciation.

While the quotations in the following paragraphs are taken from this book, they are of significance here only as representing the attitude of an entire group, and are drawn from one source only because it is the most recent, most forceful, and most thorough presentation of this point of view. Summary of the evidence upon which this opinion is based is quite impossible; the most that can be done is to state some of the principles underlying the views of the group.

Fundamental to all is the belief in the white man's supremacy. This is the modern version of the old belief of the obligation of "the white man's burden," no longer based on pseudo-moral grounds but on pseudo-scientific or psychological grounds—the superiority complex of the white race. Just as in every community there are individuals who need a guardian, so, according to those holding this view, there are inferior races "who cannot govern themselves but must have a master." Notwithstanding the long existence of Chinese culture under

native organization and control, the Chinese belong to this group. As with such individuals, so with such groups, the opening of wider opportunities through education, cultural and political advantages, especially if from superior peoples, simply throws the inferior people into confusion and misery and into that envious position which leads them to destroy those who are abler and who—through sentimental reasons—would seek to help them to a higher state. In turn, those who would endeavor to help such inferiors to a higher condition, are the idealists, theorists, sentimentalists, and cranks who believe along with a multitude of other errors that "ability and morals are matters of education, training, and environment," and "in the self-determination of nations and refuse to recognize that there are any inherently unfit to determine their own affairs"; who believe also in the organization of the unfit, that they do not sink to the lower level—and that the fit do not rise above the level of the average.

The assumption is that these "inferior people" are as school children; "the Chinese mind is a child mind." They are viewed as a nation of "unruly and impertinent school children" and need to be spanked; and it goes without saying that the white peoples are the teachers elect who should administer the spanking. Even the Chinese language is a "child's language" and "it is against reason to suppose that a people using a primitive medium of expression can think anything but primitive thoughts." Furthermore, a nation with an infantile literature and an infantile mode of expressing itself in speech stands no favorable chance before a world court of being ranked as a nation.

That this attitude has to a great extent grown up through the assumption of authority and the unwillingness (on the part of the white residents) to recognize the rights of these people in their own lands—a situation made possible through the protection of unequal privileges by foreign military force and not due to any evidences of superiority on their own part—is per-

haps natural; but there is lacking also any recognition of the possibility that there may be room in the world for cultures and races of differing capacities, standards, and achievement other than may be measured by the Nordic yard-stick.

The attitude of the disillusioned is based, often unconsciously, upon the assumption of the infallibility of the Nordic norms; and involves also a whole-hearted condemnation of the Chinese for their lack of appreciation of the superiority of these Nordic standards, and for their failure, after a short generation's attempt, to absorb and apply these measurements. If interested in cultural efforts to assist the Chinese, their conclusion is, that the Chinese should now be left to their own sad fate; or if interested in business, their conclusion is that the Western powers should take a firm hold and force the modernization of these people through commerce and military force.

However, these views are presented with such emotional fervor and bitter hostility to any *rapprochement* as to raise a shocking doubt. One does not breathe the air of China but the "fetid air" of China. The attempt on the part of the Chinese to follow voluntarily what this group would rather apply by force has resulted in "excruciatingly funny attempts to adopt foreign costumes, furniture, and etiquette." The coolie would regard "an English pig-sty as a luxurious tavern." They use "a baby language" yet "the really illiterate of them struts the boards and strikes postures from the cradle to the grave." "There are fewer good Samaritans in China than in any other country on earth." All told the Western powers "have such a case against China as a nation as could fully justify her extermination in a crusade."

Such wholesale denunciation, such emotional fervor, such complete and meticulous condemnation of a group whose actions are injurious and whose attitudes are beyond control are usually enumerated among the symptoms which the very modern investigator is apt to present as evidences of the much called upon "inferiority complex." Can it possibly be that the

disillusioned are so shocked by their inability longer to control the attitudes of government and of peoples at home in the protection of their unusual position abroad, to persuade business at home to continue their unduly protected, non-competitive, and non-taxed position abroad by expenditures of vast military outlay; are so hostile to the new-found independence of judgment and freedom of expression of opinion on the part of the Chinese, that they themselves give expression to a wholly new attitude in their "disillusionment"? One has only to read a few days' issue of the English daily press of China to discover in news item, editorial, contributed article, a wholly new note involved in protesting too much.

But our interest is in the analyses of the principal aspects of "disillusionment." Next to that of the white man's superiority complex, the most important belief of the disillusioned is that the situation can only be cleared up by the use of force, a view which grows naturally out of the former.

"The question of selection between the Oriental and the Occidental (particularly the Anglo-Saxon) outlook on life is no question of right and wrong: it is a question of survival, a question of fitness to survive and rule. Thanks to our aggressive qualities, temper them with piety as you may, we have either to be exterminated or to rule." The question may arise whether the author has not confused the question of the survival and rule of the Shanghai business community in China with that of the Anglo-Saxon survival in the world at large. While this may be a perfectly natural error on the part of a member of that community, it should not blind us to the fact that many foreign residents in China do believe the application of force by the foreign powers to be the only solution and base their belief on practical grounds. These practical grounds are usually of a business nature. "No Occidental nation is now in such a position that she can afford to ignore a rich market that requires no more than a summary house cleaning. China policed and each Chinese working for himself (!) under a

respectable authority in security and peace would yield the world a thousand per cent on the cost of restoring and maintaining order within a few years." This respectable authority must, of course, be the Western powers. The reason for this position is found in the present situation. "The official or the merchant who never had any conscience, who loses all consideration for his own laws of face, becomes fiercely and simply an unmoral opportunist, driven to and fro by ambition and fear and amenable to nothing but force." The reasons assigned for this situation are to be found primarily in "the collapse of the old moral standards and the slow growth of any new moral sanctions." While there is much to be said for this analysis, it does not necessarily follow that the white race has any monopoly of either moral conscience or of political sagacity or that it is incumbent upon the West to assert its moral supremacy by the use of force—especially since to the Oriental the use of force is an open confession of moral inferiority. The fallacy in this whole argument is again that there is only one standard, and no place for varying cultures, various abilities, and various modes of life.

This doctrine of the use of force is supplemented in the case of China by the historical argument: "Heaven's mandate, by virtue of which Chinese sovereigns have governed for three or four thousand years, has never been the reward of merit, but a blessing upon the strong and ruthless." "Against a strong government, whether good or bad, the Chinese people have never rebelled. They never quibble with superior force." On this reading of history the use of force by the Western powers is bolstered. That the Chinese should perform this task for themselves is impossible. "China can never attain to sustained self-government until the sedative which is in the air, the blood, or the civilization is eliminated for all time." As this can only be done by themselves in ages which the anthropologist or eugenist alone might calculate, modern business profits cannot wait.

The quarrel which one may legitimately find with this view is not so much with the facts as with the solution of the difficulties advocated. To those who hold these opinions the Oriental is conceived as wholly different from the Occidental and as one who will not respond to fair dealing or impact of any other conditions except the show of force. Many would find the characteristic contrasts thus drawn exactly the opposite. The friendly policy due chiefly to the missionaries is held to be entirely demoralizing and largely responsible for the present situation. That this policy is now dominating is due to the unfortunate influence of idealists on governmental authorities and to the lethargy and supineness of the population at home.

Certain other principles of interpretation of conditions and policies in China go with these major two. Not only is the policy of fair dealing ineffective in securing satisfactory solution, it is positively injurious in that any display of generosity or fair dealing is followed by outrage on the foreigner. No act of good faith by the foreigner is accepted at its face value, and leniency is always attributed by them to fear; all releases from obligations or returns of indemnities are held to be tributes or bribes.

So uncompromising, pessimistic, and dangerous is this view that this aspect of disillusionment demands definite notice. Opposition which may arise to any method of reasonableness is based upon the grounds here mentioned. Following from this position the recent decline in the prestige of the Occident is due wholly to the policy of reconciliation and to the failure to use force; not to what has happened in the West during the World War; not to the training in morals and politics given to Chinese during the war; not to the collapse of the moral prestige of the West through the commercialization of vice in art, drama, literature, and moving pictures which will give "the dirty decade" a place in the history of morals; but wholly to the failure of the West to use force in imposing its will on

the Orient. While those who hold these views may know the Orient, it is obvious that they do not know the present temper of the West.

The difficulty of dealing with the view of the disillusioned is that it is due to a complete lack of confidence in the Chinese. To them the Chinese are incapable of any sincerity or honesty. "They can believe no good of China, or of anything Chinese." Though the author of these views adds, admitting curiously enough, that there may be attitudes even more extreme than his own, that "the most unkind and unjust opinions of China" are held by just such foreigners who once had most faith in them. To them the Chinese fondness for the theatrical, for the make-believe, for "face," has made them entirely insincere in all their dealings. While, according to their view, anything meritorious in China is due to the work or the influence of the foreigner, all the present evils there are also due to the foreigner, in that all such might be avoided if the West would only treat the Chinese as bad little school children and whip them into order.

To those who hold this view, international amity or good will is an illusion and the settlement of any misunderstandings on any other basis than force makes for greater confusion in the future. While they hold as a major tenet that Western governments exist to give security of life and property to its citizens, this actually means that governments should endanger the lives of thousands and waste the property of millions in the protection of questionable property rights of a handful of citizens in China based upon claims which the moral conscience of the people at home will not justify. Nor will any amount of fulmination make it clear that this attitude is any more patriotic than the supine one of the people in the home land. The patriotism as well as the point of view of this proponent of American patriotism is thus stated: "The American 'holier-than-thou' attitude in the Orient is a policy founded upon nothing but hypocrisy, leading to nothing but dissension of

which the Chinese are ready to take every advantage, and rooted in nothing but the desire to curry favor with the Oriental at the expense of others who have courage and initiative enough to do the 'dirty work.' " In the leading Shanghai English newspaper, edited temporarily by the same writer, President Coolidge's Memorial Day (1927) address, in which he said America desired only understanding and good will of other peoples, "a meeting of minds not of bayonets," was characterized in display headlines "We Are So Good." Yet these are the people that daily are interpreting America's views to China.

The disillusioned are thorough. They have no use for the Chinese; nor for their own home governments; nor for their own diplomatic representatives; nor for the missionary or his work; nor for the idealist or sentimentalist; nor for any outsider's view of the situation.

Only they who have been long resident, who have been disillusioned, and who hold these views, really know the situation. And conversely the people at home should know how to recognize and diagnose such cases of Shanghai-itis.

In view of the charge that the Oriental is never to be believed, it is interesting to read early in the book, illustrative of this and also of the position of the preceding paragraph that: "The writer, during the residence of more than a decade in China, has never read a book, a magazine article, an opinionated contribution to the press abroad, a missionary report, a diplomatic dispatch, or a commercial report meant for publication, which was frankly true, either as an uncoloured reflection of foreign opinion in the Orient or of the Chinese attitude toward the world." And yet, according to the book, the Anglo-Saxon is the only honest and frank person in the Far East.

No marvel that the West is somewhat confused by the Chinese situation and even remains unconvinced by the views of the disillusioned. Perhaps a self-examination of motive may explain the disillusionment of the disillusioned.

THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE FOREIGN BUSINESS POPULATION

In essential points the foreign business population hold the same views as the disillusioned: the present situation is hopeless, without one redeeming trait, to be solved only by the application of military force. To apply this force is, in the business man's opinion, the chief obligation of the foreign governments. Failure to do this in the recent past is the cause of the present disturbed conditions—and the cause of his bitter criticism of his home government and of his fellow citizens at home who do not agree with him.

The foreign business man is in China for business only; to secure the gain which comes from successful business activities. In making the business profit his chief motive, he is likely to judge all conditions, incidents, occasions, social forces, or changes by the immediate effect any of these have upon his business profit. While this in itself makes him a biased judge or even reporter of events, no quarrel could be found with his attitude if it were not for other conditions which accompany and form part of the situation. Of first importance among these is the fact that the business man is in a *foreign* community; and consequently the interests, demands, and activities of a normal community, with which he would be surrounded at home, scarcely exist and certainly have but slight influence upon him. The community, social, philanthropic, educational, and religious activities which flourish at home because of the interests of the business community, do not figure here; or at most they enlist the interest of a few only, and those of a definite section of the community. That Hankow supports three race-courses, but gives slight attention to schools, or that Shanghai will spend more on its race-course, or almost as much on its brass band, as the municipality does on schools for its 800,000 native citizens, is an evidence of the situation. That missionary activities which are supported chiefly by the contributions of business men at home find little sympathy, even little attention, except that of hostile criticism, among the busi-

ness community abroad, is one of the clearest proofs of the difference between the normal community at home and the typical foreign community abroad. Consequently, the business man abroad is far more absorbed in his business interests, or in the personal pleasure supplied by the fruits, than is the business man at home.

A second of these considerations is that the typical business man abroad—especially if in residence for a short term of years only—has little knowledge of or interest in the native population and the native social environment. Coming in contact, for the most part, with those of the native population who live, through business enterprise, in a community where the struggle for existence is intense, where the standard of living is very low and where business competition is very keen, and being accustomed more or less to extravagance of living himself, he forms a very mean opinion of the people with whom he seeks to do business. He seldom, if ever, comes in contact with the more educated, the cultured and refined of these people—whom he debars from his clubs, his home, and all social contacts; so that he is in no position to judge of the finer qualities of the race, though demanding to be judged by the superior qualities of his own. Furthermore, from lack of knowledge and interest in the historical and cultural background, he is in no position to view sympathetically the contemporaneous display of traits producing anarchy and business depressions and reversals, though they may be but crude manifestations of traits which have enabled this society to survive all others. The excessive emphasis on form, or "face"—which will lead the Chinese to seek to expel foreigners whose contributions through business and finance and coöperation in cultural activities are to them essential to normal progress—appears to him but as the wild fanaticism of an ignorant mob. The tendency to compromise in politics and even in military struggle, the willingness to accept strategic advantages as an evidence of military victory, foregoing the actual appeal to arms, excites only his

ridicule; while the tendency to change sides, to dicker with the enemy, to look upon military struggle as a strife for personal aggrandizement or for mercenary and personal ends, recalls to him no vision of similar phases of evolution from our own social history in the not very remote past, as history counts time. The family loyalties which encumber modern political administration and render difficult modern corporate enterprise in business, to him are but varying forms of inefficiency and dishonesty—not the evidence of a social structure which had an entirely different code of morals, but one which, judged by the pragmatic standard of survival and workability, is counted among the most striking of social phenomena. But all these things produce no profit for the foreign business man; in fact, they have now become serious obstacles to any business whatever; and to him therefore, they are intolerable.

A third consideration is probably of far greater significance in determining emotional attitudes than would probably be admitted without considerable reflection. The foreign business man and, in fact, all foreigners residing in China are in possession of many privileges not possessed by residents at home; while at the same time they enjoy many, if not most, of the comforts of those living at home. The latter part of this statement is, of course, far less true of those living outside the large coast cities than of those within. First in importance is the fact that the business man in China is exempt from the excessive burdens of taxation borne by all at home. For a long time the British business man has been exempt from the taxes of business at home; and now, recently, the American business man is also so privileged. As they pay practically little taxes to the Chinese government, their only obligation is to the government of the concession. Furthermore, business products, which in all other countries are now heavily taxed, are taxed only the five per cent plus the two and a half per cent allowed for the Chinese tariff, plus the *liken* which may be exacted of goods going inland. When this is compared with the thirty to

sixty to one hundred per cent on the common articles of trade in the Western tariffs, or the two hundred or three hundred per cent of the Japanese tariff on articles which to the natives are luxuries, it is small indeed. Of particular significance in this respect are the low tariffs on wines, liquors, cigars, and all luxuries. Probably nowhere in the world are the taxes on this class of goods so low, or the products themselves so cheap, as in China. As the Chinese officials are just discovering how to apply an excise tax on these articles, in defiance to customs restrictions, and as the foreign resident, with a vision of the two hundred or three hundred per cent tax in neighboring Japan, realizes that his paradise is threatened, there is aroused an alarm which is vituperative in its expression. It is only human nature that so slight an emotional situation should weigh as heavily in determining attitudes as questions of large public policy. The situation at home with reference to observance of law and honest administration in government, as weighed against the personal restrictions of the Eighteenth Amendment, presents an illustrative parallel.

Cost of living for foreigners is admittedly twice as high in Japan as in China. The regret that one hears expressed by old residents on leaving China is largely of the loss of comfort and ease of living—the cheap and efficient servants—the large houses, the abundant and cheap food, the leisure and the amusements. Including Saturdays and Sundays, the banking holidays in China number one hundred and twenty-six—more than one third of the days of the year. What Western community could continue on that basis? Recent holidays for the fourth of July—the fourth falling on Monday—included the first, second, third and fourth. All Chinese holidays, British holidays, and American holidays are included. While interest and participation in sports is a saving element in this more or less exotic life, such activities are carried to an extreme which could not be supported by any Western community. What community the size of the foreign community of Hankow could support

three race-tracks? By actual count of the space in the leading English daily of Shanghai on the morning of my arrival this year, more than half of all printed matter, aside from advertisements, was given to sports. The point of the argument is, not that these interests are wrong in themselves, for in some degree they are essential to the preservation of a normal standard of life; but that the extent of such activities and of such a system of business would not be possible unless protected by artificial means, and that the prospective loss of these artificially guarded privileges is influential in creating the present bitter emotional reaction of the foreign resident.

Most important of all, however, is that aspect of the economic situation which has been previously mentioned and which, through unusual political protection, permits the continuance of methods of business which could not survive elsewhere because quite out of harmony with methods of business in the Western world. Many of the old-time businesses, many of the old-time business men, will not be able to make the readjustment; and it is only natural that they should bitterly resent any change in long-established conditions, and regard as ignoramuses those outsiders who may think such change either possible or desirable. But one cannot do business with dead people, so it does not seem good business policy "to shoot them up." One cannot even do business with hostile people, so it does not seem good business "to shoot hell out of 'em" because a few business profits have been lost. Nor does it seem to a —— professor that it is good business policy to sacrifice a large business—constantly expanding over a long period, with a market practically unlimited if it can be allowed to develop a purchasing power—for the smaller profits of the immediate future, even if they could be guaranteed by a gunboat-army-of-occupation policy. While it is easy to understand the perfectly natural desire of anyone to protect his property and his business interests, why is it not good business to view them in the light of larger business interests? And if

the nation is to be called upon to defend its business interests, why should it not take a businesslike view of the entire situation—looking toward the future instead of seeing simply the present, and working out a policy on the basis of national interest rather than of the few who now have most at immediate stake? Nor is it necessarily deserting those now involved in affairs in China if it proposes to consider their interest as a part of national interest. If America's business in China has been growing out of all proportion to the interests of other nations in the last few years, is it because we have pursued a militaristic policy or a policy of friendship? Obviously, the latter. If that policy has worked in the past, why change it now?

To one who reads both sides of the material now appearing in the daily press of China—the material in the native papers and that in the foreign language or English press—there is no great difference in the emotional surcharge, exaggeration, attempt at propaganda, inability and unwillingness to consider the other side. As a matter of fact, the foreign attitude—that is, the attitude of the British or American resident—is so surcharged with animosity and distrust that it seems hopeless to expect the two sides to come together. The task of compromise must be assumed by the home governments. It would be folly to allow the twelve thousand Americans in China or the four thousand American residents of Shanghai, or the 2,742 voters of the Shanghai municipality, or the few hundred American voters of the Shanghai municipality, to decide the policy for the American nation—a policy which might involve the whole 130,000,000 of our population in war; or, eventually, the population of many nations in another world war.

THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW

From the discussion of earlier chapters, it will be apparent that even more fundamental than the political and cultural are the economic problems. One cannot escape the belief that until the economic conditions of the many millions of hard-working

farmers, handicraft men, coolies, and factory laborers are improved, so that undernourishment ceases to be a constant condition, hunger a daily experience, and famine an episode which may bring outside relief for some, and at least relieve the pressure by the death of many, no political changes will allay the general disturbance. Even the Russian advisers see this clearly and admit the truth. Of the great political objectives in the antiforeign demands, only one—tariff autonomy—will contribute directly to improvement of economic conditions, and that only if the customs service is administered wisely and honestly. If banditry is the only employment open to the disbanded soldiery, the suppression of militarism alone will not greatly improve matters. No adequate social use will be made of the great motive power of student public opinion until it can turn its attention soberly to the assistance of the people generally through science and industry. Such truths are not very inspiring or stirring to the emotions, but they are the sober truths upon which China and China's friends must stand. China has the choice of returning to her old economic isolation, of which the political isolation was but a superficial reflex; or of adjusting herself to modern industrial and economic conditions, with their hardships and injustices, but, as a compensation for these hardships, to a status where there is no great difference between the lot of the common laborer and that of the most favored.

Every returned student from America knows that whatever may be the evils of Western society, and they are great enough at best, there is more poverty, disease, lack of sanitation, undernourishment, lack of comfort, in any region in China than he has seen in all America; and that this condition is due not merely to political restrictions which China may suffer at the hands of stronger powers. If he knows his history of China, he knows that many of these conditions were antecedent to the political encroachment of the West upon China, and that such economic penetration as has occurred has not produced them.

What, then, are the needs? Restriction of population; increase of the food supply; introduction of more scientific methods of agriculture and more efficient methods of industry; reduction of waste lands to cultivation; control of the development of the factory system, so that it does not dislocate the old system too rapidly or entail the evils it once did—or does now—in the West; accumulation of capital; introduction of railways, highways, improvement of waterways; and, as in all new countries of the West, the coöperation of the reserve capital of the older countries in doing this. Any and all of these things demand efficiency and honesty of government, and practicality in education—little else; certainly nothing more than the Chinese already possess—industry, ingenuity, common sense, honesty, business ability. What a pity that such a combination cannot be made without further enmities, further loss of energy, time, and life! Eventually this economic transfer must be made. To this end, unfortunately, the Western nations are now contributing little. The chief Russian contribution is to the curtailment of population through class warfare, the breaking-down of the family system, and its teaching of sex promiscuity. The Chinese, beyond the achievement of a unified nationality, have gained little except the profitless discussion of political forms. In the opinion of the writer, the chief contribution which the Western powers can make—and that with little sacrifice in the long run, except as it affects a limited number of individuals—is to grant the political demands, relinquish the indefensible privileges, and allow the Chinese to concentrate, if they will, on their real problems. These can never be solved unless major attention is given to them; nor can they ever be solved by the application of military force by the West. All these changes will take time; some of them time counted by generations. In this larger sense the major problems of China will be with us for this generation and longer. All the more reason why the political problem, so far as the West has complicity in it, should be solved.

THE PROBLEM AS VIEWED BY THE STUDENT OF GOVERNMENT

In the achievement of honest and efficient government, China will find the solution of many of her present troubles. What the form of that government shall be is of far less importance than the character of the men who operate it. Even as important as the economic development which we have just admitted to be fundamental, is the character of the government which will condition and direct the development of those economic forces and which will determine the distribution of the products of industry. To the Western observer friendly to all the aspirations of the Chinese, the present intense interest in political forms seems to be an obsession, and the seeming indifference to corruption and inefficiency of government operation a partisan blindness which must inevitably result in the frustration of all their political ambitions and social aspirations.

Present conditions impress one as not only anomalous but as an absolute inhibition on progress. This most industrious of people are perpetually on the verge of starvation; this people whose traditions are built of high moral principles and sentiments of brotherly love are distracted by cruel and destructive civil wars which have little or no other motive than the mercenary aggrandizement of those who participate; this people, peaceful and friendly in their normal attitudes, are guilty of shocking cruelty and brutality to their own; those who have preserved social institutions through decades of centuries seem bent now only on destruction; a people noted for practical common sense and good judgment appear to cut loose from all experience and to enter into social experiments of wildest vagaries; those who, above all other people, have venerated the wisdom of the elders and the good tested by ages, have now become wildly revolutionary, in a moral and social as well as a political sense. So, at least, much of the evidence asserts, even to friendly critics. But all these vagaries and contradictions find one explanation, in the inefficiency and corruption of the

government—in all of its branches, except those of the smaller local units, which as yet have been largely untouched by disintegrating forces—and indicate the need for but one remedy: the application to government of the disinterestedness, loyalty, efficiency, and honesty of the family system, so long traditional.

The solution of this problem and the gradual transition to a more effective social order are largely in the hands of the modern generations of students, schooled in the new learning. By their participation in the present political agitation and their devotion to new political standards they have shown the capacity to grasp political ideals, to sacrifice for them, and even to make them effectively concrete. Can they reveal or develop a similar capacity to make these new forms efficient; to sacrifice their personal interests and aggrandizement to the effectual functioning of these new forms; to realize that patriotism is not an occasional emotional experience, but a practical ideal made concrete in daily habits of action controlled by the ideal common good, and that it demands the best service, which may grow through its spread into a social custom? Only some such outcome will justify the modern student body in the assumption of leadership, will confirm it in the possession of the traditional repute of the scholar, and demonstrate the practical type of patriotism which shall actually become the salvation, the saving health, of their country.

This statement is no emotional effusion, based on an illusion of the real China and asking the impossible or even the improbable. There can be no expectation of an idealism out of harmony with the past of the Chinese, or of an efficiency and honesty of government not attained in the West. With fullest recognition of the limitations of Chinese morality and governmental efficiency in the past, and fullest acknowledgment of the limitations in honesty, efficiency, and practicality of government in the West, there must yet be an acknowledgment from within—as there is recognition of the fact by friends from without—that the present characteristics of government in

China, if persisted in, can but bring complete disappointment of the hopes now so fondly entertained.

Again it must be said that the solution lies in the hands of those who have received the modern education, know the effectiveness as well as the limitations of social organization in the West, know the aspirations of their own people and now have their confidence. Will they justify that confidence? Will they seize this opportunity? Will they make return for their special privileges? Will they maintain the traditions of leadership and unselfish service of their class inherited from the past? Will they reveal those characteristics of their race which have enabled it to survive the centuries? Will they justify the confidence of their friends of the West? Will wisdom be justified of her children? These are the questions which they alone can answer; and upon this answer will depend the immediate future of China.

FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW

To the British, who to the Chinese represent the imperialism against which they now rebel, China presents both a political and an economical problem. As British permanent investments in China are very large, probably larger than those of all the other powers combined, and as China's consumption power represents a market very important to the industries of England—doubly so in these years of unemployment and of industrial readjustment since the World War—the economic problem is one of great magnitude. The political problem involves the settlement of all the relations of foreign powers to China, which Britain took upon herself as the leader in the modern commercial exploitation or development of China, as well as in responsibility for the terms upon which all foreign relations with China for the past century have been settled. In paying the price for this leadership, she undoubtedly retains the leadership both in the hostility of the Chinese and in responsibility for a satisfactory and just settlement of the out-

standing problem. Another aspect of the political problem is no less important. Prestige is to the foreigner what "face" is to the Chinese—and Britain's prestige is at stake. And this prestige involves Britain's position not only in China, but in an important sense in India, and wherever Britain's power touches the lives of Oriental peoples. The real problem to be solved is whether that prestige is to be maintained by the use of military force and physical prowess to uphold privileges no longer in accord with political and social ideals of the day, as her nationals resident in China demand as necessary to the preservation of their vested rights; or whether it shall be maintained by methods in accordance with that sense of right and fair dealing and justice that has made the Pax Britannia of the modern world little less significant than the Pax Romana of the ancient world. Recent actions and statements of Britain's government seem to indicate that officially it has pronounced for the latter. This being so, the thing most to be desired for Britain, and for America as well, is to find the way out in a practical program of procedure.

Due, no doubt, to Russian influence and strategic guidance, the hostility aroused by the antagonism to imperialistic penetration and exploration, and in fact, the antiforeign feeling in general, has been focused on the British, when the responsibility of other nationals—even of other governments—is less only in degree. That imperialistic power soon loses its vitality if not accompanied by a sense of justice and a policy of fair play, and that Britain's dealings with subject races are notable for these qualities, may be admitted. But the essential facts of the situation to-day are: that rights or privileges that might once have been justified on a basis of fair dealing can no longer be so maintained; that the traditional attitude of superiority in which these relationships have been maintained and in which modern business has been carried on is also so characteristic of British methods as to have become intolerable to the Chinese; that former privileges have been so stretched by

interested individuals, even by governments, that original grants have now grown to exceed all bounds; that the elasticity has departed from these stretched rights, and that a new adjustment *must* now be provided. But this problem of making a new adjustment, more in accord with the facts and the conception of justice of the present day, is complicated by the internal political conditions in China and by conflict of interests among the powers.

Britain, as well as America, has acknowledged by public pronouncement of December 18, 1926, and of January 27, 1927, the justice of the political demands of China "in principle." In fact, in the treaty which immediately followed the Protocol made in settlement of the Boxer uprising—the Mackay treaty of 1901—Britain provided for the future abolition of the right of extraterritoriality. The practical problem of making the concrete adjustments is more difficult for her than for America. The British business interests in China take the same attitude of hostility to a settlement on these bases as do the American; and the British interests are far more numerous, financially and politically powerful, and vociferous. So vociferous are they, indeed, that informed Chinese state that the chief obstacle to a friendly understanding with Britain is that created by the leading English newspapers in China.

The conflict of interests between the Western powers that is of most interest to Britain is that with Russia, as is also the case with Japan. Possibly these conflicting interests may be of greater immediate importance than the adjustment of the problems of China. Certainly they form a most confusing cross-current, and they are aimed solely at the prestige of the British Empire. If that reputation for invulnerability can be undermined here, so much the more easily can it be done in India and elsewhere.

The danger lies in the isolated instances, which Britain in her tradition of power and eventual success is inclined to ignore, but which to the Chinese involve all the principles at

stake. Such are the shooting of the students at Shanghai on May 30, 1925, out of which the Shanghai problem has grown; the shooting at the Shameen in Canton in June of 1925, out of which the Hong Kong strike has grown; and the Wan Hsien incident in the upper Yangtze in the following year, out of which the troubles of the Yangtze River have grown. None of these has been settled. The traditional British way is to ignore and forget. Not so with the Chinese. The danger of troops and gunboats in China is that more such incidents will occur, and thus blot out any memory of recognition of rights "in principle," or of the far more significant change in the attitude of government. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Britain has some very much more difficult problems than has America. While Americans have some share and responsibility in the Shanghai problem, it is eventually a problem for Britain. The numerous other concessions present yet more difficult problems—and the relationship of Hong Kong is reserved for the future.

All the evidence available would seem to indicate that Britain is as anxious as America to find a way out of the difficulty, would accept substantially the same settlement as would America, and would be glad to have the American government take the lead in working out such an acceptable and workable policy.

THE JAPANESE VIEW OF THE PROBLEM

To the Japanese the problem of China is one of continuous disturbance at their own door, threatening their own peace and welfare and constituting a menace in the invitation which it offers for foreign intervention. Such a condition a generation ago precipitated Japan into two wars, the first with China, in 1894, and the second with Russia, in 1905. A similar condition in Cuba precipitated the United States into the war with Spain, and a somewhat similar one in Mexico at the present time constitutes a continual menace.

In addition, Japan has the largest trade interests at stake; first in Manchuria—where trade interests are closely bound up with political interests—and afterward, in the commercial activities in China in general; for upon these markets Japan is very largely dependent for the foreign trade essential to the maintenance of her home industries, now in a sensitive—not to say precarious—financial condition. But so great is the danger of political disturbance, which may be contagious or may result in more war, and of the loss of trade, which would mean social disturbance at home, that the Japanese, since 1921, have followed a conciliatory policy. The immediate result of this change of policy, following also the severance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, has been the substitution of Great Britain for Japan as the immediate object of Chinese suspicion and attack, together with a complete dissociation of the Japanese from the British in policy and in action as well as in popular thought. Japan has evidenced an unprecedented willingness to conciliate the Chinese, to tolerate abuse and financial loss, and even insult, rather than provoke the Chinese populace to further resentment. That this should follow within a decade the Twenty-one Demands of 1915 indicates a most remarkable change of policy; it also indicates that Japan has accepted at their face value the conclusions of the Washington Conference and, in general, the American position that force will not solve the Chinese problem; or, at least, that a policy of friendship is more advantageous than one of aggression, irritation, and hostility. The newspapers reiterate this statement; and the action of Japan's official representatives in China, as well as of her citizens, who perhaps have suffered as much financial loss as that of any other people, also indicates the same fact.

Conditions in Japan have greatly changed in recent years. Through the increase of her electorate, the disappearance of the group of elder statesmen, the emergence of the political forces of democracy in her government, the financial stringency following vast unsecured loans in China and large unprofitable

investments in Formosa, the failure to deflate excessive financial valuations after the war, and the losses incurred by the earthquake, have all created a very unstable political equilibrium at home.

Russia's menace to Japan through the political propaganda of the Communists is quite as great as to China. Russia has renewed her hold on Eastern Siberia on the Chinese Eastern Railway through Manchuria, on political forces in China, and on Chinese territory in Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria, so that the Russian menace is again assuming the proportions of the period preceding the war of 1905. The fact that the Czarist Empire is replaced by a Communist Republic does not change the situation; rather, when taken in connection with the change of the German Empire into a Republic, it becomes but another threat to the Island Empire. Japan, as well as the United States, finds it to her interest to pursue a policy of friendship with China.

Extraterritorial rights are of less importance to Japan than to other foreign powers. They are of late origin, and are based upon political considerations of equality of treatment with the other great powers rather than upon economic advantage. Because of similarity of language, culture, customs, methods of living, and the knowledge of how to deal with the Chinese, these special privileges are of far less importance to Japan than to the other powers. For many years after the opening of Manchuria she was able to develop her commerce with China without this protection. Nor, indeed, for similar reasons, are the concessions of much importance. The rights which do count are the favored positions in Manchuria and such control of the tariff as will protect the large trade of Japan with China. The rights in Manchuria are now protected by those of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, which were not withdrawn but were secured by treaty: the control of the South Manchuria ports for ninety-nine years; the control of the South Manchurian Railway, with its accompanying land rights and rights of

policing; and the extension of these rights to include the western part of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The completion of strategic railways, now under way, will guarantee these special privileges and will create a buffer between Russia and North China.

The value of these privileges is indicated by the fact that the commerce of Dairen and of South Manchuria forms now one fifth of that of all China and is practically a monopoly of Japan, built up in twenty-five years in a region formerly sparsely inhabited and wholly undeveloped.

Japan's problem in China is to maintain her trading and shipping interests and to strengthen the buffer against Russia through her hold on southern Manchuria and Mongolia. These privileges are secured by special treaties of recent date, in which none of the Western powers have any special interest. Aside from these, Japan can unite with the Western powers in a policy of conciliation with China. Events of recent years indicate that she intends to follow such a policy.

THE RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW

To the Communists and the Russian Soviet interests, the situation in China offers an opportunity to carry out their policy of opposition to the Western powers by making it impossible for the latter to remain in China with their special privileges; to advance their own doctrine among an entire people; and most immediately to checkmate the power of Great Britain by raising against her the growing force of nationalism throughout Asia, and especially in China.

There can now be no doubt—after the events of 1926-27—of the intensive influence of Communism in China. The phase most difficult to interpret is the harmonizing of the ideas and ideals for China publicly expressed by the chief Russian adviser, Borodin—which almost uniformly seem sane, well balanced and practicable—with the actual events which take place when the Communist faction obtains control.

Unfortunately, wherever Communist organizations were left in the wake of the Nationalist army, the lawless, semi-criminal element of Chinese society always came into control. The avowed aim, expressed in the words of the responsible Russian leaders, was to drive out from these communities every element that before had exercised any authority. Especially where a society is constructed upon the respect for tradition, for learning and experience, as expressed in these officials, no more topsy-turvy conception of progress or of society could possibly be imagined than that put in force under Russian guidance. Where poverty is so common, the propertyless class so large, brutality so widely developed, respect for life so slight, indifference to suffering so general, the number of incipiently criminal and ignorant elements is very large. They have absolutely nothing to lose except their heads, and anything to gain upon which they can lay their hands.

Recognition of the good which Soviet Russia has afforded the Nationalist cause—and such has been real—should not blind one to the fact that there is much in their influence that is evil, much for which China must inevitably suffer. In time China may even come to see that the most detrimental of all foreign influence is that which has so misrepresented all other foreign influences and interests in China as to leave no room except for her own self-seeking designs. In that these extremists desire to Sovietize China they make no concealment. That such Sovietizing means the wholesale destruction of the old culture, the old wealth, the old family system, the old respect for elders and for tradition, the undermining of old ethical standards, they freely admit. What has happened in Russia is held up as an ideal. If there is no nobler achievement of Nationalism, democracy, and social welfare than this, China is facing a sad future. In truth, Sovietism is a frank denial of the first two of Dr. Sun's three principles, Nationalism and Democracy. When youthful student China gets over its excess of emotionalism, it may see all this truth on the surface, now

concealed by the obvious injustices and obstinacy of the Western powers and by the immediate advantages offered by the Russians. Furthermore, no one saw more clearly than Dr. Sun that many features of modern industrial society must be introduced into China, and that China must have the help of foreign powers or of foreign capital if this was to be accomplished normally and helpfully. This is not to say that he was quite right in his determination that this help should not be given under the old humiliating terms.

The chaos, the hatred, the vandalism, the crime, the denial of even the most elemental freedom, the indifference to human life and welfare that have characterized the union of Communism and militarism during the months of 1926 and 1927 will undoubtedly bring heavy penalties of suffering which the Chinese alone must pay; but all that should not be identified with the Nationalist cause or with the influence of Sun Yat Sen.

Aside from the practical and powerful impetus which the Russians have given to China in the direction of organization, training of leadership, and methods of propaganda, time will probably reveal that their greatest influence is in the encouragement of forces destructive of the old conservatism, of the old family system, of the worship of ancestors, of the rule of the village elders, of the coupling of responsibility and wealth; in effect, the displacement of the old communism of China for the new Russian Communist rule of the self-elected few; which, so far as the masses are concerned, means a pernicious, offensive, and predatory individualism.

Yet there can be no remedy from the outside. Intervention of the powers would make matters worse. Communism is a problem which China must solve on the basis of her own interests, common-sense, experience, and traditional ideals.

AMERICA VIEWS THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

To the American politician and diplomat charged with the foreign relations of our country, the problem of China is one

of maintaining our traditional policy; namely, equality of treatment and of privilege of American nationals with that of any other nationals; protection of the lives and property of American citizens; in furthering these objects, the maintenance of as strong and as united a China as is possible; the preservation of the integrity of China; and, in the pursuit of this object, the maintenance of a concert of action and of policy toward China of all of the foreign powers having great interests in China. In the sketch of the relations between America and China, outlined in Chapter XI, the points of policy have been clearly revealed. The problem now is how to maintain them in the light of conditions in China that are little less than chaotic, and with a government in power now for some years, having no military force, no financial support, and little political support behind it, and depending more for its existence upon the recognition of the foreign powers than upon any other influence.

Dissatisfied with the slow operation of the policy in producing desirable results and disagreement with certain of its contemporary phases on the part of the American people result in a demand for modification of the policy, especially for independent action in granting the demands of China.

That the attitude of the government as well as of the people of the United States is friendly, not only toward the Chinese government and people, but toward China's nationalistic demands, has been demonstrated repeatedly by statement of the President, of the Secretary of State, and of Congress.

The Secretary of State stated: "The Government of the United States is ready now to continue negotiations on the entire subject of the tariff and extraterritoriality, or to take up negotiations in behalf of the United States alone."

In the present critical situation the debit account which the government of the United States, as also that of Great Britain presents against China is no small one. They claim that China does not afford protection to their nationals who

are peacefully living and carrying on legitimate business in China; that so far as force has been used, the initiative has of recent years been taken by the Chinese; that a false and unjust propaganda against foreigners in general and against the nationals of these countries particularly has not only been tolerated but deliberately stirred up by the governments that are calling upon the West for justice; that irresponsible elements have thus been stirred to violence and have compelled Englishmen and Americans to leave their homes and businesses because the authorities were unable or unwilling to protect them against the acts of mobs that have thus been incited. It is pointed out by American officials that the gunboats of the United States at least are in Chinese waters solely to protect American citizens from these conditions, and that at no place have American gunboats or arms sought to force American goods or American culture upon the Chinese. It is also emphasized that where the most unjustifiable attack on Americans was made—at Nanking,—America had no concessions and no business interests, and the Americans residing and visiting there were particularly sympathetic with the Chinese, that no incident of any kind had provoked this attack, and that it seemed a deliberate and gratuitous affront to the very power which was seeking to help them. These officials believe that it cannot be emphasized too strongly to Chinese authorities that with all the good will of the American people to the Chinese, they are creating an atmosphere quite unfriendly to the successful carrying out of negotiations; also, as pointed out in another connection, the Chinese should realize that pictorial presentation is far more convincing than verbal, and that the moving picture news reel is doing more to create an unfriendly attitude toward China by photographic transcriptions of real incidents than all the propaganda of the newspaper, no matter how exaggerated.

The first point in which there is likely to be a disagreement between informed public opinion and the policy of the government is in respect to independence of action in treating

with China over the disputed points, as opposed to delay and the preservation of a united front of the powers. On the part of a large section of the public there is a demand for immediate action, even if the other powers are unwilling to act; on the part of many, the demand is especially *because* the other powers are unwilling to act.

Opposed to this view, the situation may be pointed out that the policies of both Japan and Great Britain have assumed a far more lenient and friendly and sympathetic attitude toward China during the last few years. The Chinese are apt to assume that this change is due to the show of force upon their part. The change is obvious to the public, is commented on by all the newspapers of the Orient, and is met with hostility, not to say derision, on the part of the foreign business community in the East; but the reason for this change is seldom noticed. Undoubtedly, as noted elsewhere, the change grew out of the agreements of the Washington Conference, involving, as these did, the annulment of the alliance between Great Britain and Japan, and the acceptance by these two powers—as well as by other parties to the agreement—of the main points of the American policy: namely, the desirability of a strong China; no further encroachments on China; and the uselessness of force in settlement of present difficulties.

So far as the public can judge from the external evidences of policy, also as noted elsewhere, Britain and Japan have loyally kept their agreement, in the face of strong disapproval from their nationals domiciled in China and from an influential portion of the public at home. In the Hankow incident, Great Britain has gone further than either Japan or the United States in giving clear evidence of having adopted this policy, and of being willing, as circumstances permit, to follow it much further. Certainly she has gone close to sacrificing her traditional prestige with the Oriental peoples in the observance of a policy which is in striking contrast with her policy in the past. It would be a poor return for the observance of a policy

which the United States has urged—not to say forced—upon these countries, were we now to decide upon independent or immediate action, if such action were based upon the expectation of advantage to America. Similarly, if it is conceded that such action will be of advantage to China, independent action by the United States would then be poor policy, if some delay might carry along the other powers in a similar friendly, constructive, united policy.

This is not to deny that, on some minor points, independent action might well be taken, especially in regard to features of present treaty guarantees that are inimical to China. The bearing of tariff autonomy upon the economic welfare of the entire Chinese people has been noted. China is now discovering that by indirection in the levying of various other kinds of taxes the substance of a customs increase can be levied on both exports and imports on practically all goods sold outside of the concessions through excise taxes, and upon certain types of goods sold within the concessions. America's attitude toward this indirect way of meeting the unjust limitation upon China will afford an excellent illustration of how independent action may be taken without injustice to the other foreign powers.[1]

The navigation of the internal waters of China and the use of American gunboats on these waters constitutes another feature of the complex situation, where America might act with much greater consideration for China's rights and with less demand for the technical observance of treaty rights, now more or less obsolete. One illustration will serve.

The province of Szechewan and Western China has an estimated population of 100,000,000. The only transportation facilities are those through the rapids of the upper Yangtze as it passes through the great gorges. The junks must be pulled up the swift current by large crews of men—sometimes fifty to one hundred per vessel. The number of people depen-

[1] Decided adversely to the suggestions by American officials, October, 1927.

dent upon this trade has been estimated at from five hundred thousand to one million. Recently it was discovered that steamboats could safely make the trip at certain seasons of the year. Both English- and American-owned shipping lines then put on regular service of steamboats for freight and passengers. It is reported that this traffic was so profitable that the cost of a steamer could be covered in a single trip. The operation of the steamboats added greatly to the security of the traffic, and so took the freight. The junks could not successfully compete; not only on account of cost, but because many were overturned by the wash of the steamboat. Meanwhile, the thousands of boatmen were out of a living, as was also the large population of trackers, shipwrights, caulkers, rope makers, restaurant and hotel keepers and workers, shop keepers, etc., that served them. The overturning of the junks by the steamboats caused great loss of property, as well as of life. It was attempted retaliation for the swamping of junks that caused the notable Wan Hsien incident, with the loss of so many British lives, in 1926. In China there is nothing for these men deprived of a living to do, except to turn soldier or bandit—perhaps now one, now the other. It is not to be wondered at that when a coolie finds himself with a rifle in hand he should occasionally seek revenge on the foreigners on these steamers. So, from behind barricade or village wall, stray shots are fired at the steamer—flaunting its foreign flag on these great rivers of China, and washing away the fertile fields of the villages by the waves it creates, swamping its junks, and depriving thousands of a means of living. Nor is it to be wondered that the coolie continues this hostility indefinitely. For the foreigner demands protection. Gunboats must be sent, firing in retaliation, washing away on each trip additional furrows of soil from the field along the low river banks. Not only must protection be given and gun-fire be returned, but the recent naval order is that firing from the gunboats must continue until the firing from land ceases. The situation is

tragic. Whatever may be treaty rights forced seventy-five years ago by British guns, American citizens are now paying taxes to support these gunboats, six hundred to fourteen hundred miles inland among a friendly people, to protect petty profits (petty compared with the expense of the navy) of a few American shippers, who gain these profits by depriving thousands of Chinese of their living wage of ten cents per day—and in so doing destroy an occupation traditional for generations. While gunboats may now be required to protect lives, this is the origin of the situation. There are some problems that cannot be settled justly or with any national honor by clinging to the technicalities of an obsolete treaty. And in the face of this situation the most vocal American representatives are those on the ground, demanding through reiterated appeals that more gunboats must be sent "to blow hell out of them."

That there may be no confusion of the issue by argument against a minor point, let me state clearly what the situation is. The question is not whether these changes in transportation are unavoidable and inevitable economic changes, for they are; not whether the modern methods of transportation are beneficial to the Chinese, for they are; not whether a withdrawal of the foreign transportation agencies would raise the price of food and thus be an injury to the Chinese, for the answer is affirmative; not whether these commercial activities are within the treaty rights, for the answer is again affirmative; not whether the exercise of these rights on the upper Yangtze is by an unauthorized stretching of the original privileges, for the answer again is probably in the affirmative. The question is: Are the Western powers infringing on the sovereign rights of China? Are such privileges exercised by the foreign powers in China and nowhere else against any sovereign power? Are the Western powers, for the sake of a slight economic gain for a few of their nationals, exercising an influence detrimental to the Chinese, throwing huge numbers of them out of employment? Does the situation form a contributary cause both to

militarism and to brigandage? Do the foreign powers, through their activities, give basis for the sentiment of anti-imperialism and antiforeignism? And the answer in every instance is an emphatic "Yes!"

Public opinion at home might well voice the insistence on a policy of fair dealing, without awaiting the coöperation of other powers. In the face of our own corresponding situation, where we will not allow other nationals to participate in the trade between Hawaii, the Philippines, and the United States, on the ground that it is coastal trade, we might at least announce to our nationals that we would no longer protect them in any infringement on the normal rights of the Chinese to the control of navigation of their own waters and to insistence on withdrawal of American gunboats from Chinese inland waters.

The question of the maintenance of an American military force in China is another such problem. Certainly there is no need to maintain such a large guard that both the British and the Japanese may reduce their forces, as they have done because of the unusual size of the American force. At Tientsin the American forces during the summer of 1927 numbered several thousand, while the entire American population of that area, including Peking, even in normal times was probably not over six or seven hundred.

There remains to ask what should be the American policy for the immediate future. That the policy of coöperation with other foreign powers does not necessarily inhibit taking the initiative is indicated by every period in which America has adopted such a policy with success. Within the memory of the present generation, there have been two notable instances of such initiative: the first was Secretary Hay's successful effort in securing the allegiance of the powers to the "Open Door" policy, and thus preventing the dismemberment of China at the close of the nineteenth century; the second was Secretary

Hughes' policy for China at the Washington Conference, which brought an agreement to respect China's sovereignty, to refrain from aggression, and to meet the demands of a growing nationalism in China.

For the immediate future only two additions need to be made to the announced policy of the United States in order to meet the situation in China. Address the statements made by the President and the Secretary of State to American newspapers or the American public to recognized Chinese authorities, either in China or in Washington; and state that such negotiations when begun will be on the basis of reciprocal national equality. Then clearly the next move will be a responsibility of China.

The powers have, in substance, admitted that these special rights which now so antagonize the Chinese, and which are secured to them by treaties which have become antiquated, should be and will have to be relinquished. Tariff autonomy has already been promised by resolution of the Conference, if not by treaty; the control of the concessions could readily be adjusted on a satisfactory working basis by some coöperative scheme of municipal government; all but two of the territorial bases and concessions could be returned without endangering the peace of the Orient. Since the privileges of extraterritoriality have been given up by all Western powers with practically all other Oriental powers except China, without awaiting the development of conditions entirely satisfactory for their replacement, it is practically admitted that extraterritoriality privileges cannot be much longer maintained, and that even now they are of value only where military force gives them sanction. Some risk must be taken; and this risk will certainly be no greater than the present assurance of decay of business, destruction of property, occasional risk of life, and continual breeding of ill will. It is probable that under new conditions property will be just as safe as now, and business far more

flourishing. The situation now needs a policy of action and not of drift. While it is not wise to prophecy about any future conditions in China, it does not take a prophet to see that conditions will not become normal until the unequal treaties are annulled. The Nationalist movement and the "Three Principles" have practically the unanimous support of the people of China that have any political opinion. Sometime shortly, a government that can speak with authority for practically all of China south of the Wall will be established, either at Peking or elsewhere.

Even to the business man or "die-hard," it must be obvious that his governments are not going to protect by use of force his special business privileges, secured under the unilateral treaties, and are now about to be reconciled to the relinquishment of the extraterritorial privileges; consequently, on the basis of his other favorite theory that affairs are not going to get better—through the intervention of the foreign powers—until they get much worse, then he should consent to the abrogation of the extraterritorial privileges—which, again according to his theory, would bring about these worse conditions. If this action should precipitate the conditions he anticipates, and both fears and desires, then his views will be vindicated; if they do not ensue—as many, including the writer, believe they will not—then his business interests will be assured; and after all, what is the value of any political principle when compared with business profits?

The purpose of the coöperative policy, when pursued by the United States, is to secure the adoption of our national policy by the other powers. The American people evidently would support their government in taking the initiative with either a definite renouncement of the special privileges which the Chinese now consider to be unilateral, or with the definite proposal for the immediate negotiation of new treaties. Merely technical diplomatic arguments no longer carry any conviction. The recent actions and attitudes of the two great

powers most concerned, Britain and Japan, indicate that such a policy of initiative would soon become a policy of coöperation.

At one time recently the British authorities definitely suggested in public print that the American authorities take the initiative; the Chinese authorities of both the dominant factions have stated that if some initiative is not taken by the Western powers, they will take the initiative themselves by unilateral action. If they do act, the Western powers will be confronted with a situation more difficult to deal with than the present one.

The whole attitude and policy of the West toward China is archaic. We popularly think of China as antiquated; we speak of her religion as one of ancestor worship; of her social structure as based on the most primitive unit—the family; we think of her food as typified by the "century egg"; we speak of her government as the Chinese Junk of State. Yet in reality all of our policies in dealing with the Chinese are antiquated. Western business with China is largely based on artificial methods quite out of date; the go-between or middleman, ideally situated for taking tribute from both ends, working both ends in favor of the middleman, protected by concessions, extraterritoriality, special treaties, and gunboats. Our educational and cultural contacts are on antiquated bases. While all the world, including our own country, believes that education is a function of the State, to train children in the elements of citizenship for the service of society, our missionary and educational representatives in China continue to insist that education is either wholly an individual or a group affair, to be controlled either by individual or church, not by government. Our political and diplomatic relations are antiquated; based on treaties of which the spirit is of past generations, claiming and securing privileges exacted of no other people, and existing nowhere else among civilized nations.

Not until these antiquated conceptions and conditions are modernized and based on justice, efficiency, and good will, will the problem of China be solved.

Then China will enter another stage of her long, slow, painful evolution into a modern nationality and an assured place in the world of modern nations.

Shall not America say with the great humanitarian of a century ago: "We take our stand with those who are struggling out of darkness into light."

Productivity without Possession;
Activity without Aggression;
Development without Domination.

—*Wang Ching Ming*
Thirteenth century

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INDEX

Aggression, Western, 137 ff.
Agriculture, possibilities for, in Mongolia and other regions, 23-24; dependence on, 27; problems of, 28-32.
America, trade relations with, 132. *See* United States.
Amur region, struggle for, 210-211.
Analects, the, 99.
Ancestor worship, 22, 47, 48, 86-95.
Anfu party, 170, 171, 282.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 265, 266.
Annam, absorption of, by France, 138-139, 140.
Anti-imperialism, 314-319.
Antimony, 27.
Arab traders, contacts through, 119.
Architecture, Indian influence on, 119.
Army, the Chinese, 174-175.
Art, Western influence on Chinese, 117, 118, 119; Indian influence on, 119.
Arts, China's contributions to, 26.
Astronomical instruments, seizure and return of, by Germany, 129.

Banditry, problem of, 227.
Banks, establishment of foreign, 66.
Belgium, treaty with, 369.
"Blood is thicker than water" incident, 252-253.
Book of Changes, cited and quoted, 78, 79, 80.
Book of Rites, quoted, 71.
Borodin, M., 221, 226, 232-233.
Boxer indemnities, 262.
Boxer Rebellion, 5, 106, 154-155, 212, 260, 261, 262, 274.
Boycotts, 171, 201, 202, 265, 282.
Breweries, 55.
British, economic and political problems in China, 413-416. *See* Great Britain.
British East India Company, 122, 123.
Buddhism, 85, 107-109, 119.
Burial customs, 22.
Burlingame, Anson, 253, 254, 255, 269.
Burlingame Treaty, 254, 258, 388.
Burma, English control of, 140.
Business. *See* Trade.
Business methods, effect of new, on present-day problems, 67.

Canals, 37.
Canton, trade restrictions in, 130-131; modern city of, 202-203.
"Capitulations," denunciation of, 360.
Catchwords, influence of, 223.
Catholic Church. *See* Roman Catholic Church.
Catholicism, resemblance between Buddhism and, 108.
Cement works, 55.
Chang Hsun, General, 169.
Chang Tso Lin, 171, 172, 173.
Chemical works, 55.
Chen, Eugene, 205.
Chen Chiung Ming, General, 184.
Cheng, Dr., quoted, 166.
Chiang Kai Shek, 165, 205, 222, 231.
Chihli party, 171, 172.
Child labor, 61-63.
China, contrasts in, 113-115; isolation of, 115-117; Western contacts of, 117 ff.; Greek influence in, 117-118; Roman influence in, 118-119; foreign religious influence in, 119; Mongol conquerors in, 119-120; early foreign invasion, 121-123; commercial invasion, 123-132; Portuguese invasion, 124-126; political conflicts in, 125; Spanish attempts at invasion, 126; Dutch attempts at invasion, 126-127; English invasion, 127-128; Russian trade relations in, 129-130; restrictions on foreign trade within, 130-132; American trade relations with, 132, 238-243; characteristics of North and South, 157-160; betrayal of, at Versailles Conference, 171, 265, 282.

Chinese, continuous existence of, 3-4; psychological attitude of, toward Westerners, 15-18; treatment of, by foreigners, 66; resentment of, to foreign aggression, 137.
Chinese Eastern Railway, 212, 216, 218.
Chinese government, attitude of, toward foreigners, 124, 125, 126, 133, 144.
Ch'ing ui Tien, quoted, 44.
Chino-Japanese War, 5, 139-140, 211, 258.
Christian Church, increasing power of, 129; native, 330, 331.
Christianity, influence of, on democracy, 8-9; reasons for objections to, 85, 125; attacks on, 281; imperialistic aspect of, 314-319; 324-325; introduction of, 300.
Chwang Tze, quoted, 391.
Cigarette factories, 55.
Clan, solidarity of the, 46, 48-49.
Clennell, W. J., quoted, 109.
Cleveland, President, 257.
Coal, 26.
Cochin-China, French control in, 138, 140.
Co-hong, development of the, 64, 130-131.
Commerce, business procedure in, 64-67; development of, 121-132, 142.
Commission on Extraterritoriality, recommendations of, 368-369.
Communism, introduction of, 50-51, 185-186; effect of, on industry, 58; influence of, 141, 184-186, 205, 206, 214, 217-233, 281, 282-283; effect of propaganda on education and student class, 228-232.
"Comprador," system of, 65, 131.
Concessions, 141 ff., 375-382.
Confucius and Confucianism, 7-8, 72, 73, 75, 79, 80, 81, 84, 96-101.
Consular jurisdiction. *See* Extraterritoriality.
"Coolie trade," problem of, 256-258.
Cooperation, policy of, 250-253, 259-267.
Copper, 26.
Cotton, quality of Chinese, 31; manufacture of, 53; tariff restrictions on, 372-373.
Cotton mills, foreign ownership of, 55.
Courts, foreign, 364-366, 367-370.
Crime, foreign protection of, 367-368.
Crops, 28 ff.
Cultivation, land. *See* Agriculture.
Cultures, problem of alien, 13-14.
Currency, establishment of a stable, 65-66.
Cushing, Caleb, 241, 244, 245, 269.
Customs, effect of social, on modern problems, 22.
Customs duties, 64; tariff restrictions on, 373.

Dead, burial customs for the, 22.
"Deepening the revolution," 224-226.
Democracy, Imperial government functioned as a, 9-10.
Dennett, Tyler, quoted, 236, 240.
Diplomacy, development of Chinese, 144-145.
Distilleries, 55.
Doctrine of the Mean, 98.
Dominicans, hostility between Jesuits and, 128.
Dutch, trade interest of, in Far East, 121, 122, 126-127, 128, 131.
Dutch East India Company, 122.
Dutch West India Company, 121.

Economic conditions and problems, 12-13, 32-35, 408-413.
Education, traditional system of, 68-75, 271-274; Communist influence on, 229; modern system of, 274-279; student movement in, 279-283, 284-297; "Popular Education" movement, 283-284; plans for, in Shansi, 345-351. *See* Mission schools.
Elders, village, 11, 46, 49.
Emperor, rôle of, 41-42.
Empress Dowager. *See* Tzu Hsi.
England. *See* Great Britain.
English West India Company, 121.
Europe, methods of invasion, 123 ff.
Evangelism, present situation in, 329.
Everett, Edward, 269.
Evil, concept of, 82-83.
Examination system, traditonal, 6, 271, 272.
Exclusion, America's policy of, 257, 258.
Extraterritoriality, 66-67, 134, 136, 145, 224, 268; present-day Western policy toward, 360; privileges of, 362-363, 364-365; controversial points of, 363; problem of foreign courts, 365-366; problem of treaty ports, 366; problem of foreign post-offices, 366; problem of foreign

police, 366-368; problem of taxes, 368.

Factory system, development of, 55.
Family, social system of the, 46-51, 132, 280; effect of modern industry on the, 58-60.
Famine, problems of, 32-33, 35-36, 37-38.
Far Eastern Republic, 215-217, 218.
Farm laborers, migration of, 23.
Farms, average size, 28-29.
Favored-nation clause, 236, 387-388.
Feng Kuo Chang, General, 170, 171.
Feng Yu Hsiang, General, 172, 173, 175, 231.
Fertility preservation of, 30-31.
Flood, problems of, 2-3, 38.
Flour mills, 55.
Food-stuff manufactories, 55.
Food supply, problems of, 12, 25, 28-29, 32-33, 36.
Foot-binding, abolition of, 340-341.
Foreigners, privileges demanded by, 64-67; point of view of, 394 ff.; belief of, in white supremacy, 395-398; doctrine of use of force, held by, 398-401; "holier-than-thou" attitude of, 401-402; business man's attitude, 403-408; claims of inadequate protection of, 423-424.
Foreign policy, present-day, toward China, 423-425.
Forestation, 342-343.
Formosa, ceded to Japan, 139.
France, English alliance with, 135-136; territorial aggression of, 138-139, 140, 142, 143; leased territory of, 382, 383.
Fukien, Japan's claim to, 142; England's claim to, 143.
Fung-Shui, 27, 104-106.

Gallin, General, quoted on Nationalist soldiers, 230.
Germany, in Liaotung Peninsula controversy, 139, 140; territorial aggression of, 140-141, 142; leased territory of, 382; Kiao Chow acquired by, 383; mineral rights of, 384-385; treaty relations with, 388-389.
Gilbert, Rodney, cited and quoted, 395-398.
Giles, H. A., cited, 118.
Go-between, development of the system of, 131.
Gold, 27.
Government, under the Empire, 9-10, 151 ff.; problems of, 11, 411-413; ancient system, 41-42; county, 42-44; guild system within, 44-46; village, 46, 49; present-day changes in, 178-179, 272.
Graves. *See* Burial customs.
Great Britain, trade invasion of Far East by, 127-128, 131, 132 ff.; treaties with, 134-135, 361, 362; Hong Kong ceded to, 134; extra-territoriality granted, 134; alliance of, with France, 135-136; winter palace burned by, 136, 253; Kowloon ceded to, 136, 382, 383; Weihai-wei ceded to, 140; territorial aggression of, 140, 142, 143; alliance of, with Japan, 213; treaty port concessions of, 376; leased territory of, 382, 383; point of view of, in China, 413-416.
Greece, influence of, in China, 117-118.
Guilds, 44-46, 59.
Gunboats, problem of American, 425-427.

Hainan, France's claim to, 143.
Hair-net industry, 53.
Handicrafts, development of, 28, 51-53; effect of Western industrialism on, 54; effect of tariff restrictions on, 373-374.
Hankow incident, 160-161.
Han Ying steel plant, 26.
Hart, Sir Robert, 371-372.
Hawaii, annexation of, 258, 259.
Hay, John, 213, 237, 259, 261, 263, 269.
Heaven, concept of, 81-82.
Holland. *See* Dutch.
Hong Kong, 201, 225, 382, 383.
Hong merchants, 64.
Hongs, 131.
Hsu-Shih-Chang, 170.
Hughes, Charles E., 269.
Hunger, prevalence of, 29.
Hu Shuh, Dr., 280.

Immigration, problem of, 256-258.
Imperial Conference in London, 265.
Imperialism, 223, 389-390; Christian religion charged with, 314-319, 324-325.
Imports, statistics of, 29.
India, influence of, in China, 119.

Individualism, effect of doctrine of, 8-9, 48, 54.
Industry, development of, 12-13, 26, 28; introduction of modern, 54 ff.; problems of, 56-60.
Institutions, changes in social, 41 ff.; Western influence on, 118.
"Integrity of China," policy of, 263, 264, 265, 267.
Intellectual transition, 5-6.
International Famine Relief Commission, investigation by, 32-33.
International settlements, 376-377.
Inventions, contributions to, 26.
Investment, foreign capital, 299.
Iron, 26, 55.

Japan, iron industry controlled by, 55; territorial aggression of, 139-140, 141-142, 143, 211; struggle of, against Russia, 143; boycotts against, 171, 265, 282; relations of, with Russia, 216; spheres of influence of, 385; Kiao Chow leased to, 383, 384; problem of China to, 416-419.
Jesuits, early missionaries, 108; hostility between Dominicans and, 128, 129; increasing power of, 129.
Joffe, Adolph, 185, 216, 219, 220.

Kang Yu Wei, 178.
Karakhan, Russian diplomat, 219, 220, 231.
Kiao Chow, 142, 382, 383, 384.
Knox, Secretary, 213, 263.
Korea, 139, 140, 211, 212.
Kowloon, 136, 382, 383.
Kublai Khan, 119-120.
Kuomintang, 165, 229, 282.
Kwang-Chow-Wan, 266, 382, 383.
Kwang Hsu, Emperor, 153, 156, 274.
Kwangsi, France's claim to, 142.
Kwangtung, France's claim to, 142.

Labor, sanitary conditions for, 57; productivity of, 57-58; organization of, 58. *See* Child Labor.
Laborers, migration of farm, 23.
Labor unions, 201-202, 205.
Lamaism, 110.
Language, reform of written, 5; change in literary, 279-280.
Lansing-Ishii agreement, 264, 265, 266-267.
Lao Tze, 81, 84, 99, 102.
Law, administration of foreign, 45-46, 364-366, 367-370.
Leased territories. *See* Territories.
Leather works, 55.
Legal procedure, inefficiency of Western, in China, 45-46.
Liaotung Peninsula, foreign intervention concerning, 139-140, 211.
Li Hung Chang, 144, 262.
Literature, Indian influence on, 119; renaissance in, 279-281.
Liuchiu Islands, Japan's claim to, 139.
Living conditions, standards of, 12, 32.
Li Yuan Hung, General, 161, 163, 166, 169, 171, 172.
Loans, problem of, 263-264.

Macao, present-day conditions in, 124-125.
McLane, Commissioner, 250.
Magazines, introduction of new, 280.
Magistrate, importance and duties of district, 42-44.
Mallory, W. H., cited on causes of famine, 36.
Manchu dynasty, rise of, 128; fall of, 153-157.
Manchuria, Japanese control of, 140; spheres of influence in, 141; Russia's claim to, 142; Russian control of, 212; plan for internationalization of railways in, 213; struggle for control of, 216.
Marco Polo, 53, 120-121.
Marcus Aurelius, envoys sent by, 119.
Marriage, old-time customs, 59; new system of, 280-281.
Marshall, Humphrey, 248, 249, 250, 269.
Match factories, 55.
Mathematics, Indian influence on, 119.
Medical missions, 307, 329.
Mencius, 72, 99, 100.
Middlemen, introduction of, 64-66.
Migration, farmers' annual, 23.
Militarism, cost of, 174-177.
Militarists, government by the, 160-177.
Military force, question of maintaining foreign, 428-429.
Mineral wealth, 25-28, 30, 141, 142.
Ming dynasty, decline of, 128.
Missionaries, number in China, 299; opposition to, 311-323.
Missions, capital invested in, 299; educational values of, 299-300; early

Catholic, 300-301; early Protestant, 301-302; present-day opposition to, 302-303, 311 ff; development of, 303; present strength of, 303-304; educational work of, 304-307; medical work of, 307; social service of, 308-309; service of interpretation, 309-311; present state, 328-331.
Mission schools, 229, 262-263, 305-307; government demands on, 323-328; present status, 328-329; hostility to, 330; present-day trends in, 330-331.
"Model Governor," the, 333 ff.
Mohammedanism, 110, 119.
Mongolia, 23, 141, 142, 213, 216-217.
Mongols, China conquered by the, 119-120.
Monopoly, system of, 131.
Morality, effect of Communist propaganda on, 228-232.
Morbidity, 29.
Morrison, Robert, 301.
Mortality, 29.
Music, similarity between Greek and Chinese systems of, 118; Indian influence on, 119.

Nanking incident, 148, 205, 222, 230, 231.
National Assembly, establishment of, 155, 156.
National Christian Conference, 303.
National Christian Council, 303.
National Government, administration of, 204-207.
National Government Council, 204-205.
Nationalism, spirit of, in student body, 284-297.
Nationalist Movement, Soviet influence on, 214.
Nationalist Party, 184; platform, 199; accomplishments, 199-207.
National Political Bureau, 205.
National Republican Government, 184.
National University, student political influence in, 282-283.
Natural resources, limitation of, 25-28.
Nestorians, Christian influence of, 119, 300.
"New Tide," the, 279-283.
New Youth, 280.
Ningpo guilds, 45.
Non-alienation, 143.

Oil, mineral, 26; vegetable, 31.
Open Door policy, 213, 235, 236, 237, 258-267, 385.
Opium, trade in, 131, 132, 134, 135, 240-241, 243, 245.
Opium smoking, abolition of, 340, 341-342.
Opium War, 123, 134.

Pacific-area program, 253-255.
Path of Duty. *See* Tao.
Path of Virtue, 102.
Peasants, "deepening the revolution" among, 224-228.
Peasant unions, 205.
Pei-hua, introduction of, 279-280.
Peking, Soviet activity in, 219, 231.
Peking National University, anti-Japanese demonstration in, 282.
People's National Party, 178, 200, 204.
Perry, Commodore, 251.
Pescadores, ceded to Japan, 139.
Philippines, seizure by the Spaniards, 126; annexation by the United States, 259.
Philosophy, Chinese, 77 ff.; Indian influence on, 119.
Police, foreign, 366-368.
Political contacts, 132-146.
Political revolution, 9-11.
Population, stationary habits of, 11-12; crowded, 21-23; problem of, 24; post-office estimates, 25.
Port Arthur, 139, 140, 142, 211, 382, 383.
Portugal, trade relations of, 124-126, 132.
Post offices, establishment of foreign, 266, 352, 366.
Printing houses, 55.
Production, problems of increased, 55.
Propaganda, Russian Soviet, 217-233.
Protestant missions. *See* Missions.
Pulo Condor, French control in, 138.

Queue, abolition of the, 340.

Railroads, 37, 142, 211, 212; plan for internationalization, 213, 263; plans for development, 213-214; Russian claims to, 216; rights of control, 263.
Red Spears, the, 225, 226.
Religion, readjustments in, 6-9; fusion of, 84-86; Indian influence on, 119.
Republic, the, 9, 146; cause of founding, 155; events leading to, 160-161; development of, 161 ff.
Resources, natural, 25-28.

Revolution of 1911, 9, 161.
Ricci, Matteo, 301.
Rice, cultivation of, 28-29, 30.
Road building, 38-39, 343-344.
Rockhill, W. W., 259, 269.
Roman Catholic Church, 118-119, 128, 129, 300-301.
Roosevelt, Theodore, 261, 269.
Root, Elihu, 269.
Rug manufacture, 53, 61-62.
Rural conditions, 32-35.
Russia, 23; trade relations with, 129-130; treaty with, 136, 231; concessions granted, 141, 142-143, 210-217; early contacts with, 209-214; Soviet influence of, 217-233; territorial expansion of, 214-217, 382, 383; problem of China to, 419-421. *See* Communism.
Russo-Japanese War, 5, 139-140, 143, 212, 213.

Saigon, French control in, 138.
Schools. *See* Education.
Science, Indian influence on, 119; introduction of Western, 129, 277, 281, 289, 293, 301.
Settlements, concessions and, 375-382.
Seward, William H., 253, 254, 255, 256, 269.
Shameen incident, 148, 202.
Shanghai, student massacre in, 148; foreign courts in, 366; port concession of, 376; foreign population problems in, 379-382.
Shanghai-itis, 395.
Shansi, model province of, 175, 333 ff.; reforms in, 340-342; forestation in, 342-343; good-roads program in, 343-344; education in, 345-351; railroad development in, 351-352; foreign post-office abolished in, 352; religion in, 353-355.
Shantung controversy, 141, 265, 266, 282.
Shantung Treaty, 384-385.
Ship-building industry, Japanese interest in, 55.
Shops, curio, 34-35.
Sikkim, British protectorate over, 140.
Silk, manufacture of, 31, 53, 55, 62.
Silver, 27.
Sino-Japanese War. *See* Chino-Japanese War.
Social control, changes in, 271-272.
Social organization, 41 ff.; effect of modern industrial methods on, 58-60.
Social service, missionary, 308-311.
Soong, T. V., 204.
Soothill, W. E., quoted, 81-82.
South Manchurian Railroad, 140, 216.
Sovereignty, foreign disregard of, 65, 66; recognition of, 253-256, 263-264; China's right to, 427-428.
Soviet influence, 23, 217-233, 287-288. *See* Communism.
Spain, trade relations of, 126; war with, 138.
Spheres of Influence, 141 ff.; 384-386.
Spheres of Interest. *See* Spheres of Influence.
"Squeeze," 65, 124, 285.
Steel industry, 55.
Straw braid industry, 53.
Strikes, 58, 225, 227, 229.
Students, movement of, in politics, 265, 279-283; growth of nationalism among, 284-297; communist influence on, 222-223, 228-229; political and social control by, 272; foreign trained, 273-274.
Subsistence rations, minimum, 32-33.
Sugar refineries, 55.
Suiyuan Railway, 216-217.
Sun Fo, 202.
Sun Yat Sen, Dr., 161, 163, 166, 173, 213, 220, 221, 223, 272-273, 390; cited on state socialism, 60; reverence paid memory of, 181-182, 326; life of, 182 ff.; principles advocated by, 186-193; writings of, 193-198; change of views of, 206-207; quotation from will of, 207.
Szechewan, Great Britain's claim to, 142; revolt in, 160.

Tai-ping Rebellion, 248-249.
Talien Wan, 382.
Tang dynasty, supremacy during, 119.
Taoism, 83-84, 97, 102-106, 107, 109.
Tariff Conference, 375.
Tariff problems, 54, 266, 370-375.
Tariff restrictions, 370-375.
Taxes, 124, 128, 146.
Tea market, loss of, 31.
Temple, the village, 49, 50.
Territorial aggressions, 134 ff.
Territories, problem of leased, 382-384.

Textile industries, 55.
Theodosius, envoy sent by, 119.
"Three People's Principles," 187-193.
Tibet, allegiance of, 23; Great Britain's claim to, 142.
Tongs, 45.
Tonkin, France's claim to, 143.
Trade, system of, 64-67; early Roman, 119; growth of foreign, 121-132; limitation of foreign, 130-131; American, in China, 132, 238-243; effect of labor unions on foreign, 200-201.
Traders, restrictions on foreign, 64; contacts through, 121-132.
Transportation, problem of, 37-39.
Trans-Siberian railroad, 211.
Treaties, the "unequal," 16, 134 ff.; 223-224, 361, 382-389; with Great Britain, 122, 134, 135, 136, 388; with Russia, 136, 231; relations with the United States, 241, 244-246, 257, 258, 388, 389; conditions in, 369-370; tariff privileges in, 370-371; Shangtung, 384-385; with Germany, 388-389.
Treaty of Nanking, 301, 302.
Treaty of Portsmouth, 212.
Treaty of Tientsin, 251-252; 254, 302.
Treaty ports, opening of, 134; concessions, 376.
Treaty privileges, 64.
Treaty revision, problems of, 369-370, 390-391.
Tribute. *See* Taxes.
Tsing Hua College, 32.
Tsing Tao, ceded to Germany, 140, 142.
Tso Kun, 171, 172.
Tuan Chi Jui, 169, 170, 173.
Tungsten, 27.
Turkestan, allegiance of, 23; Russian aggression in, 141.
Tzu Hsi, Empress Dowager, 153, 154, 156, 162, 274.

"Unequal" treaties. *See* Treaties.
United States, policy of, toward territorial aggression, 145, 213; Open Door policy of, 213, 235, 236, 237, 258-267, 385; economic policy of, in China, 235 ff.; treaty relations with, 241, 244-253, 257, 258, 388, 389; sovereignty of China recognized by, 253-256, 263-264; policy of, toward Chinese immigration, 256-258; revival of Open Door policy, 258-264; World War, China, and, 264-267; concessions granted, 376-377; present-day attitude toward China, 421-432; suggestions for future policy of, 428-432.
Unrest, problem of, 29-30.

Versailles Conference, 147, 170, 171, 265, 282, 384.
Vice, foreign protection of, 367-368.
Virginia Company, 122.
Village, government of the, 46, 49-50.
Village elders. *See* Elders.

Wages, 56-57.
Wan Hsien incident, 148, 425-427.
Washington Conference, 147, 171, 224, 264, 265, 269, 384, 386.
Water, conservancy of, 38.
Way, the. *See* Tao.
Wealth. *See* Resources.
Webster, Daniel, 269.
Weekly Review, 280.
Wei Hai-Wei, 140, 266, 382, 383.
West, contacts with the, 14-18; present attitude of, toward China, 179.
Western aggression, 137 ff.
Whampoa Academy, 222, 296.
Wheat lands, 28.
Williams, Dr. John E., 230.
Williams, S. Wells, cited on population, 24.
Wilson, President, 171, 264, 265.
Women, status of, 17, 47, 118, 281.
World War, China and the, 146-148, 169, 264-267.
Wu, Dr. C. C., 202.
Wu Pei Fu, 171, 172, 173.
Wu Ting Fang, 202.

Xavier, Francis, 129, 300.

Yangtze River, annual overflow of, 2.
Yangtze River incident, 148, 425-427.
Yangtze valley, Great Britain's claim to, 142, 143.
Yen Hsi Shan, Governor, 175, 333.
Yin and *Yang*, 78-81, 97, 103-104.
Youth, effect of Communist propaganda on, 228-232.
Yuan Shih Kai, 154, 161-167, 168, 263.
Yunnan, British aggression in, 140; France's claim to, 142.

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